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Abstract 
The thesis identifies an issue in Papua New Guinea’s Constitution with regard to the non-
implementation of its National Goals and Directive Principles (NGDP) and Basic Social 
Obligations (BSO). Situated in the Preamble to the Constitution, the NGDP and BSO 
provide a guide for the future development of Papua New Guinea.   
Upon a careful study of ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution, which enjoins 
governmental bodies in Papua New Guinea to implement the NGDP and BSO, the thesis 
argues they are indirectly justiciable.  
Characterising the NGDP and BSO as indirectly justiciable would facilitate their 
implementation within the present constitutional framework by considering the functions 
of each of the limbs of government and the Ombudsman Commission as interconnected. 
Using indirect justiciability and the interconnectedness approach, the thesis outlines 
several proposals for the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and the Ombudsman 
Commission.  
The thesis contends these proposals can facilitate the effective and efficient 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO. 
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Chapter One – Introduction  
I National Goals and Directive Principles and Basic Social Obligations  
This thesis is about how Papua New Guinea’s National Goals and Directive Principles 
(NGDP) and Basic Social Obligations (BSO) can be implemented following the 
constitutional duty to do so under ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. The NGDP and BSO 
are in the preamble of the Constitution. Since independence in 1975 there has been no 
meaningful effort made by governmental bodies to implement them. This thesis 
establishes there are legal and constitutional avenues available to the legislature, the 
executive, the courts, and the Ombudsman Commission that have not previously been 
explored, which can ensure the effective and efficient implementation of the NGDP and 
BSO in compliance with Papua New Guinea’s Constitution. 
II Research Methodology 
The thesis applies the common law method of legal analysis to arrive at its conclusions. 
In the first instance, predominantly the Papua New Guinea Constitution and court 
decisions from the National Court and the Supreme Court are studied. Organic Laws and 
ordinary legislation will also feature in the analysis, as will decisions from the Papua New 
Guinea Leadership Tribunal. The text of the Constitution and various interpretati  ons of 
it by the courts are discussed throughout this thesis.  
Where comparative materials are considered useful they are referred to.  
For comparative inspiration the thesis looks first to common law countries with a similar 
government and legal system to Papua New Guinea. These have primarily been Australia, 
Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States. Legislation and cases 
from these countries are analysed for their relevance to the issue of implementing the 
NGDP and BSO. Of particular interest in the foreign material are discussions on the 
constitutional enforcement of social rights.   
In addition to primary legal materials, secondary sources are relied on to support 
the analysis presented in this thesis. 
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III Thesis Finding 
Very little has been written on how the Constitution of Papua New Guinea can implement 
the NGDP and BSO. In the few texts that exist, the typical argument is that the NGDP 
and BSO should be made directly justiciable to ensure implementation.  
No legal scholarship on how the present constitutional arrangement can efficiently and 
effectively implement the NGDP and BSO has been offered. This thesis addresses this 
gap in the literature.  
This thesis asserts that the best means of ensuring implementation of the NGDP 
and BSO is to confer on them an indirectly justiciable status. For the indirect justiciable 
nature of the NGDP and BSO to work well, the legislature, the executive, the judiciary 
and the Ombudsman Commission must see that their functions are interconnected or, as 
the thesis describes, use an “interconnectedness approach”. Using these two 
approaches—indirect justiciability and the interconnectedness approach—this thesis 
concludes the legislature, the executive, the courts, and the Ombudsman Commission can 
implement the NGDP and BSO.  
IV Thesis Map 
This thesis is presented in 11 chapters. A summary of each chapter and what each chapter 
discusses is provided below. Chapter 1 is this short introduction and Chapter 11 concludes 
the thesis with a summary of the main points. 
Chapter 2 sets out the political and legal context in Papua New Guinea.  
It presents an overview of the NGDP and BSO and of the type of political and 
constitutional institutions established by the Constitution. First, an overview of the NGDP 
and BSO is provided. Second, the various sources of laws in Papua New Guinea are 
identified. Third, different constitutional institutions are introduced. Fourth, the civil and 
political rights and freedoms are set out. Chapter 2 presents the main constitutional 
framework against which implementation of the NGDP and BSO will take place. 
Chapter 3 discusses the historical background of the NGDP and BSO.  
The chapter first covers the historical forces that shaped the NGDP and BSO. Second, the 
process of developing the NGDP and BSO is considered; and third, the role intended for 
the NGDP and BSO in the Constitution is identified and presented.   
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Chapter 4 outlines the legal nature of the constitutional duty to implement the 
NGDP and BSO under ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. The judicial view has been that 
the NGDP and BSO are entirely non-justiciable. Consequently, the NGDP and BSO are 
seen by the courts as merely aids of interpretation, only to be used in situations of 
ambiguity, and thereby obscuring the constitutional duty to implement them in all cases 
where relevant or appropriate. This thesis asserts that the correct legal character of the 
NGDP and BSO, on a proper interpretation of ss 25 and 63, is one of indirect justiciability, 
enabling the fulfilment of the constitutional duty to implement. Indirect justiciability (as 
opposed to non-justiciability) places greater emphasis on the role of each arm of 
government to implement the NGDP and BSO. 
Chapter 5 looks at two matters. First, the implementation record of the legislature, 
the executive, the courts, and the Ombudsman Commission, concluding that they have 
not meaningfully implemented the NGDP and BSO. The second part of the chapter 
presents some legal reasons that have contributed to the non-implementation of the NGDP 
and BSO: the Supreme Court’s mischaracterisation of the NGDP and BSO as entirely 
non-justiciable; the lack of active engagement of the preamble in constitutional and 
statutory interpretation; and finally, the lack of implementation of s 24 of the Constitution.  
Chapter 6 presents an argument for an “interconnectedness approach” to mediate 
the non-justiciable/justiciable divide in relation to the NGDP and BSO. It starts by 
considering the doctrine of separation of powers generally; and it then focuses on the 
interconnectedness approach as a modification of the doctrine for Papua New Guinea. 
Against the background provided by chapters 1 to 6, chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 
address the thesis by proposing how each limb of government and the Ombudsman 
Commission implement the NGDP and BSO: the legislature in chapter 7; the executive 
in chapter 8; the courts in chapter 9; and the Ombudsman Commission in chapter 10. 
Chapter 7 discusses the way the legislature can implement the NGDP and BSO in 
its law-making function. There are two possible methods of implementation—direct and 
indirect—neither of which should be confused with the application of indirect 
justiciability (discussed in chapter 4). Failure to observe the direct means of 
implementation by enacting laws that do not implement the NGDP and BSO can result in 
legislation being declared unconstitutional (on the basis of indirect justiciability).  
In the indirect means there is no legal sanction (on the basis of non-justiciability). 
However, there are a number of ways in which Parliament can perform its duty to 
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implement, for example: by making specific reference to a particular NGDP and BSO in 
legislation; through the use of the Budgets and Estimates Committee to ensure adequate 
resources are allocated to realise the NGDP and BSO in the annual budget; and finally in 
parliamentary debates by referring to the NGDP and BSO when discussing various 
government decisions. In addition, Chapter 7 further explores the application of direct 
and indirect implementation vis-à-vis indirect justiciability.  
Chapter 8 deals with the role of the executive in implementing the NGDP and 
BSO. This thesis proposes that the National Executive Council adopts a Cabinet Manual 
that makes specific reference to the NGDP and BSO. This will help the executive to 
anchor its decisions to the NGDP and BSO. 
Chapter 9 presents proposals for the judiciary. First, engaging the NGDP and BSO 
through the use of a contextual means of statutory interpretation. Second, development 
of the underlying law on the basis of the NGDP and BSO. Third, judicial review of 
administrative action on the basis of compliance with the NGDP and BSO. Fourth, the 
use of weak-form judicial review. And finally, the enforcement of human rights in 
harmony with the NGDP and BSO. Adoption of these proposals would ensure the 
judiciary implements the NGDP and BSO. 
Chapter 10 considers the Ombudsman Commission. The first proposal made 
relates to this entity’s administrative complaints function. Ways in which this function 
can be used to implement the NGDP and BSO are offered. The second proposal deals 
with the Ombudsman Commission’s Leadership Code function. Here, this thesis looks at 
how leaders may be found guilty of misconduct in office for breaching the NGDP and 
BSO. The third proposal is for the Ombudsman Commission to initiate judicial review of 
Bills (proposed laws can be reviewed before they are enacted) or legislation that fail to 
implement the NGDP and BSO. 
V Conclusion 
This thesis provides legal and constitutional avenues the legislature, the executive, the 
courts, and the Ombudsman Commission can use to ensure the effective and efficient 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO in accordance with the dictates of the 
Constitution.  
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Chapter Two – Political and Legal Context 
I Introduction 
Papua New Guinea’s Constitution has been described as a political road map.1 Not only 
did it establish the country’s political and legal system at independence, but equally it 
prescribed the type of society the people aspired to. This was part of the constitution-
maker’s apparatus for a home-grown Constitution.2 This view of the type of society Papua 
New Guinea should evolve into is set out in the National Goals and Directive Principles 
(NGDP) and Basic Social Obligations (BSO) of the Constitution.  
The preamble of the Constitution establishes the NGDP and BSO.3 Sections 25 and 63 
place a constitutional duty on all governmental bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO. 
There are five National Goals. Goal 1 is titled Integral Human Development, 
which touches on development of the person. Goal 2 is called National Sovereignty and 
Self-Reliance, which articulates the attributes of the system of government that should 
obtain in Papua New Guinea. Goal 3 is headed National Sovereignty and Self-Reliance, 
advocating for political and economic independence. Goal 4 is named Natural Resources 
and Environment, requiring sustainable use of resources. And Goal 5 is branded Papua 
New Guinea Ways, promoting of Papua New Guinea’s cultural identity.4 Each National 
Goal has a number of directive principles appended to them. Following the NGDP, the 
BSO places a number of obligations on all persons, including obligations to respect the 
rights of others, to contribute to the country’s economy, and to observe the NGDP.5 
This chapter provides a brief political and legal context for the thesis and has eight 
parts. Part I is this introduction. Part II introduces the main problem the thesis addresses. 
Part III provides a basic outline of Papua New Guinea’s political and legal system. Part 
IV sets out the laws of Papua New Guinea as defined by the Constitution. Part V provides 
an overview of human rights and freedoms. Part VI describes the main features of Papua 
New Guinea’s constitutional institutions, and Part VII is the conclusion. Each part 
provides an overview of the current system established by the Constitution in which 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO will take place. 
                                                     
1 John Goldring The Constitution of Papua New Guinea (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1978) at 1. 
2 Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, Part One 
(Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) at 1–2 [CPC Report]. 
3 Constitution, sch 1.2.3. 
4 The five National Goals are listed in Appendix One. 
5 The Basic Social Obligations are listed in Appendix Two. 
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II Introducing the Problem  
Governmental bodies have a constitutional duty, both justiciable and non-justiciable, to 
implement the NGDP and BSO.6 Governmental bodies with a duty to implement the 
NGDP and BSO include the traditional three arms of government—legislature, executive 
and judiciary—and constitutional institutions such as the Ombudsman Commission.7 
While the Ombudsman Commission has been given specific responsibility for 
enforcement,8 there is no official state policy on implementation.9 Chapter 5 analyses the 
selected governmental bodies’ record of implementation. 
Approaches to implementation from each arm of government have been 
piecemeal, with no central coordination, and absent a systematic approach by 
government. This situation exists despite the fact the Constitutional Planning Committee 
(CPC) made it very clear the NGDP and BSO were the basis upon which the Constitution 
was written, and that the newly independent state of Papua New Guinea must take 
adequate measures to implement these aspirations.10 
Forty (40) years after independence and there is widespread discontent about 
government’s failure to effectively deliver goods and services.11 This thesis takes the view 
the NGDP and BSO directly address many of these concerns. But how can these 
principles and obligations be meaningfully implemented within the present constitutional 
arrangements? This is the main question this thesis addresses. 
III Basic Outline of the Political and Legal System  
Papua New Guinea is a third world liberal democracy.12 The Constitution created the 
independent state of Papua New Guinea. It is established as a constitutional monarchy 
with Queen Elizabeth II as the Head of State, and is governed through a Westminster-
style parliamentary democracy. The Constitution established Papua New Guinea’s 
                                                     
6 Constitution, ss 25 and 63. The duty to implement the NGDP and BSO will be elaborated in chapter 4. 
7 At sch 1.3 and s 99(2). 
8 At ss 25(4) s 63(4). Chapter 10 proposes how the Ombudsman Commission can implement the NGDP 
and BSO.  
9 Sam Sirox Kari “The Origin and Setting of the National Goals and Directive Principles in the Setting and 
Writing of the Constitution” (PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2005). 
10 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/1 [6]. 
11 National Strategic Plan Taskforce Papua New Guinea Vision 2050 (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 
2009) at 1. 
12 Yash Ghai “Establishing a Liberal Political Order through a Constitution: The Papua New Guinea 
Experience” (1997) 28 Dev & Change 303. 
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political and legal system, including its state institutions and their functions, together with 
a complex system for the control of the exercise of public power through independent 
constitutional offices such as the Ombudsman Commission.  
Members of Parliament are elected to a single chamber house through universal 
adult suffrage.13 Election is based on limited preferential voting system. There are 111 
electorates representing 22 provinces, which include the National Capital District and the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville. The Prime Minister is elected from the legislature 
after a general election, and cannot face a vote of no confidence challenge until she or he 
has held office for 18 months or in the 12 months before a general election.14 Elections 
are held every five years. Since independence, no single party has been able to form a 
government except by a loose coalition of political parties. People join political parties 
more out of perceived ability to distribute resources than a commitment to a particular 
political ideology. 
The executive arm of the government is headed by the Queen, represented by the 
Governor-General, but the effective head of the executive is the National Executive 
Council chaired by the Prime Minister. The Constitution confers on the Prime Minister 
the prerogative to appoint a deputy prime minister, and a number of ministers with special 
responsibility for various departments.15 Each department is managed by a departmental 
secretary under specific enabling legislation. 
Of the 111 members of Parliament, 22 represent each province as provincial 
members and the rest are elected from the open electorates. Since 1976, the country has 
had a three-tier system of government: national, provincial and local. The 22 provincial 
members assume the post of Governor of the province in the provincial government.16 
The other members of the provincial government are the national open electorate 
members of Parliament and the presidents of the various local constituencies. At the third 
level of government, the presidents assume leadership roles in the local governments, 
which are made up of ward councillors. At present the country has 3,131 local level 
governments and 6,131 wards.17 
                                                     
13 Constitution, s 101(1).  
14 Constitution, s 145.  
15 Constitution, s 144. 
16 Provided for under the Organic Law on the Provincial and Local Level Government 1995. 
17 The National Research Institute Papua New Guinea District and Provincial Profiles (National Research 
Institute, Port Moresby, 2010) at 1. 
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The judiciary is independent from the legislature and executive branch of 
government.18 The Supreme Court is the apex of the court system as the final court of 
appeal, and with an exclusive jurisdiction on constitutional issues.19 The National Court 
is the court of first instance in many civil and serious criminal matters. There is no jury 
system in Papua New Guinea. National Court judges are also judges of the Supreme 
Court. There are no separate Supreme Court justices. District Court magistrates, whose 
jurisdiction is limited to matters arising within their geographical mandate, hear many 
civil and less serious criminal matters.20 
At the village level, customary disputes are settled through village courts 
established under the Village Court Act 1989. A village court magistrate is appointed 
from the village. He or she has power to hear disputes that arise in the village setting. 
Custom is applied to these disputes.21   
Customary land disputes are resolved through a separate process that encourages 
mediation in the first instance. This process is established under the Land Dispute 
Settlement Act ch 45. Land mediators are appointed within each area.22 Failing mediation, 
the matter goes to the Land Court.23 An appeal is possible to the Provincial Land Court.24 
In both courts magistrates deliberate on the disputes. As the process is informal, lawyers 
do not appear, unless for some special reason the court requires legal assistance, 
especially on evidentiary matters.25 Aggrieved parties can seek judicial review 
(administrative review as opposed to an appeal) in the National Court of the Provincial 
Land Court’s decision. A final appeal is available to the Supreme Court. 
  
                                                     
18 Constitution, s 157. 
19 Sections 18 and 155(2).  
20 District Court Act, s 20. 
21 Village Court Act 1989, s 57(1).  
22 Land Dispute Settlement Act ch 45, s 11. 
23 Section 26. 
24 Section 54.  
25 Section 72.  
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IV Laws of Papua New Guinea  
The Constitution expressly provides for the different types of laws that apply in Papua 
New Guinea:26 
 Constitution; 
 Organic Laws; 
 Acts of Parliament; 
 Emergency Regulations; 
 Provincial laws; 
 Subordinate legislative enactments; and 
 Underlying law. 
They are listed in order of importance.27 Any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution 
can be struck down by the Supreme Court as invalid and of no effect.28 
Further legislation in the form of Organic Laws provides details of the 
composition, functions and powers of the institutions initially established under the 
Constitution. Organic Laws and the Constitution together make up the constitutional laws 
of Papua New Guinea.29 Organic Laws must be contemplated in the Constitution.30  
For example, s 217(7) of the Constitution states that an Organic Law shall make further 
provision for the Ombudsman Commission’s powers and procedures. The Organic Law 
on the Ombudsman Commission was subsequently enacted. In other words, Parliament 
can only enact an Organic Law if it is expressly envisaged an Organic Law on a particular 
subject ought to be enacted. The Organic Law must therefore be consistent with the 
Constitution. 
Ordinary legislation is subject to the Constitution and Organic Laws.31 Unlike the 
Constitution and the Organic Laws, the majority required for the passage of ordinary 
legislation and the timeframes involved are not as onerous.32 Ordinary legislation 
                                                     
26 Constitution, s 9. 
27 Ombudsman Commission of PNG v Denis Donohoe [1985] PGSC 14, [1985] PNGLR 348, 3 December 
1985 at 356 per Amet J. 
28 Constitution ss 11 and 19.  
29 Constitution, sch 2.1.  
30 Section 12. 
31 Section 10.  
32 Section 64. 
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composes the majority of laws in Papua New Guinea. Upon independence many of the 
Acts operating prior to independence were repealed and re-enacted.33  
The other important law in Papua New Guinea is the underlying law. It is made 
up of customary law, the common law of England prior to 16 September 1975, and case 
law developed by the courts in Papua New Guinea.34 Before custom is applied it must be 
proved to exist as a matter of fact.35 After the court establishes the existence of a custom, 
the custom must then be considered for its consistency with written law (including human 
rights provisions in the Constitution) and with the NGDP and the BSO.36  
The courts observe common law principle of case precedent or stare decisis in 
resolving disputes.37 Previous Supreme Court decisions are persuasive in the same court, 
but are binding on all lower courts, including the National Court and the District Court.38 
A growing body of case law, especially on constitutional law and administrative law, has 
emerged since independence. 
V Civil and Political Rights and Freedoms  
The Constitution protects a number of civil and political rights and freedoms. Together 
with the NGDP and BSO they form the basis upon which the Constitution was framed.39 
The rights and freedoms are directly enforceable. 
Rights and freedoms are subdivided into two categories: fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and qualified rights and freedoms. The distinction between the two is that the 
former cannot be qualified, while the latter can be qualified by Organic Laws and ordinary 
legislation under certain circumstances as set out in ss 38 and 39 of the Constitution. 
Fundamental rights and freedoms are covered under ss 32 to 36 and include the 
right to life, the right to freedom from inhuman treatment, and the right to protection of 
the law (such as presumption of innocence). Qualified rights and freedoms start from s 
                                                     
33 Repealing pre-independence legislation and re-enacting it was to satisfy the stated aim of the Constitution 
to be home-grown or autochthonous. These re-enacted laws are given chapter numbers. Legislation enacted 
after independence does not have a chapter number allocated, only the year of enactment. 
34 Underlying Law Act 2000, s 4. 
35 Customs Recognition Act, ch 19, s 5. 
36 Underlying Law Act, s 4(2). 
37 Constitution, sch 2.5.8.  
38 Constitution, sch 2.5.9. 
39 CPC Report, above no 2, at 2/1 [20]. 
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42 and end with s 56.40 A number of “manner and form” requirements must be satisfied 
before a qualified right can be restricted.41 This includes considering whether the law 
imposing the qualifications can be justified in a democratic society.42 The NGDP and 
BSO are taken into account in making that determination.43  
Civil and political rights have had a significant impact not only in the legal arena 
but also on the political discourse of Papua New Guinea. The courts have upheld the 
supremacy of the Constitution in many instances by declaring legislation unconstitutional 
vis-à-vis human rights and freedoms.44  
VI Constitutional Institutions 
Part IX of the Constitution defines constitutional office holders and constitutional 
institutions. The latter are defined as any office or institution established or provided for 
by the Constitution, other than the office of Head of State or Minister or National 
Executive Council.45 The constitutional offices include that of judges, the public 
prosecutor and members of the Ombudsman Commission. This list is not exhaustive and 
further legislation can create additional constitutional offices.46 
                                                     
40 The rights and freedoms are: 
 Section 42 Liberty of the person. 
 Section 43 Freedom from forced labour. 
 Section 44 Freedom from arbitrary search and entry. 
 Section 45 Freedom of conscience, thought and religion. 
 Section 46 Freedom of expression. 
 Section 47 Freedom of assembly and association. 
 Section 48 Freedom of employment. 
 Section 49 Right to privacy. 
 Section 50 Right to vote and stand for public office. 
 Section 51 Right to freedom of information. 
 Section 52 Right to freedom of movement. 
 Section 53 Protection from unjust deprivation of property. 
 Section 54 Special provision in relation to certain lands. 
 Section 55 Equality of citizens. 
 Section 56 Other rights and privileges of citizens. 
41 The State v NTN Pty Ltd and NBN Ltd [1992] PGSC 11, [1992] PNGLR 1, 7 April 1987. 
42 Constitution, ss 38 and 39. 
43 Sections 38 and 39. 
44 SCR No 2 of 1982 (No 1); Re the Organic Law on National Elections (Amendment) Act 1981 [1982] 
PGSC 19, [1982] PNGLR 214, 5 April 1982 is an early example where provisions of an election law were 
found invalid for offending s 50 of the Constitution. Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive 
Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates [2010] PGSC 3, SC1057, 7 July 
2010 is a relatively recent case, where the court invalidated a number of provisions of the Organic Law on 
the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates for offending a number of provisions of the Constitution 
including s 50. 
45 Constitution, s 221(i). 
46 Section 221.  
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Constitutional offices are a mechanism of accountability. They are an extension 
of the idea of the three arms of government and the principle of separation of powers. 
Specific roles are conferred on these offices, which are given a level of independence to 
perform their functions. 
Constitutional offices are established under a number of Organic Laws.  
The common characteristic of these institutions is that they are not subject to direction 
and control from a political head.47 Appointment of the heads of these bodies is through 
a largely independent process, by an apolitical appointment body.48 Particular details of 
the offices are then spelt out in Organic Laws. Because Organic Laws are constitutional 
laws, security of office is provided against sudden political changes.49 Specific majorities 
and timeframes are required for amending these laws.50 
Additional protection granted to these offices are the specific requirements for the 
removal of constitutional office holders. Re Public Prosecutor's Power to Request the 
Chief Justice to Appoint a Leadership Tribunal set out in some detail the procedures for 
removal.51 Only after following this process can a constitutional office holder be 
removed.  
In SCR No 1 of 1978; Re Ombudsman Commission Investigations of the Public 
Solicitor the Court held constitutional offices are different from statutory bodies 
established by ordinary legislation as they were established by the people directly through 
the Constitution and not by Parliament.52 
  
                                                     
47 Section 223(2).  
48 Section 223(1). 
49 For example, the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission sets up the Ombudsman Commission.  
50 Constitution ss 14, 15, 16 and 17. 
51 Re Public Prosecutor's Power to Request the Chief Justice to Appoint a Leadership Tribunal [2008] 
PGSC 48, SC1011, 29 August 2008. 
52 SCR No 1 of 1978; Re Ombudsman Commission Investigations of the Public Solicitor [1978] PGSC 7, 
[1978] PNGLR 345, 6 October 1978. 
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When looking at a specific body to promote implementation of the NGDP and 
BSO, this thesis will focus on one constitutional institution: the Ombudsman 
Commission. The reason being that the Constitution provides ample scope to the 
Ombudsman Commission for implementation as compared to other constitutional 
institutions.53 
VII Conclusion  
The NGDP and BSO set out what Papua New Guinea aspires to as a nation.  
This aspiration reflects the social and cultural realities of Papua New Guinea, and the 
NGDP and BSO chart a new way forward. The Constitution establishes certain 
mechanisms to enable their implementation within the current constitutional 
arrangements. This chapter has set out in brief the political and legal system in which the 
NGDP and BSO are to be fulfilled. Later parts of this thesis will highlight some of the 
reasons for the non-implementation of the NGDP and BSO, and detail proposals for their 
effective and efficient implementation. 
                                                     
53 The roles and function of the Ombudsman Commission and recommendations for the Ombudsman 
Commission to implement the NGDP and BSO will be discussed in chapter 10. 
 14 
Chapter Three – Role of the National Goals and Directive Principles and 
Basic Social Obligations 
I Introduction 
This chapter will consider the historical background of the NGDP and BSO and their 
primary role. Much of the discussion will come from the Final Report of the 
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC Report).1 The CPC Report made 
recommendations on the form of the Constitution to the House of Assembly.2 Part I of 
the chapter is the introduction. Part II discusses the historical influences underpinning the 
NGDP and BSO. Part III considers the process in which the NGDP and BSO were 
adopted. Part IV presents the role of the NGDP and BSO in the Constitution. Part V 
concludes the chapter. This chapter highlights the importance of the NGDP and BSO as 
part of the groundwork for their legal implementation.3  
II Overview of Historical Forces Shaping the NGDP and BSO 
A Introduction  
There has been little critical study on the historical formation of the NGDP and BSO. 
Perhaps the only work was a sociological doctoral dissertation by Sam Sirox Kari, who 
focused on the NGDP.4 His thesis was to rebut the claim that the NGDP was a home-
grown initiative.5 According to Kari, the NGDP was a social construct of Papua New 
Guinean elites and Australians to inculcate a national ideology to support Papua New 
Guinea’s independence.6 In considering Kari’s conclusions, this thesis is mindful of the 
fact they are based on sociological theoretical assumptions.7 The response to Kari would 
                                                     
1 There are two parts of the Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee. The NGDP and BSO 
feature prominently in the first part and will be the basis of the discussion here in chapter 3 and throughout 
the thesis. This thesis will refer mainly to volume 1. Section 24 of the Constitution states the CPC Report 
is an aid to constitutional interpretation. Principles of constitutional interpretation are covered in chapter 4. 
2 Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, Part One 
(Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) [CPC Report]. The main parts of the CPC Report that relate to 
the NGDP and BSO are chapters 2 and 5 respectively.  
3 Chapter 4 makes the case for the constitutional duty to implement, by considering the legal nature of the 
implementation framework. 
4 Sam Sirox Kari “The Origin and Setting of the National Goals and Directive Principles in the Setting and 
Writing of the Constitution” (PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2005). 
5 At 2. 
6 At 39. 
7 At 19–28. 
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therefore be confined to supporting the legal claim of this thesis, that is, that the NGDP 
and BSO are the underlying aims of the Constitution. The Constitution identifies certain 
aids to constitutional interpretation, and it is these sources this legal dissertation considers 
first to support its conclusions. One authoritative source is the CPC Report (Constitution, 
s 24). Kari usefully observes the NGDP was the result of social and political tensions in 
Papua New Guinea.8 Bernard Narokobi, one of the contemporary legal advisers to the 
CPC, makes the same point.9 The CPC in fact stated one of the reasons for a constitution 
is to address existing tensions.10 A general description of these tensions up to the time of 
independence in Papua New Guinea follows. The description provides an overview of the 
historical forces which shaped the NGDP and BSO.11 
B Historical Overview 
In the period between the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945 and independence 
in 1975, Papua New Guinea had separate but concurrent existence as Papua, a colony of 
Australia and as New Guinea (a Trust Territory of the United Nations, also administered 
by Australia). From its uneasy colonial experience with the Germans in the North, the 
British in the South, and until the early part of the 20th century with the Australians, a 
strong sense of identity and dislike of the colonial rulers emerged.12  
Unlike many Polynesian and Micronesian states in the Pacific, Papua New Guinea 
is culturally diverse with over 800 different languages. Despite its unique cultures, 
Christianity has, since its difficult introduction over 200 years ago by Western 
missionaries, produced a new element to the country’s identity as a “Christian country”.13  
                                                     
8 Kari, above n 5, at 37. 
9 Bernard Narokobi “The Constitutional Planning Committee, Nationalism and Vision” in Anthony J 
Regan, Owen Jessep, and Eric L Kwa, Twenty Years of the Papua New Guinea Constitution (The Lawbook 
Company, Sydney, 2001) 25. 
10 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/1 [1]. 
11 Curiously, Kari does say the NGDP should be made into law as they are still useful for Papua New 
Guinea: see Kari, above n 5, at 309. 
12 For example, in the House of Assembly debates on the CPC Report, Tony Ila, a Member of the House of 
Assembly spoke about colonial exploitation, see House of Assembly Debates, Third House, Fifteenth 
Meeting of the First Session, 23 September to 27 September, Volume III, no 35 [House of Assembly 
Debates] at 4445. 
13 The Preamble to the Papua New Guinea Constitution, states “[we] pledge ourselves to guard and pass on 
to those who come after us our noble traditions and the Christian principles that are ours now”.  
This statement does not affect the freedom of conscience, thought and religion protected by s 45 of the 
Constitution. See Gary D Bouma, Rod Ling and Douglas Pratt, Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific, National Case Studies (Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg, London and New York, 2010) at 86. 
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Importantly, too, for Papua New Guinea was the concept of rights and freedoms. 
Experiences of racial discord saw anti-discrimination legislation enacted in 1963.14  
The Human Rights Ordinance was passed in 1971. The new Constitution would build on 
these past colonial laws by entrenching basic human rights and freedoms.  
In addition, the CPC was of the view that in order for rights and freedoms to flourish, 
people had to observe corresponding duties to each other.15 This found expression in the 
BSO. Chapter five of the CPC Report on human rights contained the recommendations 
on the BSO to demonstrate this commitment to balancing rights and freedoms with duties. 
All this marked a unique consciousness of nationalism, national identity, and a free and 
just society.   
Against this backdrop the Constitution had to make important statements about 
sovereignty and promotion of the indigenous way of life. The Constitution would not be 
an abstract legal document removed from the social, cultural and economic realities of 
Papua New Guinea. Examples of this are Goal 3 on national sovereignty and Goal 5 on 
Papua New Guinea ways. The former stipulates leaders must make decisions in the best 
interest of the country without being compromised by foreign influence. The latter 
requires the use of Papua New Guinean indigenous traditions to inform social, economic 
and political advancement.   
As pointed out above, the Constitution was developed at a time of tension.  
Some authors describe these pressures as resulting from “micronationalist” movements.16 
Bougainville and Papua wanted to secede from the proposed new state.17 The island of 
New Britain had very strong anti-colonial sentiments, organised around the Mataungan 
Association.18 Certain sections of the Highlands provinces did not think it was time for 
independence.19 So how does a Constitution accommodate all these various interests?  
The NGDP and BSO provided an ideal to demonstrate to the people that the 
Constitution, the symbol of the new state, was not going to be interpreted and applied by 
a few elite citizens or only benefit certain regions of the country. Rather, the Constitution 
should be directed towards the realisation of the aspirations of all citizens. This comes 
                                                     
14 See Papua New Guinea Discriminatory Practices Act 1963. 
15 CPC Report, above n 2, at 5/1/15 [93]. 
16 Ron May (ed) Micronationalist Movements in Papua New Guinea (Department of Political and Social 
Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1982).  
17 Bernard Narokobi “The Constitutional Planning Committee, Nationalism and Vision”, above n 10, at 27. 
18 At 27. 
19 At 26. 
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out clearly in National Goal 2 on equality and participation. Everyone, including women, 
were to participate in the new country in all areas of life. This idea of a constitution 
realising the aspirations of the people is connected to the notion of a home-grown 
constitution, and is symbolised by the NGDP and BSO.20 The Constitution was, therefore, 
an attempt to resolve these tensions and chart a new path for an inclusive society in Papua 
New Guinea.  
There was a strong awareness of the development challenges facing Papua New 
Guinea in the pre-independence era. The main policy initiative to enable development 
was the Eight Point Plan, which had a marked influence on the NGDP.21 This Plan was 
announced by Michael Somare, the territory’s chief minister, soon after self-government 
in 1972.22 The correlation between the Plan and the NGDP was one of the main reasons 
the government supported the CPC’s recommendations.23 The Plan’s main focus was on 
the economy: self-reliance, small scale business activities, and greater participation by 
Papua New Guineans in the economy.24 The CPC thought the Plan is best summed up by 
the ideas of equality, self-reliance, and rural development.25 The NGDP and BSO 
expanded the focus on economic development to a holistic conception of the person in a 
community within a specific cultural and environmental context.  
The Plan was incorporated into the NGDP in a number of ways, for example, Goal 
3 required the economy to be self-reliant.26 According to the CPC, the NGDP are 
generally consistent with the Plan but are “more specifically targeted at achieving a free 
and just society …”.27 The CPC went on to define its concept of development more 
broadly than economic progress, stating “the only authentic development is integral 
                                                     
20 CPC Report, above n 2, at 15/1 [2]. 
21 The Eight Point Plan (the CPC refers to them as the Eight Aims) is reproduced in the CPC Report at 2/1 
[7]–2/2 [7]. For a short history of the origins of the Eight Point Plan see Peter Fitzpatrick “The Making and 
the Unmaking of the Eight Aims” in Peter King, Wendy Lee and Vincent Warakai (eds) From Rhetoric to 
Reality? Papua New Guinea’s Eight Point Plan and National Goals After a Decade, Papers from the 
Fifteenth Waigani Seminar (University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1985) 22.   
22 Central Planning Office, Papua New Guinea's improvement plan for 1973-1974 (Cabinet Committee on 
Planning, Port Moresby, 1974). 
23 House of Assembly Debates, above n 12, at 4562. 
24 Ron May From Promise to Crisis: A Political Economy of Papua New Guinea – State and Society in 
Papua New Guinea (ANU Press, Canberra, 2004). For an earlier more detailed discussion of the connection 
between the implementation of the eight aims and the NGDP: see Peter King, Wendy Lee and Vincent 
Warakai From Rhetoric to Reality, Papua New Guinea’s Eight Point Plan and National Goals After a 
Decade (University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1985). 
25 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/2 [8]. 
26 May, above n 27. 
27 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/1 [9]. 
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human development”.28 This idea is expressed in Goal 1. The CPC saw integral human 
development as the appropriate form of development for the people.  
The CPC advocated harmony between social and economic progress.29 A further 
element moderating economic progress was the concern for the natural environment.  
Goal 4 on natural resources and the environment advocates sustainable use of resources 
and protection of Papua New Guinea’s sacred and scenic sites. What emerged from the 
NGDP and BSO was, therefore, an integrated view of economic development fully 
cognisant and respectful of the human person in his or her social, cultural and natural 
environment. 
III Process of Developing and Adopting the NGDP and BSO  
What was the process employed to develop and adopt the NGDP and BSO? In short, it 
went hand-in-hand with the creation of the Constitution. The first strategy was to ask the 
people what they themselves wanted for their system of government. A committee (the 
CPC) was established in June 1972 by the legislature (House of Assembly) of the self-
governing territory—already called Papua New Guinea—which reported to Canberra 
from time to time. A Chief Minister headed the territory’s executive. This was part of 
Australia’s plan to prepare the territory for independence.  
Generally, the CPC was to propose “a constitution for full internal self-
government in a united Papua New Guinea with a view to eventual independence”.30  
The caveat being the proposal had to be home-grown.31 The CPC was composed of 
Members of the House of Assembly representing various regions.32 The CPC was to 
consider how different organs of government and their functions could be incorporated 
into the Constitution. The organs of government include the role of the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary, and an ombudsman.33 A Bill of Rights was also included in the 
terms of reference.34  
                                                     
28 At 2/3 [14]. 
29 At 2/3–2/5. 
30 At 1/1 [1]. 
31 At 15/1 [2]. 
32 Bernard Narokobi “The Constitutional Planning Committee, Nationalism and Vision”, above n 9, at 25. 
33 CPC Report, above n 2, at iv. 
34 At iv.  
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It is not difficult to see liberal democratic principles reflected in the mandate.  
This was in all likelihood a result of the strong influence of the colonial system of 
government inherited from Australia. The central tenets of liberal democracy—separation 
of powers, human rights and an independent judiciary—are insisted upon. Could this be 
a home-grown Constitution if its central features had already been pre-determined? As 
discussed previously, Kari picks up on this point in his critique of the NGDP as being 
rooted in colonial influence and the work of elite Papua New Guineans.35 However, a 
careful assessment of the CPC Report and the process used to adopt the NGDP and BSO 
identifies three ways in which this concern can be rebutted. First, the CPC was not 
restricted to the institutional mechanisms proposed by the House of Assembly.36 The 
mandate allowed the CPC to consider whatever else it thought was relevant. Second, the 
CPC undertook a process of wide consultation.37 This allowed the people to provide the 
specifics of the institutions. The next Part expands on this point. Third, even if the NGDP 
and BSO were elitist constructs, the fact remains they were adopted by the representatives 
of the people.38 
Kari was right in that there was no mandate for broad ideals to underlie the 
Constitution, or what those ideals should be.39 But the fact that the NGDP and BSO arose 
after wide consultation revealed the CPC’s commitment to its mandate (which was also 
to consider anything else deemed relevant). According to the CPC, the NGDP resulted 
from a long process of discussion (over 100 public meetings) and consideration of written 
public submissions.40 It would have been interesting to see whether Kari would have 
maintained his position if he had interviewed former CPC members.41 Goldring was, 
however, impressed with the CPC’s deliberations, describing them as “unparalleled in 
comparative constitutional history”.42 
The CPC began the consultation process by releasing discussion papers on six 
different topics, including citizenship and relations between the central government and 
                                                     
35 Kari, above n 5. 
36 CPC Report, above n 2, at 1/1 [1].  
37 At 1/1 [4]–1/3 [12] and 2/2 [10]. 
38 See the House of Assembly Debates from 23 September 1974 to 27 September 1974 and the National 
Constituent Assembly Debates, vol 1(1) from 23 May 1975 to 26 August 1975 [Constituent Assembly 
Debates], especially debates from 23 May 1975 to 5 June 1975 at 66–87. 
39 The CPC’s terms of reference are reproduced in the CPC Report, above n 2, at iv. 
40 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/2 [10]. 
41 Kari states his attempts to interview Somare, John Momis, the former Deputy Chairman of the CPC and 
Bernard Narokobi, the legal advisers to the CPC were unsuccessful due to their participation in the 2002 
national elections: see Kari, above n 5, at 19. 
42 John Goldring The Constitution of Papua New Guinea (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1978) at 15. 
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other levels of government.43 The papers were distributed in the three major languages—
English, Pidgin and Hiri Motu—to as many parts of the country as possible. They were 
distributed by print material in the newspapers, on the radio and direct distribution. After 
receiving the people’s contributions on these six topics, the CPC made direct contact with 
community centres throughout the country. Teams from the CPC conducted meetings 
throughout the country on the six discussion points, the outcomes of which were recorded 
and analysed. Further, the CPC received over 2000 written submissions.44 The 
consultation confirmed the people more or less accepted liberal democratic institutions. 
But the people also made it clear they wanted the new system of government to reflect 
their way of life. The NGDP and BSO best encapsulates how that way of life would be 
contained in the Constitution. The CPC produced three reports following the 
consultations. The final report (CPC Report) was presented to the Chief Minister, instead 
of the Australian administration.45  
The Chief Minister submitted the CPC Report (which had been preceded by two 
interim reports) to the House of Assembly for debate in August 1974.46 At the same time, 
the Somare government also tabled a response to the CPC Report, entitled Proposals on 
Constitutional Principles and Explanatory Notes (PCPEN).47 The latter report’s main 
objective was to clarify some areas it thought were unclear, or to present an alternative 
view to that of the CPC.48 The United Party, an opposition party, presented a second 
response. All these documents were placed before the House of Assembly for debate. The 
NGDP were contained in chapter two of the CPC Report and the BSO in chapter five. 
After the debate, the House of Assembly resolved for chapters two and five to form the 
drafting instructions for inclusion in the Constitution, with two major modifications 
(discussed below). Four drafts of the Constitution were produced as a result, with the 
fourth draft being considered for adoption by the Constituent Assembly.  
In May 1975, the House of Assembly was dissolved by its own motion and 
reconstituted itself as the Constituent Assembly. This was to demonstrate the Constituent 
                                                     
43 CPC Report, above n 2, at 1/1 [4]. 
44 CPC Report, above n 2, at 1/2. 
45 CPC Report, above n 2, at i. 
46 At 1/1 [2]. 
47 Government Paper “Proposals on Constitutional Principles and Explanatory Notes” (Port Moresby, 
August 1974). 
48 For example, the critique of the CPC Report by Dr John Guise, a Member of the House of Assembly was 
quite strong, stating the CPC Report confuses matters of detail with that of principle: see House of 
Assembly Debates, 24 September 1974, at 4438. 
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Assembly owed its existence to its own authority and not to colonial laws.49  
The Constituent Assembly’s two main purposes were to debate and adopt the 
Constitution, and act as a break from Papua New Guinea’s colonial past.50 Members of 
the Constituent Assembly were designated as “representatives” rather than “members”, 
and were to debate freely without commitment to their political party affiliations.  
The Constituent Assembly considered the draft Constitution from 23 May 1975 to 26 
August 1975. The Constitution was adopted on 15 August 1975, with the preamble 
containing the NGDP and BSO which, in substance, was the form recommended by the 
CPC. There were two main changes. First, instead of adopting an investment code to 
implement Goal 3 on economic self-reliance, the Constituent Assembly preferred to rely 
on ordinary investment legislation. Second, in place of establishing an implementing 
entity (similar to a law reform commission) to review laws and policies for consistency 
with the NGDP and BSO, ss 25 and 63 were adopted.51 
IV Role of the NGDP and BSO 
A Introduction  
It is quite clear the NGDP and BSO, being described as “goals” and “obligations”, 
underlie the Constitution’s aims. While other roles may be attributed to the NGDP and 
BSO, for example, that they provide the terms of a social contract, those other roles are 
not the current focus. Essentially, this Part sets out to establish the importance of the 
NGDP and BSO such that their implementation becomes a critical matter for the 
Constitution to undertake.   
B NGDP and BSO: Underlying Aims/Objectives of the Constitution  
1 Introduction 
The role of the NGDP and BSO in forming the Constitution’s underlying aims or 
objectives is evident from a number of sources. These include the CPC Report, the 
enactment of the NGDP and BSO as part of the preamble of the Constitution, and a 
                                                     
49 CPC Report, above n 2, at 15/1. 
50 House of Assembly Debates, 23 May 1975, at 5811. 
51 Further discussion on these two changes will be taken up in chapter 4. 
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number of provisions of the Constitution and legislation. These sources will be considered 
together. 
A preliminary note on the interaction of the NGDP and BSO is important.  
Much will be said here on the NGDP, but the NGDP and BSO go hand in hand.  
The CPC recommended the implementing provisions for the NGDP should extend to the 
BSO.52 The importance of everyone in Papua New Guinea observing fundamental 
obligations, as demonstrated by the BSO, was an integral part of achieving the NGDP. 53 
One of the BSO states everyone in Papua New Guinea has an obligation to fulfil the 
NGDP.54 It is in this context the BSO are considered with the NGDP on the question of 
implementation. Provisions on implementation of the NGDP (s 25) and BSO (s 63), 
which are expressed in almost identical terms, support this interaction.55 The point is the 
fundamental, concurrent role envisaged for the NGDP and BSO. 
2 Aims/Objectives of the Constitution  
According to the CPC, the NGDP and BSO express the needs and aspirations of the 
people in meaningful terms.56 They outline what the people and the government hope to 
achieve. The CPC Report compares the NGDP and BSO principles as a philosophy of 
life: “it gives us a chance to define for ourselves the philosophy of life by which we want 
to live”.57 In their interim report the CPC describes them as social goals of the nation.58 
The CPC goes on to state it is crucial that the country has long term objectives.59 The 
CPC used the metaphor of a traveller who had to know where she or he was going before 
starting their journey.60 Society was discerned as having a common purpose. Naturally 
the NGDP and BSO were enacted as part of the preamble of the Constitution because of 
their role in underlying Constitution’s objectives. For example, the introduction to the 
NGDP in the Constitution states, “we … set before ourselves these National Goals and 
Directive Principles that underlie our Constitution”.  
                                                     
52 CPC Report, above n 2, at 5/1/34 [21]. 
53 At 5/1/15 [92] and at 5/1/34 [21]. 
54 BSO at [h]. 
55 Additional analysis of ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution is taken up in chapter 4.  
56 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/1 [11]. 
57 At 2/1 [2]. 
58 Constitutional Planning Committee, Second Interim Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee 
(Port Moresby, 1973) at 2/1. 
59 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/1 [3]. 
60 At 2/1 [4]. 
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The introduction to the BSO has “all persons in our country have the following basic 
obligations to themselves and their descendants, to each other, and to the Nation”.  
Many constitutions capture their underlying objectives in the preamble.61  
An example is the Solomon Islands. Justice Kapi in Minister for Provincial Government 
v Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly stated the preamble in the Solomon Island’s 
Constitution defines the principles within which the Constitution is construed and 
implemented.62 In a comparative study of roles of preambles in constitutions, they were 
classified as having five categories, one of which is establishing supreme goals of the 
country.63 The preamble of the United States Constitution has one of the most influential 
phrases, which has been adopted in many constitutions: “We the people …”. Papua New 
Guinea has a similar phrase in its preamble. It has been held in the United States that the 
preamble “indicates the general purpose for which the people ordained and established 
the Constitution”.64 Preambles in essence capture the basic ideals underlying a 
constitution.65 This seems to be true for Papua New Guinea, too. 
Another clear statement from the CPC on the NGDP as defining the underlying 
aims of the Constitution is where the NGDP is described as the “fundamental charter of 
our society”.66 The Constitution should be “an instrument which helps achieve these 
goals”.67 The CPC further suggests that the Constitution’s legitimacy depends on the 
realisation of the NGDP.68 The people expect the Constitution to be an instrument to 
transform society, through the ideals it espouses. These ideals were the NGDP and BSO, 
largely because they had shaped the CPC’s recommendations.69 Sections 25 and 63 of the 
Constitution crystallise this by creating a constitutional duty to implement the NGDP and 
BSO. The Supreme Court has held the NGDP and BSO are statements of political visions 
and developmental aspiration upon which Papua New Guinea was founded.70 
                                                     
61 Liav Orgad “The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation” (2010) 8 Int’l J Const L 714; Kent Roach 
“The Uses and Audiences of Preambles in Constitution” (2001) 47(1) McGill LJ 129. 
62 Minister for Provincial Government v Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly [1997] SBCA 1, CA-CAC 003 
of 1997, 11 July 1997. Chapter 4 will discuss further the role of the preamble in constitutional interpretation. 
63 Orgad, above n 33, at 717. 
64 Jacobsen v Massachusetts 197 US 11 (1905) at 13-14, per Harlan J; cited in Orgad, above n 33, at 719. 
65 Roach refers to Plato’s view to include preambles in laws to encourage compliance: see Roach, above n 
33, at 132.  
66 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/1 [2]. 
67 At 2/1 [2]. 
68 At 2/1 [2]. 
69 At 15/1 [2]. 
70 Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 40, SC1088, 17 
December 2010 at [23]. Chapter 6 presents a critique of this case.   
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The NGDP, and the BSO to a lesser extent, feature regularly throughout the CPC 
Report. In chapter two, the CPC proposed establishing an implementing entity to review 
existing laws adopted at independence for consistency with the NGDP and BSO.71 
Chapter three on the Leadership Code asserts Papua New Guinea’s leadership would have 
a critical role in ensuring implementation of the NGDP.72 In chapter four, citizens are said 
to have certain obligations. Chapter five on human rights deals with the BSO, and requires 
the same implementing mechanism proposed for the NGDP.73 Chapter eight requires the 
judiciary to take into account society’s goals in performing their functions.74 In chapter 
nine on finance, the NGDP are referred to as the guiding principles for raising and 
expenditure of public funds.75 Chapter 10, in proposing the establishment of a provincial 
government system, refers to the concept of decentralisation of power from the central 
government to the local districts – something that Goal 2 on equality and participation 
expresses.  
Interestingly, when Papua New Guinea became independent, the CPC’s 
recommendation to adopt a system of provincial government was ignored. As a result, 
Bougainville renewed its pre-independence secessionist demands. In 1976, the very first 
amendment to the Constitution introduced the provincial government system to quell 
Bougainville’s attempt to break away from Papua New Guinea. These are examples of 
CPC recommendations for substantive provisions of the Constitution to implement the 
NGDP and BSO. 
While the BSO have not featured as prominently, being discussed mainly in the 
context of human rights and freedoms, the CPC considered they complement the NGDP. 
Key sections on human rights and freedoms in the Constitution expressly refer to the 
NGDP and BSO. For example, s 32 requires consideration of the NGDP and BSO when 
interpreting and applying human rights and freedoms provisions in the Constitution. 
Further, Parliament may justify qualifying rights and freedoms on the basis it is necessary 
to advance the NGDP and BSO.76 The NGDP and BSO determine the scope of human 
rights and freedoms in the Constitution. 
                                                     
71 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/25 [3]. 
72 At 3/2 [13]. 
73 At 5/1/34 [22]. 
74 At 8/1 [6]. 
75 At 9/1 [4]. 
76 See Constitution, ss 38–39, which are discussed further in chapter 9. 
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If the NGDP and BSO were to underpin the Constitution, public awareness would 
be all important. The success or failure of the nation could be then be assessed against the 
standards set by the NGDP and BSO.77 The CPC wanted the NGDP to be the yardstick 
against which the government performance was measured.78 This is given effect by the 
Ombudsman Commission’s functions. The Ombudsman Commission can take into 
account the NGDP and BSO when determining the propriety of government officials’ 
conduct.79 The Ombudsman Commission provides a constitutional alternative to the 
political process to hold leaders accountable for non-implementation.  
A final example to support the claim the NGDP and BSO underlie the 
Constitution’s aims and objectives relates to the underlying law, which requires the 
development of a Papua New Guinean indigenous jurisprudence. British common law 
was to be replaced by new case law emanating from Papua New Guinea’s unique social 
and cultural circumstances. In this process, the Constitution requires the application of 
the NGDP and BSO to develop new laws and principles.80 Consequently, the shape of the 
new laws of Papua New Guinea would assume the character of the NGDP and BSO. 
The NGDP and BSO were therefore an attempt to promote the people’s 
aspirations in a manner consistent with a typical liberal democracy and a Westminster 
system. It meant the Westminster system of government, with a number of modifications 
due for Papua New Guinea’s circumstances, was going to be used to achieve the people’s 
aspirations.  
V Conclusion 
The NGDP and BSO arose out of the consultation process with the people. They reflect 
Papua New Guinea’s socially complex nature. And while they are a product of specific 
historical circumstances, they also attempt to influence the future. The NGDP and BSO 
set out the Constitution’s underlying aims and objectives. It is, therefore, the duty of all 
governmental bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO. 
                                                     
77 Bernard Narokobi “Walking the Footpath of the Constitutional Planning Committee’s Five National 
Goals and Directive Principles” in Ian Maddocks and Edward P Wolfers Living History and Evolving 
Democracy Living (University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 2010) 25 at 30. 
78 CPC Report, above n 2, at 2/1 [6]. 
79 The function of the Ombudsman Commission in the implementation of the NGDP and BSO is considered 
in chapter 10. Sections 25(4), 63(4) and 219(1) of the Constitution gives effect to this view of the CPC. 
80 Constitution, sch 2.2; Chapter 10 considers the Underlying Law Act 2000, which implements the 
requirement s 20 of the Constitution for Parliament under to enact a law to declare the underlying law. 
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Chapter Four – The Constitutional Duty to Implement 
I Introduction  
This chapter examines the legal nature of the constitutional duty to implement the NGDP 
and BSO, which is created under ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution respectively.1 It is a 
constitutional duty imposed on all governmental bodies in Papua New Guinea. And under 
the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution, it is a duty that warrants compliance.2   
The legal nature of this constitutional duty is best defined as “indirect 
justiciability.” Indirect justiciability works well with the idea that in order for 
governmental bodies to fulfil their legal obligations to implement the NGDP and BSO 
effectively, they must view themselves as part of an interconnected system where each 
arm of government influences the other in implementation.3 There are four parts to this 
chapter: Part I is the introduction; Part II looks at principles of constitutional 
interpretation; Part III analyses the terms of ss 25 and 63; and Part IV is the conclusion. 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the clear constitutional duty governmental 
bodies have to implement the NGDP and BSO.   
II Principles of Constitutional Interpretation  
A Introduction  
The present judicial view as expressed in Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd 
(Medaing on appeal) is that ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution are non-justiciable. 4 As a 
result governmental bodies do not take this duty seriously. This thesis proposes an 
alternative view of ss 25 and 63 that enables a better implementation of the NGDP and 
BSO. Explicating ss 25 and 63 is a process of constitutional interpretation. Literature on 
comparative constitutional law discusses different methods of constitutional 
                                                     
1 Other provisions of the Constitution as they relate to the NGDP and BSO such as ss 32, 38, 39 and 69 will 
be discussed in other parts of this thesis, including chapter 9. 
2 See for example Constitution, s 11. 
3 The idea of interconnectedness amongst the limbs of government and the Ombudsman Commission is 
fully presented in chapter 6. 
4 In Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGSC 40, SC1144, 22 December 2011 
[Medaing on appeal], the Supreme Court held the NGDP was non-justiciable, and by implication the BSO 
also. This chapter argues this interpretation shows a misunderstanding of ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. 
 27 
interpretation.5 The methods of interpretation are not universal, and are contested.  
The Papua New Guinea Constitution lays down specific principles of constitutional 
interpretation. Other principles are found in a number of Supreme Court decisions such 
as Reference by Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea (Ref by OCPNG).6 They 
are applied in the aggregate, but depending on the issue(s) before the court, certain 
emphasis is placed on a particular rule (or rules). The relevant provisions of the 
Constitution detailing these rules of constitutional interpretation and the cases which 
applied and developed some of these rules are highlighted below.   
B Constitutional Supremacy  
Written constitutions place specific limitations on the exercise of public power. This is 
done through the courts being given the power to review the acts of the other branches of 
government. This is the concept of constitutional supremacy or primacy of the 
constitution. Jurisdictions in the common law tradition often refer to the celebrated 
American case of Marbury v Madison, where the United States Supreme Court asserted 
its power to declare invalid ordinary legislation inconsistent with the Constitution.7 
Marbury has been cited in cases in Papua New Guinea.8 One of the main reasons the 
Constitution is considered supreme law in Papua New Guinea is the fact it embodies the 
will of the people as enacted through their elected representatives in the Constituent 
Assembly.9 The power of the people by their freely given consent is vested in the National 
Government, and its three arms.10 The arms of government exercise their powers in 
accordance with the Constitution under s 99(1). Perhaps the clearest expression of the 
principle of constitutional supremacy in Papua New Guinea is s 11 of the Constitution.11 
Section 11 highlights the operation of this principle by declaring the Constitution and the 
Organic Laws to be the supreme law of Papua New Guinea: 
 
                                                     
5 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed) Interpreting Constitutions, A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007). 
6 For example see the decision of Injia CJ for a summary of these principles in Reference by the Ombudsman 
Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 10, SC1058, 4 June 2010 [Ref by OCPNG]. 
7 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803), 1 Cr 137. 
8 SC Reference No 3 of 1999; Re Calling of the Parliament [1999] PGSC 55, [1999] PNGLR 285, 25 June 
1999. 
9 Constitution, Preamble. 
10 Section 99(3). 
11 Vergil Narokobi “The Papua New Guinea ‘Two Prime Minister’s Saga’: Parliament Testing the 
Supremacy of the Constitution” (2013) 24(2) PLR 92 at 93. 
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11. Constitution, etc, as Supreme Law. 
(1) This Constitution and the Organic Laws are the supreme law of Papua New 
Guinea, and, subject to Section 10 (construction of written laws) all acts 
(whether legislative, executive or judicial) that are inconsistent with them 
are, to the extent of the inconsistency, invalid and ineffective (emphasis 
added). 
Section 10 of the Constitution elaborates on the principle of the supremacy of the 
Constitution by stating all written laws are to be read subject to it. This means that if the 
NGDP and BSO are considered constitutional law, then they ought to play a significant 
role in assessing the performance of “all acts … legislative, executive or judicial …”.12 
Schedule 1.2.10 of the Constitution recognises the NGDP and BSO as constitutional law 
because of the duty to implement, which ss 25 and 63 create.   
The courts, especially the Supreme Court, have the role of determining the 
constitutional validity of the government’s decisions. This is given concrete expression 
in a number of ways, one of which is the Supreme Court’s special jurisdiction under s 19 
of the Constitution. Under s 19, a law or proposed law can be invalidated for offending 
the Constitution. Even an Organic Law (considered part of constitutional law) can be 
challenged on the basis it contravenes the Constitution.13 Section 19 allows certain 
authorities to file Supreme Court references for the Court to decide on the 
constitutionality of Bills, legislation, and decisions of Parliament such as the election of 
a Governor-General. 14  
C Paramount Consideration to the Dispensation of Justice 
The courts must give paramount consideration to the dispensation of justice.15  
Goldring suggests this may include the courts having recourse to abstract principles 
outside of the law.16 Early post-independence cases such as PLAR No 1 of 1980 relied on 
this constitutional provision amongst a host of others to reject the literal rule of statutory 
interpretation, and to adopt the purposive approach of interpretation where “the letter of 
                                                     
12 Constitution, s 11(1). 
13 See for example Ref by OCPNG, above n 6. 
14 See Special Reference by Morobe Provincial Executive; re Election of Governor General (2010) SC 
1085, 10 December 2010. 
15 Constitution, s 158(2). 
16 John Goldring The Constitution of Papua New Guinea (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1978) at 124. 
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the law should not prevail over the spirit of the law”.17 After reviewing several cases on 
this provision of the Constitution, Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr concluded the 
requirement for justice was justice according to law, and not based on concepts for 
example natural law.18  
D The Constitution as a Living Document 
The Constitution is considered a living document, dynamic in character, and speaking 
from time to time under sch 1.4 of the Constitution. Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr propose 
a possible interpretation of sch 1.4. Constitutional laws are to be interpreted in their 
current meaning and not according to what the text may have meant at the time of its 
enactment.19 Society changes and circumstances in existence at the time the Constitution 
was written may no longer exist. It is important for the law to develop as society evolves. 
This provision provides the legal basis to support this process.  
Balkin suggests the idea of a “living constitution” is not a rule of constitutional 
interpretation but one of constitutional construction.20 That is, the courts do not interpret 
the constitution to establish its meaning; rather, the courts ascribe a meaning that may not 
be envisaged from the text alone. There may be some merit in Balkin’s claim as changing 
social conditions may see the courts develop new case law rather than relying on new 
interpretations of the Constitution’s text and past precedents. For example, for the NGDP 
and BSO, the ascendancy of social rights discourse may require exploring different 
constructions consistent with international practice.21 
E Constitution Read as a Whole 
Each constitutional law is intended to be read as a whole. In cases where the word or 
expression used in the Constitution is clear and capable of being accorded its plain or 
ordinary meaning, the court should accord that meaning and apply it to the circumstances 
                                                     
17 PLAR No 1 of 1980; Request by Principal Legal Adviser on a Point of Law arising in a case where a 
Person tried upon Indictment has been Acquitted [1980] PGSC 15, [1980] PNGLR 326, 10 October 1980 
at 336. 
18 Brian Brunton and Duncan Colquhoun-Kerr The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea 
(University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1984) at 362. 
19 At 499. 
20 Jack M Balkin “Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution” (2009) 103 Northwest U L Rev 
549 at 550. 
21 For a general treatment of emerging trends in enforcement of social rights international and comparative 
law see Malcolm Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence, Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009). 
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of the case before it.22 This does not preclude the court’s reliance on the NGDP and BSO, 
which, by virtue of express provisions of the Constitution, must be considered in all cases 
where it is considered relevant. 
F Fair and Liberal Interpretation  
The Constitution is required to be read as a whole, and interpreted liberally: 
Sch. 1.5. Fair meaning to be given to language used. 
(1) Each Constitutional Law is intended to be read as a whole. 
(2) All provisions of, and all words, expressions and propositions in, a 
Constitutional Law shall be given their fair and liberal meaning. 
Injia CJ stated the court must ensure the legislature’s intention, spirit and purpose are 
achieved.23 The general thrust of interpreting the Constitution is to achieve, as far as 
possible, what the framers of the Constitution intended. This can be achieved by adopting 
a purposive approach and maintaining an awareness of changing social circumstances. In 
terms of the NGDP and BSO, however, the Supreme Court has considered them as aids 
to interpretation.24 With respect, the better view on this point is that judges may of course 
use the NGDP and BSO as interpretive aids, but there is also a constitutional duty to 
implement. As will be seen later in this chapter, this view is consistent with ss 25(3) and 
63(3) of the Constitution. 
G Self-executing Nature of the Constitution 
Section 11(2) of the Constitution states the Constitution’s provisions are self-executing 
to the fullest extent their respective nature and subject matter permits.25 Constitutional 
provisions must be implemented, unless there are express provisions of the Constitution 
stating otherwise. Because ss 25 and 63 impose a constitutional duty, their status as 
constitutional provisions means they must be complied with.  
                                                     
22 See Constitution, sch 1.5(1); and Re Organic Law on National Elections; Kuberi Epi v Tony Farapo 
(1983) (unreported) SC247 at 4. 
23 Ref by OCPNG, above n 6, at [30]. 
24 Per Injia CJ at [31]. 
25 Peter Bayne “Judicial Method and the Interpretation of Papua New Guinea’s Constitution” (1980) 11 FL 
Rev 121 at 129. 
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H Constitutional Directive to be Judicially Enlightened by the NGDP and BSO 
The methodology the Supreme Court should take with regard to the NGDP and BSO was 
decisively set out in two Supreme Court cases: Independent Leadership Tribunal;  
Ex Parte Sasakila (Sasakila);26 and SCR No 3 of 1986; Ref By Simbu Provincial Executive 
(Simbu).27 In Sasakila, the Court (Kearney J) stated statutory interpretation was 
essentially an intuitive and subjective exercise. The Court must, therefore, observe the 
rule of statutory interpretation, which included ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution. 
This means considering the NGDP and BSO to guide the process of arriving at a settled 
meaning.28 Developing this idea, Barnett J in Simbu said that in order to understand the 
Constitution, it was necessary to look at the Constitution as a whole including the NGDP 
set out in its Preamble.  
The relevant parts of those two cases, which establish the constitutional directive 
to consider the NGDP and BSO in constitutional interpretation, is considered in some 
length in chapters 5 and 9 of this thesis.29  
I Use of Certain Materials as Aids to Interpretation 
The Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report (CPC Report)30 and a number of 
documents involved in the preparation of the Constitution are considered aids to 
constitutional interpretation and application.31 Section 24 of the Constitution provides for 
the use of record of debates on the CPC Report from the pre-independence House of 
Assembly, the Constituent Assembly debates on the draft Constitution, the CPC Report, 
and other documents tabled in connection with the debates. Section 24 was intended to 
support the interpretation scheme in the Constitution, which rejected a literal approach 
and instead opted for a broad purposive method.32 In Haiveta, Leader of the Opposition 
v Wingti, Prime Minister; and Attorney-General; and National Parliament (Haiveta), the 
                                                     
26 The State v Independent Leadership Tribunal; Ex Parte Sasakila [1976] PNGLR 491, 5 November 1976 
[Sasakila]. 
27 SCR No 3 of 1986; Ref By Simbu Provincial Executive [1987] PGSC 17, [1987] PNGLR 151, 10 April 
1987 [Simbu]. 
28 A different view is advocated by Wilson J in Premdas v The State [1979] PGSC 20, [1979] PNGLR 329, 
1 September 1979 [Premdas]. 
29 Case law exemplifying this method of constitutional interpretation will be discussed in chapters 5 and 9. 
30 Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, Part One 
(Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) [CPC Report]. 
31 Constitution, s 24; see also Sasakila, above n 26, at 506 per Kearney J. 
32 AJ Regan and EP Wolfers “Aids to Interpretation of the Constitution – Some Preliminary Thoughts” 
(1986) 14 Melanesian LJ 153 at 156–157. 
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Supreme Court held the spirit and aspirations of the Constitution were to be given 
prominence.33  
The CPC Report is an important documentary source the courts were to use to 
realise the ideals of the Constitution. Apart from the documents stipulated in s 24, it was 
unlikely other foreign sources could be relied on.34 The Constitution was a home-grown 
document, formulated in Papua New Guinea by Papua New Guineans.35 For this reason 
the CPC Report is used heavily to guide the interpretation process. In an assessment of 
the cases up to 1986, the CPC Report was identified as the main document the courts used 
from the list of documents identified in s 24.36 That trend has continued,37 perhaps 
because the CPC Report is more accessible than the other documents listed in s 24.38 
The Constitutional Documents (Manner of Proof) Act 1976 was enacted to 
facilitate the implementation of s 24 of the Constitution. It sets out the manner in which 
the courts can accept for use the documents enumerated in s 24. For the CPC Report, all 
that is necessary is the production of a copy that bears the signature of all fourteen 
members of the CPC. 
Other documents identified in s 24 include the House of Assembly and 
Constituent Assembly debates. This thesis does not propose to consider any of them in 
any detail as the Constituent Assembly accepted almost entirely the proposals on the 
content of the NGDP and BSO. This means the CPC Report adequately reflects the 
importance of the NGDP and BSO.39  
                                                     
33 Haiveta, Leader of the Opposition v Wingti, Prime Minister; and Attorney-General; and National 
Parliament [1994] PGSC 6, [1994] PNGLR 197, 25 August 1994 [Haiveta]– see especially the decision of 
Kapi DCJ. 
34 CPC Report, above n 30, at ch 1 [2]. 
35 Goldring, above 16, at 15. 
36 Regan and Wolfers, above n 32, at 166. 
37 An assessment of the implementation record of the court is provided in chapter 5. 
38 The CPC Report is electronically available free (and perhaps relatively more easily accessible) compared 
to the other documents provided for in s 24 of the Constitution. A copy of the CPC Report is available at 
the Pacific Islands Legal Institute website: <www.paclii.org>. See also Edward P Wolfers “Finding the 
Law in the Pacific Islands: Observations with Special Reference to Papua New Guinea and Solomon 
Islands” (1982) 10 Int’l J Legal Info 93 at 94. 
39 Regan and Wolfers caution against exclusive use of the CPC Report in constitutional interpretation and 
application as the Constitution differs to some extent from the CPC Report: see Regan and Wolfers, above 
n 32, at 161. One noted difference in terms of the NGDP and BSO is on implementation: see CPC Report, 
above n 30, at 2/25. 
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J Home-Grown Constitution 
Another principle of constitutional interpretation that has emerged over time is the courts’ 
assertion the Constitution is home-grown, which is reflected in a wariness to rely on 
constitutional cases and doctrines from other jurisdictions. This was established in the 
case of Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law 
on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (Fly River).40 In Fly River, the Court 
refused to accept the Basic Structure doctrine enunciated in Keshavanada Bharati v State 
of Kerala.41 The Court instead relied on the provisions of the Constitution to decide the 
case.  
In addition to the Constitution, sources of the underlying law in Papua New 
Guinea include English common law and equity cases decided prior to 16 September 
1975.42 Cases after that period are only of persuasive value. This thesis takes the view the 
Constitution does not prevent the use of foreign cases because the Constitution itself states 
it is a living document. Cases from other countries help develop Papua New Guinea 
jurisprudence by providing instructive experience. For example, s 39 of the Constitution 
provides factors for the court to consider when deciding whether a law is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society, which requires resort to international human rights 
instruments. Many cases in Papua New Guinea dealing with constitutional issues draw 
useful analogies with cases from other countries, and consider how similar provisions in 
their jurisdiction have been interpreted. 
III Sections 25 and 63 of the Constitution  
Sections 25 and 63 of the Constitution provide for the implementation of the NGDP and 
BSO. There is no case law that has attempted to reconcile the non-justiciable and 
justiciable aspects of the NGDP and BSO.43 This thesis suggests a careful reading of  
ss 25 and 63, taking into account the principles of constitutional interpretation, indicates 
the most legally sound view is that the NGDP and BSO have a measure of justiciability 
                                                     
40 Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates [2010] PGSC 3, SC1057, 7 July 2010 at [100]–[112]. 
41 Kesavananda v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 255, (1973) AIR 146. 
42 Underlying Law Act 2000, s 3; see also Constitution, sch 2.2. 
43 Although Sasakila, above n 26, and Premdas, above n 36, considered s 25(3) and s 63(3), they did not 
look at the issue of justiciability. Other cases after that such as Medaing on appeal, above n 4, focused on 
the issue of justiciability. 
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dependant on the nature of a public authority’s function, moderated by whether the 
governmental body’s action is reasonable or not.  
The specific principles of constitutional interpretation discussed above, which 
have influenced this thesis’ interpretation of ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution as indirectly 
justiciable are: 
 The CPC Report; 
 The supremacy of the Constitution; 
 Reading the Constitution as a whole; 
 Fair and liberal interpretation of the Constitution; 
 Self-executing nature of the Constitution; and 
 Constitutional directive to be judicially enlightened by the NGDP and BSO. 
Other principles of constitutional interpretation of the Constitution play a role, too, and 
may be referred to in the discussion below.  
A The CPC on Implementation 
It is important to point out what the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) 
recommended in terms of implementation of the NGDP and BSO. Arguably, what the 
CPC had in mind was a form of “indirect justiciability”, which is best expressed in ss 25 
and 63 of the Constitution. The term indirect justiciability was first used by Brunton and 
Colquoun-Kerr although they appear to have limited it to the development of the 
underlying law, and not to the general duty of all governmental bodies to implement the 
NGDP and BSO.44 The concept underpinning the general duty is that where a NGDP 
and/or BSO can be applied, it should be implemented, unless Parliament expressly states 
otherwise, or it is unreasonable to do so. This idea is further developed below. 
The CPC devoted some attention to dealing with Goal 3 on “National Sovereignty 
and Self Reliance” separately, proposing an Investment Code.45 A code would provide a 
detailed guide to implement Goal 3 of the NGDP. The code was to be enacted as part of 
the Constitution. It is unclear whether this code was intended to be justiciable, but the fact 
the CPC wanted it to be given “the force which provisions of Constitution should have” 
                                                     
44 Brunton and  Colquhoun-Kerr, above n 18 at 69. 
45 CPC Report, above n 30, at 2/16 [134]. 
 35 
suggests it may have been intended to be legally enforceable.46 The Constituent Assembly 
did not take up this proposal. It opted to have the investment code established in ordinary 
legislation to give the government greater freedom to develop its investment policies. 
As to the NGDP generally, the CPC wanted all government activities and 
institutions to be based on the NGDP and be directed towards achieving them.47  
The NGDP were to guide judicial interpretation.48 The CPC elaborated that in the event 
of an ambiguity of a law, including constitutional law, the interpretation consistent with 
the NGDP should be preferred.49 Importantly, the NGDP would not be directly 
justiciable, but should not be “regarded by any court, other adjudicatory tribunal or 
institution as being of less weight than other directly justiciable provisions”.50  
To strengthen the implementation process, the CPC proposed a body that would review 
laws and policies to ensure consistency with the NGDP and BSO (as well as with human 
rights and freedoms).51 The CPC did not clarify whether the body would do that before 
or after enactment of laws and policies. But it is possible to infer that as much pre-
independence legislation was simply adopted at independence, the work would relate to 
both existing and new laws and policies.  
It should be noted ss 25(3) and s 63(3) of the Constitution use more direct 
language than that of the CPC on enforcement, but with the same intention of giving 
prominence to the NGDP and BSO in decision-making by governmental bodies.  
In addition, the Constitution makes the NGDP and BSO directly enforceable when it 
comes to the Leadership Code in ss 25(4) and 63(4). The reasons for this difference was 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
B NGDP and BSO as Part of the Preamble of the Constitution  
The Interpretation Act 1975 defines the preamble of the Constitution under s 3(1), which 
includes the NGDP and BSO. The NGDP and BSO appear before Part 1 of the 
Constitution, so they are considered part of the preamble, something the Constitution 
itself reinforces under Schedule 13(1): 
Sch. 1.3(1). Form of the Constitutional Laws. 
                                                     
46 At 2/16 [130]–[152]. 
47 At 2/1 [6]. 
48 At 2/25. 
49 At 2/25. 
50 At 2/25. 
51 At 2/25. 
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(1) The Preamble to this Constitution (being the provisions that end 
immediately before the heading to Part I.) forms part of this Constitution, 
but expresses general principles and therefore must be read subject to any 
other provision of this Constitution, though it may be used as an aid to 
interpretation in cases of doubt (emphasis added). 
If the NGDP and BSO were to remain as a part of the preamble only, they would 
be used only as an aid to interpretation in cases of doubt. But this position is subject to 
any other provision of the Constitution, and the Constitution is required to be read as a 
whole. As a result, ss 25 and 63 confer a different status on the NGDP and BSO when 
compared to the other parts of the preamble.52 
C The Concept of Justiciability  
Where a question is non-justiciable, it cannot be heard by the court.53 On the other hand, 
a justiciable dispute is one the court can determine.54 A provision of the law that is 
justiciable entitles a person who is aggrieved to come to court when that provision is 
breached. There are a number of provisions in the Constitution that are stated to be non-
justiciable.55 Sections 25 and 63 are two provisions that refer to the interaction between 
justiciability and non-justiciability in the context of the NGDP and BSO. 
As an example of justiciability, s 14 of the Constitution establishes constitutional 
procedures to amend the Constitution. If this procedure is not complied with when 
parliament amends the Constitution, the constitutionality of the amendment can be 
challenged for non-compliance with s 14 of the Constitution.56 This is because this 
provision is justiciable.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, an example of non-justiciability would be s 
153(2) of the Constitution which states the procedures of the National Executive Council 
(NEC) are non-justiciable. If the NEC made a decision that did not comply with its 
                                                     
52 Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above n 18, at 69. 
53 Constitution, sch 1.7. “Non-justiciable” states: 
Where a Constitutional Law declares a question to be non-justiciable, the question may not be heard or 
determined by any court or tribunal, but nothing in this section limits the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman 
Commission or of any other tribunal established for the purposes of Division III.2 (leadership code). 
54 Ernest A Jelf “Justiciable Disputes” Transactions of the Grotius Society Vol 7, Problems of Peace and 
War, Papers Read before the Society in the Year 1921 (1921) 59–71 (published by Cambridge University 
Press on behalf of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law) <http.labs.jstor.org>. 
55 Constitution, ss 25(1), 63(1), 86(4), 87(2), 99(4), 134, 153(2), 153(3), 170(4), 187C(7) and 187D(3).   
56 The procedures set out in s 14 of the Constitution are mandatory. Non-compliance with them would 
render a constitutional amendment unconstitutional and invalid. See In the Matter of Constitutional Validity 
of Constitutional Amendment (Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments) [1995] PGSC 12; 
[1995] PNGLR 481 (20 September 1995). 
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internal procedures, the decision could not be challenged in court because s 153(2) makes 
the NEC procedures non-justiciable.57 To reiterate, “justiciablity” determines whether an 
issue can be resolved in court. It creates a right or cause of action determinable in the 
court. 
The concept of justiciability is often used in international law.58 The American 
Constitution was probably the first to apply it in a domestic setting. The question of a 
dispute’s justiciability has also entered into the debate on the enforcement of social rights. 
This is useful when speaking about the NGDP and BSO because constitutions often give 
social rights the status of non-justiciable state policy.59 In considering whether a social 
right can be enforced there are a number of “normative preconditions” that must exist: 
the claim, the setting, and the consequences of the claim.60 The claim relates to the 
identification of the particular right from a legal instrument.61 The setting is the judicial 
or quasi-judicial body that has jurisdiction to hear the claim.62  
The consequences of the claim entails the remedy the body hearing the claim can order 
for a breach.63 Seen in this way, a legal dispute would be articulated with specificity. 
These three features that ensure the justiciability of a social right can be applied to 
appreciate the extent to which the NGDP and BSO can be made justiciable following the 
provisions of ss 25 and 63.  Avenues for enforcement of the NGDP and BSO as a legal 
claim, and the available remedies on the basis of ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution can be 
explored under such a framework.  
Another important factor to be considered about the extent of the justiciability of 
the NGDP and BSO is the appropriateness of the court to determine the dispute.64  
The importance of the question or the parties involved does not determine justiciability. 
                                                     
57 See Lenalia J’s decision in the National Court in Tiensten v Koim [2011] PGNC 127; N4420, 14 October 
2011. A National Executive Council (NEC) decision can however be challenged for illegality, in that the 
NEC made the decision contrary to law. See also Marat v Hanjung Power Ltd [2014] PGSC 33; SC1357, 
4 July 2014. 
58 Jelf, above n 5. 
59 See generally Langford, above n 21. 
60 Takele Soboka Bulto “The Indirect Approach to Promote Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in RH Murray (ed) Human Rights Litigation and the 
Domestication of International Human Rights Standards in Sub-Saharan Africa (jointly published by The 
Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Nairobi and The Swedish Section of the 
International Commission of Jurists, Stockholm, 2009) 136 at 136.  
61 At 136. 
62 At 136. 
63 At 136. 
64 For instance the analysis of justiciability in the context of judicial review on the exercise of the power of 
mercy has not been clear cut. See BV Harris “Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Prerogative of Mercy” 
(2003) 62 The Cambridge Law Journal 631 at 631. 
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Justiciability is a status conferred by law. One of the main reasons behind not conferring 
such a status is that there may be other, more appropriate avenues to effectively resolve 
disputes around a particular law. The idea that certain constitutional provisions are non-
justiciable was taken up in the CPC Report, and found its way into the Constitution. 
Conferring a non-justiciable status on a constitutional provision highlights the importance 
of the provision, but refers any dispute arising from such provision to another body (other 
than the courts) to resolve.  
D Duty to Implement Under ss 25 and 63 
1 Introduction 
Sections 25 and 63 make the duty to implement the NGDP and BSO a substantive 
provision of the Constitution: 
25. Implementation of the National Goals and Directive Principles  
(1) Except to the extent provided in Subsections (3) and (4), the National Goals 
and Directive Principles are non-justiciable [emphasis added]. 
(2) Nevertheless, it is the duty of all governmental bodies to apply and give 
effect to them as far as lies within their respective powers. 
(3) Where any law, or any power conferred by any law (whether the power be 
of a legislative, judicial, executive or administrative or other kind), can 
reasonably be understood, applied, exercised or enforced, without failing 
to give effect to the intention of the Parliament or to this Constitution,  in 
such a way as to give effect to the National Goals and Directive Principles, 
or at least not to derogate them, it is to be understood, applied or exercised, 
and shall be enforced that way (emphasis added). 
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman 
Commission or any other body prescribed for the purposes of Division III. 
2 (leadership code), which shall take the National Goals and Directive 
Principles fully into account in all cases as appropriate. 
In similar terms to s 25, s 63 of the Constitution states: 
63. Enforcement of the Basic Social Obligations 
(1) Except to the extent provided in Subsections (3) and (4), the Basic Social 
Obligations are non-justiciable [emphasis added]. 
(2) Nevertheless, it is the duty of all governmental bodies to encourage 
compliance with them as far as lies within their respective powers. 
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(3) Where any law, or any power conferred by any law (whether the power be 
of a legislative, judicial, executive or administrative or other kind), can 
reasonably be understood, applied, exercised or enforced, without failing 
to give effect to the intention of the Parliament or to this Constitution, in 
such a way as to give effect to the Basic Social Obligations, or at least not 
to derogate them, it is to be understood, applied or exercised, and shall be 
enforced that way (emphasis added). 
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman 
Commission or any other body prescribed for the purposes of Division III. 
2 (leadership code), which shall take the Basic Social Obligations fully 
into account in all cases as appropriate. 
Clearly, ss 25 and 63 create a constitutional duty. However, the more pressing 
issue following from the duty to implement the NGDP and BSO is the question of its 
legal nature.  
There are two possible competing approaches for the proper legal characterisation 
of ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution. The first is the “interpretive aid” approach, and 
the second, argued by this thesis, is “indirect justiciability”.  
This thesis contends the interpretive aid approach, while a legally sound exercise of 
“judicial power” under ss 25(3) and 63(3), is not the only legal avenue available.  
The other more compelling role of ss 25(3) and 63(3) would be that they confer an 
indirectly justiciable duty on governmental bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO. 
These two approaches will be discussed now beginning with the current judicially 
sanctioned position, the interpretive aid approach.   
2 Current jurisprudence on the use of ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution: The 
interpretive aid approach  
In the courts’ view, ss 25(3) and 63(3) are provisions outlining rules of statutory 
interpretation. For example, in Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New 
Guinea (ROCPNG), the Supreme Court held the NGDP and BSO could only be used to 
interpret the law and could not determine the constitutionality of laws.65 Interestingly, the 
reasoning in ROCPNG does not preclude indirect justiciability. ROCPNG was followed 
a year later by Medaing on appeal which ruled on a 2–1 majority that ss 25(3) and 63(3) 
                                                     
65 Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 40, SC1088, 17 
December 2010 [ROCPNG].  
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are rules of statutory interpretation. An analysis of both cases is presented below as well 
as in chapters 5, 7 and 9. 
(a) Judicial definition of NGDP and BSO as interpretive aids 
Sections 25 and 63 of the Constitution have been judicially determined as providing for 
the NGDP and BSO to be used as an interpretive aid. This reading of ss 25 and 63 of the 
Constitution stems from Kearney J’s decision in Sasakila:66 
The process of statutory interpretation is essentially intuitive and subjective, in 
the absence of rules consistently applied. The Act is a Constitutional Law and 
thus subject to the general principles of interpretation set out in Constitution ss 
10, 25 (3), 63 (3) and Basic Social Obligation (a) … 
An interpretive aid, is essentially a tool for the courts to use to understand the 
meaning of a law or perhaps to confer a meaning on the law when two or more options 
are available. An example of how the NGDP and BSO are used as interpretive aids can 
be found in Haiveta.  In Haiveta, s 142(5) of the Constitution was the subject of the appeal. 
There were two different meanings of s 142(5) argued for by the appellant and the 
respondents respectively. Kapi DCJ preferred the meaning which accorded with the 
NGDP and BSO. In this instance the NGDP and BSO were used as interpretive aids.  
Of itself, the interpretive aid approach is sound. But Supreme Court decisions such 
as Medaing on appeal have held the interpretive aid approach is the only legally and 
constitutionally acceptable means of using s 25(3) (and by implication s 63(3)) of the 
Constitution. This is where the difficulty arises especially with the implementation of the 
NGDP and BSO. This issue will be discussed further in the next chapter on impediments 
to implementation.  
3 The new approach: Indirect justiciability and its justification  
(a) Background 
As it is clear there are exceptions to non-justiciability, the idea of indirect justiciability 
may best express how far the NGDP and BSO can be judicially enforced through a 
statement of claim to a court. 
                                                     
66 Sasakila, above n 26, at 507. 
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Constitutions from countries that have entrenched directive principles have not 
used the type of provision Papua New Guinea has adopted. For example, in the 
Constitution of Ireland (perhaps the first country to have directive principles in its 
Constitution) state policy is non-justiciable.67 India takes a similar approach, having been 
inspired by the Irish Constitution, and its state policy and directive principles are 
designated as non-justiciable.68 However, courts in India have circumvented non-
justiciability by interpreting justiciable rights in a way that results in the implementation 
of directive principles.69 In Uganda, the directive principles are non-justiciable, but the 
President must provide an annual report to Parliament on the extent of implementation.70  
Directive principles are often treated as social rights.71 In South Africa, the 
Constitution has no directive principles but makes social rights justiciable along with civil 
and political rights and freedoms.72 Therefore for Papua New Guinea the starting point 
for interpreting ss 25 and 63 must be the text of the Constitution, and its own developed 
principles of constitutional interpretation.  
In other countries directive principles are treated as non-justiciable, but what may 
be instructive are the mechanisms other countries use to address the question of how the 
law mediates the idea of separation of powers when it comes to implementing directive 
principles and/or social rights. An example from South Africa that helpfully illustrates 
the point is discussed below and also in chapter 9. 
The idea of indirect justiciability appears in the CPC Report. The CPC Report 
must be considered in interpreting the Constitution.73 The relevant part of the CPC Report 
states:74 
(2) Except to the extent provided for in this recommendation, the National 
Goals and Directive Principles shall not be directly justiciable. However, 
these goals and principles should not be regarded by any court, other 
adjudicatory tribunal or institution of government as being of less weight 
than other directly justiciable provisions. 
                                                     
67 Constitution of Ireland, art 45. 
68 Constitution of India, art 37. 
69 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v India [1981] 2 SCR 516. Justice Bhagwati stated the right to life “derives its 
life breath from the Directive Principles” (at 103). 
70 Constitution of Uganda, art 1(1). 
71 Patrick Macklem and Craig Scott “Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights 
in a New South African Constitution” (1992) 141 U Pa L Rev 1 at 116.  
72 See, for example, s 26, the right to housing, under the South African Constitution. 
73 Constitution, s 24. 
74 CPC Report, above n 30, at 2/25 [3]. 
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Support for the indirect justiciability of the NGDP and BSO is found in the pre-
independence Papua New Guinea self-government comment on the CPC Report, 
although they did not use the term “indirect justiciability”:75 
The CPC recommendation on the application of the National Goals seem to be 
aimed at ensuring that government bases policies and actions upon them as far as 
is practicable and that court decisions should be made following the spirit of the 
goals as far as this is consistent with the law they must apply. Courts are not 
however to apply the goals as law but must administer the law as it stands … the 
government agrees with this approach. 
The government believed their proposal for s 25 best expressed the CPC’s 
intention while avoiding confusion and ambiguity.76 Because similar wording to s 25 is 
used for s 63, the same can be said for the BSO. The CPC did not say the NGDP and BSO 
were non-justiciable; but that they were not to be directly justiciable.  
The interpretation of the CPC position noted above is therefore reinforced. 
As noted earlier, Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr picked up the idea of indirect 
justiciability, but only in the context of the development of the underlying law.77  
They did not elaborate on whether the idea of indirect justiciability could be applied to 
other sources of law. Brunton’s and Colquhoun-Kerr’s view, as far as can be ascertained, 
is that where the source (for example customary law and common law) of an underlying 
law is inconsistent with the NGDP, it would not be adopted; but it would be indirectly 
justiciable.  
There is no provision in the Constitution expressly requiring consistency with the 
NGDP and BSO, but courts should nevertheless consider them in the development of the 
underlying law.78 Taylor briefly alluded to this idea in her article on the justiciability of 
the NGDP and BSO, but she did not use the term indirect justiciability.79 In Taylor’s view, 
the consistency of executive and administrative decisions with the NGDP and BSO must 
also be considered (and not just the underlying law).80 This thesis takes the view that such 
                                                     
75 Government Paper “Proposals on Constitutional Principles and Explanatory Notes” (Port Moresby, 
August 1974) at 4. 
76 At 3. 
77 Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above n 18, at 69. The Underlying Law Act 2000 was passed subsequently, 
and supersedes sch 2.3.3 of the Constitution, which Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr rely on; see Jennifer 
Corrin Care and Jean G Zorn “Legislating Pluralism, Statutory Developments in Melanesian Customary 
Law” (2001) 33 J Legal Pluralism 49. The Underlying Law Act will be discussed in chapter 9.  
78 Constitution, sch 2.3. 
79 Meg Taylor “The Constitution and the Environment” in Anthony J Regan, Owen Jessep and Eric L Kwa 
(eds) Twenty Years of the Papua New Guinea Constitution (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2001) 333. 
80 At 340. 
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a position entitles an aggrieved person to come to court for non-compliance with the 
NGDP and/or BSO, but in an indirect manner. 
(b) Definition of indirect justiciability  
Reading s 25 of the Constitution as a whole, and likewise for s 63, ss 25(2) and 63(2) 
requires governmental bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO “as far as lies within 
their respective powers”. Consequently, ss 25(3) and 63(3), which are an exception to 
non-justiciability (provided for in ss 25(1) and 63(1)) require the exercise of “legislative 
power”, “executive power”, “judicial power”, and “administrative power” to be exercised 
in a way that enforces the NGDP and BSO; or at least in a way that does not derogate 
from them. The legal justification for this interpretation (for indirect justiciability) is 
discussed below. 
The indirect justiciability of the NGDP and BSO, as set out in ss 25 and 63 of the 
Constitution, differs from justiciability as understood in litigation arising from a breach 
of statutory provisions. It is not constitutionally permissible to directly compare statutory 
provisions with the NGDP and/or BSO and argue inconsistency. However, inconsistency 
can be inferred as follows: a governmental body (which includes the legislature, the 
executive, and the courts) must carry out its statutory (and constitutional) functions in a 
way that either implements the NGDP and BSO, or at least does not derogate from them. 
Failure to do so is a justiciable matter. Justiciability is dependent on the extent to which 
the governmental body has fulfilled its lawful functions in a way compatible with the 
NGDP and BSO. 
Indirect justiciability is, therefore, a legal process where substantive legal claims 
(that is justiciable claims) or cause(s) of action are influenced or directed by underlying 
principles or higher norms. In and of themselves these principles and norms do not entitle 
a person to claim redress from an alleged offender, but they work in tandem, perhaps in 
a symbiotic relationship, to achieve society’s higher goals. Where an opportunity exists 
for a governmental body to exercise its functions to implement the NGDP and/or BSO 
and it fails to do so, an aggrieved person can make a claim against that governmental 
body for failure to implement. The different types of claim that can be made under indirect 
justiciability, its scope and limitations, and type of remedies available, are discussed 
below and in chapters 7 and 9. 
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(c) Judicial attempts to consider indirect justiciability 
Although the terminology of “indirect justiciability” has not used by Papua New Guinea 
courts, a survey of cases reveals at least two attempts to consider indirect justiciability in 
a way similar to that presented in this thesis. The first case, decided in 2010, was Ref by 
OCPNG (not to be confused with ROCPNG discussed above), which will be discussed 
later in the chapter. The second case, Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd 
(Medaing), decided in 2011, is considered here.81 
Medaing tested Taylor’s view on the justiciability of the NGDP and BSO.  
The main difference between the interpretive aid approach and indirect justiciability in 
Medaing was the plaintiff actually relied on the NGDP and BSO as the basis of his claim 
against the defendants. In a case where the NGDP and BSO are used as an interpretive 
aid, the courts would have recourse to the NGDP and BSO proprio motu. 
The three prominent issues in Medaing were whether the discharge of mine waste 
(Deep Sea Tailings Placement (DSTP)) into Astrolobe Bay in Madang Province of Papua 
New Guinea: (a) amounted to the tort of nuisance; (b) was contrary to the Environment 
Act 2000; and (c) conflicted with National Goal 4 on natural resources and the 
environment as it would be destructive to the marine ecology. The Court (Cannings J) 
denied the plaintiff’s claim to public nuisance and breach of the Environmental Act but 
on the third issue held it was within the Court’s province to express an opinion on whether 
DSTP would be contrary to the NGDP. 
Justice Cannings was of the view the DSTP was contrary to Goal 4 on the 
environment.82 Section 25(3) of the Constitution relates to the exercise of judicial power 
in a way that promotes the NGDP. A liberal definition of judicial power which the 
Constitution enjoins the Court to undertake (discussed above) would enable Cannings J 
to do what he did. But Cannings J did not go so far as to express the idea of indirect 
justiciability.  
The better approach would have been for Cannings J to examine whether a 
governmental body had exercised its power to fulfil the NGDP and/or BSO. If it had not, 
then an appropriate order would be made to remedy the non-implementation of the NGDP 
and/or BSO. In this case could have been an injunction to stop the discharge of 
                                                     
81 Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGNC 95, N4340, 26 July 2011[Medaing]. 
82 At [121]. 
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environmentally deleterious waste or for the government to carefully consider any 
competing interests (as promoted by the NGDP and/or BSO) before it issued a permit. 
If the court took an interpretive approach in Medaing, it is submitted it would have 
been limited in examining the implications of the waste discharge on the environment to 
the NGDP and/or BSO. The court would only have considered the NGDP and BSO if a 
question of interpretation arose. Since no question of interpretation arose, the scope for 
applying the NGDP and/or BSO would be limited. The majority in Medaing on appeal 
relied solely on the common law of public nuisance, and denied the appellant’s claim to 
prevent environmental degradation. Indirect justiciability would have produced a 
different result as it would have raised a cause of action (with an attached substantive 
right) for the courts to consider and decide on.   
Another interesting aspect of the Medaing case was the Court’s declaration of 
inconsistency with the NGDP, although it was not binding. The non-binding declaration 
the National Court issued in Medaing may be another useful way to approach the idea of 
interconnectedness between the different arms of government (interconnectedness is 
discussed in chapter 6). As this thesis notes in chapter 10, a non-binding declaration is 
sanctioned by ss 25(2) and 63(2) of the Constitution, which supports implementation of 
the NGDP and/or BSO, but it does not align with the idea of indirect justiciability 
premised on ss 25(3) and 63(3). This is because indirect justiciability would, in an 
appropriate case, result in a substantive remedy requiring the governmental body to 
rectify its non-attendance to the NGDP and/or BSO.  
(d) Justification from current jurisprudence for differentiating NGDP and 
BSO as not merely aids to interpretation 
There are four reasons justifying the application of indirect justiciability. Each one of 
these reasons will be developed further to support the case for indirect justiciability. 
(i) The duty to implement 
The CPC did consider the NGDP and BSO to be an aid to interpretation, but it was to be 
more than an aid to interpretation. The CPC envisaged active reference to the NGDP and 
BSO. Reliance on the CPC’s intention reinforces the view that ss 25 and 63 create a 
specific constitutional duty and a role beyond merely interpretation. 
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The Preamble to the Constitution establishes the duty to implement the NGDP 
and BSO. For the NGDP it states: 
WE HEREBY PROCLAIM the following aims as our National Goals, and direct all 
persons and bodies, corporate and un-incorporate, to be guided by these our declared 
Directives in pursuing and achieving our aims:– … 
The BSO is prefaced: 
WE HEREBY DECLARE that all persons in our country have the following basic 
obligations to themselves and their descendants, to each other, and to the Nation:– … 
Sections 25 and 63 provide the implementation mechanism for the Preamble. 
Sections 25(2) and 63(2) state all governmental bodies have a duty to implement the 
NGDP and BSO respectively. They are constitutional provisions that confer a duty on 
governmental bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO. This is a clear signal to the 
courts they must look at legal mechanisms to give effect to the NGDP and BSO.  
The question is whether designating the NGDP and BSO as interpretive aids will achieve 
this requirement. But it is a question ROCPNG and the majority in Medaing on appeal 
did not confront. This shows a lack of appreciation of the duty to implement, which is 
more than a rule of statutory interpretation. 
If ss 25 and 63 were to be defined as aids to constitutional interpretation, the 
Constituent Assembly might have used similar text in the provision immediately before 
s 25 of the Constitution: “s 24. Use of Certain Materials as Aids to Interpretation.” 
Section 24 provides for the courts to have recourse to certain materials as aids to 
interpretation. This is not the same with s 25, which is titled “Implementation of the 
National Goals and Directive Principles”; or s 63 “Enforcement of the Basic Social 
Obligations”. Sections 25(2) and 63(2) both impose a specific duty on governmental 
bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO as “far as lies within their respective powers”. 
There is, therefore, an obvious distinction between a duty to implement, and an approach 
that treats the NGDP and BSO as an aid to interpretation. 
To strengthen the position advanced by this thesis, it is helpful to consider texts 
of legislation from comparable jurisdictions which provide for certain norms to be used 
as aids to interpretation. The United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 states: 
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3. Interpretation of legislation. 
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is 
compatible with the Convention rights. 
A comparable provision can be found in section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990: 
6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with 
the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning 
shall be preferred to any other meaning. 
Both these provisions are considered as aids to interpretation. But in the case of 
Papua New Guinea, the Constitution specifically places a duty on all governmental 
bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO. It is, therefore, an error on the courts’ part to 
consign the NGDP and BSO to the role of being merely interpretive aids. The phrase 
“can reasonably be understood, applied, exercised or enforced …” in s 25(3) and 63(3) 
does not have “can reasonably be interpreted” limit on its function as an interpretive aid.  
Another compelling reason why the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
provisions cited above may not provide an appropriate comparison is that they relate 
mainly to norms arising from negative rights or civil and political rights and freedoms.  
They do not address social, economic and cultural goals in the way ss 25 and 63 of the 
Papua New Guinea Constitution do. Treating the NGDP and BSO as a mere interpretive 
aid would not sufficiently account for positive rights relating to social, cultural and 
economic advancement. NGDP and BSO have a much more important role than that 
given the Constitution states the NGDP and BSO must be complied with. Further, the 
Constitution states its provisions are self-executing to the fullest extent possible.83 
(ii) Limitation of non-justiciability in ss 25(1) and 63(1) 
A plain reading of ss 25(1) and 63(1) of the Constitution reveals non-justiciability applies 
to s 25(2) and s 63(2) only; but not to s 25(3) and s 25(4) (NGDP), and s 63(3) and s 63(4) 
(BSO). The courts have not given serious judicial attention to the extent of non-
justiciability stated in ss 25(1) and 63(1). This was the error the Supreme Court majority 
                                                     
83 Constitution, s 11(2). Discussed above in principles of constitutional interpretation. 
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in Medaing on appeal made when it made a blanket application of non-justiciability of 
the NGDP (and BSO by implication).  
The majority in Medaing on appeal consisting of Sawong and Hartshorn JJ 
approached the issue by first outlining the definition of non-justiciability in sch 1.7 of the 
Constitution. This was an indication non-justiciability would influence their reasoning. 
Consequently, Sawong and Hartshorn JJ went on to state:84 
The extent provided in s 25(3) for the National Goals and Directive Principles to 
be heard or determined is in relation to whether a law can be reasonably enforced 
to give effect to or not derogate from the National Goals and Directive Principles. 
It is not provided in s 25(3) that the National Court can give an opinion or make 
a declaration as to whether a law or power conferred by a law is contrary to the 
National Goal. By giving an opinion or making a declaration, the trial judge heard 
and made a determination as to a National Goal to an extent not provided for 
under s 25(3) of the Constitution.  
In Medaing, the plaintiff had specifically pleaded the application of the NGDP in 
their cause of action. As a result, the court (Cannings J) made a ruling in the plaintiff’s 
favour. The majority in Medaing on appeal appear to be saying this is not a proper use of 
the NGDP; rather it is for the court to apply the NGDP when an issue of interpretation 
arises. Such an approach does not adequately explain the limitations of non-justiciability 
established by ss 25(1) and 63(1). 
(iii) Non-application of principles of constitutional interpretation 
A careful reading of ROCPNG shows the Supreme Court took a cursory approach to 
interpreting s 25, and did not carefully construct that provision. The Supreme Court 
provides its reasoning in four short paragraphs. The most detailed was para 23 where the 
Court merely asserted its position with no substantive justification:  
Except where the Constitution itself provides the NGDP and BSO [are] to be 
used as an aid to the interpretation of specific statutes, they cannot be used as a 
ground to strike down legislation: see s 38 of the Constitution. The provisions of 
s 25(3) and 63(3) provide guide to exercise of power conferred by statute and of 
themselves do not provide a ground to invalidate an offending legislation.  
The Court did not explain how s 38 of the Constitution supported its position that the 
NGDP and BSO are only interpretive aids. 
                                                     
84 Medaing on appeal, above n 4 at [163]. 
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Medaing on appeal maintained the position established by ROCPNG, although 
the Court did not expressly refer to ROCPNG in its decision. But a 2–1 majority ruled in 
favour of the NGDP and BSO being interpretive aids only under ss 25(3) and 63(3) of 
the Constitution. Davani J, in upholding Cannings J’s decision in the National Court 
(discussed below), relied on sch 1.5 of the Constitution, which enjoins courts to interpret 
the Constitution liberally, to influence her interpretation of s 25(3):  
123. Section 25(3) of the Constitution cannot be any clearer. If given its fair 
and liberal interpretation, states in no uncertain terms that a Judicial 
power, which includes the power to issue any declaration by a Court and 
which is also a judicial power to issue administrative relief being a 
Declaration, is issued to give effect to the National Goals and Directive 
Principles because it must be enforced in that way (s 25(3) of the 
Constitution). 
The minority (Davani J) in Medaing on appeal attempted to apply principles of 
constitutional interpretation before arriving at her position. The majority (Sawong and 
Hartshorn JJ), as the ROCPNG Court did, merely asserted their position with no reference 
to principles of constitutional interpretation or case authorities.  
Another important constitutional principle of interpretation is for each 
constitutional law to be read as a whole (Constitution, sch 1.5(1)). This would mean ss 
25(1) and 63(1) alone should not dominate the interpretation of ss 25 and 63. Sections 
25(1) and 63(1) first state there is an exception to the non-justiciability of the NGDP and 
BSO. This is in ss 25(3), 63(3), 25(4) and 63(4). Immediately following ss 25(1) and 
63(1), ss 25(2) and 63(2) use the word “Nevertheless …” it is the duty of all 
governmental bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO. A synonym for nevertheless is 
“notwithstanding”. So, despite ss 25(1) and 63(1), the NGDP and BSO are required to 
be implemented. The question that arises is how ss 25(1), 63(1), and ss 25(2) and 63(2) 
can be reconciled. 
This thesis submits ss 25(3) and 63(3) provide for this reconciliation. There is no 
specific provision stating ss 25(3) and 63(3) are directed towards the courts exclusively 
as a tool for interpretive aid. One can infer that the subject of ss 25(3) and 63(3) is not 
the courts, but governmental bodies. Why? Immediately before ss 25(3) and 63(3), in ss 
25(2) and 63(2), the subject of the latter two provisions is to confer on governmental 
bodies a duty to implement the NGDP and BSO. The use of the terms “legislative 
power,” “executive power”, “judicial power”, and “administrative power” supports this 
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assertion as these powers are exercised by governmental bodies. Sections 25(3) and 63(3) 
reconcile the two preceding provisions, and provide the scope and limits of governmental 
bodies’ duty to implement the NGDP and BSO. As will be argued later in the chapter, 
the legal nature of this duty is best described as “indirectly-justiciable”.  
As a result of the Medaing on appeal Court not carefully reading ss 25 and 63, 
and failing to apply relevant principles of constitutional interpretation, it has erred by 
treating the constitutional duty to implement the NGDP and BSO under ss 25 and 63 as 
entirely non-justiciable. This will be dealt with further on the section below on indirect 
justiciability.  
(iv) Current jurisprudence does not preclude indirect justiciability 
It is submitted ROCPNG, which is perhaps the most authoritative judicial pronouncement 
on ss 25(3) and 63(3), does not preclude the indirectly justiciable approach. ROCPNG 
was decided by a bench of five justices of the Supreme Court  
(as opposed to three justices in Medaing on appeal). Furthermore, Medaing on appeal 
was not unanimous. ROCPNG would therefore be the leading authority on the issue. 
The ROCPNG Court said legislation could not be struck down on account of the 
NGDP. This is not disputed because that would involve direct justiciability. It is an open 
question whether the Supreme Court would be open to considering favourably a claim 
made using the NGDP and/or BSO indirectly. This thesis argues this is possible 
constitutionally. 
Arguably, Ref by OCPNG was a case that applied indirect justiciability without 
expressly referring to it in those terms. The Court was asked to deliberate on the 
constitutionality of an amendment to an Organic law taking into account the NGDP. The 
litigant’s question (cause of action) expressly asked the Court to declare the amendment 
to be invalid for offending s 187C(2)(a) of the Constitution, taking into account the 
NGDP. The Court found the amendment was unconstitutional; the NGDP influenced this 
outcome. Ref by OCPNG is further analysed below, and in chapter 9.   
4 Practical application of indirect justiciability and its difference from the 
interpretive aid approach 
The main difference between indirect justiciability and the interpretative aid approach, as 
noted above, is that indirect justiciability shapes the cause of action of an aggrieved 
 51 
person, whereas an interpretive aid is a tool available to the court to use at its discretion 
as appropriate. It must also be stressed that an interpretive aid can become a useful tool 
to support indirect justiciability as Ref by OCPNG suggests.  
The form indirect justiciability takes would depend on the type of power being 
exercised. In the case of legislative power, the question the court can be asked to 
determine is whether a particular law has provided the opportunity to implement the 
NGDP and BSO. If it does not, then it will be a ground to invalidate the legislation.  
An example of indirect justiciability, as it applies to the exercise of legislative 
power, is proposed in chapter 7 when ROCPNG is discussed. This thesis submits the 
question in that case that would meet the requirements of indirect justiciability would be: 
“Is the repeal of s 59 of the Forest Act 1991 a derogation by parliament of its duty to 
implement the NGDP through its legislative power under s 25(3) of the Constitution?” 
To answer this question, the court would obviously have to consider whether Parliament 
considered the NGDP and/or BSO in the process of repealing the NGDP and/or BSO. As 
discussed in chapter 7, the court’s supervision of parliamentary compliance would be 
through a procedural lens. If parliament did not consider the NGDP and/or BSO, the 
Supreme Court would declare the repeal of s 59 of the Forest Act 1991 unconstitutional 
and as a result invalid.  
The NGDP and BSO then become an interpretive aid when the claim is before the 
court. In order for indirect justiciability to function effectively the courts would 
necessarily have to use the NGDP and BSO as an interpretive aid. The thesis submits that 
this is an appropriate exercise of judicial power to complement legislative power to 
supervise the implementation of the NGDP and BSO. 
Another example relates to the exercise of executive power. When the government 
makes a decision, an aggrieved person could challenge the decision on the grounds that 
it was unreasonable as the government had the opportunity to implement the NGDP 
and/or BSO, but it did not. R v Minister of Agriculture ex parte Padfield (Padfiled) 
provides an apt illustration.85 The court ruled that the decision was unreasonable as it did 
not fulfil the objectives of the legislation. In a situation where the law makes specific 
reference to a NGDP and/or BSO, an aggrieved person could argue that the government’s 
decision was unreasonable, as it did not take a course of action that would implement the 
                                                     
85 R v Minister of Agriculture ex parte Padfield  [1968] AC 997 (HL). 
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NGDP and/or BSO. As discussed in chapter 9, this process can be pursued under existing 
administrative judicial review procedures and remedies. 
As can be seen in ROCPNG and Padfield, the courts’ role in supervising 
governmental bodies’ compliance with the NGDP and BSO is mainly through a 
“procedural” lens as opposed to a “substantive” one. The court is looking for 
opportunities a governmental body had to implement the NGDP and BSO, but did not. If 
a court was to make a direct finding of incompatibility with the NGDP and/or BSO, it 
would not be necessary to consider other provisions of the law. The NGDP and BSO 
would operate as other provisions of the law and such an approach is not permitted in the 
scheme of ss 25 and 63 (as it would make the NGDP and BSO directly justiciable).86    
When the NGDP and BSO are used as an interpretive aid, we confront a situation 
where the court, on its own motion, relies on the NGDP and BSO to interpret a law. 
Examples of the courts using the NGDP and BSO as an interpretive aid include the Public 
Curator of Papua New Guinea v Public Trustee of New Zealand (Public Curator);87 
Sasakila; Peter v South Pacific Brewery Ltd;88 Simbu; and Haiveta.  
The aggrieved in each of these cases did not come to court questioning whether a 
governmental body failed to interpret the NGDP and BSO as its cause of action, but the 
court took the NGDP and BSO into account on its own motion to interpret the issues 
before the court.  
The ideal situation in which we can see the indirect justiciability approach in 
practice is when a cause of action is premised on the NGDP and/or BSO, and the court 
would have to determine the outcome of the matter based on the NGDP and/or BSO raised 
in the claim. Such a situation presented itself in Ref by OCPNG where the constitutional 
question to determine the validity of an amendment to the Organic Law on Provincial and 
Local-Level Government 1995 was put before the Supreme Court in the following 
manner:89 
Whether Sections 1 and 2 of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and 
Local-Level Government (Amendment No 10) Laws 2006, in removing: 
                                                     
86 ROCPNG, above n 65. 
87 Public Curator of Papua New Guinea v Public Trustee of New Zealand [1976] PGNC 48, [1976] PNGLR 
427, 28 September 1976. 
88 Peter v South Pacific Brewery Ltd [1976] PGSC 28, SC 109, [1976] PNGLR 345, 29 November 1976. 
89 Ref by OCPNG, above n 4. 
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(1) Heads of the rural Local-Level Government as Members of the 
Provincial Assembly; and 
(2) One representative to represent the heads of both urban authorities 
and urban council members of the Provincial Assembly; and 
(3) Either the heads of the rural Local-level Government or the 
representative of the heads of both urban authorities and urban 
councils from contesting the post of Deputy Governor 
Is contrary to the requirements of Section 187C(2)(a) of the Constitution to have 
“an elective or mainly elective legislature”, as understood, applied and enforced 
within the meaning of the Second National Goal (Equality and Participation) of 
the National Goals and Directive Principles and therefore unconstitutional?  
The NGDP was used to formulate the cause of action, but the substantive justiciable 
provision relied on was s 187C(2)(a) of the Constitution. The NGDP would then be used 
to determine the outcome of the case. In this instance the Supreme Court ruled that the 
amendment to the OLPLLG was unconstitutional and therefore invalid. More will be said 
of this case as regards the contextual approach to interpretation and its relationship to 
indirect justiciability in chapter 9. 
5 The limits and scope of indirect justiciability 
On their own, the NGDP and BSO are not justiciable. They become justiciable in 
the context of a governmental body’s specific statutory functions. There are, however, 
three exceptions or limitations on their application: first, where it would be contrary to 
Parliament’s expressed intention; second, where it would be inconsistent with the 
Constitution; and third, where to do so would be unreasonable. Each of these exceptions 
follows on from the other. 
(a) Contrary to Parliament’s intentions 
This exception arises from the phrase, “without failing to give effect to the intention of 
Parliament …” in ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution. The effect of this phrase on 
implementation depends on whether Parliament considers there are overriding reasons 
why the NGDP and BSO are not an appropriate consideration in the specific context of 
the subject matter addressed by the law. But ss 25 and 63 require implementation in the 
first instance, so Parliament has a positive duty to make clear its intention to derogate 
from this obligation. This responsibility falls to Parliament – not the other arms of 
government.  
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The best way for Parliament to make its intentions clear (and to avoid future 
questions about its intentions) would be for Parliament to include a statement in 
legislation. Parliament can enact laws that have specific provisions stating Parliament did 
not wish the NGDP and/or BSO to be considered for implementation in the particular 
law. However, a survey of Papua New Guinea legislation that refers to the NGDP and 
BSO reveals Parliament has never expressed an intention against the implementation of 
the NGDP and BSO. On the contrary, laws have expressly required the implementation 
of the NGDP and BSO, but the practice should be consistent. 
An interesting example where parliament has expressed its intentions on the 
NGDP and BSO is in the Underlying Law Act 2000. Under s 4 of the Underlying Law 
Act, customary law and common law would not apply if they are inconsistent with the 
NGDP and BSO (amongst other requirements). As an exception to both non-justiciability 
and indirect justiciability, this appears to be a case of direct justiciability; but parliament 
has made its intention express. Alternatively, parliament can equally express its intention 
that it is inappropriate to implement the NGDP and/or BSO in certain circumstances. The 
development of the underlying law is discussed further in chapter 9.  
(b) Inconsistent with the Constitution 
This exception follows straight after the first exception. Again, it arises from the phrase, 
“without failing to give effect to … this Constitution …” in ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the 
Constitution. The exception could be triggered when interpreting and/or applying a law 
to give effect to the NGDP and BSO, but in a way that is contrary to the Constitution, 
especially the provisions on human rights and freedoms. This situation has not arisen in 
Papua New Guinea, but it has in India in relation to its State Policies and Directive 
Principles, for example, State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan.90 In that case, a 
policy which was supposed to implement the directive principles was found to be 
inconsistent with justiciable fundamental rights and therefore unconstitutional. If such a 
scenario were to arise in Papua New Guinea, there is little doubt the Constitution would 
prevail. 
Indirect justiciability would also be limited where another provision of the 
Constitution addresses expressly addresses the NGDP and BSO. Three examples are 
provided. The first obvious example is ss 25(4) and 63(4) of the Constitution on the 
                                                     
90 State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan [1951] AIR 226 (SC). 
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Ombudsman Commission. The idea of indirect justiciability as premised on ss 25(3) and 
63(3) would not apply to the Ombudsman Commission’s Leadership Code function 
(discussed in chapter 10). Second, s 219(1)(a) of the Constitution talks expressly about 
the Ombudsman Commission’s jurisdiction in administrative complaints taking into 
account the NGDP and BSO (also discussed in chapter 10). The third example relates to 
questions of whether a law is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. Under ss 38 
and 39 of the Constitution, the NGDP and BSO is one of the grounds that may allow 
parliament to restrict a right or freedom (discussed in chapter 9). These provisions would 
override the application of ss 25(3) and 63(3).  
(c) Where it would be unreasonable  
If implementation is not contrary to Parliament’s express intention and not inconsistent 
with the Constitution, the question arises whether it would be unreasonable to expect 
governmental bodies to implement the NGDP and BSO within their statutory or 
constitutional functions. The question of what is reasonable will depend on the facts of 
each case. There can be no universal standards. However, the South African case of 
Government of the Republic of South Africa & Ors v Grootboom & Ors is a useful 
illustration of relevant considerations.91 
Although South Africa does not have directive principles, it has social rights that 
are directly enforceable in its Constitution. Issues of implementation of social rights are 
similar in countries with directive principles alone.92 In Grootboom, the plaintiffs claimed 
the right to housing, a social right under s 26 of the South African Constitution. This right 
is justiciable. The plaintiffs were squatters in a place called Wallacedene. Their shelter 
was rudimentary consisting of plastic, and they lacked basic sanitation and electricity. In 
assessing the plaintiffs’ argument that their right to housing had been breached, the Court 
considered the government’s duty in three areas:  
1. the obligation to take reasonable legislative and other measures— 
2. to achieve the progressive realisation of the right— 
3. within available resources. 
                                                     
91 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19, [2001] 1 SA 46 
(CC), [2000] 11 BCLR 1169, 4 October 2000 [Grootboom]. 
92 The experience of India was considered when deciding on the enforcement of social rights in South 
Africa’s Constitution: see Bertus De Villiers “Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: 
The Indian Experience” (1992) 8 S Afr J Hum Rts 29. 
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A Papua New Guinea court would do well to ask similar questions when 
determining whether a governmental body has fulfilled its obligation to implement the 
NGDP and BSO under ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. The court would be asking if 
adequate steps have been taken to realise the NGDP and BSO and, if so, whether the 
government had done all it reasonably could in balancing competing demands for its 
available resources. This judicial scrutiny of other government bodies would be 
undertaken by the court applying a procedural lens. The question of reasonableness will 
be taken up further in chapters 7, 8, and 9 to see how it may work in practice. 
6 Indirect justiciability and remedies   
The availability of a remedy does not determine whether a question is justiciable.  
Each case is treated on its merits. For example, a claim may be justiciable, but the court 
may decline to award a remedy; or a person may come to court claiming a justiciable right 
or rights, but the court may not find it appropriate to award a remedy.93 However, the 
remedy is significant to the idea of interconnectedness. The remedy that courts award can 
demonstrate to other limbs of government that each one of them have a duty to implement. 
A procedural lens enhances this approach of each arm seeing its functions as connected.  
The type of remedy available when the question of implementation of the NGDP 
and/or BSO is at issue (by means of indirect justiciability) would be no different to the 
existing remedies. For example, in constitutional references it would be a declaration of 
unconstitutionality (or not). In administrative judicial review, these would be certiorari, 
prohibition, mandamus and a declaration. Chapters 7 and 9 expand on the discussion of 
available remedies, especially in relation to court scrutiny of parliament and other 
government bodies, including through the development of the underlying law, 
administrative judicial review and the protection and enforcement of human rights and 
freedoms. What can be said now, is indirect justiciability would not require the courts to 
develop a special remedy. 
The court can reasonably be expected to undertake a careful analysis of the 
appropriate remedy depending on the nature of the claim. But there can be no universal 
                                                     
93 See, for example, in Grootboom, above n 91, the Court did not directly order the government to provide 
housing, which was a social right in the South African Constitution, but instead ordered the government to 
put in place policies and processes to support the provision of this right. 
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rule, and the court must proceed on a case by case basis. The court must also respect the 
function of each arm of government, and the fact that there may be limited resources.   
The court’s primary role would be to consider whether the governmental body has 
considered the NGDP and/or BSO in the decision making process and decide whether the 
non-implementation was reasonable or not. In this regard the court would be assessing 
the other arms of government through a procedural lens. 
In borderline cases, where appropriate, greater deference will be accorded to each 
arm of government because of the separate functions each performs. This is not to 
diminish the case for indirect justiciability, but to enhance it, by recognising the role each 
arm of government plays, and the challenges it faces, such as limited resources.  
It is not for the court to assume the role of another branch of government, but to ensure 
each body performs its role fairly and in an accountable and transparent manner in 
accordance with the Constitution. What is important, however, is for the NGDP and/or 
BSO to be actively engaged in ways that each governmental body can implement. 
E A Note on Similarities and Differences between ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution  
Sections 25 and 63 are similar, but there are some differences. Importantly, however, ss 
25 and 63 demonstrate that when considering the implementation of the NGDP, the BSO 
is to be considered concurrently. One does not have priority over the other. While much 
of the discussion in the literature has been on the NGDP, the constitutional mandate is for 
the NGDP and BSO to be implemented without distinction.94   
The first difference between ss 25 and 63 relates to the location of the provisions. 
Both the NGDP and BSO appear under Part III, “Basic Principles of Government”. Part 
III of the Constitution has five divisions: 
 Division 1 – National Goals and Directive Principles; 
 Division 2 – Leadership Code; 
 Division 3 – Basic Rights; 
 Division 4 – Principles of Natural Justice; and 
 Division 5 – Basic Social Obligations. 
Division 3 on “Basic Rights,” has three further sub-divisions: 
                                                     
94 Constitution ss 25 and 63. See also CPC Report, above n 8, at 5/1/34 [21]. 
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 Sub-division A – Introductory; 
 Sub-division B – Fundamental Rights; and 
 Sub-division C – Qualified Rights. 
The implementation framework for the NGDP, Basic Rights and BSO appears in Part III 
(the NGDP fall under Division 1; Basic Rights in Division 3 and the BSO is the last 
section of Division 5). However, despite their co-location in Part III, a different approach 
to enforcement of the Basic Rights is provided for. Basic Rights are detailed from ss 32 
to 58. Sections 57 and 58 enable a person to seek redress for breach of their rights and 
freedoms. The NGDP and BSO are implemented by ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution by 
way of non-justiciability and indirect justiciability. This is a legal distinction. A policy 
reason for this implementation difference could be the NGDP and BSO are considered as 
underlying aims of the Constitution and not as substantive rights and freedoms per se. 
The fact that rights and freedoms are situated alongside the NGDP and BSO is not 
without significance. The state is to carry out its functions within certain legal and 
political boundaries. Accordingly, the Constitution has been described as programmatic.95 
To say it another way, a constitutional agenda is set for the country. Government laws 
and policies must conform to the constitutional mandate granted to them in the way they 
discharge their functions. 
The second difference arises from the CPC’s view on the interdependence of 
rights and obligations. In order for rights to be recognised, they must be accompanied by 
obligations.96 In the CPC Report, human rights are considered concurrently with 
obligations. Chapter 5 is entitled “Human Rights and Obligations and Emergency 
Powers”, and Part 1 is “Human Rights and Obligations”. The CPC Report states:97 
As well as entrenching in our Constitution the fundamental rights and freedoms 
which we recommend should be protected, we believe that certain basic 
obligations should also be incorporated in the Constitution as duties which all 
people in this country should accept if our goals are to be achieved.  
For this reason, s 63 is placed immediately after the provisions on rights and 
freedoms in the Constitution. The title of s 63 opens with the word “Enforcement”. 
                                                     
95 Anthony J Regan “Introduction” in Anthony J Regan, Owen Jessep and Eric L Kwa (eds) Twenty Years 
of the Papua New Guinea Constitution (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2001) 1 at 3. 
96 CPC Report, above no 30, see generally ch 5. 
97 At 5/1/15 [92]. 
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Section 25 commences with “Implementation”. Both these terms place a positive duty on 
those to whom they apply to carry out what is stated in these provisions. 
The other difference relates to s 25(2) and s 63(2). Different words are used to 
provide for implementation. In terms of the NGDP it is stated that the duty of all 
governmental bodies are to “apply and give effect to them …” while for the BSO, all 
governmental bodies are conferred the duty to “encourage compliance with them”.  
The variance probably indicates a slight shift in urgency towards the NGDP over the 
BSO. The latter uses words depicting persuasion while the former has more direct 
language. Apart from that, the overall import is characteristic of implementation. 
IV Conclusion  
Sections 25 and 63 of the Constitution impose duties on governmental bodies to 
implement the NGDP and BSO. What is the legal nature of this duty? Applying the 
various principles of constitutional interpretation and a plain reading of ss 25 and 63, this 
thesis argues that there is an exception to the general non-justiciable nature of the NGDP 
and BSO. The NGDP and BSO are indirectly justiciable by virtue of ss 25(3) and 63(3). 
Proposals will be made to fulfil this duty to implement the NGDP and BSO within the 
constitutional functions of the courts, the legislature, the executive and the Ombudsman 
Commission in chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively.   
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Chapter Five – Implementation Record of Governmental Bodies and 
Impediments  
I Introduction  
This chapter presents the current state of affairs of governmental bodies’ performance 
record with regards to the implementation of the NGDP and BSO. The governmental 
bodies this thesis focuses on include the three traditional arms of government and the 
Ombudsman Commission. After discussing governmental bodies’ performance, the main 
legal impediments to implementation of the constitutional duty under ss 25 and 63 of the 
Constitution are identified. Essentially, the impediments have prevented governmental 
bodies from appreciating that their functions are interconnected, since interconnectedness 
supports (or would support) efficient implementation. This conclusion is established from 
assessing the performance record of the legislature, the executive, the courts, and the 
Ombudsman Commission.  
This chapter has four parts. Part I is the introduction. Part II discusses the 
performance record of the legislature, the executive, the courts and the Ombudsman 
Commission on the implementation of the NGDP and BSO.1 Part III presents the legal 
impediments which have stifled the contributions of the NGDP and BSO to Papua New 
Guinea’s development. Part IV concludes the chapter.   
II Governmental Bodies’ Record of Implementing the NGDP and BSO 
A Introduction  
The first attempt to consider ways in which the NGDP can be implemented as well as the 
implementation record was in 1982 where an entire seminar was devoted to the 
government pre-independence economic policy, the Eight Point Plan or Aims, and the 
NGDP.2 There was no discussion on legal avenues for implementation of the NGDP.  
The seminar did not consider the BSO.  
                                                     
1 The three arms of government and the Ombudsman Commission have been selected in this thesis to make 
proposals for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO, hence the review of their performance record. 
2 Peter King, Wendy Lee and Vincent Warakai (eds) From Rhetoric to Reality? Papua New Guinea’s Eight 
Point Plan and National Goals After a Decade, Papers from the Fifteenth Waigani Seminar (University of 
Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1985). 
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B The Legislature 
Currently, legislative references to the NGDP and BSO occur haphazardly. Appendix 
Three, which identifies how legislation refers to the NGDP and BSO confirms this 
finding. Only 44 pieces of legislation (of the estimated total of 734) refer to the NGDP 
and BSO. Of the 44, a good number do so because of the constitutional requirement under 
s 38 of the Constitution. Under this provision, any legislation that restricts a qualified 
right and/or freedom, must expressly state in its preliminary provisions the particular right 
and/or freedom restricted, and advance a public reason for it. A public reason that entitles 
the Parliament to restrict a right and/or freedom would be implementation of the NGDP 
and BSO. But Parliament cannot simply enact a provision to state the law is for the 
advancement of the NGDP and BSO; there must exist factual basis for such a claim, 
which the courts can examine.3   
Four main methods of reference to the NGDP and BSO can be identified from an 
analysis of the legislation studied: 
 In the preamble;  
 In the objective section; 
 As part of the requirement for constitutional compliance under ss 38 and 39 
of the Constitution; and  
 In the substantive text of the legislation. 
Only two Acts provide any mechanism to aid the implementing authority engage the 
NGDP and/or BSO in the decision-making process.4 These two laws, the Salaries and 
Remuneration Commission Act 1983, and Underlying Law Act 2000, do not apply to the 
role of the executive. These Acts have an express requirement for the NGDP and/or BSO 
to be considered by Parliament and the courts, respectively. This thesis asserts such a 
device may be useful in drawing the attention of the executive to the NGDP and BSO. 
Regardless of express legislative reference, the executive has a constitutional duty to take 
into account the NGDP and BSO in its decisions. But it may be helpful to have express 
reference in the legislation. So, while different laws vest powers in various authorities to 
                                                     
3 See The State v NTN Pty Ltd and NBN Ltd [1992] PGSC 11, [1992] PNGLR 1, 7 April 1987. 
4 Appendix Three summarises how the NGDP and BSO are engaged by legislation. Salaries and 
Remuneration Commission Act 1983, s 14; and Underlying Law Act 2000, s 7. 
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make decisions, there is little guidance on how to implement the NGDP and/or BSO in 
legislation that defines the functions of a governmental body. 
The Standing Orders of Parliament provide a key guide for Parliament in the 
enactment of legislation. However, the Standing Orders lack a specific provision on how 
to engage the NGDP and BSO in Bills brought before Parliament. Part XIX on “Bills” 
sets out the different stages a Bill has to follow before enactment, but it does not refer to 
the duty to implement under ss 25 and 63. Part XIXA of the Standing Orders provides for 
separate treatment of amendments to constitutional laws. This, too, does not cater for the 
constitutional requirement to implement the NGDP and BSO. Even the Manual of 
Practice and Procedure prepared by the Clerk of the Parliament to help members of 
Parliament to understand their roles and functions under the Constitution and the Standing 
Orders lacks any reference to the NGDP and BSO.5  
C The Executive 
There are many laws (Constitution, Organic Laws, and legislation) that confer power on 
the executive to make decisions over many different subject areas. Some of these laws 
apply directly to a minister or ministry, while others confer powers exclusively on the 
National Executive Council as a collective entity. It is in the application of these laws the 
NGDP and BSO are required to be implemented. Chapter 7 of this thesis recommends 
that Parliament passes legislation with specific reference to a particular NGDP and/or 
BSO, to guide the executive in the implementation process. This is one way the legislature 
and the executive can interact with each other in the implementation process. At present 
there is little scope for such interaction.  
The Papua New Guinea government’s most recent policy on development does 
try in some ways to address the NGDP and BSO. This is Vision 2050, the strategies to 
which decisions for national development are tied.6 However, Vision 2050 did not 
consider how the Constitution, either in its present state or through reforms, could 
effectively respond to developmental challenges using the NGDP and BSO. Nor did it 
take up the CPC’s proposal to create a permanent parliamentary committee to review laws 
and policies to determine their alignment with the NGDP and BSO. 
                                                     
5 National Parliament of Papua New Guinea Manual of Practice and Procedure (1st ed, prepared by the 
Clerk of Parliament, Port Moresby, 2009).  
6 National Strategic Plan Taskforce Papua New Guinea Vision 2050 (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 
2009). 
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D The Courts 
An early case setting out the courts’ attitude to the importance of the NGDP and BSO 
was Public Curator of Papua New Guinea v Public Trustee of New Zealand (Public 
Curator).7 The decision in Public Curator interpreted legislation (interpretive aid 
approach) to give effect to the NGDP. This case showed immediately after independence 
the CPC’s enthusiasm and idealism was reflected in judicial creativity. This interest has 
waned to such an extent that in 1992, Anthony Regan observed that the Papua New 
Guinea judiciary had made little use of the NGDP.8 His article did not refer to the BSO. 
According to Regan, the blame did not lie solely with the judiciary; the other arms of 
government were also responsible – an example being the re-distribution of wealth.9 
Many parts of the country did not have access to basic services, which was a responsibility 
of the government. Be that as it may, the courts still have an important role as the 
“guardian of the Constitution” to ensure that these various arms of government interact 
well in regards to the NGDP and BSO.10 The Constitution aids this process by allowing 
the courts to be liberal in their interpretative functions.11 Even the CPC anticipates the 
courts being called upon to deliberate on politically sensitive matters.12 Laws have an 
important role in directing the evolution of human societies, and the courts are 
inextricably linked to this process of applying the law so as to fulfil the Constitution’s 
vision.13  
There are two cases which are perhaps emblematic of the courts’ performance. 
The first is In Re Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea 
(ROCPNG).14 In that case, the Court was asked to determine the validity of legislation in 
relation to the NGDP. What is relevant with regard to the implementation of the NGDP 
                                                     
7 Public Curator of Papua New Guinea v Public Trustee of New Zealand [1976] PGNC 48, [1976] PNGLR 
427, 28 September 1976 [Public Curator]. 
8 Anthony Regan “Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and the Judiciary” in RW James and I Fraser (eds) Legal 
Issues in a Developing Society (Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1992) 12 
at 32.  
9 At 32. 
10 See Amet CJ’s decision in Haiveta, Leader of the Opposition v Wingti, Prime Minister, Attorney-General, 
and National Parliament [1994] PGSC 6, [1994] PNGLR 197, 25 August 1994. 
11 Constitution, sch. 1.2.5. 
12 Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, Part One 
(Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) at 8/1 [5] [CPC Report]. 
13 At 8/1 [6]. 
14 Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 40, SC1088, 17 
December 2010 [ROCPNG]. 
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and BSO is that the Court said they were non-justiciable, and valuable only as an aid to 
interpretation:15 
Except where the Constitution itself provides the NGDP and BSO are to be used 
as an aid to the interpretation of specific statutes, they cannot be used as a ground 
to strike down legislation: see s 38 of the Constitution. 
There may have been scope for creativity such as to make non-binding declarations 
against the legislature (which the court of first instance did in the second series of cases 
discussed below).16 However, the Court took the position that it should not interfere with 
the role of the legislature and the executive. 
A greater role in the implementation of the NGDP and BSO may have been 
possible in the second case of Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd (Medaing 
on appeal).17 This case was an appeal from Medaing v Ramu Nickel (Medaing).  
In Medaing, the Court made a non-binding declaration that a government decision to issue 
an environmental permit to discharge waste into the waters of Basamuk Bay was 
inconsistent with the NGDP.18 This decision was subsequently overturned in Medaing on 
appeal. Indigenous landowners from an area where a nickel mining project was to take 
place took the mining company and the state to court for possible future environmental 
damage from mining waste. The waste was to be piped to Basamuk Bay and discharged 
400 metres from the sea-shore. Overwhelming scientific evidence indicated the ecology 
would be fundamentally disturbed. The Court said such an activity was contrary to Goal 
4 on natural resources and the environment. On appeal the Supreme Court overruled the 
court of first instance, holding the NGDP were non-justiciable.19 Chapter 4 of the thesis 
discussed the reasons for the Court’s position. This was despite the fact this aspect of the 
decision had no legal effect on the parties’ rights.   
ROCPNG was decided in 2010 and Medaing on appeal followed a year later. 
Together, these decisions have relegated the NGDP and BSO to a position where there is 
no direction from the judiciary to the other arms of government on how and whether to 
engage the NGDP and BSO. 
                                                     
15 At [23]. 
16 Chapter 9 will elaborate on this proposition. 
17 Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGSC 40, SC1144, 22 December 2011 [Medaing 
on appeal]. 
18 Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGNC 95 N4340, 26 July 2011 [Medaing]. 
19 Medaing on appeal, above n 17, at [163].  
 65 
E The Ombudsman Commission 
The two main functions of the Ombudsman Commission are, first, to investigate 
administrative complaints against governmental bodies, and second, supervision and 
enforcement of the Leadership Code. These two functions will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 10. What can be said now is while the Ombudsman Commission has maintained 
a strong reputation for independence, its work has not seriously taken on board the 
requirement to implement the NGDP and BSO under s 219 of the Constitution on 
administrative complaints, and under ss 25(4) and 63(4) of the Constitution with regard 
to the Leadership Code function.  
Under the administrative complaints function, the Ombudsman Commission has 
issued a number of reports, many of which have been tabled in Parliament, after which 
they become public documents. A review of the reports from 2008 to date reveals the 
Ombudsman Commission, while effective in its function as an independent oversight 
body of government actions, has not effectively grasped the opportunity to implement the 
NGDP and BSO. If the Commission did so, it would ensure other government agencies 
take due account of the NGDP and BSO. The conclusion is the Ombudsman Commission 
has not implemented the NGDP and BSO under its own mandate. If it did, it would 
similarly ensure other arms of government also implement the NGDP and BSO. Proposals 
to help the Ombudsman Commission are detailed in chapter 10. 
The same observation about the Ombudsman Commission on the lack of 
engagement with the NGDP and BSO in its administrative complaints function applies to 
how it accounts for the NGDP and BSO in its Leadership Code function. Since its 
establishment, the Ombudsman Commission has referred a large number of leaders for 
prosecution for misconduct. The type of leaders captured under the leadership code 
function covers persons occupying office in all three arms of government.20 There is 
scope for the Ombudsman Commission to oversee the conduct of other arms of 
government, ensuring greater engagement with the NGDP and BSO. An assessment of 
the cases brought before the leadership tribunal since independence reveals the 
Ombudsman Commission has typically focused on the actual breach of provisions of the 
Constitution and the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership when 
                                                     
20 Section 26 of the Constitution defines the type of leaders subject to the Leadership Code. 
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framing misconduct allegations. But the Commission, which has a narrow view of its 
functions, has not incorporated the NGDP and BSO in the allegations.21  
III Impediments to Implementation of the National Goals and Directive 
Principles and Basic Social Obligations 
A Introduction  
The reasons for non-implementation have been identified from primary and secondary 
legal materials. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct an empirical study of the 
social/political reasons behind the non-implementation of the NGDP and BSO as the 
approach is normative rather than sociological. Such a distinction between legal, 
philosophical and sociological analysis has been made, for example, by Joel Colon-
Rios.22 Nevertheless, it is also important to have a general overview of some of the 
possible non-legal reasons behind non-implementation as relevant background 
information.  
B Reasons for Non-Implementation of the NGDP and BSO  
1 Brief over-view of non-legal reasons for non-implementation  
(a) Liberal democratic system of government 
The CPC identified leadership in the country as central to implementing the NGDP and 
BSO.23 Perhaps the point Colquhoun-Kerr raises is an impediment to implementation.24 
In Colquhoun-Kerr’s view, liberal democratic regimes such as Papua New Guinea have 
shifting policy orientations. Each political party that controls the executive is at liberty to 
formulate government policy. The NGDP and BSO are premised on social democratic 
ideals.25 But what if a new government is elected on a neo-liberal policy platform? 
Implementing the NGDP and BSO would create a potential conflict: the government may 
                                                     
21 Proposals for how the Ombudsman Commission can overcome this will be taken up in chapter 10. 
22 Joel Colon-Rios Weak constitutionalism: democratic legitimacy and the question of constituent power 
(Routledge, New York, 2012) at 103. Colon-Rios relies on works of Beetham, Kelsen and Rawls to 
distinguish the different approaches to legitimacy from sociological to legal and philosophical respectively. 
23 CPC Report, above n 12, at 3/2 [14].  
24 DJ Colquhoun-Kerr “Sources of Political Legitimacy in Conflict and Naturalised Foreigners: Some 
Comments on the General Constitutional Commission’s Final Report, 1983” in De Vere, Colquhoun-Kerr 
and Kaburise (eds) Essays on the Constitution of Papua New Guinea (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 
1985) at 116. 
25 The CPC Report states the NGDP are designed to achieve a free and just society: see CPC Report, above 
n 12, at 2/2 [8]. 
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implement an agenda that had popular support but which is at odds with the Constitution. 
This is a potential if not actual barrier to implementation, although no political party has 
publicly disavowed the NGDP and BSO.  
(b) Lack of political will 
Much of the secondary literature indicates little effort to implement the NGDP and BSO.26 
This resulted in the first concerted review of the Constitution to suggest that of the NGDP 
and BSO, at least the NGDP should be made enforceable.27 Parliament did not take up 
the recommendations. The reason why Parliament did not adopt the review’s findings is 
unclear, but a lack of political will was a probability.28 Bernard Narokobi agrees with the 
General Constitutional Commission that lack of political will was a key factor behind 
non-implementation.29 This thesis, however, addresses legal impediments within the 
present constitutional arrangement from a constitutional and legal perspective. 
(c) Level of literacy 
The country’s adult (15 and over) literacy rate is at 60 per cent of the population.30  
Literacy does not necessarily equate to awareness of legal and political institutions.31  
The NGDP’s and BSO’s continuous inclusion in the Constitution demonstrates their 
supposed acceptance but does not necessarily indicate the level of citizens’ awareness. 
The consultative model the CPC used to engage the people in constitution-making has 
not been followed in other major legal/constitutional changes in Papua New Guinea.32 
The momentum for change that captured the imagination of the people during the 
independence era has waned. People’s awareness can be enhanced through active 
                                                     
26 See for example Meg Taylor “The Constitution and the Environment” in Anthony J Regan, Owen Jessep 
and Eric L Kwa (eds) Twenty Years of the Papua New Guinea Constitution (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2001) 
at 333; and Bernard Narokobi “Walking the Footpath of the Constitutional Planning Committee’s Five 
National Goals and Directive Principles” in Ian Maddocks and Edward P Wolfers Living History and 
Evolving Democracy Living (University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 2010) at 24. 
27 Cited in Colquhoun-Kerr, above n 24, at 118.  
28 This is the position as at 20 January 2015. 
29 Bernard Narokobi Life and Leadership in Melanesia (Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South 
Pacific, Suva and University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1983) at 108. 
30 UNESCO Adult and Youth Literacy, 1990-2015, Analysis of data of 41 Countries (Unesco Institute for 
Statistics, Montreal, 2012) at 13 <www.uis.unesco.org>. 
31 Andrew Heywood Politics (Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1997) 186. 
32 For example, Parliament amended the Constitution in 2014. The amendment makes it difficult for 
Parliament to move votes of no-confidence in the Prime Minister in the first 30 months of the five year life 
of the Parliament. This did not arise from consultation with the people: see Tobias Kulang “We need 
complete review of Constitution” The National (online ed, PNG, 16 July 2013). 
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participation in the system of government, but the engagement must be continuous to 
remind the people of the government’s requirement to implement the NGDP and BSO.33  
(d) Present relevance of the NGDP and BSO 
The relevance of the NGDP and BSO to the present social circumstances in Papua New 
Guinea is also important. The NGDP and BSO were developed out of the experiences of 
the period leading up to independence in 1975. Against this, one can ask whether the 
NGDP and BSO remain relevant to help Papua New Guinea meet its contemporary 
challenges. This is a question of legislative reform that could arise from political and 
social empirical studies.  
2 Legal reasons for non-implementation 
The NGDP and BSO have been impeded by the courts in three ways. First, by incorrectly 
characterising the NGDP and BSO as entirely-non-justiciable; second, by adopting a 
restrictive role of preambles in statutory interpretation; and third, by using them as an aid 
to constitutional interpretation. The first concerns a constitutional duty and the second 
and third relate to the courts’ function in statutory interpretation. These impediments have 
had a flow-on effect on the other arms of government, affecting the way they view the 
NGDP and BSO and incorporate them (or not) into the exercise of their functions.   
(a) Lack of recognition of indirect justiciability  
Sections 25(1) and 63(1) characterise the NGDP and BSO as both non-justiciable and 
justiciable. This perhaps was a result of the CPC’s request that although the NGDP and 
BSO are non-justiciable, they should nevertheless be treated as no less justiciable than 
other provisions of the Constitution.34 In analysing the CPC’s position, chapter 4 
concluded the most appropriate legal status of the NGDP and BSO was indirect 
justiciability, and explained what this could mean. The most recent authoritative decisions 
from ROCPNG and Medaing on appeal suggest the idea of non-justiciability alone should 
determine the application of the NGDP and BSO. This was despite the active use of the 
NGDP in early cases such as Public Curator and Peter v South Pacific Brewery Ltd.35 As 
a result, the correct legal nature of the NGDP and BSO remains unsettled. Medaing on 
                                                     
33 See for example King, Lee and Warakai, above n 2, who document a conference which took place in 
1982 to assess how far the NGDP and the pre-independence eight aims have been implemented. Nothing 
similar has been done since then. 
34 CPC Report, above n 12, at 2/25. 
35 Peter v South Pacific Brewery Ltd [1976] PGSC 28; SC109, [1976] PNGLR 345, 29 November 1976. 
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appeal was not a unanimous decision. Davani J’s minority decision upheld the lower 
Court finding on its power to express an opinion on the consistency of government 
decisions in light of the NGDP. However, commentators on the NGDP and BSO have 
taken the view the NGDP and BSO are non-justiciable, and have not gone on to examine 
the nature of justiciability.36  
The effect of not making the NGDP and BSO indirectly justiciable is evident in 
the legislature and the executive, neither of which have been keen implementers. 
Consequently, there is no effective legal means to enforce the NGDP and BSO against 
the other arms of government. In fact, the very idea of non-justiciability is to see 
compliance left to public authorities outside of the court. The CPC Report, as chapter 6 
will show, encourages each arm of government to work with the other to implement the 
NGDP and BSO. In such a scenario, presently promoted by the court (such as in Medaing 
on appeal), the separation of powers affects how each arm of government views their 
relations with each other. Each limb of government is left to implement of its own 
volition; interconnectedness and interaction suffer. 
(b) The role of preambles 
(i) Introduction 
One of the reasons why the courts have insisted on the non-justiciable aspects of the 
NGDP and BSO is the fact the NGDP and BSO are placed in the preamble. This should 
not, however, lessen the legal impact of the NGDP and BSO. As will be shown below, 
courts have generally adopted a narrow view of preambles in statutory interpretation 
rather than a more expansive approach in line with the liberal and purposive approach 
required in constitutional interpretation in Papua New Guinea. In this way, preambles are 
emphasised more as moral postulates, rather than as having substantive legal effect. 
(ii) An overview of the nature of preambles  
Chapter 3 of this thesis briefly addressed the role of preambles as setting out a 
constitution’s underlying aims. Preambles play an important role in legislation generally, 
being placed after the long title and before the enacting words and the substantive 
sections.37 The objectives of the law and the process leading up to enactment are often 
                                                     
36 Anthony Regan “Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and the Judiciary” in RW James and I Fraser (eds) Legal 
Issues in a Developing Society (Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1992) 12. 
37 Constitution, sch 1.2.3; Interpretation Act, s 3. 
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recited in the preamble.38 Preambles have an effect of motivating compliance with the 
law, by pointing out the aspirations leading up to the enactment of the law.39 In a way, 
constitutional preambles point citizens and the government to the state’s founding 
principles and beyond a narrow consideration of the demarcated boundaries of the various 
entities constituting the state. This is true for Papua New Guinea; the NGDP and BSO are 
contained in the preamble of the Constitution and direct all persons to observe them.40 
Many constitutional preambles have an aspirational role rather than a legal one.41 They 
set out states’ historical realities, and are not intended to have a legal status. Something 
more than this is expected of the NGDP and BSO. 
The preamble contains express statements about the Constitution’s purpose, 
setting out very broadly the reasons why the Constitution was established, before it details 
the NGDP and BSO. Similar to the American Constitution, it uses the phrase “We the 
people …”. Fundamental principles declared to be self-evident in Papua New Guinea 
society are expressed in the preamble: for example, cultural heritage, adopted Christian 
values, and community inter-dependence. In a way, the preamble outlines what was in 
existence prior to the Constitution, such that the Constitution was to “formally” recognise 
this prior social order. Certainly, the NGDP and BSO build on that theme. 
(iii) Common law comparative experience  
The Solomon Islands case of Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly v Speaker of National 
Parliament (High Court) determined the constitutionality of legislation that created a 
provincial government system.42 The law in question, the Provincial Government Act 
1996, was found to be inconsistent with the underlying principle of responsible and 
representative government expressed in the preamble of the Solomon Islands 
Constitution. The decision was overturned on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Justice 
Kapi’s decision is instructive:43 
I would conclude from this that it was clearly intended by the framers of the 
Constitution that the purposes stated in the Preamble are to be defined and clearly 
                                                     
38 Kent Roach “The Uses and Audiences of Preamble in Legislation” (2001) 47(1) McGill LJ 129. See also 
Anne Twomey “The Preamble and Indigenous Recognition” (2011) 15(2) AILR 4 at 7.  
39 Roach, above n 38. 
40 Preamble of the Constitution, reproduced in Appendix One. 
41 Sanford Levinson “Do Constitutions Have a point? ‘Reflections on Parchment Barriers’ and Preambles” 
28(1) Soc Phil & Pol’y 150. 
42 Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly v Speaker of National Parliament [1997] SBHC 5, HC-CC 309 of 
1996, 26 February 1997; see also Folotalu v Attorney-General [2001] SBHC 149, HC-CC 234 of 2001, 19 
October 2001.  
43 Minister for Provincial Government v Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly [1997] SBCA 1, CA-CAC 003 
of 1997, 11 July 1997 at 8. 
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set out in the enacting provisions of the Constitution. It would follow from this 
conclusion that one has to go to the enacting provisions to define the principle 
and the extent to which such a Preamble may apply. The extent to which a 
preamble may be used as aid to construction will be determined from reading the 
preamble with the whole of the enacting provisions of the Constitution.   
The Canadian case of In Re Provincial Judges Reference placed heavy reliance 
on the preamble of the constitution in developing legal principles having the force of 
law.44 This was a case about the constitutionality of legislation reducing the salaries of 
judges in federal and provincial courts on the basis of the common law principle of 
judicial independence. The relevant part of the Canadian Constitution Act 1867 preamble 
states: 
Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have 
expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar 
in Principle to that of the United Kingdom … . 
The Court relied on the provision “with a Constitution similar in Principle to that 
of the United Kingdom” to declare this involved adopting legal principles from the United 
Kingdom. Judicial independence was one such principle adopted from the United 
Kingdom and, as a result, it achieved the status of a constitutional norm in Canada. The 
court stated, “It is the means by which the underlying logic of the Act can be given the 
force of law”.45 On that basis the Canadian Supreme Court found the legislation 
unconstitutional as it offended the principle of judicial independence. It is suggested here 
that the CPC’s view, and indeed the Constitution’s clear position under ss 25 and 63, has 
always been that the substantive provisions of the Constitution were to give expression 
to the ideals contained in the NGDP and BSO. In Canada, the “gaps” were left to be filled 
by the court as there was no express statement in the preamble of the adoption of 
principles such as judicial independence. But for Papua New Guinea, its founding 
principles are expressed in its preamble via the NGDP and BSO.  
Sections 25 and 63 of the Constitution direct the Papua New Guinea Constitution 
toward the Indian experience. It was the preamble to the Indian Constitution in 
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala that resulted in the much publicised basic 
structure doctrine.46 Under this doctrine, where certain values are enshrined in the Indian 
Constitution (Preamble, “Equality of status and of opportunity”) substantive provisions 
                                                     
44 Re Provincial Judges Reference [1997] SCR 3. 
45 Per Lamer CJ at [95]. 
46 Kesavananda v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 255, (1973) AIR 146. 
 72 
of the Constitution promoting these values cannot be repealed or amended by Parliament 
(notwithstanding an established amendment process). It was argued in Special Reference 
by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates that the Papua New Guinea Constitution has a basic structure 
which Parliament cannot amend, but the Supreme Court rejected this doctrine.47 
Underlying the Supreme Court’s rejection was its view that the Papua New Guinea 
Constitution was home-grown or autochthonous and “foreign doctrines” had no 
application.48 The Papua New Guinea Constitution was detailed and provided its own 
mechanisms to deal with issues of constitutionality.  
It is true the Papua New Guinea Constitution is home-grown, and the Court did 
not need to rely on foreign precedents to support its conclusion. But the methodology in 
Kesavanananda is appropriate – using relevant principles in the preamble to elevate 
substantive provisions that realise these principles. It seems the Fly River Court was not 
properly guided on how the basic structure operated. The Court was not referred to the 
fundamental importance of the NGDP and BSO, supporting a common vision of a new 
society in Papua New Guinea that was home-grown, and not based on foreign ideology.49 
In that way the home-grown nature of the Papua New Guinea Constitution would have 
been kept intact, relying on the NGDP and BSO, to support a “basic structure doctrine”. 
(iv) Constructive versus contextual role of preambles  
There appears to be two common law positions on the role of preambles in statutory 
interpretation: constructive and contextual.50 The first approach is to refer to the preamble 
only when there is an ambiguity in the provision of a statute.51 In all issues that go before 
the court, the court will in the first instance refer to the substantive provisions of the law 
to determine the case. Only when it cannot do that, are preambles called upon for guidance 
to settle the ambiguity. This position was articulated by Griffith CJ in Bowell v 
Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd:52 
                                                     
47 Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates [2010] PGSC 3, SC1057, 7 July 2010. 
48 At [100]. 
49 Interestingly at [182] the Supreme Court referred to integral human development as the basis upon which 
political culture was to develop and not to be legislating through prohibiting political freedoms. 
50 Anne Winckel “The Contextual Role of a Preamble in Statutory Interpretation” (1999) 23 (1) MULR 
184. 
51 R v Pierce (1814) 3 M & S 62, [1814] 105 ER 534 at 536; Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of 
Hanover [1957] AC 436 (HL) at 474. 
52 Bowtell v Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd (1906) 3 CLR 444 at 451; see also Gibbs CJ’s decision in 
Wacando v Commonwealth [1981] HCA 60; (1981) 148 CLR 1 at 14–16. 
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… where the words of a Statute are plain and clear, their meaning cannot be cut 
down by reference to the preamble. But, if the words are uncertain as applied to 
the subject matter, and bear more than one meaning, then you may, in a proper 
case, refer to the preamble to ascertain what was the occasion for the alteration 
of the law. 
Gibbs CJ in a much later case, Wacando v Commonwealth, also adopted the constructive 
approach.53  
In the second (contextual) approach, the preamble is referred to as part of the 
whole process of determining the ordinary meaning of enactments.54 This approach calls 
for the whole legislation to be read, including the preamble, to arrive at a suitable 
interpretation. The preamble is read together with the rest of the legislation to provide the 
background to ascertain the correct meaning. 
Interestingly, the contextual approach was also used in Wacando v 
Commonwealth, but by Mason J (Gibbs CJ’s opposing view is noted above):55 
It has been said that where the enacting part of a statute is clear and unambiguous 
it cannot be cut down by the preamble. But this does not mean that the court 
cannot obtain assistance from the preamble in ascertaining the meaning of an 
operative provision. The particular section must be seen in its context; the statute 
must be read as a whole and recourse to the preamble may throw light on the 
statutory purpose and object … . 
The contextual approach works well with the idea the NGDP and BSO are 
indirectly justiciable. It calls for the exercise of public power in a way that promotes the 
NGDP and BSO by looking at the background reasons for a law or decision. 
A third, more direct approach, is to treat the preamble as directly justiciable.  
This approach is not normally used in common law jurisdictions but a 1971 decision of 
the French Constitutional Council is an example of this use of the preamble.56 While this 
is an attractive option for effective implementation, the manner in which ss 25 and 63 are 
                                                     
53 Wacando v Commonwealth [1981] HCA 60; (1981) 148 CLR 1 at 15–16; see also DC Pearce and RS 
Geddes Statutory Interpretation in Australia (7th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths Australia, Chatswood, 2011) 
at 155 to 156. 
54 Winckel, above n 50, at 188. 
55 Wacando v Commonwealth, above n 53, at 333. See also the Solomon Islands cases of Minister for 
Provincial Government v Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly, above n 46, where the contextual approach 
was applied. 
56 French Constitutional Council, decision no 71-44DC, 16 July 1971, JO 7114, 18 July 1971, Recueil 29. 
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worded suggests the NGDP and BSO are indirectly justiciable. As such, the French 
approach would not be applicable.57 
(v) The legal status of the use of preamble in Papua New Guinea  
The Constitution has generally adopted the first (constructive) approach by stating that in 
the event of doubt the preamble may be referred to under sch 1.3(1) of the Constitution: 
Sch. 1.3(1). Form of the Constitutional Laws. 
(1) The Preamble to this Constitution (being the provisions that end 
immediately before the heading to Part I.) forms part of this Constitution, 
but expresses general principles and therefore must be read subject to any 
other provision of this Constitution, though it may be used as an aid to 
interpretation in cases of doubt. 
Two important matters come out of this provision. First, the preamble is to be read subject 
to other provisions of the Constitution, and second, it is to be used as an aid to 
interpretation in cases of doubt. The view that the preamble is only to be referred to in 
cases of doubt appears to have dominated judicial interpretation in Papua New Guinea.58 
This approach is not entirely correct because the NGDP and BSO have been conferred a 
different status by other provisions of the Constitution including ss 25 and 63.59 
Sections 25 and 63 of the Constitution privilege the NGDP and BSO over other 
provisions of the preamble. It says that where a power can be exercised in a way that 
realises the NGDP and BSO, then it should be exercised that way. Failure to fulfil this 
duty is indirectly justiciable. The extent to which it is directly justiciable was seen in 
chapter 4. The contextual role of the preamble provides a more accurate account of the 
role of the NGDP and BSO in statutory interpretation under ss 25 and 63. The courts 
ought to assign a contextual role to the NGDP and BSO to fulfil the ss 25 and 63 mandate: 
when the NGDP and BSO are used to provide context, it will influence the manner in 
which the Constitution is interpreted and applied. The contextual approach shows the 
circumstances in which the provisions were enacted and the purpose they must achieve. 
The natural result of the contextual approach is, therefore, indirect justiciability. 
                                                     
57 Brian Brunton and Duncan Colquhoun-Kerr The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea 
(University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1984) at 69; also as discussed in chapter 4. 
58 Medaing on appeal, above n 17. 
59 Other provisions of the Constitution include ss 23, 32, 38, 39, and sch 1.2. 
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In constitutional and statutory interpretation, the meaning which implements the 
NGDP and BSO is to be preferred. The use of the NGDP and BSO should not be limited 
to cases of doubt. The role ss 25 and 63 play in this regard was discussed in chapter 4 of 
this thesis. 
Case law confirms the debate over whether the proper role of the preamble is only 
constructive or sets out the context of the whole legislative scheme is very much alive in 
Papua New Guinea. The two leading cases on the opposing views are Independent 
Leadership Tribunal; Ex Parte Sasakila v The State (Sasakila)60 for the contextual 
approach and Premdas v Independent State of Papua New Guinea (Premdas)61 for the 
constructive approach.  
Sasakila concerned a Member of Parliament, Moses Sasakila, who was referred 
by the Ombudsman Commission to the Public Prosecutor for prosecution before a 
Leadership Tribunal for misconduct in office. The referral centred on the Constitution 
and the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership (OLDRL).  
Mr Sasakila challenged the constitutionality of a particular provision of the OLDRL, and 
sought orders for his prosecution to be quashed. The Supreme Court comprising of Frost 
CJ, Saldanha and Kearney JJ upheld his challenge. Kearney J’s approach to interpreting 
the constitutional issue was important for the way ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution 
were utilised:62 
The process of statutory interpretation is essentially intuitive and subjective, in 
the absence of rules consistently applied. The Act is a Constitutional Law and 
thus subject to the general principles of interpretation set out in Constitution ss. 
10, 25 (3), 63 (3) and Basic Social Obligation (a), and 158 (2); and to the more 
specific canons in Constitution ss. 24, 109 (4) when read with 12, and Sch. 1.5. 
In my opinion these provisions amount to a direction to the Court that in carrying 
out its functions under Constitution s 18 (1) the words actually used in the Act 
do not have to be strictly adhered to but are to be construed with the assistance 
of the materials referred to in Constitution s. 24, so as best to attain what 
Parliament intended.  
Kearney’s J statement, while coming from a single judge, has been highlighted in 
legal commentary for its authority. Brian Brunton and Duncan Colquhoun-Kerr in their 
work,  
                                                     
60 The State v Independent Leadership Tribunal; Ex Parte Sasakila [1976] PNGLR 491, 5 November 1976 
[Sasakila]. 
61 Premdas v The State [1979] PGSC 20, [1979] PNGLR 329, 1 September 1979 [Premdas]. 
62 Sasakila, above n 60, at 506. 
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The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea, described this as the “judicial 
ingenuity approach”, which can also be equated to the contextual approach.63  
They referred to the competing approach as the “case of doubt approach,” or referred to 
here as the constructive approach.64 In Premdas Wilson J said:65 
As there can be no doubt as to the interpretation of the provisions to which 
reference will be made, (i.e. this is not a “case of doubt”), I find it unnecessary 
(indeed I think it inappropriate) to use the preamble to the Constitution and, in 
particular, the national goals and directive principles “as an aid to interpretation” 
and, in any event, the preamble, although forming part of the Constitution, “must 
be read subject to any other provision” of the Constitution (see Sch. 1.3(1) of the 
Constitution).  
According to this approach if the provisions of the Constitution itself are clear, it 
would be unnecessary to refer to the NGDP and BSO in the interpretation and application 
of the Constitution. But a careful reading of s 25(1) and s 25(3) and s 63(1) and s 63(3) 
suggests Kearney J’s approach in Sasakila squares with the constitutional duty to 
implement the NGDP and BSO. Those provisions make the NGDP and BSO mandatory 
considerations in constitutional interpretation and application. 
Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr’s 1984 work noted that the Supreme Court had not 
provided a definitive statement on the correct approach.66 SCR No 1 of 1990; Reference 
by the Executive Council of the Enga Provincial Government (Enga) attempted to 
reconcile Premdas and Sasakila.67 The difference remained because the Court ended up 
discussing s 24 only, and did not discuss the use of ss 25 and 63 and their role in elevating 
the NGDP and BSO beyond a restrictive constructive role. Enga held there was no 
discrepancy between these two different views:68  
We do not consider that there is any conflict between Wilson J on the one hand 
and Kearney J or Barnett J on the other. What Wilson J said is clear from his 
judgment and that is that some provisions do not require to be interpreted by 
referring to the Constitutional Planning Committee Report or any other material 
put before the Constituent Assembly. For instance, s 187a of the Constitution 
says “There shall be a system of Provincial Government for Papua New Guinea 
in accordance with this Part”; s 169(1) of the Constitution says “An office of 
Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea is hereby established” and s 103(1) says: “A 
                                                     
63 Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above n 57, at 5. 
64 At 5. 
65 Premdas, above n 61, at 375 per Wilson J. 
66 Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above n 57, at 5. 
67 Reference by the Executive Council of the Enga Provincial Government [1990] PGSC 10, [1990] PNGLR 
532, 28 December 1990 [Enga]. 
68 Enga, at 537 per Kidu CJ, Amet, Los and Brown JJ. 
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member of the Parliament must not be less than 25 years of age.” There is 
absolutely no reason to resort to the Constitutional Planning Committee Report, 
the Debates of the Constituent Assembly and other relevant documents to 
ascertain what these provisions means — they are clear and require no 
interpretation. 
The difficulty with this statement is that if a provision of the Constitution is clear, 
such as the ones the Court refers to, s 169(1) and s 103(1), the matter would not be 
litigated. The question of whether the NGDP and BSO should be applied to the 
interpretation of these provisions would not arise, because it would not be a matter before 
the court. And even if it did come before the court, it would not be the central issue. For 
example, if a losing candidate was to dispute an election result on the basis that the 
winning candidate did not meet the required age to contest the election, the issue would 
be an evidentiary matter, and would not rely on the interpretation of  
s 103(1).69 
The fact that many subsequent Supreme Court decisions do not refer to the NGDP 
and BSO suggests the Court’s approach is only to refer to them in the case of doubt rather 
than to actively promote them. It is difficult to implement the NGDP and BSO if they are 
going to be referred to only in the case of an ambiguity. A proactive role is suggested as 
this is consistent with ss 25 and 63, despite the fact the NGDP and BSO are part of the 
preamble. 
(c) Non-implementation of s 24 of the Constitution 
Much of the justification establishing the necessity for the NGDP and BSO is found in 
the CPC Report and in the records of the House of Assembly debates. These documents 
would help promote the implementation of the NGDP and BSO by providing supporting 
historical information on them.  
Reference to parliamentary material helps the court understand the challenges the 
Parliament faced when enacting the law. Courts must decide the correct legal position 
after hearing opposing views. Referring to parliamentary materials does not determine 
the outcome of a case, but it would assist the court to arrive at its decision. 
                                                     
69 See for example Aimo v Anisi [2012] PGNC 182, N4870, 28 November 2012 where a losing candidate 
questioned the results on the basis the winning candidate was not 25 years old at the time of his election.  
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At the time the Constitution was adopted in 1975, the general rule in the United 
Kingdom was that references to parliamentary material as an aid to statutory construction 
was not permissible – this was the exclusionary rule.70 The House of Lords did not depart 
from this position until 1993, in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart.71 Lord Wilkinson-
Brown outlined three steps before parliamentary materials are referred to. First, if the 
legislation is ambiguous; second, if there is a series of statement by the Bill’s promoter 
and they need to be referred to; and third, only if the statement relied on is clear.72 But it 
is significant to note that there is some literature on the different approach to interpretation 
by the courts of a constitution as compared to an ordinary statute.73  
In terms of statutes, Australia’s position only changed in 198474 and in New 
Zealand, s 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999 allows reference to parliamentary material 
and other relevant external sources.75 In Australia and in the United States, there is an 
interesting debate over the relative merits of focusing on the original intention of the 
framers of the Constitution versus textual intention (or referring to the text alone).76  
In both countries, the use of historical documents is not expressly provided for in the 
Constitution and has evolved from judicial activity. In Papua New Guinea, s 24 of the 
Constitution permits reference to parliamentary material: 
24. Use of Certain Materials as Aids to Interpretation. 
(1) The official records of debates and of votes and proceedings— 
(a) in the pre-Independence House of Assembly on the report of the 
Constitutional Planning Committee; and 
(b) in the Constituent Assembly on the draft of this Constitution, 
together with that report and any other documents or papers tabled 
for the purposes of or in connection with those debates, may be used, 
so far as they are relevant, as aids to interpretation where any 
question relating to the interpretation or application of any provision 
of a Constitutional Law arises. 
                                                     
70 Davis v Johnson [1978] UKHL 1, [1979] AC 264. 
71 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, [1993] AC 59. 
72 At 28. 
73 Ahron Barak Purposive Interpretation in Law (transl S Bashi, Princeton University Press, 2005), relevant 
excerpts reprinted in Tony Blackshield and George William Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (5th 
ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2010) at 304. 
74 Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 1984 (Australia, Cth) s 7.  
75 Awatere Huata v Prebble [2005] 1 NZLR 289 (SC) at [51], per Elias CJ. See also Cathy Nijman 
“Ascertaining the Meaning of Legislation – A Question of Context” (2011) 38(3) VUWLR 629 at 643.  
76 Anthony Mason “The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the Australian 
and the United States Experience” (1986) 16 FL Rev 1.  
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It was necessary for legislation and administrative processes to be put in place to 
implement s 24 of the Constitution. An Act of Parliament, the Constitutional Documents 
(Manner of Proof) Act 1976 was enacted to provide for the manner of proof of the official 
records of debates, and of votes and proceedings. This Act sets out the following 
documents as forming the documents referred to in s 24 of the Constitution: 
 Draft (revised and renumbered) Constitution of the Independent State of 
Papua New Guinea presented to the Constituent Assembly on 29 May 
1975;77 
 Record of the debates of the pre-Independence House of Assembly on the 
report of the CPC;78 
 Record of the debates of the Constituent Assembly on the draft 
Constitution;79 
 Minutes of proceedings of the pre-independence House of Assembly 
bearing proceedings concerning the adoption of the CPC Report;80 
 Minutes of Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly relating to the 
proceedings of the Constituent Assembly on the draft Constitution;81 
 Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee 1974 Part 1;82 
 Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee 1974 Part 2;83 
 Government Paper Proposals on Constitutional Principles and Explanatory 
Notes;84 and 
 United Party Proposals for the Constitution Port Moresby 1974.85 
It is apparent that apart from the CPC Report, there is no official record of the 
documents referred to in s 24 of the Constitution and the Constitutional Documents 
(Manner of Proof) Act. No particular government agency is responsible for securing these 
documents on account of their need in constitutional construction. Brunton and 
Colquhoun-Kerr observe that no official published record of the debates exist.86  
                                                     
77 Constitutional Documents (Manner of Proof) Act 1976, s 2. 
78 Section 3(a). 
79 Section 3(b). 
80 Section 4(a). 
81 Section 4(b). 
82 Section 5(a). 
83 Section 5(b). 
84 Section 6. 
85 Section 7. 
86 Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above no 57, at vi. 
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A review of the cases, especially Supreme Court decisions after independence, and major 
government policy initiatives, does not reveal much use of these historical documents, 
with the exception of the CPC Report. The lack of attention to these historical documents 
and parliamentary materials contributes to a lack of appreciation of the nature of the 
NGDP and BSO, and of the reasons why they were included in the Constitution. 
Regan and Wolfers have suggested that even if these documents were available 
they would not be helpful because the Constitution is an amalgamation of different 
proposals and therefore no clear intention can be discerned from all these documents.87 
The practicality of the use of these documents should not, however, obviate the need to 
have them available.  
Even the CPC Report, which is a little more accessible than the House of 
Assembly debates, is contested. The sharp divide was considered together with ss 25 and 
63 of the Constitution in Sasakila88 and Premdas89 discussed above. What is important 
about Kearny J’s statement in Sasakila is that when s 24 is considered together with ss 
10, 25, 63, 109(4), 158(2) and sch 1.5 of the Constitution, it amounts to a direction to the 
Court to always search for Parliament’s intention. But in Premdas Wilson J focused on s 
24 only:90 
As, on the authorities and having regard to the Constitution itself, there can be 
no doubt as to the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of the 
Constitution to which reference will be made, I find it unnecessary (indeed I think 
it inappropriate) to use the final report of the pre-Independence Constitutional 
Planning Committee dated 13th August 1974, and presented to the pre-
Independence House of Assembly on 16th August 1974, as ‘aid to interpretation’. 
Obviously Wilson J favoured a more restricted and literal approach to interpreting 
the Constitution but he seemed to be referring only to the provisions at issue in that case, 
not to the general interpretation of the Constitution. Using his approach, implementation 
of the NGDP and BSO would not be engaged in the same way it would if Kearney J’s 
approach was followed. 
                                                     
87 AJ Regan and EP Wolfers “Aids to Interpretation of the Constitution – Some Preliminary Thoughts” 
(1986) 14 Melanesian LJ 153 at 161. 
88 Sasakila, above n 60. 
89 The CPC Report is available electronically at <www.paclii.org>. 
90 Premdas, above n 61, at 376; also cited in Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above no 57, at 67. 
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In Enga Provincial Government, reference to the CPC Report was considered 
appropriate only in cases of doubt.91 In contrast to Enga, which envisaged a less 
prominent role for the CPC Report as an aid to interpretation, the Court in Sasakila 
required reference to the CPC Report to consider its relevance.92  
It is accepted that parliamentary materials are used on a case by case basis. The 
“in case of doubt” approach for the role of the preamble in some common law 
jurisdictions would be very useful for allowing the CPC Report to be used to facilitate the 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO. But that is a different proposition altogether from 
not having these materials available. 
3 Cumulative effect of legal impediments 
This thesis contends the cumulative effect of the various legal reasons for non-
implementation has resulted in an ad hoc approach to addressing the duty to implement 
the NGDP and BSO. The point underlying ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution, which 
governmental bodies have misunderstood, is that each arm of government has authority 
to implement the NGDP and BSO. Failure on the part of one arm has an effect on the 
other. Significantly, because the courts and the Ombudsman Commission have not held 
the other arms to account for the non-implementation, the legislature and the executive 
are left to largely ignore the NGDP and BSO.  
This thesis also contends that indirect justiciability under ss 25 and 63 of the 
Constitution mediates the non-justiciable/justiciable divide. Such an approach would help 
each arm of government to see themselves as being interconnected with each other. It is 
the failure of governmental bodies to undertake this dual role of indirect justiciability and 
the interconnectedness approach that has resulted in the non-implementation of the 
NGDP and BSO. The nature of the latter view (the “interconnectedness approach”) is 
outlined in chapter 6. Adopting this approach to the implementation of the NGDP and 
BSO under the duties in ss 25 and 63 will support greater coordination between the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and the Ombudsman Commission. The proposal 
is outlined in more detail in chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively. Again, the best legal 
means of ensuring an “interconnected approach” is “indirect justiciability”.93  
                                                     
91 Enga, above n 67. 
92 Sasakila, above n 60, at 506. 
93 Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above n 57, at 69. 
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IV Conclusion  
The main focus in this chapter was to highlight the issue of non-implementation of the 
NGDP and BSO, and the legal impediments to implementation of the NGDP and BSO. 
Non-implementation was identified through the performance of the legislature, the courts, 
the executive, and the Ombudsman Commission. There are three principal legal 
impediments to implementation of the NGDP and BSO. First, the lack of recognition of 
the indirect justiciability of the NGDP and BSO. Second, the difference in opinion on the 
role of preambles in statutes generally and in the Constitution more specifically.  
The courts appear to favour a constructive role for the preamble over a contextual one. 
However, the provisions of the Constitution on implementation of the NGDP and BSO 
respectively, particularly ss 25(3) and 63(3), require a contextual role for the preambles. 
Third is the non-implementation of s 24 of the Constitution. Non-accessibility of the 
official records of the House of Assembly debates (apart from the CPC Report) has 
resulted in a gap in the historical record of the role of the NGDP and BSO in Papua New 
Guinea’s legal, political and social development. This has led to the absence of a 
coordinated approach by the various arms of government to the implementation of the 
NGDP and BSO.  
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Chapter Six – Implementation Framework and the Interconnectedness 
Approach  
I Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to present a framework for the implementation of 
the NGDP and BSO, within the doctrine of separation of powers, which ensures the 
proposals for the legislature, the executive, the courts, and the Ombudsman Commission 
(to be presented in chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively) does not see the different arms of 
government encroaching on one another’s functions. The separation of powers, as a stand-
alone principle of government in most Western liberal democracies, often assumes a 
neutral position to the executive’s policy objectives, which are likely to be influenced by 
where a government sits on the left-right political spectrum. In Papua New Guinea, all 
arms of government have a constitutional duty to implement the NGDP and BSO (which 
have social-democratic aims), which may require some adjustment of the principle of 
separation of powers.   
The organising principle in which implementation is to take place is the 
“interconnectedness approach”. The interconnectedness approach is an application of the 
separation of powers to Papua New Guinea’s constitutional context to ensure effective 
and efficient implementation of the NGDP and BSO by the government. According to ss 
25 and 63, the legislative, executive, judicial and administrative powers of government 
are required to be exercised in a manner that fulfils the NGDP and BSO.  
The interconnectedness approach is not a constitutional norm as such, but it is a means of 
ensuring the practical and effective application of the separation of powers in the Papua 
New Guinea constitutional scheme to achieve the constitutional objectives of fulfilling 
the NGDP and BSO. The interconnectedness approach helps the different arms of 
government mediate both the non-justiciable and justiciable aspects of the NGDP and 
BSO. This approach therefore attempts to promote a more comprehensive methodology 
of implementation. It works well with the indirectly justiciable nature of the NGDP and 
BSO.  
This chapter has four parts. Part I is this introduction. Part II outlines the principle 
of separation of powers. Part III presents the separation of powers as it applies in Papua 
New Guinea, detailing the interconnectedness approach. Part IV concludes the chapter. 
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II Separation of Powers 
A Introduction  
The separation of powers is one of the main principles underlying the constitution of 
many countries in the world today. Power is conferred on three separate arms of 
government: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The main objective of the 
principle of separation of powers is to prevent the abuse of power, which can occur when 
power is lodged in only one person or arm of government. This part of the chapter briefly 
looks at the origins of this principle and its application in some countries today. It will set 
the basis for assessing what form of separation of powers Papua New Guinea applies in 
its constitutional system.   
B Origins of Separation of Powers  
The separation of powers as a theory of politics and government gained influence through 
the French political theorist Montesquieu.1 Before him, other commentators of note who 
espoused similar ideas included Aristotle and Locke.2 Montesquieu held the view that 
there must be a check on power to ensure political liberty. This would come about by 
recognising and keeping separate three types of government power: legislative, executive 
and judicial. Montesquieu stated:3 
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or body, whether of the 
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that 
of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of the individuals. 
Montesquieu’s work led to the modern classification of powers. Montesquieu formulated 
his theory based on his observation of the English political system.  
A common criticism of Montesquieu is that there was no actual separation of powers in 
England in the sense of each arm of government being completely independent from each 
other.4 In England, the executive was drawn from the legislature and was accountable to 
the legislature. Members of the executive, the Prime Minister and ministers, were also 
members of the House of Commons. Members of the English upper house, the House of 
                                                     
1 Baron de Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws (transl Thomas Nugent, Hafner Press, 1949) at 150.  
2 Blackshield and Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (5th ed, The Federation Press, 
Sydney, 2010) at 8. 
3 Baron de Montesquieu, above n 1, at 150. 
4 Laurence Claus “Montesquieu’s Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation” (2005) 25(3) OJLS 419. 
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Lords, acted as both law makers and sat in court as judges in the final court of appeal.5 
Nevertheless the idea has taken root and influenced democratic government systems the 
world over. 
C Separation of Powers  
In the scheme of separation of powers, the legislature has the power to make, alter, or 
repeal laws;6 the executive function is the carrying out of laws;7 and the judicial function 
consists of the interpretation of laws and their application by rule or discretion to the facts 
of a particular case.8 One arm of government should not assume the role of another arm 
of government. 
The separation of powers has operated in practice by following four assertions.9 
First, the existence of three agencies: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.10 
Second, the membership of each branch of government would be composed separately.11 
Third, there would be no overlapping membership from one branch with another. Fourth, 
if each arm of government was to operate in its own sphere of influence, it would act as 
a check on the other arm of government.12 Systems of government have tried in varying 
degrees to follow these four principles of the separation of powers in their constitutional 
arrangements.  
Notwithstanding the above classification, a complete separation of powers is not 
possible in practice, since it would bring government to a standstill.13 For example, in 
many countries, the executive has been delegated law-making power.14 This is because 
the legislature does not have the time or the expertise to deal with detailed technical 
issues. Even courts when interpreting the law, are often accused of usurping Parliament’s 
power to make laws. Therefore the actual distinction of powers, when applied to various 
                                                     
5 The Supreme Court reforms have since separated the judicial function of the House of Lords under the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK), creating the Supreme Court as the highest court of appeal. 
6 Owen Hood Philips and Paul Jackson Constitutional and Administrative Law (7th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1987) at 11. 
7 At 12.  
8 Philips and Jackson, above n 6, at 12. 
9 Michael A Ntumy Administrative Law of Papua New Guinea (2nd ed, CBS Publishers & Distributors, 
New Delhi, 2002) 46. 
10 At 46. 
11 At 46. 
12 At 46. 
13 Blackshield and Williams, above n 2, at 10. 
14 Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73 [Dignan’s Case]. 
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national constitutions, becomes blurred.15 What is important is the prevention of tyranny 
by the government.16 
D Comparative Experiences of Application of Separation of Powers  
Two countries that have incorporated the separation of powers are the United 
States and Australia. Like Papua New Guinea, both countries have a written constitution. 
Australia’s government system has historical links to the Westminster system as does 
Papua New Guinea.  
What is witnessed in Australia and the United States are certain core functions 
granted to each arm of government and cooperation in certain areas to enable the smooth 
functioning of government operations. For example, in the United States Supreme Court 
Justices are appointed by the President, but appointments must be ratified by the 
legislature in the form of the Senate. Another observation made about government in the 
United States is the development of an additional limb of government, since classified as 
the administrative branch. The extraordinary growth of government regulation, such as 
the Commerce Commission, which has quasi-judicial and law-making powers, has 
attracted this further classification of a fourth branch.17   
In Australia, ministers are appointed by the Crown with the support of the lower 
house; the minister must be a Member of Parliament. An important control over 
Parliament in Australia is the courts’ ability to invalidate laws on constitutional grounds 
in the context of federal and state relations. There is no strict separation. Some American 
states and the French Constitution 1891 have tried to follow strict separation of powers 
but failed.18 Separation of powers is a theory and must give way to the realities of 
government.19 
                                                     
15 Blackshield and Williams, above n 2, at 9. 
16 Blackshield and Williams, above n 2, at 10. 
17 President’s Committee on Administrative Management Administrative Management in the Government 
of the United States (United States Government Printing Office, 1937) at 36. 
18 For example the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Part the First, art XXX: “In the government of this 
Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either 
of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them: The judicial 
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a 
government of laws and not of men.”: cited from The University of Chicago Press <http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu>.  
19 Gerard Carney, “Separation of Powers in the Westminster System” (1994) 8(2) Legis Stud 59 at 60. 
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III Separation of Powers in Papua New Guinea and the 
Interconnectedness Approach 
A Introduction  
The separation of powers has been adopted in Papua New Guinea with many 
modifications, and even a judicial pronouncement in SCR No 1 of 1978; Re Ombudsman 
Commission Investigations of the Public Solicitor (Public Solicitor) going so far as to 
suggest it has no application in Papua New Guinea.20 The Constitutional Planning 
Committee (CPC) addressed the principle of separation of powers by devoting one 
chapter for the legislature,21 the judiciary22 and the executive.23 It did not discuss the 
doctrine as a separate concept.  
The CPC assumed the general Western liberal description of the separation of 
powers,24 and went on to recommend additional independent constitutional institutions, 
providing for a very complex power sharing scheme. It is interesting to see how the 
Constitution reflects the CPC recommendations, and also how the CPC wanted the NGDP 
and BSO to be implemented by the national government, within certain parameters. What 
is evident is the supremacy of the Constitution, rather than three arms of government 
having separate and equal powers. 
In Papua New Guinea, two main concerns influenced the CPC’s version of the 
separation of powers. First, the prevention of abuse of power; and second, developing a 
national agenda for development. Unlike the United States, which was primarily 
concerned with preventing the abuse of government power (following the Lockean 
political philosophy of limited government), Papua New Guinea added a further task of 
fulfilling a national philosophy. The first concern—control of public power—is evident 
in the establishment of constitutional institutions such as the Ombudsman Commission, 
which provides an additional mechanism to protect the people from abuse of power.  
The Ombudsman Commission is an independent institution, not subject to the direction 
and control of the other arms of government. Its roles and functions will be discussed in 
                                                     
20 See Pritchard J’s decision in SCR No 1 of 1978; Re Ombudsman Commission Investigations of the Public 
Solicitor [1978] PGSC 7, [1978] PNGLR 345, 6 October 1978 [Public Solicitor]. 
21 Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, Part One 
(Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) [CPC Report] at 6/1 “chapter 6 ‘The Legislature’”. 
22 CPC Report, at 7/1 “chapter 7 ‘The Executive’”. 
23 CPC Report, at 8/1 “chapter 8, ‘The Administration of Justice’”. 
24 See for example the CPC’s statement on the courts as constituting the third pillar of the government of a 
country: see CPC Report at 8/1 [2].  
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chapter 10, especially as it pertains to the implementation of the NGDP and BSO.  
The CPC’s second concern related to the implementation of a national philosophy. This 
is the requirement to implement the NGDP and BSO. The NGDP and BSO are the 
fulcrum upon which public power is exercised and therefore require close attention to 
how the separation of powers becomes a means to this end. The cooperation of all arms 
of government and constitutional offices such as the Ombudsman Commission is 
necessary to address the CPC’s concerns, and ensure implementation of the NGDP and 
BSO.  
B Constitutional Recognition of Separation of Powers  
The separation of powers is expressly recognised under Part VI of the Constitution: 
99. Structure of Government. 
(1) Subject to and in accordance with this Constitution, the power, authority 
and jurisdiction of the People shall be exercised by the National 
Government [emphasis added].  
(2) The National Government consists of three principal arms, namely:– 
(a) the National Parliament, which is an elective legislature with, 
subject to the Constitutional Laws, unlimited powers of law-
making; and 
(b) the National Executive; and 
(c) the National Judicial System, consisting of a Supreme Court of 
Justice and a National Court of Justice, of unlimited jurisdiction, and 
other courts. 
(3) In principle, the respective powers and functions of the three arms shall 
be kept separate from each other [emphasis added].  
(4) Subsection (2) is descriptive only and is non-justiciable. 
Section 99(1) makes a clear connection between the people (identified in the preamble as 
the source of all government power) and who is to exercise their power – the National 
Government. The National Government is composed of the traditional three arms of 
government (Constitution, s 99(2)). Importantly, these three arms of government must 
exercise their powers “Subject to and in accordance with …” the Constitution. In Public 
Solicitor Prentice CJ observed:25 
                                                     
25 Public Solicitor, above n 20, at 350 per Prentice CJ. 
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… one refers to s 99 of the Constitution which asserts the ‘power, authority and 
jurisdiction’ of the people is to be exercised by the National Government.’ But 
this is ‘subject to and in accordance with the Constitution’. 
This immediately brings to attention ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. When the 
National Government exercises the people’s power, it is required to comply with ss 25 
and 63. There is express reference to the three arms of government in ss 25(3) and 63(3). 
In addition, “administrative power” is identified. In fact, ss 25(3) and 63(3) place a duty 
that requires legislative, judicial, executive and administrative power to be exercised in a 
manner that fulfils the NGDP and BSO. There is, therefore, a strong link between s 99 
and ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. 
Section 99(3) of the Constitution then states that the legislature, the executive and 
the judiciary must exercise their powers and functions separately from each other. 
However, the separateness operates only “in principle”. “In principle …” has a specific 
legal meaning: 
Sch. 1.6. Statements of general principle.  
Where a provision of a Constitutional Law is expressed to state a proposition “in 
principle”, then— 
(a) an act (including a legislative, executive or judicial act) that is inconsistent 
with the proposition is not, by reason of that inconsistency alone, invalid 
or ineffectual; but 
(b) if the act is reasonably capable of being understood or given effect to in 
such a way as not to be inconsistent with the proposition it shall be so given 
effect to. 
In the first instance, sch 1.6(b) imposes a duty to observe the relevant 
constitutional provision (in this case s 99(3)), unless it is unreasonable to do so.26  
The language of sch 1.6(b) is reminiscent of ss 25(3) and 63(3). In the latter are the words, 
“… without failing to give effect to the intention of the … in such as a way as to give 
effect to …”. Again, it calls for close attention to the NGDP and BSO and the three 
branches of government.  
In addition to ss 99, a number of other provisions in the Constitution invoke the 
separation of powers: s 100 on legislative power, s 138 on executive power, and s 158 on 
                                                     
26 Other provisions in the Constitution that use the term “In principle” are s 118(1) and (4) on the committee 
system, s 119(2) on the chairman of the parliamentary committee, s 124(1) on parliament meetings, and s 
255 on consultation.  
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the judiciary.27 Each of these provisions will be examined in chapters 7, 8 and 9 to 
determine how they can be utilised to implement the NGDP and BSO. 
The table below summarises the operation of separation of powers in Papua New 
Guinea. 
Table on Application of Separation of Powers in Papua New Guinea  
Institution  Power  Personnel  Control  
National 
Parliament  
Power to 
make laws 
Members of Parliament elected 
to National Parliament  
Breach of Leadership 
Code or expulsion 
from the Parliament. 
Judicial review 
National 
Executive  
Executive 
power  
Ministers appointed by the 
Prime Minister. Must be 
members of the Parliament  
Breach of Leadership 
Code or expulsion 
from the Parliament. 
Parliamentary and 
judicial review  
The Courts  Judicial Power  Chief Justice appointed by the 
Executive, but other judges, 
including Deputy Chief Justice 
appointed by the Judicial and 
Legal Services Commission   
Judges removed for 
breach of Leadership 
Code  
Constitutional 
offices, such as 
Ombudsman 
Commission, 
Public Solicitor, 
Public Prosecutor 
and Electoral 
Commission  
Various 
functions 
established 
under the 
Constitution  
Appointment body established 
under the Constitution, for 
example the Ombudsmen are 
appointed by the Ombudsman 
Appointments Committee, 
which consists of the Prime 
Minister, Opposition Leader, a 
Member of Parliament, Chief 
Justice and the Chairman of the 
Public Service Commission  
Constitutional office 
holders removed for 
breach of the 
Leadership Code. 
Judicial review 
 
The table includes an additional group of public offices – constitutional offices – as they 
operate independently from the traditional three arms of government. This creates what 
has been argued to be a fourth branch of government. In Public Solicitor, Prentice CJ 
stated:28 
                                                     
27 Michael A Ntumy “Separation of Powers” in Anthony J Regan, Owen Jessep and Eric L Kwa (eds) 
Twenty Years of the Papua New Guinea Constitution (Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2001) 183 at 183. 
28 Public Solicitor, above n 20, at 350 per Prentice CJ. 
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Insofar as such bodies are created independent of direction and control, they 
would seem to be exercising the power of the people given to them as a direct 
grant by the Constitution and Organic Laws and their exercise of powers could 
not I think be said to be an exercise of power “by the National Government” in 
such a sense as would by itself constitute any of them “an arm” of the National 
Government, or department or agency or instrumentality thereof within the 
meaning of s. 219 and Sch. 1.2 of the Constitution. 
To reiterate a previous point: under s 99 of the Constitution, the National 
Government is composed of the three arms of government. So, Prentice CJ is saying that 
constitutional offices are outside of the traditional division of powers because they 
operate independently from the other arms of government. The Ombudsman Commission 
has been identified from this category of constitutional offices to support the three 
branches of government to implement the NGDP and BSO. The Ombudsman 
Commission was the obvious choice from the list of constitutional offices because of its 
significant constitutional latitude (discussed in chapter 10) to implement the NGDP and 
BSO. The next part of this chapter discusses how the courts have tried to apply the 
principle of separation of powers to specific political and legal issues that have arisen in 
Papua New Guinea. 
C Practical Application of the Principle of Separation of Powers 
It is important to observe the ways in which the courts have tried to apply the principle of 
separation of powers. The cases reflect two main approaches: a general application of the 
principle of separation of powers; and a more complex approach consistent with the 
structure of Papua New Guinea’s constitutional system. 
Peter v South Pacific Brewery Limited presented a general application of the 
principle.29  What was in contention was s 131 of the District Court Act 1963, which 
allowed the District Court to hear cases in the absence of the accused for certain types of 
minor offences. The Court was asked to decide whether s 131 was inconsistent with the 
accused’s right to be present in his or her trial (Constitution, s 37(5)). 
The controversy over the application of separation of powers arose from Deputy 
Chief Justice Prentice’s dissenting judgment. He not only found s 131 unconstitutional, 
but went further to hold that taking into account ss 25 and 32 of the Constitution and the 
NGDP, the courts were permitted to add words to the provision of the law, to reflect 
                                                     
29 Peter v South Pacific Brewery Ltd [1976] PGSC 28, SC109, [1976] PNGLR 345, 29 November 1976. 
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Parliament’s intention as well as to implement the NGDP. His Honour said this may be 
undesirable in other more established constitutions, but was permissible in Papua New 
Guinea. The majority disagreed with Prentice DCJ on the basis that the separation of 
powers operated in Papua New Guinea, and the Court could only find a law 
unconstitutional and could not add words to the legislation, which was the province of 
the legislature. 
In Public Prosecutor v Rooney (No 2), the Opposition Leader Iambakey Okuk, 
instituted contempt proceedings against Nahau Rooney, Minister for Justice, for writing 
to the Chief Justice criticising him for a court decision.30 The Court had issued an 
injunction preventing the deportation of a foreign national. Rooney was unhappy with the 
court interference over the exercise of executive power and expressed her disappointment 
in correspondence to the Chief Justice. Okuk cited the principle of separation of powers 
in his case for contempt against Rooney. However, the Court did not think this was an 
infringement of the separation of powers, especially of judicial independence as protected 
by s 157 of the Constitution. The correspondence was instead found to be contempt on 
the basis of scandalising the court. Subsequently, the Minister was sentenced to eight 
months in jail.31 The separation of powers was the key principle behind the initiation of 
the case. 
Another case which looked at the separation of powers generally was SCR No 1A 
of 1981; Re Motor Traffic Act.32 This was a reference by the Public Solicitor pursuant to 
s 19 of the Constitution to determine the constitutional validity of certain amendments to 
s 19AB(2)(e)(ii) of the Motor Traffic Act 1950, s 138A(1)(b) of the District Courts Act 
1963, and s 38A(1)(c ) of the Local Courts Act 1963. The effect of these amendments 
was that if a person was fined for a traffic offence, and did not pay the fine and failed to 
appear in court (after service of the summons), the person would be presumed to be guilty 
of the offence. The Court found the amendments unconstitutional on the basis that the 
legislature had assumed the powers of the judiciary, and this offended the principle of 
separation of powers.  
                                                     
30 Public Prosecutor v Rooney (No 2) [1979] PGSC 23, [1979] PNGLR 448, 11 September 1979. 
31 Soon after the sentence, the Prime Minister Michael Somare and his national executive council, using the 
executive prerogative of the power of mercy, released Rooney. This caused great controversy and a number 
of judges resigned. 
32 SCR No 1A of 1981; Re Motor Traffic Act [1982] PNGLR 122. 
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Public Solicitor expressed a contrary view contesting the application of the 
doctrine of separation of powers in Papua New Guinea.33 But it was Pritchard J’s minority 
decision that has spurred academic debate in Papua New Guinea. One result is the 
emergence of the view promoted by APW Deklin,34 which articulates an explanation of 
the separation of powers most likely to enable the efficient and practical implementation 
of the NGDP and BSO. 
In Public Solicitor, the Court had to deal with the issue of whether the Public 
Solicitor was subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Commission.35  
The Constitution did not specifically identify the Public Solicitor as being subject to the 
Ombudsman Commission’s jurisdiction. Instead, under s 219(1)(a)(ii), the jurisdiction of 
the Ombudsman Commission was defined as having application over all governmental 
bodies. The question was whether the Public Solicitor was a governmental body. 
Schedule 1.2(1) defines “governmental body” to include “an arm … of the National 
Government”, and s 99(2) describes the “three principal arms” of the National 
Government as: (a) the National Parliament, (b) the National Executive, and (c) the 
National Judicial System. The majority held the Public Solicitor was not part of the 
National Government, which is limited to the traditional three arms of government, so the 
Public Solicitor fell outside the Ombudsman Commission’s jurisdiction. 
Pritchard J expressed a minority view. His Honour found the Public Solicitor was 
a governmental body within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Commission.  
He reasoned the separation of powers did not operate in Papua New Guinea. According 
to Pritchard J, the Public Solicitor was a “separate arm of the National Government not 
an instrumentality responsible or subservient to any one of the principal arms”.  
His Honour went on to reject the traditional view of separation of powers by stating:36 
I say here and now, there is no such tradition [i.e. ‘three traditional functions of 
government’] in Papua New Guinea. Except to the extent that the principles and 
rules of common law and equity in England are adopted under Schedule 2.2 of 
our Constitution, in Papua New Guinea we do not call on traditions of 
government from anywhere in the World at all; we look to our constitutional laws 
and them alone. The Constitution and the Organic Laws are the Supreme Law of 
                                                     
33 Public Solicitor, above n 20. 
34 APW Deklin “The Legal Control of the Executive in Papua New Guinea” in Pacific Constitutions: 
Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VI Peter Sack (ed) (Law Department Research School of 
Social Science, ANU, 1982) at 173–187. 
35 Public Solicitor, above n 20. 
36Public Solicitor, above n 20, at 377 per Pritchard J. 
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Papua New Guinea and their provisions are self-executing to the fullest extent 
their respective natures and subject matters permit (Constitution, s 11).  
It is unclear whether Pritchard J rejected the doctrine outright. It is more likely his 
Honour simply preferred the view there were more than three branches of government. 
On this latter view, it is also worth pointing out that Prentice CJ and Pritchard J, although 
reaching different conclusions, were both of the view the Constitution created an 
additional arm of government. When one speaks of the composition of the National 
Government, the composite institutions fell outside of the traditional tripartite division of 
power and could be considered a fourth arm of government. In Prentice CJ’s view, their 
power is derived directly from the Constitution.37 This was to be differentiated from other 
statutory bodies created by the Parliament through ordinary statute and subject to 
executive or parliamentary control. 
Deklin, relying on Pritchard J’s decision, has expounded a view of the separation 
of powers within Papua New Guinea’s constitutional system that lays an appropriate 
groundwork for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO.38 The next part of this thesis 
presents the “interconnectedness approach”. It differs to some extent from Deklin’s view, 
and adopts a rationale similar to that of the CPC.  
D Interconnectedness Approach   
This part will firstly outline Deklin’s view, the main criticism of his view, and finally 
present the interconnectedness approach. The terminology of “interconnectedness” was 
inspired by Narokobi who stated that the various arms of government should work closely 
to ensure Papua New Guinea meets its development objectives. Narokobi preferred the 
term “interdependent power and mutual self-restraint”. 39 Deklin provides a good starting-
point to develop this idea.  
1 Deklin's view 
Deklin’s main objective was to understand the nature of the constitutional control on the 
exercise of executive power in Papua New Guinea. This required him to examine the 
principle of the separation of powers, as it was the traditional mechanism used to control 
                                                     
37 Per Prentice CJ at 350. 
38Deklin, above n 34. 
39 Bernard Narokobi Law and Custom in Melanesia (Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of South 
Pacific and Melanesian Institute for Pastoral and Socio-Economic Service, Goroka, 1996) at 119. 
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executive power. Deklin took the view that the separation of powers did not operate in 
Papua New Guinea; instead he took a “composite approach”. This was a system of 
multiple institutions with constitutional power to control the exercise of public power. 
The table above provides an indication of this. One of the main reasons Deklin took this 
view was the existence of the NGDP and BSO. There had to be a system in place to ensure 
the implementation of the NGDP and BSO. Section 99 of the Constitution was important 
to Deklin’s view. As discussed above, where the Constitution states a provision is “in 
principle”, non-compliance does not trigger possible legal enforcement. According to 
Deklin, the fact s 99(3) says the independence of the three branches of government was 
in principle only, means that the doctrine of the separation of powers had been modified 
in Papua New Guinea. There would be no legal consequences if one branch of 
government intruded into the work of another. 
Two statements from the CPC played a significant role in Deklin’s view.  
The first arose from the relationship between the legislature and the executive. The CPC 
envisaged a participatory democracy with a maximum emphasis on consultation and 
consensus.40 The legislature would have a central role and should not be a rubber stamp 
for the executive.41 Rather, the legislature was to be the executive’s “full and constructive 
partner”. Cooperation underscored the relationship between the legislature and the 
executive.42 This signalled to Deklin that the traditional separation of powers was not 
intended for Papua New Guinea. 
Although the CPC was mindful of the importance of judicial independence to the 
effective function of the rule of law, in terms of the courts, the importance of taking a 
slightly more collaborative approach influenced the CPC’s recommendations for the 
judiciary:43 
In carrying out their judicial role, judges and magistrates must take full account 
of the goals of the society in which they live; they must be attuned to the wishes 
of that society and to that extent must be politically conscious (although not party 
politically conscious). In Chapter 2, “National Goals and Directive Principles”, 
we have spelt out what we believe to be the goals of Papua New Guinea and we 
have recommended that our judges uphold the Constitution and interpret the laws 
made under it in the spirit of those goals and principles. 
                                                     
40 CPC Report, above n 21, at 6/1 [1]. 
41 At 6/1 [1]. 
42 At 6/1 [1]. 
43 At 8/1 [6]. 
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The courts also have an important role to implement the NGDP and BSO, and 
appear to be performing an executive role, but this is sanctioned by the Constitution. 
Again, for Deklin, a traditional approach to separation of powers would not allow the 
courts to perform this role intended by the CPC. This is because the courts’ function is to 
interpret the law and not to make policy decisions, which is the responsibility of the other 
branches of government. 
Deklin then discussed the functions of the Ombudsman Commission, again as an 
institution separate from the traditional three arms of government, but as one involved in 
the control of the exercise of public power, to prevent abuse. As an independent institution 
the Ombudsman Commission has a duty to implement the NGDP and BSO under ss 23(4) 
and 63(4) of the Constitution. Deklin concluded Papua New Guinea had a “composite 
approach”, which essentially was a complex power sharing scheme. 
Another supporting observation from the CPC, which lends support to Deklin’s 
thesis, was on the Leadership Code, which the Ombudsman Commission administers 
under the Constitution. The CPC stated:44 
Experience in many countries has shown that constitutional provisions and 
declarations have little effect by themselves. We believe that perhaps the single 
most important factor in determining the direction of national development is the 
quality of leadership. If Papua New Guinea is to have any chance of 
implementing its national goals and directive principles, it must ensure that its 
leadership has a genuine commitment to these goals. 
According to the CPC, maintaining a Leadership Code, independently 
administered, would help foster a commitment to the NGDP (and BSO by implication). 
This is demonstrated in ss 25(4) and 63(4) of the Constitution. Public leadership in Papua 
New Guinea is composed at its highest in the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 
Members of Parliament, ministers, and judges are all subject to the Ombudsman 
Commission’s jurisdiction. 
2 Criticism of Deklin  
Michael Ntumy has criticised Deklin, stating that if the Constitution did not require 
separation of powers to control exercise of public power, but instead relied on a composite 
approach, it would have expressly referred to it in those terms.45  
                                                     
44 CPC Report, above n 21, at 3/2 [13]. 
45Ntumy, above n 27. 
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Ntumy further adds to his criticism that Deklin was proposing a view that was not readily 
identifiable from the text of the Constitution – an “amorphous monstrosity”.46  
In Ntumy’s view, there was in place a system of separation of powers, but its precise 
nature had not been defined by the courts. He relied on Peter v South Pacific Brewery 
Limited, which applied the principle of separation of powers, and then Public Solicitor, 
which took a different view. Ntumy concludes these approaches need to be reconciled by 
the courts in the future. The issue was not that Papua New Guinea did not have separation 
of powers, but rather the courts had not clearly defined its application. 
In assessing the criticism of Ntumy, one can agree it makes practical sense. 
However, the criticism does not take into account one of the factors underlying Deklin’s 
view, which was the implementation of the NGDP and BSO. Section 99 is made subject 
to the Constitution, and this requires compliance with ss 25 and 63. These provisions 
place a duty on the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive to implement the NGDP 
and BSO. In addition, there is the duty on the Ombudsman Commission in ss 25(4) and 
63(4). All this means that while it is important to observe the separation of powers to 
prevent abuse, a balance must be struck to ensure each arm of government cooperates 
with the other arms of government to ensure implementation of the NGDP and BSO. But 
this is to be done within their specific sphere of influence. Implementation must, 
therefore, take place in a way that connects the different functions of government.  
This is the basic premise of the parameters that will inform the proposals presented in 
chapters 7 to 10. 
3 Interconnectedness approach  
According to Narokobi, the theory of the separation of powers in Papua New Guinea 
should be abandoned.47 Narokobi’s main objective is to work towards reforming the 
law.48 Narokobi recommended a constitutional arrangement enabling interdependent 
power and mutual self-restraint.49 His recommendation was premised on the basis of 
exercising control to achieve predetermined goals of society.50 But the separation of 
powers is a present day reality in Papua New Guinea’s Constitution. However, what can 
be taken from Narokobi would be to consider ways in which the separation of powers in 
                                                     
46 Ntumy, above n 27, at 193. 
47 Narokobi, above n 39, at 119. 
48 At 199. 
49 At 119. 
50 At 199. 
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the Constitution can promote cooperation to implement the NGDP and BSO. To some 
extent Deklin accommodates implementation within the existing Constitution. 
Whilst Deklin can be applauded for attempting to propose a view of the separation 
of powers that accounts for the NGDP and BSO, the fact that the Constitution expressly 
refers to the separation of powers and confers separate functions on the legislature, the 
judiciary, and the executive, means that one could not completely reject the separation of 
powers as Pritchard J did. But to accept Ntumy’s criticism would mean that the NGDP 
and BSO are not given prominence. This is because the principle of non-justiciability is 
an effective tool of the separation of powers. That is, implementation of the NGDP and 
BSO should best be left to the legislative and executive arms of government without court 
interference. The better view would be to say that although there is a separation of powers, 
the Constitution creates a separate arm of government in constitutional offices and, 
equally significantly, all these institutions function to implement the NGDP and BSO 
within their sphere of influence. This naturally coincides with the indirect justiciability of 
the NGDP and BSO. 
The idea of an interplay between the different arms of government has been 
highlighted as an advantage of non-justiciable directive principles in constitutions.51  
In countries without constitutional directive principles, a similar idea of constitutional 
dialogue has been promoted.52 Constitutional dialogue usually takes place where courts 
determine the constitutionality of legislation and Parliament replies by enacting 
legislation that responds to the courts’ view on the law. The situation is different for Papua 
New Guinea, where a specific constitutional duty has been conferred on all arms of 
government to implement the NGDP and BSO. In a sense it is a conversation or dialogue 
with a specific terms of reference extending to all arms of government as well as 
constitutional institutions.  
Deklin made a positive start by developing his view based on the NGDP and BSO. 
However, Deklin did not expand on how the idea of the legislature and executive being 
“full and constructive partners” would operate in practice, especially as it relates to the 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO. This thesis extends Deklin’s view by proposing 
the “interconnectedness approach”. Fundamental to the interconnectedness approach is 
                                                     
51 Jeffrey Usman “Non-justiciable Directive Principles: A Constitutional Design Defect” (2007) 15 Mich 
St J Int’l L 643 at 684. 
52 Peter W Hogg and Allison A Bushel “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislature (Or Perhaps 
The Charter Of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing after All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75. 
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the requirement on each arm of government to pursue an active relationship to ensure the 
efficient and effective implementation of the NGDP and BSO. This is so no one arm of 
government is burdened with the sole responsibility of implementation, but operates 
cooperatively with the other arms of government to achieve the desired outcome. The 
best legal means of ensuring the interplay between the different arms of government is 
again indirect justiciability. 
The main thrust of the interconnectedness approach is for each arm of government 
to work cooperatively. For example, Parliament can make laws which provide direction 
to the executive in policy formulation, and indicate to the judiciary how the NGDP and 
BSO can be prioritised in disputes before the court. Parliament will assist this process by 
mentioning explicitly in the preamble of the legislation or the objective provision of the 
law the particular NGDP and BSO it wants implemented.  
A law would be enacted to implement a particular NGDP and/or BSO. For example, in 
Public Curator of Papua New Guinea v Public Trustee of New Zealand, Prentice CJ 
interpreted the Wills, Probate and Administration Act in a way that promoted National 
Goal 2 on equality and participation.53 There was no reference to this Goal in the 
legislation. Appendix Three identifies the relatively small number of laws that make 
explicit reference to the NGDP and/or BSO.  
If Parliament had made reference to a particular NGDP and/or BSO, the court 
would not have as wide a discretion to choose for itself which NGDP and/or BSO to 
apply. The courts’ mind would be directed to the NGDP and/or BSO due to their explicit 
reference. This leads to certainty and prominence of the NGDP and BSO. Many cases do 
not make reference to the NGDP and/or BSO, so a reminder from Parliament would 
prompt the courts to consider the NGDP and BSO. Similarly, when the government is 
formulating policy or carrying out laws, it would know which areas have priority based 
on the expressed intention of the law. It also signals to the Ombudsman Commission how 
it should engage the NGDP and BSO in the performance of its functions when it 
investigates misconduct by leaders or wrong conduct by governmental bodies.54  
At the heart of the interconnected approach is the necessity for the legislature to 
assume leadership in the laws it enacts, so the executive, the courts, and the Ombudsman 
                                                     
53 Public Curator of Papua New Guinea v Public Trustee of New Zealand [1976] PGNC 48, [1976] PNGLR 
427, 28 September 1976. 
54 The Ombudsman Commission is granted this power in the Constitution under ss 23(4) and 63(4) in terms 
of misconduct, and s 219(1)(vi) for wrongful conduct. 
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Commission are sufficiently guided in their functions. Whilst the absence of 
interconnectedness does not prevent other arms of government continuing implementing 
the NGDP and BSO within their present functions, its operation would ensure efficient 
and effective implementation. 
Chapter 4 set out the limits of indirect justiciability as being subject to the 
Constitution. The Constitution at s 157 stipulates the independence of the judiciary.  
Therefore, the interconnected approach is not meant to impede on the independence of 
the judiciary.   An independent judiciary is critical to ensuring that any failure to 
implement the NGDP and/or BSO by another limb of government is not left without 
adequate and independent supervision from the court. Without the independence of the 
judiciary, the supervision by the court will not be effective to ensure that each arm of 
government fulfils its mandate to implement the NGDP and BSO.   
IV Conclusion 
When discussing the implementation of the NGDP and BSO by the traditional three arms 
of government and the Ombudsman Commission, it is important that each arm does so 
within its specific functions, and does not intrude into the spheres of influence of the other 
arms. That does not, however, preclude cooperation amongst the arms of government. 
There has to be a concept that will be able to mediate this. Such a view, based on the CPC 
Report and ss 99, 25 and 63 of the Constitution, is appropriately termed an 
“interconnectedness approach”. It enables each arm of government to work cooperatively 
with one another in the implementation of the NGDP and BSO.  
The proposals for the practical application of this approach is explored in subsequent 
chapters. 
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Chapter Seven – The National Parliament  
I Introduction  
The objective of this chapter is to present proposals for the practical and efficient 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO by Parliament. Parliament has a constitutional 
duty to implement the NGDP and BSO in the fulfilment of its specific function(s).1 
Parliament’s main function is the power to make laws for the “peace, order and good 
government …” of Papua New Guinea.2 This power is subject to the Constitution,3 and it 
should be exercised to give effect to it.4 Since the NGDP and BSO are constitutional law, 
implementing the NGDP and BSO gives effect to the Constitution.5 Parliament has other 
functions, too, that will also be considered in this chapter.  
This chapter has five parts. Part I is the introduction. Part II gives an overview of 
the two methods of implementation proposed for the Parliament. Part III presents the first 
proposal, direct implementation of the NGDP and BSO, and Part IV deals with the second 
proposal: indirect implementation of the NGDP and BSO. Part V is the conclusion.  
II Overview of the Two Methods of Implementation for the Parliament 
A Introduction  
Holding Parliament to account for its performance under the Westminster system of 
government is traditionally done through elections and by public scrutiny in the media. 
The CPC refers to the NGDP as the yardstick by which the public can evaluate the 
government’s performance.6 Although the CPC does not expressly mention the BSO in 
this regard, by implication the BSO is to be equally considered with the NGDP.7 In this 
way, the NGDP and BSO are enforced by the people through elections. The focus of this 
thesis, however, is on employing the existing mechanisms established under the 
                                                     
1 Constitution, ss 25(3) and 63(3). 
2 Section 109(1). 
3 Peter v South Pacific Brewery Ltd [1976] PNGLR 537 at 542 per Frost CJ. 
4 Constitution , s 109(2): 
In particular, Acts of the Parliament, not inconsistent with the Constitutional Laws, may provide for all matters 
that are necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out and giving effect to this Constitution. 
5 Constitution, sch 1.2.3. 
6 Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report 1974 (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) [CPC 
Report] at 2/1 [6]. 
7 CPC Report, at 5/1/15 [92]. 
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Constitution to implement the NGDP and BSO. The implementation proposals under 
Parliament’s various functions can be categorised into two general areas: direct and 
indirect. Direct implementation is provided for by ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution, 
and the authority for indirect implementation is found in ss 25(2) and 63(2).8 The general 
difference is explained below.  
B Direct and Indirect Implementation  
The manner in which Parliament enacts its laws will determine how the other arms of 
government, including the Ombudsman Commission, implement the NGDP and BSO.  
It is therefore important to ensure Parliament performs its duty to enact legislation that 
promotes the NGDP and BSO. So, direct implementation refers to constitutional 
functions within which the court can compel Parliament to implement the NGDP and 
BSO when enacting laws. This is possible through the indirect justiciability of the NGDP 
and BSO under ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution. Sections 25(3) and 63(3) have been 
interpreted as rules of interpretation, but they go beyond that as chapter 4 demonstrated. 
It is direct in the sense the court is involved in ensuring legislation implements the NGDP 
and BSO. 
Indirect implementation (not to be confused with indirect justiciability) is 
concerned with the various constitutional mechanisms Parliament can utilise to 
implement the NGDP and BSO; but there is no legal sanction. Be that as it may, what 
Parliament does under the indirect means of implementation can still impact on 
Parliament’s attempts to implement the NGDP and BSO under ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the 
Constitution. Details of this interplay are considered further below. Again, indirect 
implementation is the fulfilment of the non-justiciable duty under ss 25(2) and 63(3) of 
the Constitution. 
III Direct Implementation  
A First Order Implementation and Second Order Implementation 
In terms of direct implementation by Parliament, this thesis asserts that ss 25(3) and 63(3) 
provide a first order implementation and a second order implementation.  
                                                     
8Sections 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution establish indirect justiciability of the NGDP and BSO and 
was discussed in chapter 4. 
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First order implementation provides the platform for second order implementation to take 
place. Under first order implementation, the courts will consider whether Parliament has 
provided adequate opportunity in legislation for interpreters, implementers and enforcers 
of the law (courts, executive, and Ombudsman Commission respectively) to engage the 
NGDP and BSO. This is where the legislature has a pivotal role to direct the other arms 
of government.9 To put it in another way, the executive, the courts, and the Ombudsman 
Commission have the primary role of interpreting and applying the laws which Parliament 
has enacted. Some of the practices Parliament has used, as discussed in chapter 5, include 
naming a particular National Goal in the long title, or the preamble of the legislation, or 
in the objects section of the law.10 More direct reference in the substantive text of the 
legislation has been rare.11 These are some examples of how Parliament can demonstrate 
that it has fulfilled its duty (in the first order sense) to implement the NGDP and BSO. 
But it could simply involve discussing the implications of the NGDP and BSO when 
enacting a Bill.  
Second order implementation occurs when the legislation is being interpreted and 
implemented. The use of the NGDP and BSO as an interpretive aid is an example.  
This is the current judicial view in Papua New Guinea as expressed by the Supreme Court 
in In Re Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea (ROCPNG).12 
The courts have not developed the law in a way that ventures into the first order sense of 
implementing the NGDP and BSO by Parliament.  
First order implementation allows for greater democratic legitimacy as there is 
political direction from Parliament to the executive, the courts, and the Ombudsman 
Commission about which NGDP and BSO it should prefer in implementation. The first 
order requirement applies only to Parliament and is not applicable to the other branches 
of government because their functions are determined by Parliament from the laws it 
enacts. The other branches’ of government’s duty is to implement the NGDP and BSO 
within the boundaries determined by Parliament.   
                                                     
9 The pivotal role of the legislature was discussed in chapter 6 as the lynchpin for the interconnectedness 
approach. 
10 Observation based on an analysis of current legislation. 
11 Only two Acts have been identified, which take this approach: see Salaries and Remuneration 
Commission Act 1988 and Underlying Law Act 2000. 
12 See the Supreme Court decisions in Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea 
[2010] PGSC 40, SC1088, 17 December 2010 [ROCPNG].  
 104 
The legal basis of direct implementation is founded on indirect justiciability under 
ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution.13 It enables direct implementation in the first order 
sense.14 As a noted commentary on the American Constitution states, “the explicit 
language of the text … [should] give effect to the underlying values and purposes that 
animate the Constitution …”.15 The NGDP and BSO are the underlying values and 
purposes that animate the Constitution. A law (the Constitution) has conferred legislative 
power on Parliament, and this power is to be exercised in a way that gives effect to the 
NGDP and BSO.16 If Parliament does not act reasonably to fulfil its constitutional duty 
in a law, then that law is subject to judicial review. It is open to the court to examine 
whether Parliament has made reasonable attempts to implement the NGDP and BSO in 
legislation.17 The manner in which the exercise of law-making power is subjected to court 
scrutiny is admittedly a delicate judicial process, with deference to Parliament in 
borderline cases. 
The only law exempt from this judicial scrutiny is the annual appropriation 
legislation. The government is provided a certain level of discretion to prepare and present 
budgets to Parliament.18 Parliament’s latitude on the content of the budget is discussed 
further below, but essentially it would be impractical to allow the court to interfere with 
the budgetary process. If, for example, the court was to declare the annual appropriations 
unconstitutional, it may lead to instability in the country’s economy. That, however, does 
not mean Parliament is exempt from implementing the NGDP and BSO in the budget. 
But the duty would be non-justiciable under ss 25(2) and 63(2) of the Constitution. Areas 
open for it to undertake this non-justiciable duty are discussed below. It is more practical 
to approach financial concerns in relation to the NGDP and BSO on a case by case basis. 
This will be addressed in chapter 8 on developing the underlying law. 
                                                     
13 Indirect justiciability of the NGDP and BSO was established in chapter 4. 
14 These provisions provide for the exception to non-justiciability for the implementation of the NGDP and 
BSO. Chapter 4 deals with the exception to non-justiciability of the NGDP and BSO in some detail. The 
provisions directing a liberal interpretation of the Constitution is sch 1.2. This principle of interpretation is 
covered in the role of the judiciary in the implementation of the NGDP and BSO in chapter 9.  
15 Milton Handler, Brian Leiter and Carole E Handler, “A Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality 
of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation” (1990–1991)12 Cardozo L Rev 117 at 132. 
16 Constitution, s 109. 
17 This is the exception to non-justiciability presented in chapter 4. 
18 Constitution, s 210(2). 
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B Legal Avenue for Direct Implementation of the NGDP and BSO by Parliament 
1 Introduction  
The general provisions for ensuring compliance with constitutional duties are ss 22 and 
23 of the Constitution, which provide sanctions for breaches. Nonetheless, a careful 
examination of ss 22 and 23 and relevant case law suggests direct enforcement of the 
NGDP and BSO in the manner envisaged under ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution 
(especially ss 25(3) and 63(3)) would not be appropriate against Parliament. Instead, s 19 
of the Constitution would be more suitable. The relevance of s 22 (and also s 185 of the 
Constitution) to implementation of the NGDP and BSO are as ancillary provisions to the 
primary provision under s 19, enabling the court to tailor an appropriate remedy.  
It is, nevertheless, important to explain the non-application of ss 22 and 23 because, at 
first blush, they appear to provide the legal basis for enforcement. However, ss 22 and 23 
can be used to vest power in the court to compel Parliament to observe other provisions 
of the Constitution. 
2 Non-application of ss 22 and 23 of the Constitution  
The Constitution may not necessarily have the supporting procedural mechanism to lead 
to the compulsion of entities to fulfil their constitutional duties. The Constitution 
anticipate this by granting the court discretion to overcome any perceived constitutional 
deficiencies:  
22. Enforcement of the Constitution 
The provisions of this Constitution that recognize rights of individuals (including 
corporations and associations) as well as those that confer powers or impose 
duties on public authorities, shall not be left without effect because of the lack of 
supporting, machinery or procedural laws, but the lack shall, as far as practicable, 
be supplied by the National Court in the light of the National Goals and Directive 
Principles, and by way of analogy from other laws, general principles of justice 
and generally-accepted doctrine. 
The National Court is empowered by s 22 to develop procedures to compel public 
authorities to give effect to the Constitution. In SC Reference No 3 of 1999; Re Calling 
of the Parliament (Calling of Parliament) the Supreme Court determined Parliament was 
a public authority within the meaning of that term in s 22.19  
                                                     
19 SC Reference No 3 of 1999; Re Calling of the Parliament [1999] PGSC 55, [1999] PNGLR 285, 25 June 
1999 [Calling of Parliament]. 
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The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether Parliament was in breach of its 
constitutional duty, imposed by s 124(1) of the Constitution, to meet for a minimum 
number of days.20 The question which led the Court to discuss s 22 was the appropriate 
legal process to use when there is a breach of constitutional duty.21 The Court held s 
124(1) imposed a duty within the meaning of s 22.22 The Court further held a person 
seeking to give effect to this duty may institute proceedings under the National Court 
Rules by way of administrative judicial review.23  
The Supreme Court relied on the English cases of R v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn (No 1); R v Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn 
(No 3); and R v GLC, ex parte Blackburn as relevant for this conclusion.24  In the Court’s 
view, these English cases were helpful precedents for the procedure and the remedy of 
ensuring compliance with the law.25 Alternatively, the Court proposed seeking an order 
in the nature of prerogative writs,26 or to apply to the courts for specific directions.27 It 
will become clear in the following discussion that these types of procedures and remedies 
are not appropriate to raise implementation questions against Parliament based on ss 25(3) 
and 63(3) of the Constitution. 
The decision in Calling of Parliament also considered the interaction of s 22 with 
s 23 of the Constitution. It stated while s 22 provided for the procedures to approach the 
courts to secure compliance with the Constitution, s 23 set out the type of remedy the 
court could award against a public authority for failing to fulfil a constitutional duty.28 
Section 23 provides four main types of remedies the National Court can award depending 
                                                     
20 Calling of Parliament (see especially the decision of Kapi DCJ). 
21 The relevant question the court considered in Calling of Parliament was: 
(a) Does Section 124(1) of the Constitution impose a duty on the Parliament, as a public authority, for the 
purposes of Section 22 of the Constitution, to mitigate or avoid a breach of Section 124(1)? 
(b) Having regard to the dates on which the 6th National Parliament has met and its adjournment on 2 
December 1998, is there, for the purposes of Section 22 of the Constitution, a lack of supporting, 
machinery or procedural laws to give effect to that duty? 
(c) If there is a lack of supporting, machinery or procedural laws, does s 22 of the Constitution give the 
National Court jurisdiction to supply the lack? 
(d) In particular, does Section 22 of the Constitution give the National Court jurisdiction to make an order 
requiring the Parliament to meet on or a prescribed day for a prescribed period so as to give effect to the 
duty imposed by Section 124(1) of the Constitution? 
22 Calling of Parliament, above no 19. 
23 The procedures for administrative judicial review are provided for under Order 16 of the National Courts 
Rules. 
24 R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn (No 1) [1968] 2 QB 118 [Blackburn 
(No 1)]; R v Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No 3) [1973] QB 241 [Blackburn (No 3)]; R v GLC, 
ex parte Blackburn [1976] 1 WLR 550) [GLC]. 
25 Calling of Parliament, above n 19, per Kapi DCJ. 
26 Constitution, s 155(4).  
27 Section 185.  
28 Calling of Parliament, above n 19, per Kapi DCJ. 
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on the circumstances of the case: imprisonment, fine, compensation and injunction. The 
National Court has the discretion to award any of these remedies depending on the nature 
of the breach of the Constitution.  
The question arises whether the legal options and remedies provided in Calling of 
Parliament are appropriate procedures to review the Parliament’s failure to fulfil the 
NGDP and BSO in enacted legislation, especially with the types of remedies offered 
under s 23.29 Can the National Court declare a piece of legislation or a Bill invalid because 
Parliament did not make reasonable attempts to implement the NGDP and BSO? If so, 
the National Court will effectively be deciding the legislation or Bill is unconstitutional. 
There are two difficulties with this scenario, discussed below. 
(a) Supreme Court has jurisdiction over constitutional issues unless the 
Constitution states otherwise 
First, where laws Parliament has made are questioned in court, they are considered by a 
specially constituted court such as a constitutional court.30 In Papua New Guinea, this is 
reserved for the Supreme Court.31 In SCR No 4 of 1980; Re petition by MT Somare, Kidu 
CJ stated:32 
The rulings sought involve interpretation or application of Constitutional Laws. 
Subject to application of s 23, s 42(5), s 57 and s 58 of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has “original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of other courts, as to 
any question relating to the interpretation or application of any provision of a 
Constitutional Law” (Constitution s 18(1)). 
The National Court is comprised of a single judge, unlike the Supreme Court 
where the bench is composed of three judges or more.33 Questioning the exercise of 
legislative power is a serious matter and should therefore not be taken lightly.34  
As a result, the National Court would not be the proper forum. 
  
                                                     
29See Blackburn (No 1), above n 24; Blackburn (No 3), above n 24; GLC, above n 24.   
30 Papua New Guinea does not have a constitutional court. All constitutional matters are heard by the 
Supreme Court unless the Constitution specifically confers jurisdiction on the National Court (Constitution, 
s 18). 
31 Constitution, ss 18 and 19. 
32 SCR No 4 of 1980; Re Petition by MT Somare [1981] PNGLR 265 at 267 per Kidu CJ [Somare]. 
33 The factor deciding the number of judges (with three being the standard Supreme Court composition) is 
the importance of the issue being considered, which most often relates to constitutional matters. 
34 Somare, above n 32, at 267 per Kidu CJ. 
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(b) Inappropriateness of remedies under s 23 of the Constitution  
The second difficulty is the appropriateness of the remedy provided by ss 22 and 23 for a 
case considering the constitutional duty to implement the NGDP and BSO. In Calling of 
Parliament the Court proposed an order in the nature of a mandamus to secure compliance 
by public authorities. Such a remedy is inappropriate against an entity like Parliament. 
Parliament represents diverse interests resolved by negotiations and voting to enact a law. 
It would be difficult for the court to effectively order Parliament to implement a particular 
NGDP and/or BSO. The other penalties envisaged by s 23 such as imprisonment, fine, 
compensation, and injunction are also inappropriate in the context of a collective entity 
such as Parliament. The Supreme Court recognised this issue when it stated that it could 
not interfere with Parliament’s law-making function when it came to issuing a remedy 
under s 23 of the Constitution. All it could do was to state whether a law was constitutional 
or not:35 
To me it seems that using s 23 to punish or penalize Parliament is not what the 
provision was intended to do. Although the court has power to rule acts of the 
Parliament unconstitutional, it has no power to penalize it, nor does it have power 
to order it to pay compensation. (See s. 115 of the Constitution.) It has no power 
either to stop the Parliament from making laws. The court has power only to 
determine whether a law made by Parliament is constitutional or 
unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, it would be inappropriate on this ground, too, to use s 23 to secure 
Parliament’s compliance with its duty under ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution for 
failing to enact a law implementing the NGDP and BSO.  
3 Use of s 19 of the Constitution for direct implementation  
(a) Introduction  
If ss 22 and 23 do not provide an appropriate mechanism, then what is the appropriate 
legal process? This thesis contends this process is available under s 19 of the 
Constitution.36 Section 19 grants jurisdiction to a number of authorities to file for judicial 
                                                     
35 Somare, above n 32, at 267 per Kidu CJ. 
36 The alternative procedure, that potentially enables any person with sufficient interest (outside of the 
prescribed authorities under s 19 of the Constitution) to challenge the constitutionality of laws (and Bills) 
is by s 18(1) of the Constitution uses an originating summons (see Re Constitutional Validity of 
Constitutional Amendment (Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments) [1995] PGSC 12, 
[1995] PNGLR 481, 20 September 1995; but this avenue is not pursued here because the body proposed to 
take up the role of examining laws to determine whether they implement the NGDP and BSO, is the 
Ombudsman Commission (discussed in chapter 9). 
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review of legislation and Bills (the common term used is constitutional references as 
opposed to judicial review) in the Supreme Court to determine their constitutionality. The 
Court identifies two other alternatives to judicial review in Calling of Parliament: seeking 
orders in the nature of prerogative writs under s 155(4) of the Constitution; and applying 
for directions to the Court under s 185 of the Constitution. But these alternatives would 
also be inappropriate as the issue of reviewing Parliament’s exercise of legislative power 
attacks the constitutionality of a Bill or law, an outcome covered by s 19. That said, it is 
interesting to observe there is judicial authority for the proposition that a process initiated 
under s 19 can rely on ss 22, 155(4), and 185 to award a remedy the courts deems 
appropriate.37  
Certain public authorities are granted recognition by the Constitution to initiate 
constitutional references before the Supreme Court for its binding opinion.38 Most often 
the nature of the questions relate to the validity of legislation and Bills. But an interesting 
development has arisen where the Supreme Court has considered issues concerning the 
constitutional propriety of the election of the Governor-General under  
s 19 of the Constitution.39 This has seen the expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction under s 
19 to compliance with constitutional processes.  
(b) Sections 19, 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution 
The question arises whether s 19 can be used to ensure Parliament complies with its 
constitutional duty under ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution? An examination of s 19 
suggests it is sufficiently broad to mandate a constitutional challenge against Parliament 
on the basis of its failure to meet ss 25(3) and 63(3). Section 19(1) states: 
… on application by an authority referred to in Subsection (3), give its opinion 
on any question relating to the interpretation or application of any provision of a 
Constitutional Law, including (but without limiting the generality of that 
expression) any question as to the validity of a law or proposed law. 
                                                     
37 SCR No 2 of 1978; Re Corrective Institutions Act 1957 [1978] PGSC 9, [1978] PNGLR 404, 25 October 
1978 [SCR No 2 of 1978]. 
38 Some of these authorities under s 19(3) of the Constitution are:  
 Parliament;  
 Law Reform Commission; 
 Ombudsman Commission; 
 A Provincial Assembly or a Local-level Government;  
 A provincial executive; and 
 Speaker of Parliament. 
39 Re Re-election of the Governor General [2010] PGSC 38, SC1089, 22 December 2010. 
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The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to provide its opinion on question(s) relating 
to the interpretation or application of any provision of a Constitutional Law. The NGDP 
and BSO are part of constitutional law, and it is therefore appropriate for the Supreme 
Court to determine questions relating to their interpretation or application. Section 19 
being the most likely provision to support implementation should be read liberally in a 
way that enables the fulfilment of a constitutional duty. It is important to bear in mind 
that where the Constitution imposes a duty, this duty is expected to be fulfilled.   
(c) Present judicial view: a critique 
The leading case on whether legislation can be struck down for being inconsistent with 
the NGDP and BSO is ROCPNG. This was a reference by the Ombudsman Commission 
under s 19 of the Constitution seeking the Supreme Court's opinion on the constitutional 
validity of the Forestry (Amendment) Act 2005 and other provisions of the Forestry Act 
1991, as amended. The case concerned s 59 of the Forestry Act, which requires 
consultation with the customary owners of forest resources who are parties to a Forest 
Management Agreement (FMA).  
The FMA is an agreement between the Papua New Guinea National Forest 
Authority (NFA) and the customary landowners of an area designated for logging.  
The consultation related to who should be issued a timber permit. The agreement sets out 
the conditions of logging. Based on the FMA, the NFA issues a timber permit to a 
developer to conduct logging. This is because under s 56 of the Forestry Act, the NFA 
acquires rights to logging in the area covered by the FMA. The customary owners were 
one of three groups of bodies or persons, which s 59 required the NFA to consult before 
a timber permit was issued to the project developer. The Reference considered whether 
repealing s 59 of the Forestry Act was constitutional. 
The Ombudsman Commission did not raise the constitutionality of the repeal of s 
59 against the NGDP directly. It first raised a question of interpretation, by asking 
whether s 56 could be interpreted in a manner consistent with the NGDP: 
By Section 56 of the Forest Act 1991, the Papua New Guinea forest authority 
may acquire the timber rights of customary owners.  
Does the acquisition of the timber rights of customary owners under a Forestry 
Management Agreement, constitute participation by the customary owners in the 
development of their resources within the meaning of the National Goals and 
Directive Principles of the Constitution, and Section 6 and 46 of the Forestry Act 
1991 or is it only a disposition of their rights and interests as in an agreement for 
sale and purchase for a money and/or benefits consideration? 
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Following this question, the constitutionality of s 59 of the Forestry Act was raised: 
Is the repeal of Section 59 of the Act which provided for meaningful consultation 
with and by forest resource owners with the State and the forest developer 
discriminatory to forest resource owners and therefore, unconstitutional within 
the meaning and the spirit of Section 55 of the Constitution? 
Section 55 of the Constitution protects the right to equality: 
55. Equality of Citizens 
(1) Subject to this Constitution, all citizens have the same rights, privileges, 
obligations and duties irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political 
opinion, colour, creed, religion or sex. 
In answer to these questions raised by the Ombudsman Commission, the Court ruled:40 
The NGDP and BSO are statements of political vision and developmental 
aspirations on which the State is founded. They also spell out the basic principles 
of good governance of themselves. Their application are non-justiciable: s 25 (1) 
and s 63 (1) of the Constitution. Except where the Constitution itself provides the 
NGDP and BSO to be used as an aid to the interpretation of specific statutes, they 
cannot be used as a ground to strike down legislation: see s 38 of the Constitution. 
The provisions of s 25 (3) and s 63(3) provide guide to exercise of power 
conferred by statute and of themselves do not provide a ground to invalidate an 
offending legislation. Indeed we are not aware of any law or proposed law being 
struck down by the Court solely on the grounds that it offends the NGDP and 
BSO. The proposition put to us by counsel for the Applicants is clearly against 
the expressed intention of the Constitution that laws should not be struck down 
by the Courts purely on the ground that the law offends or fails to give effect to 
political pronouncements on developmental aspirations and good governance 
[emphasis added].  
There are two ways to look at ROCPNG in terms of the NGDP and BSO under  
s 25 and 63. First, the question did not attack the Parliament’s law-making powers, or 
first order category of implementation. It merely focused on interpreting the legislation 
in light of the NGDP. The question could have been asked: “Is the repeal of s 59 of the 
Forest Act 1991 a derogation by Parliament of its duty to implement the NGDP through 
its legislative power under s 25(3) of the Constitution?” A question put this way meets 
the terms of ss 25(3) of the Constitution, which requires any law or power, be it 
legislative, judicial, executive, or administrative to be exercised in a way that gives effect 
to the NGDP. In this instance, the issue questioned the exercise of legislative power. It 
                                                     
40 ROCPNG, above n 12, at [23]. 
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was unsurprising, therefore, that the Court refused to answer the question. It must also be 
noted that Parliament has the authority to expressly derogate from the NGDP and BSO 
for a legitimate (or reasonable) reason.41 
Second, the Court also failed to apply its own definition of the meaning of s 25(3) 
(and s 63(3)). It is true the Court was only interested in restricting the role of the NGDP 
(and BSO) to being an interpretive aid, that is, the second order sense. But even on this 
score, the Court did not make any judicial pronouncement on whether s 56 can be 
interpreted in a way that promotes the NGDP. The Court simply made a blanket statement 
that the NGDP were non-justiciable. Perhaps if the Supreme Court had addressed the 
question, it could have interpreted s 55 of the Constitution in a manner consistent with 
the NGDP and/or BSO so the constitutionality of s 59 of the Forest Act would have been 
considered.   
(d) Proposals for Parliament to fulfil its constitutional duty to directly 
implement the NGDP and BSO in a reasonable manner 
If the courts have the power to strike down legislation for non-implementation of the 
NGDP and BSO, it is important for Parliament to have clear guidelines on how it should 
exercise its power in a constitutionally-compliant manner. However, there is presently no 
guidance on how Parliament should go about fulfilling its constitutional duty. All the 
Constitution suggests is to use legislative power to implement the NGDP and BSO unless 
it would be unreasonable to do so.42  
The often used test of reasonableness was established in Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation.43 Where an authority has power to do 
something, it must do it in a way that is reasonable. If it fails to act reasonably, the courts 
can step in. The usual test proceeds on the basis of whether a reasonable person in a 
similar situation would have made such a decision. While Wednesbury dealt with the 
exercise of administrative power, and not judicial review of legislation, the idea that the 
duty to act reasonably must be within the parameters of the law is apposite. It is difficult 
to set a single test of what would be a reasonable means for Parliament to enact laws that 
implement the NGDP and BSO. Matters to be considered include Parliament’s collective 
nature, the complexity of the Bill’s subject matter, and the availability of resources. Tying 
                                                     
41 Discussed in chapter 4. What is reasonable depends on the circumstances of each case. 
42 The term “reasonable” appears in the Constitution, ss 25(3) and 63(3). 
43 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA). 
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down a particular view of what a “reasonable person” would have done in the 
circumstances is challenging. The most practical option would be to suggest procedural 
guidelines to provide opportunities for Parliament to meaningfully address 
implementation. 
Another case that might provide a useful comparative lesson is Government of 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others.44 The Constitutional Court 
reviewed the South African government’s legislative and policy efforts to implement the 
right to housing under s 26 of the South African Constitution. The Court determined the 
government’s legislative effort, policy initiatives, and budgetary allocations failed to 
make reasonable provision for the affected people’s right to housing. Granted South 
Africa recognises housing as a right as opposed to a directive principle, the comparison 
is appropriate because of the positive duty conferred by ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. 
The factors which the court in Papua New Guinea could examine to determine 
reasonableness include legislative, policy, and budgetary decisions.  
(e) Determining what is reasonable for Parliament to fulfil its duty to 
implement the NGDP and/or BSO 
This thesis presents a two-stage approach for Parliament to implement the NGDP and 
BSO in a way that can be said to be reasonable relying on ss 22 and 185 of the 
Constitution. The authority to enable the courts to devise such a procedure is SCR No 2 
of 1978; Re Corrective Institutions Act 1957, where the Supreme Court, on the basis of  
s 19 of the Constitution, considered the validity of s 30 of the Corrective Institutions Act 
1957.45 This provision prevented prisoners from appealing conviction for offences 
committed in custody. The Supreme Court found this was inconsistent with s 37(15) of 
the Constitution which deals with the right to appeal. As a result, the Court devised a 
procedure to correct this constitutional deficit until such time Parliament enacted the 
procedure to enable appeals. It did this on the basis of ss 22 and 185 of the Constitution. 
While s 22 referred to the National Court only, the Supreme Court did not see that as an 
obstacle to devising appropriate remedies for a case initiated under s 19. 
                                                     
44 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19, [2001] 1 SA 46 
(CC), [2000] 11 BCLR 1169, 4 October 2000. 
45 SCR No 2 of 1978, above n 37. 
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The procedure (presented below) the courts may consider sanctioning would be 
authorised by ss 22 and 185 to enable Parliament to fulfil its constitutional duty.46  
Such procedure would not be mandatory, but Parliament can use it to demonstrate to the 
court its efforts to implement the NGDP and BSO. Nevertheless, it is well supported by 
the Constitution and is presently provided for under the Standing Orders; although not in 
so far as considering the NGDP and BSO. It must be stressed that following this process 
is not the only legal avenue for Parliament to satisfy its duty under ss 25 and 63 of the 
Constitution, but this process has the advantage of enabling Parliament to avail itself of 
relevant documents to make a considered decision on a Bill in an environment of wide 
consultation. 
(f) Centrality of the committee system 
The centrality of parliamentary committees to this process is crucial and a short overview 
will be presented below to demonstrate its importance.47 Parliament should as a matter of 
good practice refer all Bills to a relevant parliamentary committee.  
The committee system is established under the Constitution.48 It is designed to ensure all 
Members of Parliament are involved in the work of the government and should cover all 
areas of government activity.49 Committees are either permanent or sessional.50  
An example of the former is the Public Accounts Committee.51 Sessional committees are 
set up by Parliament for a specific purpose and cease to exist after fulfilling their terms 
of reference. Committees form an important part of the work of Parliament in Papua New 
Guinea.52  
The CPC believed the parliamentary committee system was the most significant 
of the proposals it made for Parliament to properly discharge its functions.53 The CPC 
considered it so important that they proposed that every Bill presented to Parliament 
should be referred to an appropriate committee after the first reading.54 Referral to the 
relevant committee would be a formal matter. But the attention the committee devotes to 
studying the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill is important to ensure good 
                                                     
46 In chapter 10, it is proposed the Ombudsman Commission undertake this role. 
47 The different types of committees operating as at present are listed in the National Parliament website: 
National Parliament of Papua New Guinea <www.parliament.gov.pg> [National Parliament website]. 
48 Constitution, s 118. See also chapter 4, which discusses the committee system in general. 
49 Constitution, s 118(1). 
50 National Parliament website, above n 47. 
51 Constitution, ss 118 and 121. 
52 National Parliament website, above n 47. 
53 CPC Report, above n 6, at 6/9 [66]. 
54 At 6/11 [71]. 
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legislation is enacted. At this stage the committee can ask for public submissions to ensure 
its final report to Parliament is broadly representative of the people’s views. 
The CPC’s strategy to ensure that laws conform to the NGDP and BSO revolved 
around the committee system and the Law Reform Commission.55 The reason for the 
CPC’s approach is not entirely clear, but it may well reflect the fact that much of the 
legislation adopted at independence were pre-independence laws that had to be reviewed 
for conformity with the Constitution.56 Implementation would be a gradual process. This 
recommendation demonstrates that not only the courts, but each arm of government, too, 
has a responsibility to ensure implementation of the NGDP and BSO.57  
To date, Parliament has not established a particular committee to implement the 
NGDP and BSO; nor has the Law Reform Commission been given a specific mandate to 
consider the compatibility of existing legislation with the NGDP and BSO.58  
Since this thesis focuses on the legislature, the executive, the courts, and the Ombudsman 
Commission, the work of the Law Reform Commission is not considered. But as a 
governmental body, there is no doubt it could (and should) make an important 
contribution. Its role is particularly important because much (if not all) of the pre-
independence legislation was merely adopted at independence to fill a legal vacuum, with 
no careful assessment of their compatibility to the Papua New Guinea’s stated national 
Goals and Obligations.59 As an indication, those laws that refer to the NGDP and BSO, 
includes only one pre-independence Act, the Harbours Act 1963 (adopted in 1975 at 
independence), which refers to the NGDP and BSO.  
No specific parliamentary committee is required to be established to promote the 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO in laws. The existing committees can each 
separately undertake this role, which helps ensure all parliamentarians can be involved in 
the process (as they should be). The reason why it should not be a specific committee is 
                                                     
55 At 5/1/34 [23].  
56 At 2/25 [3].  
57 See discussion on interplay of the arms of government in chapter 5. 
58 One of the earliest attempts the Law Reform Commission made to consider proposals for the 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO was a seminar conducted in 1976 in Goroka, Eastern Highlands 
Province. It was highlighted there was a lack of cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats and there 
was a need to educate them on the National Goals: see JK Gawi, YP Ghai and A Paliwala “National Goals 
and Law Reforms: A Report on the Goroka Seminar” (1976) 4 Melanesian LJ 259 at 269.  
59 Immediately after independence (1976), the Law Reform Commission set about recommending laws that 
would be relevant to Papua New Guinean circumstances fulfilling the NGDP and BSO. Two pieces of 
legislation it recommended were the Fairness of Transaction Bill (see Fairness of Transaction Act 1993) 
and the Underlying Law Bill (see Underlying Law Act 2000). It was not until in 1993 and 2000 respectively 
that Parliament enacted these laws. 
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mainly practical. For example, there is an Industry and Industrial Relations Committee. 
Presumably it will deal with matters/Bills relating to industrial relations, and could 
promote the NGDP and BSO in the context of industrial relations. Likewise, there is an 
Economic Affairs Committee, which can deal with laws relating to creating economic 
opportunities for Papua New Guineans consistent with Goal 2 of the NGDP.   
(ii) Mandatory consideration of NGDP and BSO   
After the relevant committee has a Bill referred to it, it should consider and record its 
recommendation noting how the referred Bill can implement the NGDP and BSO within 
its subject matter, and report its findings to Parliament. Parliament then votes on the Bill 
taking into account the report. This is an opportunity for Parliament to demonstrate to the 
Supreme Court its attempts to implement the NGDP and BSO through its specific 
instruments. With time, a culture of NGDP and BSO implementation will hopefully be 
inculcated into Parliament’s practices as well as influencing other governmental bodies. 
Subsidiary legislation is enacted by the executive; s 116 of the Constitution 
requires it to be tabled in Parliament for ratification. The relevant committee that deals 
with the primary legislation on the particular subject matter would be best placed to 
review the subsidiary legislation and report to Parliament whether it should confirm the 
subsidiary legislation.  
There may be good reasons for not considering the NGDP and BSO relevant to a 
Bill. The area of foreign aid is one example. Papua New Guinea relies heavily on foreign 
aid, especially from Australia. Accepting the aid may run contrary to Goal 3 of the 
Constitution on National Sovereignty and Self-Reliance.60 Nevertheless, there may be 
overriding economic reasons for accepting aid, for example, in a time of natural disaster. 
Such reasons should be stated clearly when the committee reports to Parliament.  
The use of Hansard in the context of Parliament discharging its duty to implement 
the NGDP and BSO would be an extension of the present position where Hansard is used 
as an interpretive aid:61  
In general, proceedings of Parliament are protected by Parliamentary privilege. 
An exception is the Court's use of Hansard records to resolve ambiguities or 
competing meanings in statutory provisions, and their application to the 
                                                     
60 See for example Directive Principle 8 of Goal 3. 
61 Re Reference to Constitution section 19(1) by East Sepik Provincial Executive [2011] PGSC 41, SC1154, 
12 December 2011 at [24] per Injia CJ [East Sepik]. 
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circumstances of the case at hand. Recourse to the Hansards for statutory 
interpretation is not a breach of Parliamentary privilege … . 
Hansard records useful information to assist the court to make an assessment on 
whether the efforts of Parliament have been reasonable or not in the implementation of 
the NGDP and BSO.62 This would add another dimension to the general rule on Hansard’s 
use as an interpretive aid. Since courts can already refer to Hansard, there should not be 
any legal obstacles to extending the manner in which the courts can use Hansard to 
implement the NGDP and BSO pursuant to ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. 
Useful lessons may be drawn from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which enacts the European 
Convention on Human Rights in domestic law.63 Under NZBORA, s 7, the Attorney-
General is required to report to Parliament if a Bill is inconsistent with NZBORA.64  
The Attorney-General’s opinion is tabled for Parliament to consider, but Parliament is 
sovereign and it can choose to enact laws that are inconsistent with NZBORA.65 In the 
United Kingdom a Minister of the Crown is required to make a statement before a Bill’s 
second reading that, in the Minister’s view, the Bill is compatible with Convention 
Rights.66 The important point for Papua New Guinea would be that Parliament has 
considered a Bill in light of the NGDP and BSO, and expressed a view on its compatibility 
with the NGDP and BSO.  
For Papua New Guinea it is appropriate for a committee of Parliament to 
undertake this role. In New Zealand, it has been suggested assessing compatibility with 
human rights is not only a legal exercise but has a political dimension, and relying solely 
on the Attorney-General’s view is unduly legalistic.67 A committee review would 
incorporate political views on the Bill for compatibility with the NZBORA. Since the 
NGDP and BSO may have implications on current government policy, the committee is 
                                                     
62 Use of debates in Parliament to interpret the Constitution is allowed especially the pre-independence 
Constituent Assembly debates and the CPC Report, based on s 24 of the Constitution. See Chapter 5. Access 
to Hansard maintains that position. 
63 For a useful comparison between the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 on the issue of Parliament clearance of Bills vis-à-vis human rights: see Janet McLean “The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Constitutional Propriety” (2013) 11 NZJPIL 19. 
64 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
65 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 4 and 7; and see Petra Butler “15 Years of the NZ Bill of Rights: 
Time to Celebrate, Time to Reflect, Time to Work Harder?” [2006] HRR 1 at 5. 
66 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 19. 
67 Janet L Hiebert “Rights-Vetting in New Zealand and Canada: Similar Idea, Different Outcomes” (2005) 
3 NZJIPL 63 at 98. 
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best placed for undertaking the task of reviewing Bills for compatibility with the NGDP 
and BSO. Such assessments by a parliamentary committee have been considered by the 
courts in the United Kingdom. The House of Lords was impressed by the level of 
parliamentary scrutiny on the compatibility of the Communications Act (UK) with human 
rights.68 In R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport, the House of Lords noted the attention which a committee of Parliament 
addressed to the issue of human rights, despite the requirement that issues of compatibility 
are in the purview of a Minister of Crown.69 Papua New Guinea would not be acting 
alone, as it has these common law experiences to draw from.  
The committee can be composed of members from the government, the 
opposition, various parties, and also from the different regions in the country.  
For example, the CPC was a committee of a parliament-like body, the House of 
Assembly, which was representative of the various regions, political parties, interests 
groups, and opinions from conservative to radical.70 A committee would give due 
attention to the Bill, while at the same time being representative of Parliament and society 
in general. Details of the committee’s study should help Parliament decide on a Bill’s 
merits and demerits, especially in light of the NGDP and BSO.  
How the committee performs its task will evolve over time. Two immediate 
possibilities are that after the committee studies a Bill, it recommends a particular NGDP 
and BSO the Bill should implement, perhaps by inserting it in the preamble and/or 
objectives section. Another possibility is to recommend that the Bill explicitly highlights 
the NGDP and BSO (either generally or specifically) as factors a public authority 
(established under the proposed law) has to take into account when it has discretion to 
make a decision. An example is the Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act 1988. 
This Act establishes the powers and functions of the Salaries and Remuneration 
Commission (SRC). The SRC sets the terms and conditions of important public office 
holders in Papua New Guinea, including Members of Parliament. Section 14 of that Act 
                                                     
68 R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15, 
[2008] 1 AC 1312. 
69 R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport was discussed in 
McLean, above n 63, at 25. 
70 Bernard Narokobi “The Constitutional Planning Committee, nationalism and vision” in Anthony Regan, 
Owen Jessep and Eric Kwa (eds) Twenty Years of the Papua New Guinea Constitution (Lawbook Co, 
Sydney, 2001) 25 at 25. 
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stipulates the guidelines the SRC should take into account, one of which is the NGDP.71 
In this way the body making the decision is required to turn its mind to the NGDP.  
(iii) Nature of constitutional challenges for failure to implement the NGDP and 
BSO 
The challenge to Bills and/or legislation is an example of implementation in a first order 
sense. It considers whether Parliament has made reasonable attempts to implement the 
NGDP and BSO in the law. Constitutional challenges to laws and Bills under s 19 of the 
Constitution are not about whether the law or Bill is inconsistent with the NGDP and 
BSO, but rather whether the law or Bill has made provision for implementing the NGDP 
and BSO. There is a slight difference to the traditional way the Supreme Court deals with 
constitutional questions. While this may appear to be a judicial encroachment into the 
legislative sphere, the CPC envisaged that although the court would be considering 
political questions, it should not retreat from dealing with such issues:72 
The courts do not, however, exist in a vacuum. Like other institutions of the 
government of a country they are caught up in political realities, and often their 
decisions have important political consequences. 
The court must consider carefully extent to which it can interfere with 
Parliament’s law-making power on the basis of ss 25(3) and 63(3). Unlike other specific 
provisions of the Constitution, the NGDP and BSO are cast as principles. Parliament 
would be allowed a greater level of discretion. There could be instances where a particular 
NGDP is thought to be more appropriate (or not at all). What is important is that those 
reasons are discussed and recorded. For example, in the United Kingdom, in cases which 
deal with public authorities such as the police, courts have stated the police were not 
entirely free and had a legal duty to the public to enforce the law, but if it was exercised 
reasonably, the court would not interfere.73 In Canada in 2005, the Supreme Court revised 
the minimum constitutional requirements of judicial financial security and “confirmed 
the need for curial deference to government decisions on judicial compensation”.74 In the 
context of Papua New Guinea, such experiences point to the need to develop the law on 
                                                     
71 14. Guidelines in Fixing Salaries, etc. 
(1) In fixing the salaries, allowances, pensions and other benefits (financial and otherwise) for all or any 
members of the Parliament, the Parliament shall give full and proper consideration to— 
(a) the National Goals and Directive Principles; … . 
72 CPC Report, above n 6, at 8/1 [5]. 
73 Blackburn (No 3), above n 24. 
74 Lori Sterling and Sean Hanley “Judicial Independence Revisited” (2006) SCLR (2d) 34 at 57. 
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a case-by-case basis in this potentially new area of constitutional law. Other arms of 
government also have a role to play in implementation, with direction from Parliament to 
assist them. 
It is important the documents and reports Parliament relies on to arrive at its 
decisions are available to the court to consider. Papua New Guinea has adopted the 
position advanced in Pepper v Hart.75 Hansard is available to the courts to ascertain 
Parliament’s intentions, but only in certain circumstances.76  
IV Indirect Implementation 
Parliament can record its decisions and intentions in a number of ways. This would be 
primary legislation, subsidiary legislation, committee reports, and Hansard.77 The legal 
aspect of implementation comes into play when these documents are made available to 
the courts to ascertain Parliament’s intentions when question(s) relating to the 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO arise. The court will use these “records of 
Parliament’s intentions” to determine whether Parliament has discharged its duty.  
A three-point plan is presented here for Parliament to indirectly implement the NGDP 
and BSO. However, this thesis does not intend to suggest these options are the only 
avenues available to Parliament in this respect. 
The first proposal is to make greater use of the NGDP and BSO in the preamble 
and/or objective statement of legislation. The second proposal argues for the Plans and 
Estimates Committee to recommend to the National Executive Council, prior to the 
formulation by the NEC of the budget, areas where the government can spend more 
resources to implement the NGDP and BSO. The third proposal is that Parliament should 
consider in the debates during question time whether decisions made by the executive 
fulfil the NGDP and BSO.78 Parliament’s interaction with the executive, the courts, and 
the Ombudsman Commission as it undertakes these functions will be considered in 
chapters 8, 9 and 10 respectively. The plan also demonstrates the interplay between the 
                                                     
75 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, [1993] AC 593. This case was cited with approval 
in East Sepik, above n 62. 
76 See East Sepik, above n 62. 
77 Hansard is available to the court to consider the reasons and circumstances in which a Bill was enacted. 
See East Sepik, above n 61, at [24] per Injia CJ. 
78 Question time is provided for in the Standing Orders of Parliament.  
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legislature and the courts, discussed in chapter 6. The three proposals are considered in 
more detail below.  
A Preambles/Objective Section of Legislation  
The Constitution requires a purposive approach to the construction and interpretation of 
legislation enacted by Parliament. Section 109(4) states: 
Each law made by the Parliament shall receive such fair, large and liberal 
construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of 
the law according to the true intent, meaning and spirit … . 
Parliament can assist the courts to fulfil their constitutional duty to interpret laws liberally 
by stating their purpose clearly in the preamble or in the objectives section. An example 
of the use of this means to indirect implementation is the Environment Act 2000, but this 
approach is not common. Its preamble states: 
Being an Act to provide for and give effect to the National Goals and Directive 
Principles and in particular— 
(a) To provide for protection of the environment in accordance with Fourth 
National Goal and Directive Principle (National Resources and 
Environment) of the Constitution; 
It is evident from the preamble to the Environment Act that its purpose is to ensure 
sustainable use of the environment advocated by Goal 4 of the Constitution. When this 
law is being implemented by its administrators, such as the Director of Environment, this 
Goal will guide how the legislation is applied.79 Similarly, where any decision the 
Director of Environment makes is contested by an aggrieved person, the Goal will assist 
the court in resolving the issues. A liberal and purposive approach to interpretation 
ensures this.80 
In terms of the current legislation surveyed, this approach to legislative enactment 
is not universal in Papua New Guinea; it is in fact atypical.81  
It is recommended Parliament should undertake a specific and consistent approach to 
enacting laws. There may be special reasons or particular situations where Parliament 
                                                     
79 Director of Environment is appointed under s 15 of the Environment Act 2000 and is responsible for the 
office of environment and conservation matters. One of the director’s function is to administer the Act (s 
16(1)(a)). 
80 Constitution, s 109(4). 
81 This is from a survey of legislation in Papua New Guinea. Results are summarised in Appendix Three. 
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considers the NGDP and BSO should not apply to a particular piece of legislation. 
However, any intention not to implement the NGDP and BSO should be expressed in the 
Act. Alternatively, Parliament should clearly record in its pre-enactment deliberations the 
reasons for not entertaining the NGDP and BSO. 
Situating the NGDP and BSO clearly in the preamble or the objectives section of 
legislation displays Parliament’s efforts at implementation. It allows for “indirect 
application”, as it will determine how rules are applied when the particular legislation 
enacted by Parliament is enforced by the court.82 Enacting legislation with clear 
preambles and objective statements is consistent with the role proposed for the courts in 
chapter 8 of this thesis.  
Rather than the court relying directly on the Constitution to determine for itself 
which NGDP and/or BSO to apply, as it did in Public Trustee of New Zealand v Public 
Curator of Papua New Guinea, it can do so relying on Parliament’s express view.83  
An example is provided by the Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1966 which made 
no reference to the NGDP and BSO in its preamble. The Court took it upon itself to refer 
to Directive Principle 4 of Goal 2 to interpret s 43 of the Act.84 Had Parliament provided 
for the NGDP and/or BSO it thought were applicable in the preamble of the Act, the Court 
would have been guided by Parliament’s expressed intentions. This does not mean the 
court was wrong to rely on the NGDP directly from the Constitution. Rather, Parliament 
would have assisted the Court by stating which principles it thought were applicable to 
the Wills, Probate and Administration Act, thereby limiting the unwarranted exercise of 
court discretion as well as giving greater political legitimacy to its decisions. 
B Control of Finance 
Parliament has ultimate control for raising revenue and public expenditure in Papua New 
Guinea.85 This is done annually through an Appropriations Bill commonly referred to as 
the “Budget”. This is an avenue for Parliament to ensure resources are allocated to areas 
that promote the NGDP and BSO.  
                                                     
82 Another term that could be equally used is “indirect justiciability,” which was discussed in chapter 4. 
83 Public Curator of Papua New Guinea v Public Trustee of New Zealand [1976] PGNC 48, [1976] PNGLR 
427, 28 September 1976. 
84 Directive Principle 4 of National Goal 2 states: 
(4) equalization of services in all parts of the country, and for every citizen to have equal access to legal 
processes and all services, governmental and otherwise, that are required for the fulfilment of his or her 
real needs and aspirations; and … . 
85 Constitution, s 209. 
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The executive is responsible for preparing and implementing the Budget.86  
The Constitution provides the executive arm of government certain latitude to develop 
the Budget.87 The annual Budget is presented to Parliament for debate and approval. 
Parliament can reduce, but not increase or re-allocate, the amount and purpose of any 
proposed taxation, loan or expenditure.88 But Parliament can help ensure the executive 
allocates resources to areas that focus on the NGDP and BSO.  
Section 209(3) of the Constitution provides very clear roles for a parliamentary 
committee to be involved in this process: 
Before any Budget or appropriation is prepared for submission to the Parliament, 
the National Executive Council shall consult with any appropriate Permanent 
Parliamentary Committee, but this subsection does not confer any right or impose 
any duty of consultation after the initial stages of the preparation of the Budget 
or appropriation. 
The legal implications if the relevant committee is not consulted are unclear, but 
the government does not have any duty to consult after the Budget’s initial stages.  
When the initial stages end is similarly unclear as there has not been any cases on this 
point. This is important because the Parliamentary Committee must know at what point 
it can contribute to the Budget formulation process. Interestingly, though, Parliament has 
debated the constitutionality of a Budget after a failure to consult the relevant 
committee.89 Another aspect is the form of the consultation between the committee and 
the executive branch. The Constitution provides guidance on what consultation should 
entail: 
  
                                                     
86 The role of the executive will be considered in chapter 8. 
87 Constitution, s 210, following the CPC Recommendations: see CPC Final Report, above n 6, at 9/2 [10]. 
88 Section 210(2). CPC Final Report 1974, above n 6, at p 9/2 [10]. 
89 Graham Hassall “The Parliamentary Committee System in Papua New Guinea, 1975–1997” (2011) 17 
CLJP-RJP 29 at 33–34. 
 124 
255. Consultation. 
In principle, where a law provides for consultation between persons or bodies, or 
persons and bodies, the consultation must be meaningful and allow for a genuine 
interchange and consideration of views. 
Such explicit consultation requirements place the relevant committee in a strong position 
to have its views taken seriously by the National Executive Council. 
The relevant committee with this function is the Plans and Estimates Committee, 
established to fulfil s 209(3) of the Constitution.90 The Plans and Estimates Committee 
has the following main function:91 
1. The Committee shall be established at the commencement of each 
Parliament and for the purposes of consulting with the National Executive 
Council before any budget or appropriation is prepared for submission to 
the Parliament, in accordance with Section 209 (3) of the Constitution. 
In terms of the NGDP and BSO, the Plans and Estimates Committee would be 
responsible for proposing to the executive arm of government areas where resources can 
be spent to fulfil the NGDP and BSO. The committee would not have to start from scratch. 
Most of the institutions directly funded by the government through the annual 
appropriations cycle are established by law. For example, the Department of Education 
is established by the Education Act 1983. This Act has in its objectives Goal 1 of the 
NGDP on Integral Human Development.92 If, for some reason, the Department of 
Education is underfunded, Goal 1 can be used as the basis for the Plans and Estimates 
Committee to recommend an increase in funding. The complementarity between the roles 
of Parliament and the executive on implementing the NGDP and BSO are made possible 
through the active reference to the NGDP and BSO in the preamble of legislation. 
Funding of organisations like the Department of Education will fulfil the NGDP and BSO 
as the NGDP and BSO are explicitly stated as an objective in the relevant legislation.   
                                                     
90 National Parliament website, above n 47. 
91 National Parliament website, above n 47. 
92 Education Act 1983: 
4. Objects of the National Education System. 
(1) Bearing in mind the National Goals and Directive Principles of the Constitution, and subject to a 
provincial law and this section, the objects and purposes of the National Education System, by means of 
the maximum involvement and co-operative effort by persons and bodies interested in education in the 
country (including the State, the teaching profession, Provincial Governments, Local-level 
Governments, churches and the community as a whole) and the maximum utilization of the resources 
available from all sources are— 
(a) for the integral human development of the person; … . 
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The Plans and Estimates Committee’s report, if not taken seriously by the 
National Executive Council, can be the subject of debates on the Budget. Parliament’s 
role as ultimate overseer of public funds is thematic rather than addressing individual 
claims, which can be pursued through other avenues.93 
C Parliamentary Debates  
The Constitution protects free speech and parliamentary debate.94 It is important for 
Parliament to constructively debate the implication of legislation and government policies 
on the NGDP and BSO.95 Parliament, as a governmental body, ought to use its functions 
to promote the NGDP and BSO. Parliament, through its discussion around the NGDP and 
BSO and the steps it takes to implement them, has an important role to play in promoting 
a culture of implementation for other arms of government to follow. 
Reports on parliamentary committees’ deliberations are eventually tabled in 
Parliament. Such reports can suggest how Parliament can best implement the NGDP and 
BSO within the scope of the Bill the committee deliberated on. Members of Parliament 
should refer to committee reports and the NGDP and BSO when debating Bills in 
Parliament. Hansard then records these exchanges. If the Bill becomes law, the courts 
may refer to Hansard to clarify Parliament’s intentions to resolve any ambiguity in 
interpretation.96 The reference to Hansard will be necessary only to determine whether 
Parliament has considered the NGDP and BSO in the enactment of the legislation.97 
Where it is clear from the text, it may not be necessary to refer to Hansard. This enables 
a constitutional exchange to take place between the court and the Parliament on common 
ground but at the same time respecting the specific functions of each arm of government. 
  
                                                     
93 As will be seen in chapter 9 on the underlying law, there is the possibility (and potential) of making a 
claim against the government on the basis of the right to development under Goal one on Integral Human 
Development. If a claim of this nature succeeds in court, it would be factored into the budget by the 
executive for approval by the legislature to satisfy the court order.  
94 Constitution, s 115 (2). 
95 The CPC argued the NGDP and BSO should be the yardstick by which the performance of the 
government is measured: see CPC Report, above n 6, at 2/1 [6].  
96 Refer to chapter 4. 
97 Chapter 4 states House of Assembly debates should be considered in constitutional interpretation and 
used where relevant. Here the situation is different. Hansard will only be referred to if Parliament’s intention 
is not clear from the law. 
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There is no direct legal enforcement should Parliament fail to debate the NGDP 
and BSO. But this lack of attention to the NGDP and BSO will be exposed when the court 
interprets legislation or formulates new underlying law.98 The court will be imposing its 
view on how the legislation promotes the NGDP and BSO, and little weight is given to 
Parliament’s view. This may be a disincentive to Parliament enacting legislation without 
appropriate reference to the NGDP and BSO. As a result, it should prompt Parliament to 
address this constitutional deficit in its deliberations. 
For example, Parliament may wish to debate the issue of resource development. 
It is an important subject where implications involving the NGDP and BSO can be 
addressed. Two relevant Goals that may come into conflict when discussing mining are 
Goal 3 on National Sovereignty and Self-Reliance and Goal 4 on Natural Resources and 
Environment. Parliament may feel it needs to encourage mining projects to support its 
revenue raising. This will help Papua New Guinea to be economically self-reliant 
pursuant to Goal Three. But mining can have disastrous environmental consequences.99 
Pursuing economic self-reliance may come into conflict with Goal 4 on Natural 
Resources and Environment.  
This balancing exercise seems to have weighed heavily in the mind of the Court 
in Medaing v Ramu Nico when it considered whether it should issue an order compelling 
the mining company Ramu Nico to construct a tailings dam.100 Had the Court issued such 
an order, the mining project was likely to stop operations, as the construction costs would 
not have made the project feasible. While the Court relied on Goal 4 in issuing a non-
binding declaration noting the waste discharge would damage the environment, the 
economic advantage outweighed the environmental harm.  
In practice, the Court conducted a balancing exercise. Parliament can assist the courts by 
debating these matters itself so the courts will have the benefit of its views when deciding 
                                                     
98 Underlying law is used in the sense of new case laws developed from existing laws that are inappropriate. 
Chapter 9 discusses the use of the NGDP and BSO to develop the underlying law. 
99 One of Papua New Guinea’s largest gold and copper mine, Ok Tedi Mine caused widespread 
environmental damages to the various river systems that run off from the mine because its tailings are 
directly discharged into them. As part of the settlement for these damages BHP Biliton the major 
shareholder, transferred its shares to PNG Sustainable Development Ltd, a trust company to use the 
proceeds of the mine for the benefit of the affected people: see Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth 
Supplement) Agreement Act 2001. 
100 Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGNC 95 N4340, 26 July 2011. Refer to chapter 
10 for a discussion on the aspect of non-binding declaration of the court. 
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a case that touches on related and conflicting NGDP and BSO. The courts will refer to 
Hansard to determine which NGDP and/or BSO Parliament prioritised.  
V Conclusion  
This thesis proposes the legislature’s constitutional functions to make laws, approve the 
national Budget, and debate Bills and policies can be used either directly or indirectly to 
implement the NGDP and BSO.  
In terms of direct implementation, this thesis relies on the exception to non-
justiciability under ss 25(1) and 25(3) and ss 63(1) and 63(3). It presents the view a 
governmental body (which includes Parliament) is subject to court intervention if it does 
not exercise its power in a way that implements the NGDP and BSO. The issue is whether 
Parliament has been reasonable or not in enacting legislation that fulfils the NGDP and/or 
BSO. There is no guidance on what this may entail, but this thesis proposes active 
engagement of Parliament’s committee system to fulfil this constitutional duty. 
Depending on a Bill’s subject matter, the relevant committee (permanent or select) will 
prepare its report in light of the NGDP and BSO, and submit its report to Parliament to 
consider before Parliament votes on the Bill. 
A number of proposals have been offered for Parliament in terms of indirect 
implementation. If Parliament has attempted any of these proposals for indirect 
implementation before enacting a Bill, Parliament can argue with confidence that it has 
satisfied its duty in respect of the NGDP and BSO under ss 25(3) and 63(3). An example 
discussed was referring to the NGDP and BSO in the preamble or objects section of the 
legislation. The courts would then have recourse to these guiding principles and 
obligations in the way legislation is interpreted using the contextual role of preambles in 
statutory interpretation. The executive is similarly assisted when implementing the 
legislation on a day to day basis. 
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Chapter Eight – The National Executive 
I Introduction 
The executive arm of government has a constitutional duty to implement the NGDP and 
BSO.1 The effective unit in the executive is the National Executive Council (NEC), 
headed by the prime minister.2 This thesis identifies the non-implementation of the NGDP 
and BSO by governmental bodies as a significant issue in Papua New Guinea’s 
constitutional development and3 the NEC is a governmental body.4 Proposals to address 
this issue have been suggested for the legislature in the previous chapter.5 What can be 
done for the executive to enable it to fulfil its duty to implement the NGDP and BSO? 
The proposals in this chapter come in three parts. Part II (after the introduction) 
provides a brief overview of the chapter. Part III presents the proposal for an NEC manual, 
discussing its necessity to implement the NGDP and BSO. It covers justifications for the 
manual, proposed content in light of the NGDP and BSO, and legal status. Part IV 
concludes the chapter with a summary of the main points. 
II Brief Overview 
This chapter recommends the NEC should adopt a manual that explicitly spells out in the 
decision-making process the duty to implement the NGDP and BSO with other 
constitutional principles.6 The manual would emphasise linkages with the proposals for 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO by the judiciary,7 the legislature,8 and the 
Ombudsman.9 There is at present no such publicly available document undertaking this 
role.10  
                                                     
1 Constitution, ss 25(3) and 63(3). 
2 The ceremonial head of the Papua New Guinea executive is the Queen of England, represented by the 
Governor-General: see Constitution, ss 86(2) and 139. 
3 The issue of impediments to implementation is discussed in chapter 5. 
4 Constitution, s 139.  
5 Refer to chapter 7 on the legislature and chapter 9 for the judiciary. 
6 For example, compliance with the principles of the rule of law and separation of powers. 
7 Refer to chapter 9 for discussions on proposals for the judiciary. 
8 Refer to chapter 7 for discussions on proposals for the legislature. 
9 Refer to chapter 10 for discussions on proposals for the Ombudsman. 
10 Papua New Guinea National Executive Council [NEC] does not have a manual at present. This is 
confirmed from official email correspondence with the Papua New Guinea Department of Prime Minister 
and National Executive Council and from the Prime Minister’s official website: <www.pm.gov.pg>. 
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This thesis proposes a constitutional document to facilitate proper conduct of 
cabinet meetings following the New Zealand and United Kingdom tradition, instead of 
the Australian model. The chapter spells out why a Cabinet manual could be an important 
step to ensuring the implementation of the NGDP and BSO. This proposal cannot set out 
in detail the manual’s specific content, but this thesis suggests key focus areas where the 
NGDP and BSO can be incorporated into the NEC policy and decision-making process.11 
These areas include responding to judicial review challenges,12 formulating legislation,13 
preparation of the annual supply Bill,14 avoiding wrongful conduct, and observing the 
Leadership Code.15 By explicitly recognising principles, the manual would require the 
NEC to develop new policies consistently with them.16  
It would offer an important tool for the interplay between the various arms of government 
in the implementation of the NGDP and BSO. 
III A Proposal for the National Executive Council – Cabinet Manual  
A Introduction  
What follows is a justification for a manual as a useful NEC aid, not only in terms of 
implementing the NGDP and BSO, but also to ensure transparent and constitutionally 
sound decisions. The manual (or handbook as used in Australia) would be an easily 
accessible public document.17 
Part III has five sections. After section A, Introduction, section B provides an 
outline of the Australian Handbook, and the New Zealand and United Kingdom Cabinet 
Manuals. It explains why there are good grounds for comparison. Section C considers the 
legal status of the present NEC decision-making process, and how a manual would impact 
on it. In section D justifications for a manual are presented. The proposed contents of the 
                                                     
11 See Lanse Minkler “Economic Rights and Political Decision Making” (2009) 31(2) Hum Rts Q 368. 
12 The application of the NGDP and BSO in judicial review is considered in chapter 8. 
13 Formulating legislation to take account of the NGDP and BSO was discussed in chapter 6. 
14 Engaging the NGDP and BSO in formulating the annual supply Bill was discussed in chapter 7. 
15 Wrong conduct and misconduct are discussed in chapter 9 on the Ombudsman Commission. 
16 A useful analogy can be drawn from Dworkin’s argument for court and government decisions to conform 
to principles. For Papua New Guinea the principles are the NGDP and BSO: see Ronald Dworkin Taking 
Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978) at 82–84. 
17 Manual or handbook is used interchangeably, but where there is a need for use of a particular term, it will 
be pointed out. In this thesis, a manual records a country’s interpretation of the fundamental laws from the 
point of view of the executive, and is more formal with broader subject matter and higher labels; a 
handbook, being less formal, provides a procedural guide for conducting a cabinet meeting. 
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manual are outlined in section E. Finally, in section F, the legal status and accessibility 
of the Manual are discussed.  
B Relevance of Comparison  
Papua New Guinea has a political system similar to Australia, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom, popularly described as the Westminster system of government. Papua 
New Guinea’s Constitution professes to have separation of powers and a parliamentary 
democracy. The latter features principles of collective responsibility and representative 
government. These common elements Papua New Guinea has with Australia,  
New Zealand and the United Kingdom can facilitate comparisons.18 Papua New Guinea’s 
colonial links to Australia and the United Kingdom, as well as their continuing influence 
on Papua New Guinea’s political system lend support to this view.19  
These countries have a stable and vibrant system of government, and keenly observe a 
culture of transparency and accountability.20  
The Cabinet Manual (New Zealand and the United Kingdom) or Handbook 
(Australia) are an important tool these three countries employ to aid the executive 
government’s performance. The Cabinet Manual guides the conduct of Cabinet affairs.21  
Since the Handbook/Manual are public documents in each of these countries, the public 
is informed on how Cabinet makes decisions. Similarly, public accessibility of the 
proposed NEC Manual is recommended for Papua New Guinea.  
Having publicly accessible rules in one document under which the government 
operates helps promote a culture of transparency because the public has a set of guidelines 
to hold the executive to account. The public and/or Parliament can point to the manual 
where the executive oversteps its mark. The executive (including civil servants and 
ministers), and not only the Cabinet, knows what is expected and conduct official affairs 
accordingly. 
                                                     
18 Tony Blackshield and George Williams Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (5th ed, The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 2010) at 1. 
19 Whilst Papua New Guinea was determined to have a home-grown constitution, its content retained much 
of Westminster parliamentary democracy. 
20 In the 2013 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (from least corrupt), out of 171 
countries Australia is ranked 9th, New Zealand is ranked 1st and the United Kingdom is 14th. Papua New 
Guinea is 144th: see Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2013 
<www.transparency.org>.  
21 See: Australia <www.dpmc.gov.au>; New Zealand <http://cabinetmanual.cabinetoffice.govt.nz>; United 
Kingdom <www.gov.uk>. 
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In the Foreword to the 2008 New Zealand Cabinet Manual, Prime Minister Helen 
Clark wrote:22 
The Cabinet Manual is an authoritative guide to central government decision 
making for Ministers, their offices, and those working within government. It is 
also a primary source of information on New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements, as seen through the lens of the executive branch of government.  
The Manual is not governed by statute, but aims to reflect in one document the 
various constitutional arrangements that obtain in New Zealand. Important sources of 
constitutional law, such as the Treaty of Waitangi and the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZBORA) are identified. The executive branch of government is alerted to the 
principles promoted by these sources of constitutional law, to make decisions consistent 
with them where appropriate. 
The United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron, expressed similar views in 
the Foreword to the United Kingdom Cabinet Manual:23 
The Cabinet Manual sets out the internal rules and procedures under which the 
Government operates. For the first time the conventions determining how the 
Government operates are transparently set out in one place. 
A manual may be more useful for countries with unwritten constitutions such as 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. But even for Canada, a country with a written 
Constitution, it has been suggested that following the United Kingdom model of cabinet 
Manual may be appropriate.24 What Canada presently has is quite detailed. The Manual 
of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada is some 1,500 pages long.25  
It is mainly intended for use by senior civil servants, the Prime Minister and Ministers, 
and has the following function:26  
These practitioner’s handbooks compile historical precedents and provide 
justifications in a more exhaustive format, designed to present decision-makers 
with the relevant information required to make informed decisions. Their sheer 
bulk and technical nature, however, make them inaccessible to a general audience 
who would want to learn about parliamentary government. 
                                                     
22 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at xv [NZ Cabinet Manual]. 
23 Cabinet Office The Cabinet Manual (1st ed, October 2011) at iii [UK Cabinet Manual]. 
24 Fraser Harland “Constitutional Convention and Cabinet Manuals” (2011) 34(2) Canadian Parl Rev 25. 
25 Nicholas A MacDonald and James W Bowden “The Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of 
Canada: An Exposé” (2011) 20(1) Constit Forum 33. 
26 At 37. 
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The advantage of the New Zealand and United Kingdom model over what Canada 
has is their brevity and accessibility:27 
In contrast, “cabinet manuals” like the British Cabinet Manual and the New 
Zealand Cabinet Manual are presented in shorter, more accessible formats, 
describing general principles and constitutional conventions of the parliamentary 
system and the basic roles and functions of its main components, rather than 
listing historical precedents that justify current positions. 
This thesis argues reasons advanced for Canada to shift to the New Zealand and 
United Kingdom model is appropriate for Papua New Guinea, which like Canada, has a 
written constitution. A manual as operates in New Zealand and United Kingdom would 
also aid the implementation of the NGDP and BSO as will be explained below. 
Australia has a written Constitution, but its Cabinet is not expressly referred to in 
the constitutional text.28 Instead of a manual, the Australian government has a handbook. 
The difference between a manual (New Zealand and the United Kingdom) and a 
handbook (Australia) is not only semantic but also substantive as is evident in this 
statement from Prime Minister Julia Gillard and the Cabinet Secretary, Mark Dreyfus, in 
the Foreword to the Australian Cabinet Handbook:29 
The Handbook outlines the underlying principles of Cabinet government and 
general expectations for Cabinet business and meetings, with detailed 
arrangements included in Annexes. The Handbook should be used as a resource 
for all ministers, ministerial staff and public officials involved in the development 
and progression of Cabinet business. 
The Handbook helps the Prime Minister organise the affairs of the Cabinet, but 
does not reflect other constitutional principles on the executive government’s relationship 
with the other arms of government in the way the New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
manual does. The use of the word “manual”, going by current practice in the 
Commonwealth, has a greater constitutional and political implication. 
For Papua New Guinea, something more in the nature of the New Zealand and 
United Kingdom model may be relevant. What is proposed is a document that will have 
constitutional implications for the way the government conducts its affairs.  
                                                     
27 At 37. 
28 Australian Constitution, Chapter II, The Executive Government, ss 61–70 inclusive. 
29 Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Cabinet Handbook (7th ed, 2014) 
at 6 [Australia Cabinet Handbook]. 
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It is important to set out clearly, simply, and briefly, the main constitutional principles 
that determine the executive’s relationship with other organs of government. The focus 
would be on implementing the NGDP and BSO in the executive’s relations with other 
government branches.  
C The Legal Status of the NEC Decision-Making Process 
The Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) recommended establishing specific 
decision-making procedures for the NEC. The Constitution was to define the manner in 
which the NEC would make its decisions.30 Did the CPC want this to be a mandatory 
requirement? The CPC Report does not say so directly, but because it details a specific 
process, it is reasonable to infer their view was the NEC’s modus operandi should be spelt 
out in the law. The Constitution did not take up this option, leaving the process open-
ended.31 Furthermore, the process was left non-justiciable.32 However, where the NEC is 
directed to observe a law, failure to comply enables an aggrieved person to seek redress 
in the court. Non-justiciability does not prevent, for example, judicial review of NEC 
decisions.33 A number of these decisions relate to appointments to public offices.34 
The Prime Minster and National Executive Council Act 2002 is the main law 
governing NEC procedures.35 The legislation deals with two main subjects – appointing 
an acting Prime Minister in the event of a vacancy, and the roles and functions of specific 
NEC committees such as the National Security Council, the National Security Advisory 
Committee, and the Central Agencies Co-ordination Committee. Apart from the NEC, 
general procedures are not governed by any other laws.36 Since the NEC can create its 
own procedures, it can also adopt a manual for the public to appreciate its decision-
making process. 
                                                     
30 Constitutional Planning Committee Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report, Part One 
(Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) [CPC Report] at 7/2–7/3 [17]. 
31 Constitution, s 149(5) states: “Subject to any Organic Law or Act of the Parliament, the procedures of 
the Council are as determined by it”. 
32 Constitution, s 153(2) states: “The question, whether the procedures prescribed for the National Executive 
Council have been or are being complied with, is non-justiciable”. 
33 The most recent high profile case was over the government decision to host (and process) asylum seekers 
seeking entry into Australia on Manus Island of Papua New Guinea. The case was initiated by then 
Opposition Leader Belden Namah on the basis the arrangement was unconstitutional. The case is on-going.  
34 For example see Lupari v Somare [2008] PGSC 33, SC951, 10 November 2008. 
35 The Prime Minster and National Executive Council Act 2002 was the subject of the “two prime minister’s 
saga”. The issue was the Act’s non-observance in removing Michael Somare from office, which became 
the subject of intense constitutional litigation: see Vergil Narokobi “The Papua New Guinea ‘Two Prime 
Ministers’ Saga’: Parliament Testing the Supremacy of the Constitution” (2013) 24 PLR 92.   
36 There are specific laws the NEC is required to consider when dealing with a particular subject matter 
such as the Organic Law on the Provincial Governments and Local Level Governments 1995, s 57 on 
suspensions of provincial governments. 
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The Standing Orders of Parliament provide another useful comparison for 
determining the legal status of a proposed manual for the NEC. Compliance with the 
Standing Orders is non-justiciable.37 But the Standing Orders provide a comprehensive 
guide to the Parliament to conduct its affairs in a legally compliant manner. Furthermore, 
it provides an indication of whether Parliament has complied with other justiciable 
provisions, such as the procedures for enacting constitutional laws and amendments. For 
example, “Part XIXA – Constitutional Laws” of the Standing Orders, prescribes 
procedures for constitutional amendment consistent with ss 14 and 17 of the Constitution. 
Parliament’s non-compliance with ss 14 and 17 in enacting laws can result in the Supreme 
Court declaring such laws unconstitutional.38  
D Justification for a Manual  
1 Introduction  
There are obvious advantages and disadvantages in having a manual. However the 
advantages of a manual for Papua New Guinea that expects the fulfilment of broad 
constitutional principles, appears to outweigh the disadvantages. The main point 
underlying the various reasons for a manual would be a more user friendly guide for 
decision-making consistent with constitutional principles, rather than insisting the NEC 
resort directly to constitutional laws and case law for direction. As alluded to earlier, a 
manual would combine in a single, publicly accessible document all the main principles 
of government, especially as it pertains to the executive’s functions and its relations to 
other organs of government and thus support transparent practices.  
New Zealand introduced a Cabinet Manual in the late 1970s to consolidate the 
principles of various laws (such as the Constitution Act 1986) and conventions pertaining 
to the executive.39 The United Kingdom adopted a Manual in 2009.  
The United Kingdom did not have a Cabinet Manual before that.40 The United Kingdom 
                                                     
37 Constitution, s 134. 
38 In the Matter of Constitutional Validity of Constitutional Amendment (Provincial Governments and 
Local-Level Governments) [1995] PGSC 12; [1995] PNGLR 481, 20 September 1995. 
39 Rebecca Kitteridge “The Cabinet Manual: Evolution with Time” (paper presented to the 8th Annual 
Public Law Forum, Wellington, 20–21 March 2006). 
40 There were separate manuals for different departments, but no manual specifically for the Cabinet as a 
collective entity.  
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drew heavily from the New Zealand experience as neither country has a written 
constitution.41 Three advantages of a Cabinet Manual in these two countries are:42 
 It allows for codification of constitutional conventions without making them 
law; 
 It clarifies key conventions to help prevent a constitutional crisis following 
the election of a minority government; and 
 It is relatively simple to implement – at least from a logistical perspective.  
A Cabinet Manual may be more suited to countries with unwritten constitutions 
as a means to document unwritten constitutional conventions. Like other written 
constitutions, there are aspects of the Papua New Guinea Constitution left undefined. 
Resorting to the provision’s historical antecedents may aid interpretation. Section 149(3) 
places responsibility on the NEC for the executive government of Papua New Guinea. 
However, there is no definition of “executive government”43 apart from the requirement 
to observe collective responsibility.44 So whilst Papua New Guinea has a written 
constitution, there is a large area of government functioning left for convention to fill, 
based on countries with similar government systems, including those with Westminster 
traditions.45 In addition, when ss 25(3) and 63(3) refer to the exercise of executive power 
to implement the NGDP and BSO, no guidance is provided to the executive. A manual 
would satisfy this expectation.  
A disadvantage would be setting up a manual can confuse Ministers, who can 
refer directly to laws to determine an issue. In the United Kingdom the proliferation of 
codes has been identified as a potential challenge.46 But principles of government 
modelled on a Westminster system can sometimes be wrongly assumed to be understood 
by all key stake-holders from resorting to the Constitution. The realities in Papua New 
                                                     
41 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee Constitutional Implications of the 
Cabinet Manual Sixth Report of Session 2010–11, Volume 1 (29 March 2011) at 5. 
42 Harland, above n 24. 
43 John Goldring “Responsibility of the Executive Government – To Whom and for What” (1981) 9 
Melanesian LJ 116 at 117–118. 
44 Constitution, s 141. For an interesting piece on ambiguity in the courts constitutional review jurisdiction 
see: Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea Occasional Paper No 16: Constitutional Review 
Jurisdiction in Papua New Guinea (September 1981). 
45 Goldring, above n 43, at 117–118. For a Supreme Court decision drawing on relevance of Westminster 
comparison with Papua New Guinea: see Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re 
Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates [2010] PGSC 3, SC1057, 7 July 2010, at 
[209]. 
46 Andrew Blick “The Cabinet Manual and the Codification of Conventions” (2014) 67 Parl Aff 191 at 193. 
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Guinea militate against making such assumption.47 The two Prime Minister’s saga is one 
example.48 A manual which provides a ready chart for leaders to navigate the complex 
constitutional system would go a long way to avoid misunderstandings. Further, there 
could be a gap, or an issue in the law, and the manual would not confuse the Ministers, 
but actually help clarify the issue.  
Another argument against a manual is the difficulty of reaching consensus on its 
content. In Canada, it was observed that codifying conventions is a contested field, and it 
would be difficult to get parties to agree on the terms of a particular convention to include 
in a manual.49 In the United Kingdom, the process was initiated by the legislature, and 
driven by a specific committee. Ultimately it would be for the executive to determine 
whether it accepted the parliamentary committee recommendation.50  
If there is wide stake-holder consultation prior to adoption of a manual (as there should 
be), various and often conflicting views are bound to arise, compounding the difficulty. 
The response to this would be that a manual is a statement of the executive’s intent, 
understanding and commitment to government under constitutional law. Whatever 
differences there are can be resolved when the matter is contested in court. An example 
could be in the context of litigating a justiciable provision of the Constitution and the 
scope of a related constitutional practise(s) arises.51 Such differences and ambiguities 
should not prevent the executive from establishing a manual. In the United Kingdom, the 
problem of ambiguity was addressed by simply stating the uncertainty in the Manual.52 
  
                                                     
47 In Public Prosecutor v Rooney (No 2) [1979] PGSC 23, [1979] PNGLR 448, 11 September 1979, 
Minister for Justice Nahau Rooney was found guilty of contempt of court for writing a letter directly to the 
court criticising the court over its decision. Rooney was imprisoned for six months but was soon released 
by the National Executive Council exercising its prerogative power of mercy. A number of judges resigned 
from office, in protest against the interference by the executive over the independence of the judiciary. 
48 Narokobi, above n 35. 
49 Bruce Hicks “Advice to the Ministers of democratic reform: Senate reform, constitutional amendments, 
fixed election dates, and a Cabinet Manual” Constit Forum (Fall, 2012) 23. 
50 For example in New Zealand, it has been customary for each incoming government to declare its support 
for the Cabinet Manual. This point was observed by Kitteridge, above n 39. 
51 For example in Board of Inquiry appointed under Public Service (Interim Arrangements) Act 1973 Re 
Alleged Disciplinary Offences in Office by Mr Phillip Bouraga [1982] PGSC 11, [1982] PNGLR 178, 23 
March 1982, the court has to define what the executive function entailed. 
52 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, above n 41, at [22]. 
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2 Non-justiciability versus justiciability 
A strong reason for a Cabinet Manual is that a manual clarifies conventions,53 and 
demonstrates a government’s commitment to what cannot be enforced by law.54  
A Manual would as a result reduce the opportunity for arbitrary government because it 
provides a tool for the government to follow, especially in areas where the law confers 
powers with wide discretion.  
In the context of social rights enforcement, it has been suggested in New Zealand 
the Cabinet Manual can be amended to cater for the consideration of social rights by 
Cabinet alongside the Treaty of Waitangi for instance.55 Due to the prevailing position in 
Papua New Guinea that the NGDP and BSO are non-justiciable, this proposal warrants 
serious consideration.56 Despite the United Kingdom Manual’s non-binding nature, 
David Cameron expected Ministers and officials would comply with it.57 The sanction 
for non-compliance is political, but it may eventually lead to a “legitimate expectation” 
to comply.58 A Manual would evince a commitment from the NEC to implement the 
NGDP and BSO, therefore demonstrating it has taken its constitutional duty seriously. 
Since the procedures of the NEC are non-justiciable, a Manual primarily 
concerned with the procedures of the NEC would be non-justiciable as well; much like 
the status of the Parliament’s Standing Orders.59 The non-justiciability of the NEC 
procedures is provided for in the Constitution.60 But the Manual would contain important 
constitutional principles (as expressed in the Constitution) pertaining to the executive 
government. Non-compliance with these provisions is justiciable without the manual, but 
the Manual would draw the NEC’s (and the public’s) attention to the requirements of the 
law. An example discussed below relates to the Prime Minister’s referral by the 
Ombudsman Commission to the Public Prosecutor for breach of the Leadership Code.61 
                                                     
53 Harland, above n 24. 
54 A convention is a rule that is not supported by the force of law: see Blick, above n 46, at 191. 
55 Claudia Geiringer and Matthew SR Palmer “Human Rights and Social Policy in New Zealand” (2007) 
Soc Pol J NZ 12. 
56 Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 40, SC1088, 17 
December 2010 at [23]. 
57 UK Cabinet Manual, above n 23, at iii. 
58 Elizabeth McLeay “What is the Constitutional Status of the New Zealand Cabinet Office Manual?” 
(1999) PLR 10 at 13. 
59 Constitution, s 134. 
60 Constitution, s 153(2). 
61 The basis of the allegation was the Prime Minister committed Papua New Guinea to a loan without 
approval from Parliament contrary to Constitution, s 209. The loan was for about US$400 million from the 
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3 Contribution towards general constitutional compliance 
It is not only the lack of implementation of the NGDP and BSO that poses a constitutional 
issue, but there have been differences in the understanding of the Constitution between 
the legislature and the executive. Having a manual would also serve a greater purpose of 
general compliance with the Constitution and contribute towards avoiding the 
constitutional strains that the country has experienced. Two cases will be highlighted to 
make the point. 
In 1994, Prime Minister Pius Wingti attempted, with another 18 months in office 
to circumvent the constitutional process to avoid a vote of no-confidence.62 Under the 
Constitution, a Prime Minister is immune from a vote of no confidence for a period of 18 
months from the time he is elected.63 By resigning and getting re-elected again on the 
same day, Wingti planned to surprise his political opponents and retain additional life 
(another 18 months) in power. This move was contested, and the Court decided against 
Wingti declaring it unconstitutional. The Court relied heavily on the NGDP and BSO to 
justify its decisions:64 
Sections 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution direct the courts to interpret and 
apply the law in such a way to give effect to the National Goals and Directive 
Principles and to encourage compliance with the Basic Social Obligations, 
without failing to give effect to the intention of the Parliament or the Constitution. 
These goals, principles, and obligations are subject to the intention of the 
Parliament or the provisions of the Constitution … . 
I bear all these principles in mind in interpreting the provisions of s 142 of the 
Constitution. 
The court held the view that the surprising manner in which Wingti used 
Parliament to extend his political rule did not allow Papua New Guineans to participate 
meaningfully in the decision-making process through their elected representatives 
consistent with Goal 2 on equality and participation. This decision demonstrates a 
powerful interaction between the NGDP, BSO and the Constitution. The principles of that 
case are important, especially as regards meaningful participation by elected 
                                                     
Union Bank of Switzerland to purchase shares in Oil Search Limited, which part owns a Liquefied Natural 
Gas project in the highlands of Papua New Guinea. 
62 Haiveta, Leader of the Opposition v Wingti, Prime Minister, Attorney-General, and National Parliament 
[1994] PGSC 6, [1994] PNGLR 197, 25 August 1994 [Haiveta]. This case was also discussed in chapter 6 
on the legislature on the manner in which the judiciary can incorporate the NGDP and BSO in constitutional 
interpretation. 
63 Constitution, s 145. 
64 Haivetta, above n 62. 
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representatives in decision-making. Those principles should be captured in a Cabinet 
Manual, to alert the NEC to such matters when making decisions. 
The lesson from the experience of 1994 seems not to have been learnt. In 2011, 
Papua New Guinea was caught up in a constitutional and political stand-off where two 
members of Parliament declared they were the Prime Minister, in what is now popularly 
described as the “two Prime Minister’s saga”.65 In that case, Prime Minister Michael 
Somare was ousted from office by Parliament, in defiance of constitutional procedures, 
including the Prime Minister and National Executive Council Act 2002. Despite the 
court’s ruling that Somare’s unseating was unconstitutional, Peter O’Neil continued to 
hold office.66 Both sides claimed to act within the Constitution. The often used phrase 
was “court appointed prime minister versus parliament appointed prime minister”.  
This demonstrates the need for the NEC to capture the major principles of the Constitution 
and of the laws that have legal consequences for the NEC, and reduce them to a single 
document guiding the NEC in its decision-making process. Obviously there may still be 
areas the Manual may overlook, but it reduces the opportunity for arbitrary behaviour. 
4 Recording constitutional development  
Despite a number of amendments, Papua New Guinea has retained the main features of 
its Constitution enacted in 1975.67 There have been important constitutional 
developments affecting the distribution of power between the various government arms. 
It is important to clarify, simplify and combine these decisions in the document that will 
help the NEC in its deliberations. It will provide clear guidance on how the NGDP and 
BSO can be implemented without compromising functions of other arms of government. 
Important cases in Papua New Guinea’s constitutional development can be expressly 
referred to in the manual. For example, the United Kingdom Cabinet Manual refers to the 
case of Pepper v Hart as a case with the status of constitutional law.68 
                                                     
65 Narokobi, above n 35. 
66 See Re Reference to Constitution section 19(1) by East Sepik Provincial Executive [2011] PGSC 41, 
SC1154, 12 December 2011; and Re Reference Pursuant to Constitution section 19(1) by Allan Marat 
[2012] PGSC 1, SC1149, 23 January 2012. 
67 Two of the major amendments (of the 22) to the Constitution was the introduction of the provincial 
government system in 1976, and the creation of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in 2006.   
68 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, [1993] AC 593 determined courts can have recourse 
to Parliamentary records (Hansard) to determine the intention of Parliament when the objective of  
legislation is ambiguous and it cannot be resolved by reference to the texts of the legislation alone.  
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Court decisions on important constitutional matters lend support to a cabinet 
manual. The courts (especially the Supreme Court) are designated as the guardian of the 
Constitution.69 In interpreting the Constitution, the courts actually lay down new laws. 
New precedents are created on how the Constitution should be interpreted and applied. 
This adds to the complexity of the constitutional arrangement, especially for non-lawyers. 
Distilling the main principles of the court’s decision along with other important aspects 
of the Constitution would aid the NEC. A number of cases that have influenced the 
constitutional development of the country will be discussed below. These cases show two 
things – firstly the necessity to appreciate constitutional process and secondly, that the 
experiences of these constitutional developments should not be lost, but continue to 
influence the behaviour of future governments.   
The Constitution is said to speak from time to time, meaning that an interpretation 
of the Constitution in one period of time may differ when circumstances change in the 
future.70 Such changes are important to document. An example is s 124 of the Constitution 
on the number of sitting days of Parliament.71 In 1990 the Supreme Court determined that 
s 124 was only a guide and not mandatory.72 There would be no legal sanction against 
Parliament if it did not comply with s 124. Nine years later, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the provision differently stating that failure to sit the minimum number of sitting days in 
a year was a breach of the Constitution, making the Parliament liable to enforcement 
proceedings in the court.73 Such changes in the interpretation of the Constitution should 
be recorded in a manual; the NEC has control of the majority of Parliament, and should 
observe changes in constitutional understanding. The Manual would be produced by the 
NEC as a statement of its intent in constitutional understanding; but does not prevent 
consultations with the public to develop a manual. This is a challenging area for Papua 
New Guinea as often the executive, having control of Parliament would postpone sittings 
to avoid potential votes of no confidence.74 
                                                     
69 Haiveta, above n 61, per Amet CJ. 
70 Constitution, sch 1.2.4. 
71 Constitution, s 124. 
72 SCR No 4 of 1990; Reference by the Acting Principal Legal Adviser [1994] PGSC 17, [1994] PNGLR 
141, 11 January 1991 [Acting Principal Legal Advisor]. 
73 SC Reference No 3 of 1999; Re Calling of the Parliament [1999] PGSC 55, [1999] PNGLR 285, 25 June 
1999 [Calling of Parliament]. Despite this ruling there has been no enforcement proceedings against the 
parliament, and concerns continued in 2010 because parliament was not sitting the required number of 
sitting days: see Solomon Kantha “Papua New Guinea” (2011) The Contemporary Pacific 23. 
74 This behaviour of Parliament has resulted in a number of constitutional cases; see Acting Principal Legal 
Adviser, above n 70, and Calling of Parliament, above n 71. 
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What has emerged over time in Papua New Guinea is important policies have been 
developed by the government on an ad hoc basis. The reason is government formation 
depends on coalitions and no single party has been able to secure an outright majority to 
run a single party government to implement the party policies. Policies are often a result 
of compromises. These policies are not law, but have assumed a level of importance and 
permanence. One can categorise them as part of Papua New Guinea’s constitutional 
commitments. Papua New Guinea has adopted a key set of goals in Vision 2050. The 
primary objective of this policy is to enable Papua New Guinea to improve its human 
development index to at least a rank of 50 by the end of 2050. Vision 2050 sets some 
guidance on how this can be done, by focusing on key development priorities. Being an 
important policy objective of the government, it is given prominence.75 Vision 2050, 
however does not have any legal status as does the NGDP and BSO. But a Manual could 
incorporate it as part of the directional focus of the country. 
5 Whole of government approach 
The Papua New Guinea Constitution’s definition of constitutional law extends to organic 
laws, which have an entrenched status almost the same as the Constitution itself.76 The 
Constitution establishes the main organs of the state, their functions and responsibilities, 
but provides for the specific details of these constitutional institutions to be enacted under 
separate organic laws. For example, the Constitution established the Ombudsman 
Commission, but its specific powers and organisational structure is provided for in two 
Organic Laws: the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission; and the Organic Law 
on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership. In addition to this, the types of laws 
existing in Papua New Guinea are set out in s 9 of the Constitution and include the 
Constitution, Organic Laws, provincial government laws, ordinary legislation, subsidiary 
legislation and the underlying law.77 Such a complex statutory framework presents a 
formidable task for any decision-maker, let alone the NEC, to steer through to ensure that 
its decisions are legally correct, and at the same time implement the NGDP and BSO. 
Capturing the main principles of these laws as they pertain to the NEC in a single 
                                                     
75 The Prime Ministers Department website refers to PNG Vision 2050 as an important policy it tries to 
implement <www.officeofprimeminister.com>. 
76 Constitution, sch 1.2 defines constitutional law as composed of the Constitution, organic law and 
amendments to the Constitution; s 13 to 17 of the Constitution set out the enactment (of organic laws), 
amendment and repeal process of the Constitution and organic laws. 
77 The Underlying Law Act, s 4 defines the sources of the underlying law as customary law and common 
law and equity. 
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document would enable a more effective guide for the NEC to operate within the 
parameters of the law.  
Another example where a manual would enable effective governance is in the area 
of devolution of power. In the United Kingdom, devolution of power to Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales is regulated by legislation78 and expressly identified in the Manual.79 
In Papua New Guinea there are 21 provinces and one autonomous region (Bougainville). 
The political head of a province is the governor. He or she is a member of the provincial 
assembly and concurrently a member of the national Parliament.  
The provincial assembly is made up of presidents of local level governments. Each local 
level government has its own assembly consisting of ward members. For the former, the 
Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government sets up the legislative areas of 
competence for each of the provinces. Furthermore, there are local level governments in 
each of the provinces, which have law-making powers over certain subject areas.80  
It is important that the national government does not make laws for a subject that is 
designated for a province or a local level government. Bougainville, with its special 
relationship to Papua New Guinea and a higher degree of autonomy than the other 
provinces, is regulated by a separate Organic Law.81 A manual would help the 
government identify the various limitations on its powers on certain subject matters and 
help the NEC steer through this complex area. 
The complexity of the level of legal compliance with the constitutional obligation 
to implement the NGDP and BSO requires a measure of guidance that can bring all these 
diverse pieces of legislation together for a common objective. 
                                                     
78 Northern Ireland Act 1998; Scotland Act 1998; and Government of Wales Act 2006 (superseding the 
Government of Wales Act 1998). 
79 UK Cabinet Manual, above n 23, at [8.1]. 
80 Organic Law on the Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments, s 42 sets out the subject areas 
for provincial laws and s 44 sets out the areas for local level government laws. Essentially a subject not 
distributed to the province or the local level government remains with the national government, unless the 
matter is of national interest (s 41). 
81 Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville-Autonomous Bougainville Government and 
Bougainville Referendum 2002. 
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E The Content of the Manual  
1 Introduction  
This part of the chapter first conducts a comparison of the contents of the 
manuals/handbook from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and, second, 
makes specific suggestions for Papua New Guinea. 
2 Contents of manual: Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom   
The Australian Cabinet Handbook has the following content, reflecting its practical 
orientation: 
 Cabinet Government in Australia; 
 Cabinet business; and 
 Cabinet meetings. 
There are three main subjects and the specific details are set out in 11 annexes, specifying 
the roles and responsibilities of each of the stakeholders in preparing Cabinet 
documentation amongst other requirements. The Handbook guides ministers’ preparation 
of submissions to Cabinet and also helps prevent confusion over ministerial subject areas. 
Persons singled out in the Handbook are the Prime Minister, ministers, Cabinet secretary 
and Cabinet committees.  
The New Zealand Cabinet Manual covers the following areas: 
 Governor-General and the Executive Council; 
 Ministers of the Crown: Appointment and Role; 
 Ministers of the Crown and the State Sector; 
 Ministers and the Law; 
 Cabinet Decision Making; 
 Elections, Transitions and Government Formation; 
 The Executive, Legislation and the House; and 
 Official Information. 
New Zealand’s Manual is more detailed than the Australian Handbook, because it 
captures the main principles of the country’s constitutional arrangements. It sets out in 
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some detail how Cabinet is to conduct itself, and simultaneously maintain a compliant 
constitutional relationship with other arms of government.  
In the United Kingdom, there is the following: 
 The Sovereign; 
 Elections and government formation; 
 The Executive – the Prime Minister, ministers and the structure of 
government; 
 Collective Cabinet decision-making; 
 The Executive and Parliament; 
 The Executive and the Law; 
 Ministers and the Civil Service; 
 Relations with Devolved Administration and Local Government; 
 Relations with the European Union and other international institutions; 
 Government finance and expenditure; and 
 Official information. 
Comparing the United Kingdom model to New Zealand, the former’s content is quite 
exhaustive, attempting to capture the essence of the country’s complex constitutional 
structure. There is a level of complexity apparent in Papua New Guinea’s government 
system such that a manual as it operates in New Zealand and the United Kingdom may 
be helpful. Papua New Guinea has three levels of government (national, provincial and 
local), and an autonomous region in Bougainville. Coordinating these complex 
relationships from guidelines out of a single document is practically beneficial to the 
NEC.  
3 Contents of a NEC manual  
A Cabinet Manual for Papua New Guinea can be an important device to concurrently 
reflect the country’s constitutional arrangements and focus attention on the NGDP and 
BSO. The following subjects are recommended: 
 Main Principles of Government; 
 The Executive and the Law; 
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 The Executive and the Parliament; 
 The Executive and the Ombudsman Commission; and 
 Government Finance and Expenditure. 
Each of these areas links up with the other government arms, including the 
Ombudsman Commission. A Cabinet Manual with principles guiding how the 
government operates places all ministers, civil servants, provincial (including the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville) and local level governments,  on equal footing to 
appreciate the process of governance and the separate areas of responsibilities.  
Some comments will now be offered for each of these proposed subject areas for the NEC 
manual. 
(a) Main Principles of Government  
The beginning of the cabinet manual should outline the NGDP and BSO and state clearly 
that the executive is committed to fulfilling them in the performance of its functions. All 
decisions of the government would be weighed against the standards of the Basic Rights 
and the NGDP and BSO.82 Where a decision of the NEC can fulfil the NGDP and BSO, 
it should do so. This is not only a non-justiciable duty, but also a justiciable one.83 This 
dual non-legal and legal nature of the NGDP and BSO is provided for in ss 25 and 63 of 
the Constitution.84 
If the NGDP and BSO are stated clearly at the commencement of the manual, it 
would draw the attention of the NEC to them. For example, in New Zealand, the 
fundamental principles governing New Zealand constitutional arrangement, touching on 
matters such as the decisions of the courts, the Treaty of Waitangi and conventions are 
marked out clearly in the manual.85 In the United Kingdom, the manual refers to the role 
of the Sovereign, the idea of parliamentary democracy and statutes such as the Magna 
Carta 1215.86 Papua New Guinea’s manual could demonstrate an appreciation of its 
home-grown Constitution by making express reference to the NGDP and BSO as first, 
the country’s founding principles and second, the Constitution’s underlying aims.87 
                                                     
82 CPC Report, above n 30, see ch 2 generally, especially at 2/1 [6]. 
83 Constitution, ss 25(3) and 63(3). 
84 This is the interpretation of ss 25(3) and 63(3) defended in chapter 4. 
85 NZ Cabinet Manual, above n 22, at 2. 
86 UK Cabinet Manual, above n 23, at 2. 
87 See chapter 3. 
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Significantly, the preamble to the Papua New Guinea Constitution states clearly 
that all power belongs to the people and that it is exercised through the people’s 
representatives. Leaders must be constantly reminded of this. This power is to be 
exercised to fulfil the NGDP and BSO. 
(b) The executive and the law 
Two legal avenues are considered here, where the executive’s decision (including the 
NEC) can be reviewed in court against the basis of the NGDP and BSO. They are first, 
judicial review of administrative action and second, matters of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation. Detailed discussions on these two aspects of the judiciary will be taken up 
in chapter 9. What follows is a brief overview of the main points of these two matters, to 
set the context for the proposal to incorporate provisions in the manual alerting the NEC 
to this level of judicial scrutiny.    
(i) Judicial review  
When the executive implements legislation, it exercises decision-making powers and this 
can be subject to judicial review.88 If the executive is not able to promote the NGDP and 
BSO in a decision, then it should state the reasons for it. A person aggrieved by such a 
decision can seek review on the basis of ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution using the 
Wednesbury test of reasonableness under the National Court Rules.89  
If the courts adopt this approach, it would require the executive and the NEC in particular 
as the head of the executive in Papua New Guinea to adequately defend its decisions when 
it is judicially reviewed. The Manual for the NEC would provide this guide in decision-
making. 
Reviewing a NEC outcome requires court access to the materials the NEC relied 
on to make its decision. But documents used in the NEC decision including the NEC 
submission may be privileged. What can be made available would be the minutes of the 
decision recording separately the manner in which the NGDP and BSO were considered 
and the reasons either for their implementation or not. The minutes would be made 
available to the court when it undertakes its process of review on the basis of Wednesbury 
reasonableness. The manner of recording the engagement of the NGDP and BSO in the 
decision-making process ought to be stated clearly in the Manual. 
                                                     
88 The grounds of judicial review are discussed in chapter 9. 
89 This point was discussed in chapter 7. 
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(ii) Interpretation and application of laws 
The other legal avenue for the court’s intervention in the executive function is the 
interpretation and application of the Constitution, Organic Laws and legislation. Chapter 
7 recommended that the legislature enacts laws with specific reference to the NGDP and 
BSO in the preamble and/or in the objectives provision. If the courts then use a contextual 
role of preambles in statutory interpretation they will naturally engage the NGDP and 
BSO. This is an indication to the executive as to the manner in which its decisions will 
be reviewed by the court. It therefore requires the executive to respond accordingly to 
both the direction of the legislature in implementing Acts and the attitude of the courts in 
statutory interpretation. It is submitted that the best means of ensuring a harmonious 
relationship with the other arms of government in implementing the NGDP and BSO 
would be through a manual which explicitly proposes the consideration of the NGDP and 
BSO. 
The executive operates by virtue of law, primarily legislation. Chapter 7 
recommended Parliament adopts consistent reference to the NGDP and BSO in 
legislation more consistently. If Parliament regularly adopts the thesis proposal of 
engaging the NGDP and/or BSO in the legislation, it will consequently provide a clear 
direction to the executive of which Goals or Obligations it should promote in 
implementing the relevant legislation. The end result would be a recording of this practice 
in the Manual. A greater implementation effort by both the legislature and the executive 
would have been achieved.  
(c) The executive and the parliament 
The NEC is politically responsible to the Parliament under the principle of collective 
responsibility.90 Parliamentary question time and debates are avenues to hold the 
executive to account for its decisions (or lack of). Conversely, it is also an opportunity 
for the executive to promote its performance. Parliament also has the opportunity to 
inquire about laws it has enacted from the executive whether it has fulfilled the NGDP 
and BSO in implementing these laws. The ultimate control that the Parliament has over 
the executive is to remove it from office through a vote of no confidence.91  
                                                     
90 Constitution, s 141. 
91 The use of the motion of no confidence is discussed later in the chapter. 
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In countries like Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Cabinet 
Handbook/Manual states clearly that the executive’s existence is by virtue of the 
legislature’s confidence.92 Papua New Guinea has witnessed a great degree of executive 
dominance over the legislature.93 For example, of the 111 members of Parliament, the 
Opposition currently has fewer than 10 MPs. Despite the executive’s overwhelming 
majority, it is a requirement of the Constitution that it justifies its decisions to Parliament. 
A manual that demonstrates the executive’s commitment to a sense of accountability to 
the legislature is important to help maintain an appropriate balance between the 
legislature and the executive. 
Much of the legislative programme of the Parliament in a Westminster 
government system is determined by the executive and Papua New Guinea is no 
exception. The Manual would take up the proposal for any legislation initiated by the 
executive to specifically have a preamble and/or objective section stating which NGDP 
and/or BSO the legislation intends to implement. This connects the two arms of 
government – the executive and the legislature. In chapter 7 it was recommended that if 
the legislature did not enact legislation that took due account of the NGDP and/or BSO it 
would be liable to a constitutionality challenge. A statement in the Manual capturing this 
proposed requirement would reflect the legal obligation of the legislature argued by the 
thesis. 
The level of engagement by laws with the NGDP and BSO would increase if the 
NEC’s attention is drawn to sponsoring Bills which expressly identify and promote a 
particular NGDP and/or BSO. The flow on effect on the implementation of the laws by 
the executive and the interpretation of the law by the judiciary using a contextual role of 
preambles in statutory interpretation (discussed in chapters5 and 9) should help fulfil the 
NGDP and BSO. 
(d) The executive and the Ombudsman Commission  
The Ombudsman Commission has an important accountability role in the government 
system. Members of the NEC are subject to the twin jurisdictions of the Ombudsman 
Commission: the administrative complaints function and the Leadership Code. In both 
                                                     
92 Australia Cabinet Handbook, above n 29, at [13]; NZ Cabinet Manual, above n 22, at 3; UK Cabinet 
Manual, above n 23, at [5.2]. 
93 Bal Kama “Can PNG democracy survive without the Opposition?” (3 September 2014) Dev Policy Blog 
<http://devpolicy.org>. 
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these matters, the Ombudsman Commission takes account of the NGDP and/or BSO.94 
Drawing the attention of the NEC to the requirements of the Ombudsman Commission 
makes sense, too, as Ministers are alerted to these requirements before decisions are 
made. For the purposes of the Leadership Code, the NGDP and BSO are justiciable that 
is, enforceable in a Leadership Tribunal.95 Having clear guidelines stating what type of 
conduct and behaviour are expected of the leaders who are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Ombudsman Commission is important.  
The Manual should outline matters which are potentially the subject of the 
Ombudsman Commission investigation for wrong conduct.96 It would remind leaders of 
what good administration entails. Ministers can then encourage their departments to meet 
these requirements. An example which is discussed in detail in chapter 10 was the Peter 
Yama case.97 Yama unfairly and inequitably distributed public funds under his control 
contrary to the NGDP, particularly Goal 2 and was found to have committed misconduct 
in office by the Leadership Tribunal. A Manual which guides the conduct of the Minister 
may help the leader avoid running foul with the Leadership Code.  
An important limitation on the power of the executive is stated in s 219(3) of the 
Constitution: 
(3) The Commission shall not inquire into the justifiability of a policy of the 
National Government or a Minister or a provincial government or a 
member of a provincial executive, except insofar as the policy may be 
contrary to law or to the National Goals and Directive Principles, the Basic 
Rights or the Basic Social Obligations, or of any act of the Parliament. 
It is imperative that this requirement is set out clearly in the Manual so the NEC will be 
guided as it carries out its duties. 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have ombudsman institutions, 
but these institutions do not have the role of supervising and enforcing a Leadership Code. 
In Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Handbook or Manual sets out 
requirements for integrity in office, and avoiding conflict of interests., including the 
process for dealing with a conflict of interest during a Cabinet meeting.98  
                                                     
94 Constitution, ss 25(3), 63(3) and s 219(1)(B). 
95 Constitution, ss 25(3) and 63(3). 
96 For definition of wrong conduct: see Constitution, s 219(2). 
97 In the matter of Peter Yama, Member of Parliament [2004] PGLT 2, N2746, 1 December 2004. 
98 Australia Cabinet Handbook, above n 29, at 25–34; UK Cabinet Manual, above n 23, at 26.  
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Papua New Guinea has a Leadership Code, where the NGDP and/or BSO are justiciable.99 
The Leadership Code refers specifically to ministerial behaviour, especially to avoiding 
conflicts of interest.100 A Manual which draws the attention of the members of the NEC 
to this requirement encourages a collective approach to compliance instead of leaving it 
to the conscience of the individual Minister.101 Responsibility is placed on the Prime 
Minister as chairperson of the NEC to routinely remind Ministers. 
(e) Government finance and expenditure  
Parliament has ultimate authority to approve the annual supply Bill or the budget under s 
209 of the Constitution. In Norah Mairi v Alkan Tololo, Secretary for Education102 and 
Saleng Mileng v Alkan Tololo Secretary for Education103 the Court, relying on the English 
case of Attorney-General v Wilts United Dairies Ltd,104 held certain fees imposed on 
students purportedly under the Education Act 1970 were in reality taxes and an illegal 
exercise of power by the executive, as it was only the legislature that has the power to 
impose taxes. The Court’s decision also referred to the English Bill of Rights of 1689 for 
its historic relation to s 209.105 This is an important area, because in August 2014 the 
Prime Minister was referred to the Public Prosecutor by the Ombudsman Commission for 
misconduct in office.106 The basis of the allegation was that the Prime Minister had 
committed Papua New Guinea to a loan from an international financier without obtaining 
approval from Parliament. On its face, it is a clear requirement of the Constitution which 
the Prime Minister appears not to have complied with.  
This constitutional requirement has its roots in the historical tradition of the Westminster 
system emanating from the Glorious Revolution of 1688, where parliament successfully 
wrested financial powers from the monarchy. 
The Treasury Department of Papua New Guinea has a Manual that refers to  
s 209 of the Constitution among other laws to guide governmental bodies to prepare 
                                                     
99 Constitution, ss 25(4) and 63(4). 
100 Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, s 9. 
101 For example former Public Service Minister Peter Peipul was referred for misconduct in office by the 
Ombudsman Commission for failing to declare his interest in the appointment of his brother to an important 
public office. See Peipul v The Leadership Tribunal [2002] PGSC 1, SC706, 24 May 2002. 
102 Mairi v Tololo, Secretary for Education [1976] PGSC 9, [1976] PNGLR 125, 15 April 1976 [Mairi]. 
103 Mileng v Tololo [1976] PGSC 12, [1976] PNGLR 447, 6 October 1976. 
104 Attorney-General v Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 884. 
105 Mairi, above n 102, at 130 per Frost CJ. 
106 Prime Minister Peter O’Neil was referred to the Public Prosecutor to consider a prosecution before the 
Leadership Tribunal for alleged misconduct in office in August 2014.  
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budget submissions for funding, reporting and accountability.107 It also spells out the 
budget cycle and approval process. Interestingly, the Treasury Manual does not refer to 
the NGDP and BSO. Allocating resources to fulfil the NGDP and BSO is an important 
step to fulfilling them. The NEC should have its own Manual that connects with that of 
the Treasury Department. Both Manuals should make reference to the NGDP and BSO. 
When the NEC is formulating the budget for submission to Parliament for 
approval, the Manual should state that the NEC ought to allocate resources to matters that 
fulfil the NGDP and BSO.108 Government institutions are established by legislation, and 
such laws refer to the NGDP and/or BSO.109 Funding these statutory institutions will 
result in these organisations achieving the NGDP and/or BSO.110  
Another area where the Manual can draw the attention of the NEC to the NGDP 
and BSO is the need to pay attention to any report a committee of the Parliament may 
make in terms of reviewing the previous year’s finance and expenditure. The NEC will 
be required to consider any such reports in formulating the following year’s budget.  
In chapter 7, it was pointed out that the Plans and Estimates Committee could take up this 
role. The Manual can be an important link between the role of the parliamentary 
committee and the NEC in terms of the latter giving due regard to the recommendations 
in the committee’s report.   
F Legal Status and Accessibility of the Manual  
Although the NEC procedure is non-justiciable, the manual proposed for the NEC would 
be documentary evidence of constitutional and legal expectations.111 It would not only 
demonstrates to the public the executive’s commitment to upholding the country’s 
constitution and the fundamental principles underlying it, but what the NEC does in fact. 
The public is informed of the executive’s understanding of the present state of the 
Constitution. From the many varied pieces of constitutional laws and policies, the NEC 
Manual brings them together in one document and supports the NEC in coordinating these 
commitments so that there is an overall policy and legal compliance. 
                                                     
107 Papua New Guinea Department of Treasury Budget Manual (10 September 2014) 
<www.treasury.gov.pg>. 
108 The NEC is required by the Constitution to formulate the budget (s 210(1)). Parliament has sole authority 
to approve, but this approval is restricted to either not approving the budget in total or to reduce certain 
items; it cannot change or increase (s 210(2)). 
109 Refer to chapter 7 for an elaboration of this point. 
110 This proposal was made in chapter 7. 
111 Constitution, s 153(2). 
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However, that does not mean the matters it refers to, especially the fulfilment of 
the NGDP and/or BSO are non-justiciable. It will be recalled that a decision of the NEC 
can be reviewed by the courts for not making reasonable attempts to implement the NGDP 
and/or BSO.112 Such judicial scrutiny against the terms of the NGDP and/or BSO should 
not come as a surprise to the NEC. The Manual would set out the extent to which the 
NGDP and BSO are justiciable in the decision-making process. 
What is important, as noted above, is while NEC procedure is non-justiciable, the 
NEC should still demonstrate to the court its attempts to implement the NGDP and/or 
BSO within the dual confines of the particular law on the subject and reasonableness. 
The proposed Manual should be publicly available to ensure transparency in 
government decision-making. For example in 2014, the NEC awarded a K71 million 
contract (about NZ$30m) to a foreign pharmaceutical company to distribute medicines 
throughout the country. Originally, the Tender Board indicated bidding companies had to 
comply with International Standards Organisations (ISO) benchmarks to ensure they were 
qualified and reputable.113 During the tender process, the NEC dropped this requirement. 
The contract was awarded to a company that did not satisfy the ISO standards, leading to 
widespread complaints about the government’s decision. One of the strongest criticisms 
was from the Papua New Guinea National Doctors Association.114 The government 
indicated it would not reverse its decision to award the contract to this company.  
A NEC Manual would require the NEC to deliberate on how this medicine supply 
contract would interact with the NGDP and BSO. National Goal 1 calls for integral human 
development. Under Directive Principle 4 of this Goal, it calls for “… improvement in 
the level of nutrition and the standard of public health to enable our people to attain self-
fulfilment …”. Taking into account this principle would require the NEC to consider the 
purpose of the contract and its beneficiaries, the ordinary people, especially in the rural 
areas. In aid of the position of the NGDP the BSO states: 
                                                     
112 This argument was presented in chapter 6. 
113 Rowan Callick “High-cost bid secures tender for drug distribution in PNG” The Australian (online ed, 
Surry Hills, NSW, 14 March 2014). 
114 Martyn Namarong “The Regime, the Drug Company and the ‘murder’ of #PNG Citizens!” (14 January 
2014) Namarong Blog Spot <http://namorong.blogspot.com.au>. The Papua New Guinea National Doctors 
Association states: 
The Medical Society of PNG appeals to the Prime Minister to reject the recommendation from the CSTB 
(Central Supplies and Tenders Board) in this case, and insist that tenders for the nation’s medicines only be 
accepted from ISO Quality Management System accredited companies who promise to only supply medicines 
from GMP accredited manufacturers.  
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(c) to exercise the rights guaranteed or conferred by this Constitution, and to 
use the opportunities made available to them under it to participate fully in 
the government of the Nation; … 
A person who intends to review such a decision by way of judicial review would 
ask the NEC how it took into account relevant Goals and Obligations. The public would 
be participating in the governance of the country through the ability to scrutinise the 
decision because of a transparent process. Such scrutiny would portray a message to the 
government not to take the views of the public for granted in important decisions.  
It would ensure active participation by the people in the governing process. In the United 
Kingdom it is possible to challenge inconsistent allocation of funds to government policy. 
For example, a civil society organisation has challenged government decisions because 
of apprehension of aid being applied for undesirable purposes.115 In that case, potential 
aid recipients with questionable backgrounds were prevented by civil society organisation 
through successful litigation. Such cases provide useful guidance for Papua New Guinea 
on the extent of judicial review of government policy and resource allocation. 
It may be that over time, a new legal doctrine may emerge together with a 
legitimate expectation that the manual should be complied with.116 This angle is not not 
taken up in this thesis. The thesis accepts for the present the Manual, as in New Zealand 
will be non-justiciable. Te Waka Hi Ika O Te Arawa v Graham provides perhaps the most 
recent view on the New Zealand Cabinet Manual.117 The Cabinet Manual “outlines 
conventions and procedures of Cabinet government but without a statutory basis”.118 
However, it can be used to establish the proper process of government.119 Accepting the 
New Zealand legal position as appropriate for Papua New Guinea, this thesis further 
contends that the Manual, as a constitutional document, helps the NEC coordinate its 
functions amongst the complex government machinery to ensure the NGDP and BSO are 
implemented. Some of these requirements to implement the NGDP and BSO are 
potentially justiciable, and the NEC must be conscious of them in its decision-making 
process.120  
                                                     
115 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement 
Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611. 
116  House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, above n 41, at 12. 
117 Te Waka Hi Ika O Te Arawa v Graham CA556/96, 27 November 1996 [Te Waka]. 
118 Te Waka, per Richardson P, referred to by Grant Duncan “New Zealand’s Cabinet Manual: How Does 
It Shape Constitutional Conventions?” (2014) Parl Aff 1 at 8. 
119 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, above n 41, at 12. 
120 For example, the use of NGDP and BSO in judicial review discussed in chapter 1, and constitutionality 
challenges against the legislature for not making reasonable attempts to implement legislation proposed in 
chapter 7. 
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IV Conclusion 
This chapter recommended the NEC adopts a Cabinet Manual that demonstrates the 
executive’s constitutional understanding and commitment to the NGDP and BSO 
underlying the Constitution as well as the substantive Constitution. A Manual would help 
the NEC link up its functions with that of the other governmental bodies that also have 
the duty to implement the NGDP and BSO.  
There are many reasons that justify the adoption of a Manual for the NEC.  
They include the fact it can enable the effective implementation of the NGDP and BSO 
in a non-justiciable manner, consistent with ss 25(2) and 63(2) of the Constitution.  
A Manual can also help the NEC comply with its constitutional obligations by distilling 
main principles of government as they apply to the NEC. Another reason is the developing 
nature of constitutional law. A Manual may help state in a clear but simple manner the 
current state of the law. 
What is important is the content of the Manual, which brings together the various 
proposals taken up in the thesis. The proposed Manual should be available publicly and 
would have a clear statement expressing the NEC’s commitment to fulfilling the NGDP 
and/or BSO. The public is then made aware of the fact that the NEC has made a serious 
commitment to fulfilling the NGDP and BSO. Other measures which this thesis proposes 
for the legislature, the judiciary and the ombudsman are brought to the attention of the 
NEC in the Manual. 
The Manual itself would be non-justiciable but it would contain a clear statement 
on how the NEC should adopt specific procedures to demonstrate to an aggrieved person 
how it has engaged the NGDP and/or BSO in its decision and for the courts too, if the 
decision is judicially reviewed.     
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Chapter Nine – The Judiciary 
I Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the judiciary and how its functions under the Constitution can 
be used effectively to implement the NGDP and BSO. The judiciary is one of the 
authorities required to implement the NGDP and BSO.1 Under the Constitution, the 
judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, National Court and other statutory courts.2  
The Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal and also hears cases on constitutional 
issues unless the Constitution grants jurisdiction to another court. The National Court is 
the court of first instance in most civil disputes including judicial review of administrative 
matters and underlying law causes of action (which has customary law and common law 
as its source), except where statute confers jurisdiction on another court or tribunal such 
as the District Court. This is not to say other courts like the Village Court and the District 
Court have no role to implement the NGDP and BSO. The Supreme Court and the 
National Court lie at the apex of the court system in Papua New Guinea and their 
decisions have significant legal and political implications for the operation of other 
branches of government.3 
This chapter has seven parts. Part I is the introduction. Part II presents the 
contextual role of preambles as the appropriate rule of statutory interpretation to 
implement the NGDP and BSO. Part III makes a proposal for the development of the 
underlying law by the court in a way consistent with the NGDP and BSO. Part IV makes 
proposals for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO in the judicial review of 
administrative action. Part V will look at weak-form judicial review and how it could 
have been properly grounded in the Constitution to enable the courts to better implement 
the NGDP and BSO. Part VI discusses the protection and enforcement of human rights 
and freedoms and its interaction with the NGDP and BSO. Part VII concludes the chapter. 
                                                     
1 Constitution, ss 25(3) and 63(3) refer to exercising judicial power (amongst legislative, administrative and 
other powers) to give effect to the NGDP and BSO respectively.  
2 Constitution, s 155 (1). 
3 For Village Courts: see Village Court Act 1989; and for District Court: see District Court Act 1963. 
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II Contextual Role of Preambles and Indirect Justiciability  
A Introduction  
Chapter 4 argued the courts have incorrectly limited the NGDP and BSO to an 
interpretation aid and have not ventured into examining the implication of a positive duty 
to implement the NGDP and BSO. Chapter 4 also highlighted the difference between the 
two approaches (interpretive aid versus indirect justiciability). But even if the NGDP and 
BSO are considered as an aid to interpretation, there is scope for the courts to make greater 
use of them in the context of indirect justiciability. 
The NGDP and BSO are situated in the preamble of the Constitution.4 Although 
the Constitution applies the common law case of doubt approach on the use of preambles, 
the NGDP and BSO are distinguished by ss 25 and 63.5 This suggests the NGDP and BSO 
should always be considered in appropriate cases to provide the context of the 
Constitution and legislation in the court’s interpretive function. This is unless the 
Constitution or Parliament’s intention is expressed otherwise. A proper meaning cannot 
be ascribed to words in the Constitution and legislation unless the judicial mind is 
“enlightened” by the NGDP and BSO.6 
B Contextual Role of Statutory Interpretation 
Chapter 5 highlighted the two competing views courts take of preambles and the difficulty 
this may cause for implementing the NGDP and BSO. The views were constructive and 
contextual. The latter was found to be more compatible with implementation. The 
contextual role of preambles in statutory interpretation also works well with active 
reference to the NGDP and BSO in the preamble and/or objectives section of the 
legislation, recommended in chapter 7. Interpreting legislation will require automatic 
reference to the NGDP and BSO as part of the process of having recourse to its context. 
In the English case of Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of New Hanover 
(Prince Ernest of Hanover) the Court stated preambles are an integral part of the Act:7 
For words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation: their 
colour and content are derived from their context. So it is that I conceive it to be 
                                                     
4 Constitution, sch 1.2.3 “Form of the Constitutional Laws”. 
5 Schedule 1.2.3. 
6 SCR No 3 of 1986; Ref by Simbu Provincial Executive [1987] PGSC 17, [1987] PNGLR 151, 10 April 
1987 at 174 per Barnett J [Simbu]. 
7 Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436 (HL) [Prince Ernest Augustus]. 
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my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use 
‘context’ in its widest sense, which I have already indicated as including not only 
other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state 
of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those 
and other legitimate means, discern the statute was intended to remedy. 
The meaning of words and phrases in legislation are derived from a context of 
which the preamble is an important element. Use of the preamble in statutory 
interpretation should therefore not be restricted to instances of ambiguity only.8 
Legislation having a particular NGDP and BSO will have its provisions interpreted to 
promote them.  
This statement from SCR No 3 of 1986; Ref by Simbu Provincial Executive 
(Simbu) best expresses the contextual approach in Papua New Guinea:9 
When interpreting the details of a provision in a constitutional law … an essential 
pre-requisite [is] for the judicial mind to be enlightened by the spirit of the 
Constitution itself. This enlightenment comes from developing a thorough 
understanding of the National Goals and Directive Principles, by taking an 
overview which will place the particular provision in the context of the total 
legislative scheme of which it forms a part and by seeking to understand the 
intention of the founding fathers as they expressed it on behalf of the people, 
when enacting the Constitution and subsequent amendments. 
The reason why the preamble should be referred to in statutory interpretation to 
either confirm the meaning of legislation or resolve an ambiguity is because it provides a 
good indication of the intention of the legislation, its scope or purpose, and the values it 
seeks to promote.10 This view of the preamble follows a line of common law authority 
such as Prince Ernest of Hanover, which have held a preamble is part of the Act.11  
C Indirect Justiciability and the Contextual Approach 
1 Introduction  
The chapter proposes an area in which the courts can use the contextual approach to 
implement the NGDP and BSO. This approach places the onus on the parties to the case, 
and the manner in which they frame constitutional issue(s), to point the court to using a 
                                                     
8 Prince Ernest Augustus, at 174. 
9 Simbu, above n 6, at 174 per Barnett J. 
10 Anne Winckel “The Contextual Role of a Preamble in Statutory Interpretation” (1999) 23 MULR 184 at 
185. 
11 Prince Ernest Augustus, above n 7, at 467. 
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contextual approach to interpret the law and determine the issue based on the cause of 
action pleaded before the court.  
2 Framing constitutional issues for the courts using NGDP and/or BSO – Indirect 
justiciability 
A survey of the Supreme Court cases dealing with constitutional interpretation under s 19 
of the Constitution revealed framing constitutional questions to couch the NGDP and 
BSO is not common. Ordinarily, the cases that have had made reference to the NGDP 
and/or BSO in the decision do so on the Court’s initiative. But a pro-active use of the 
NGDP and BSO in framing questions is a permissible exercise of indirect justiciability. 
It can draw the Court’s attention to using the contextual method of statutory  
(or constitutional) interpretation. 
An example of actively framing constitutional issues to engage the NGDP and 
BSO was the case of Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea 
(Ref by OCPNG).12 A short background to this case is necessary to understand the nature 
of the constitutional issues determined by the court. Papua New Guinea has three levels 
of government: local, provincial and national. The Constitution (under Part VIA) provides 
for an Organic Law to establish a provincial government system. This is the Organic Law 
on Provincial Government and Local Level Government 1995 (OLPGLLG). A provincial 
government is made up of the Provincial Assembly, the Provincial Executive and the 
Head of the Provincial Executive. Section 187C(2)(a) of the Constitution states a 
Provincial Assembly must be constituted by a mainly elective body.  
In reality, the Provincial Assembly representation is nominal. There are no 
directly elected members of the Provincial Assembly being composed of elected local 
government level Presidents and national Members of Parliament. The provincial 
executive is selected from the Provincial Assembly (except for the head of the province, 
the Governor, who is directly elected by the province). In 2000, Parliament made 
amendments to the OLPGLLG. These amendments (s 18) removed members of the local 
level government (Presidents) from the Provincial Assembly and, as a result, of the 
executive too (because one had to be a Member of the Provincial Assembly before 
appointment to the executive arm of the Assembly). This amendment became the subject 
                                                     
12 Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 10, SC1058, 4 June 2010 
[Ref by OCPNG]. 
 159 
of court proceedings initiated by the Ombudsman Commission which has power under 
the Constitution to challenge laws or proposed laws in the Supreme Court.13 
The OLPGLLG, the subject of the constitutional litigation, had in its preamble the 
purpose of fulfilling Goal 2 on equality and participation. The Referrer (Ombudsman 
Commission) framed the question for the Supreme Court, thus: 
Whether Sections 1 and 2 of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and 
Local-Level Governments (Amendment No 10) Laws 2006, in removing: 
(1) Heads of the rural Local-Level Government as Members of the Provincial 
Assembly; and 
(2) One representative to represent the heads of both urban authorities and 
urban councils as member of the Provincial Assembly; and 
(3) Either the heads of the rural Local-level Government or the representative 
of the heads of both urban authorities and urban councils from contesting 
the post of Deputy Governor 
is contrary to the requirements of Section 187C(2)(a) of the Constitution to have 
"an elective or mainly elective legislature", as understood, applied and enforced 
within the meaning of the Second National Goal (Equality and Participation) of 
the National Goals and Directive Principles and therefore unconstitutional? 
Two observations can be made about this question. The first is the Ombudsman 
Commission correctly identified the second National Goal on equality and participation 
in the way it raised the question for the court, because this goal is in the preamble of the 
OLPLLG. The question also brings attention to the purpose (or context) of the OLPLLG, 
which is to fulfil the NGDP. The second observation is in order for the court to determine 
the constitutionality of the amendments to the OLPLLG if it had to choose an 
interpretation of s 187C(2)(a) that is consistent with the NGDP. Such an approach is 
supported by a contextual approach to interpretation. The Court decided in Ref by 
OCPNG the amendments were contrary to the Constitution and declared them invalid. 
No doubt the NGDP played an important role in reaching this outcome:14 
The Amendment Law is inconsistent with the meaning, purpose and spirit 
of Constitution, s 187C 2) (a) and the whole purpose of provincial government 
system in the Constitution. The Amendment Law effectively removes people at 
the provincial, district and community level from participation in the legislative 
process and important policy decisions through the provincial legislature … .  
It is contrary to the intentions and aspirations of the people, expressed through 
the Constitution, of a participatory democracy where the people at all levels of 
the community; in their own diverse way; in all matters that concern them at their 
                                                     
13 Constitution, s 19. 
14 Ref by OCPNG, above n 12, at [68] per Injia CJ. 
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own level; are active participants in decision-making at all levels of government; 
and not mere spectators and recipients of goods and services delivered by the 
national government. 
This approach of highlighting the NGDP and BSO in framing questions has two 
consequences. First, courts are compelled to refer to the NGDP and BSO in the course of 
their decision, because they are raised directly in the issue(s) for determination; and 
second, and importantly for this thesis, it demonstrates the indirect justiciability of the 
NGDP and BSO. 
3 Conclusion  
The use of the contextual approach to statutory interpretation enables the court to engage 
with the context of the legislation, by considering its preamble. Since the NGDP and BSO 
are part of the preamble of the Constitution, using the contextual rule of interpretation 
provides an opportunity to implement the NGDP and BSO meaningfully.  
III Developing the Underlying Law 
A Introduction 
The sources of the underlying law of Papua New Guinea consists of customary law, 
common law and equity of England prior to 1975, and court made law.15 In 2000 
Parliament passed the Underlying Law Act 2000 to fulfil the constitutional dictate to enact 
such a law. This legislation was based on the recommendations of the Law Reform 
Commission in 1977, but did not get much attention from the Parliament until 2000.16 
The Law Reform Commission’s recommendation had an extensive preamble that referred 
strongly to the NGDP.17 This section looks at the role of the NGDP and BSO in the 
development of the underlying law in the Act passed in 2000.  
There have not been many cases on the Underlying Law Act. The case of New 
Britain Oil Palm Ltd v Sukuramu exposed the practical limitations of the Act and 
prompted the courts to rectify the situation.18 In the view of the Supreme Court, a court 
                                                     
15 Underlying Law Act 2000, ss 3 and 7. The underlying law has new case law, developed using either 
custom or the common law as a source (Underlying Law Act 2000, s 3). It also relates to new law developed 
by the courts, where no existing law applies to the particular facts (Underlying Law Act, s 7). 
16 Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea Role of Customary Law in the Legal System (Law 
Reform Commission, Waigani, 1977) vol 7. 
17 At 15. 
18 New Britain Oil Palm Ltd v Sukuramu [2008] PGSC 29, SC946, 30 October 2008. 
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could not develop new principles of the underlying law without the parties expressly 
pleading this claim in the originating process. Soon after this decision, the Court (under 
its delegated authority), enacted the Rules of the National Court of Justice (Underlying 
Law Amendment) 2011 (Underlying Law Rules). Persons going to court now have more 
certainty in pleading their claim under specific court rules. 
B Proposals for Implementing the NGDP and BSO in the Development of the 
Underlying Law 
1 NGDP and BSO as a shield  
(a) Introduction 
There are two proposals to enable implementation of the NGDP and BSO in the 
development of the underlying law. The first proposal concerns the utilisation of the 
NGDP and BSO in the application of custom and the common law. The second proposal 
is to develop new case law (also defined as part of the underlying law under the Act) 
where no law applies to an issue, relying on a number of factors, including the NGDP and 
BSO. One could explain the situation using the analogy of “shield” and “sword” as used 
in equitable estoppel.19 In the first proposal the NGDP and BSO are used as a “shield” 
and in the second as a “sword”. 
(b) NGDP and BSO as a shield 
The Underlying Law Act recognises customary law and the common law as sources of 
the underlying law of Papua New Guinea. But their recognition is not automatic, 
depending on a number of criteria.20 The criteria for recognition of custom as underlying 
law are a little less rigorous than for the common law. But they both include the necessity 
to be consistent with written law, human rights and freedoms and the NGDP and BSO. 
This places the NGDP and BSO on equal footing with other directly justiciable provisions 
in the legal system. Issues of justiciability arise as a result of this, but as it is a specific 
                                                     
19 Prior to the case of Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, equitable estoppel was 
used as a “shield” and not as a “sword.” That is to say that it could not be used to assert justiciable rights, 
but could be used to prevent the strict enforcement of existing contractual rights to prevent injustice: see 
John Philips and Louis Proksch “Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher: Implications for the Law of 
Contract” (1989) 19(1) UWA L Rev 171 at 175. 
20 Underlying Law Act 2000, s 4. 
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intention of Parliament to treat the NGDP and BSO in this manner, ss 25(3) and 63(3) 
would permit this interaction.21 
In a review of cases on the underlying law, Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea, 
Sir Salamo Injia, observed that courts routinely apply the common law without 
specifically measuring its relevance against the standards of the Underlying Law Act.22 
It is therefore important to consider carefully the requirements of the Underlying Law Act 
before applying custom or the common law. 
The NGDP and BSO are used as a “shield” in the general sense of societal 
protection from either inappropriate foreign values or customs repugnant to present day 
values. A certain vision of the country is promoted in the Constitution. The NGDP and 
BSO would ensure the progressive realisation of this vision. The concept of a shield is 
not used directly in the sense of protecting a person from strict application of another 
person’s legal rights as was observed in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees 
House Ltd by Lord Denning.23 In Central London Property Trust Ltd there was an existing 
lease agreement between the tenant and the landlord, but the acquiescence by the landlord 
not to insist on the full original rental amount created an estoppel in favour of the tenant 
against the landlord. The idea was that it acted as a “shield” against an otherwise 
legitimate claim under contract law. The application of the term “shield” in the 
development of the underlying law is to rely on the NGDP and BSO to prevent application 
of common law or new case law that is inconsistent with the NGDP and BSO.  
One of the earliest cases to consider the Underlying Law Act was Magiten v 
Beggie.24 The plaintiff commenced proceedings by originating summons, alleging his 
wife, the first defendant, had illegally married his brother, the second defendant.  
The plaintiff claimed the defendants’ marriage was in breach of the East Sepik  
(a province of Papua New Guinea) customary law, to which all parties were subject. The 
plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendants’ marriage was prohibited by custom and 
void, and also requested consequential orders for damages. After considering the 
provisions of the Act, the Court decided against the plaintiff because he did not state 
                                                     
21 Vergil Narokobi “The Justiciability of the National Goals and Directive Principles and Basic Social 
Obligations in the Context of the Underlying Law Act 2000” (2015) The Underlying Law Journal 
Developments in the Underlying Law of Papua New Guinea (forthcoming). 
22 Salamo Injia “Presentation by the Chief Justice to the Underlying Law Conference, Alotau, December 
2010 (2012) 8 The Underlying Law Journal Developments in the Underlying Law of Papua New Guinea 
3. 
23 Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 (HC). 
24 Magiten v Beggie [2005] PGNC 75 N2880, 21 April 2005 [Magiten]. 
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clearly the custom being relied on, who it applied to, and did not provide details of its 
requirements in clear, precise and adequate terms. If the case had proceeded, the Court 
would have had to assess the applicability of the custom at issue against the provisions of 
the Act. 
If the plaintiff in Magiten v Beggie had satisfied the procedural requirements the 
Court would have had to apply the custom of the parties that prohibited a woman marrying 
her husband’s brother.25 But the custom would not have applied if:26 
(a) it is inconsistent with a written law; or 
(b) its application and enforcement would be contrary to the National Goals 
and Directive Principles and the Basic Social Obligations established by 
the Constitution; or 
(c) its application and enforcement would be contrary to the basic rights 
guaranteed by Division III.3 (Basic Rights) of the Constitution. 
The Court would have had to examine the custom preventing a woman from 
marrying her husband’s brother against the factors stated above including the NGDP and 
BSO. Would such a custom be sanctioned by the NGDP and BSO, for example with 
Directive Principle five of Goal 1?:  
(5) the family unit to be recognized as the fundamental basis of our society, 
and for every step to be taken to promote the moral, cultural, economic 
and social standing of the Melanesian family;  
Or would such a custom run contrary to Directive Principle 12 of Goal 2?: 
(12) recognition of the principles that a complete relationship in marriage rests 
on equality of rights and duties of the partners, and that responsible 
parenthood is based on that equality.  
The court would be required to perform a delicate balancing process. If the Court took 
the view the particular custom was applicable, it would have proceeded to declare the 
marriage of the two defendants was illegal by virtue of underlying law (customary law 
transforms into underlying law, once it satisfies the requirements of the Underlying Law 
Act).  
                                                     
25 At the time of Magiten, the Rules of the National Court of Justice (Underlying Law Amendment) were 
not adopted yet. The Underlying Law Act 2000 alone determined the application of customary law.  
26 Underlying Law Act, s 4(2). 
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If the Magiten v Baggie case was decided after 2011, the Underlying Law Rules 
would have regulated how the case would have been pleaded. An interesting feature of 
the Underlying Law Rules is the way it describes the NGDP and BSO as “constitutional 
rights”.27  Equally interesting is the fact the Rules deem the custom, common law or 
equity being pleaded is consistent with the NGDO and BSO (and the written law and 
human rights) unless the contrary is shown. A plaintiff would automatically plead the 
underlying law sought to be relied on; and the burden shifts to the defendant to argue that 
the particular custom or common law should not be recognised as part of the underlying 
law for inconsistency with the NGDP and/or BSO.28 So in Magiten v Baggie, the custom 
preventing a woman from marrying her husband’s brother would have been deemed to be 
applicable, unless the defendants could demonstrate its application would be contrary to 
the NGDP and BSO. 
(c) Remedy for NGDP and BSO as a Shield 
The remedy an aggrieved person would seek when arguing a particular custom or 
common law is not applicable based on the NGDP and BSO would be straightforward. 
The court would consider the NGDP and BSO (amongst other factors) and make a ruling 
that the custom or common law is inapplicable to the circumstances of Papua New 
Guinea. A new rule would as a result emerge where such customs and common law is no 
longer applicable in Papua New Guinea. 
In a scenario such as this, the court would be making a declaration. Before making 
the declaration, the court will consider a host of factors, which, as noted above, are found 
in the Underlying Law Act. One of the criteria is whether the common law is consistent 
with the NGDP and/or BSO. 
(d) Conclusion 
The NGDP and BSO are used as a shield when they do not create legal rights, but shape 
how rights emanating from custom and the common law are used. It is a balancing 
exercise, and the court would be using its discretion to determine which principles should 
                                                     
27 Rules of the National Court of Justice (Underlying Law Amendment) 2011 [Underlying Law Rules], 
Order 8, rule 20A(1)(c): 
In this rule the term “Constitutional rights” means the National Goals and Directive Principles and Basic 
Social Obligations established in the Constitution and the basic rights guaranteed by Division III.3 (Basic 
Rights) of the Constitution. 
28 As seen in s 4(2) of the Underlying Law Act above, other reasons to refute the application of custom in 
addition to the NGDP and/or BSO are inconsistent with the written law and human rights and freedoms. 
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prevail in this process. This feeds into the idea of indirect justiciability discussed in 
chapter 4.   
2 NGDP and BSO as a sword  
(a) Introduction  
On the reverse side is the question of the extent to which the NGDP and BSO can be used 
as a cause of action in the underlying law, hence the sword analogy. The NGDP and BSO 
are used to create legally enforceable rights. 
(b) NGDP and BSO as a sword 
A factual scenario may help bring the issue into perspective. Imagine a village that has 
had its only road destroyed by earthquake. It is a village of about 1,000 people. The village 
is some 500 metres above sea level. The only access to schools, hospitals and the market 
is by road. The distance is not far compared to other more remote places, but the slope is 
steep and makes transport of heavy store goods and housing materials almost impossible. 
Sick and deceased persons rely on human carriers for transportation to and from the 
village. It is almost 20 years since there was a road. Despite numerous promises from 
elected representatives, there has been no assistance. So the people decide that they will 
institute a class action against the state compelling it to provide budgetary allocation to 
build their roads. They argue they have a right to development and that this is provided 
for under National Goal 1 (Integral Human Development). 
Under s 7 of the Underlying Law Act, the court would have to consider whether 
there is a written law that applies to the facts the plaintiffs say gave rise to a cause of 
action. In this case the plaintiffs claim a right to development. If there is no written law, 
the next question is to consider custom and the common law. Assuming there is neither, 
it would be an appropriate case for the development of the underlying law. The court 
could start by looking at Goal 1 on integral human development – for every person to 
have the opportunity to develop as a whole person in relationship with others. A road 
would enable better access to education, good health services and stimulate economic 
activities. Following Goal 1, Goal 2 requires the state to provide equal opportunity for the 
people to participate in the development of the country. A road would meet the 
expectation of Goal 2 for equal opportunity.  
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Further, a road would also ensure greater prospects of self-reliance (third National 
Goal). This could happen by enabling efficient means for the people to bring their 
proceeds to the market through vehicles, resulting in increased production levels. 
Additionally, the BSO places an obligation on the people to contribute to the revenue of 
Papua New Guinea. A road is a means to help them fulfil this obligation to the country. 
All in all, by taking into account the NGDP and BSO as discussed here, the court would 
be required to develop a new underlying law requiring the government to take all 
reasonable measures to provide the people appropriate development. To decide whether 
the government was reasonable in its efforts, the court would consider whether the 
circumstances of these people were dire and furthermore, determine if the state had 
overlooked them in the previous annual budgetary allocations. 
While the factual and legal scenario may appear fanciful or novel, the heritage of 
the NGDP and BSO suggest otherwise. The idea of having Directive Principles in a 
Constitution has travelled to Papua New Guinea via India and Ireland. In India, the legal 
status of the Directive Principles of State Policy is defined as “not enforceable by the 
court”.29 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, the petitioner approached the court 
on behalf of a group of children under the age of 14, arguing that the children’s 
employment violated their rights under the Constitution.30 What is interesting about this 
case, is firstly, the petitioner took the case on behalf of the children; and secondly, the 
defendant was the state, not the alleged offender. The petitioner sought a mandamus to 
compel the state to put in place programmes to protect the children from child labour.  
The Court in granting the petition, interpreted the right to life in a way consistent with the 
Indian Constitution’s Directive Principles. The Court held the right to life:31  
[was the] most precious human right … [and] …must therefore be interpreted in 
a broad and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which 
may … enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. 
The state was therefore required to investigate the abuse of children and implement 
programmes to prevent child labour. This demonstrates the potential of Directive 
Principles to enable an innovative use of the law.   
The NGDP and BSO have been identified by constitutional commentators such as 
Kwa as providing economic, social and cultural rights similar to the International 
                                                     
29 Constitution of India, art 7. 
30 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161, [1984] AIR 802 [Bandhua]. 
31 Bandhua, cited in Malcolm Langford “The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory” in 
Malcolm Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) at 6.   
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.32 As noted previously, the recent 
amendments to the National Court Rules recognise the NGDP and BSO as “constitutional 
rights”.33 In South Africa, cases such as Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v Grootboom and Others have attempted to directly enforce social rights like the 
right to housing.34 The main question the court examined was whether the government 
housing programme had been reasonable in the circumstances. The necessity to ascertain 
rights compliance on the test of reasonableness is by virtue of the requirement of the 
South African Constitution.35 Such an approach does not directly compel the government 
to act, but examines whether it has discharged its mandated role properly. The advantage 
is that the court does not interfere with government functions but reviews the latter’s 
actions as an independent but interested observer. 
The NGDP and BSO must also be taken into account where the court finds that a 
particular underlying law (for example, common law) is no longer relevant.36  
There have not been many cases on this aspect of the Act. Sukuramu v New Britain Palm 
Oil Ltd, which was overruled in the Supreme Court is one example of the court attempting 
to use its jurisdiction under s 9.37 The National Court had held the common law right to 
hire and fire was no longer appropriate to the circumstances of Papua New Guinea, and 
proceeded to develop a new principle of the underlying law that took into account natural 
justice principles, the constitutional right to protection against harsh and oppressive 
actions (Constitution, s 41), and the NGDP and BSO.38 The case went on appeal to the 
Supreme Court and the decision of the National Court was overturned. In the Supreme 
Court’s view, a court could not develop new principles of the underlying law without the 
parties expressly pleading this claim in the originating process. The rationale was to 
provide an opportunity to opposing parties to respond to the new underlying law in their 
defence. It appears this decision prompted the court under its delegated authority to enact 
                                                     
32 Eric Kwa Constitutional Law of Papua New Guinea (Law Book Co, Sydney, 2001) at 169. There is 
nothing directly on point in the CPC Report to suggest the analogy to social, economic and cultural rights, 
but there is a strong suggestion of comparison to these types of rights because ss 38 and 39 of the 
Constitution require consideration to be had to the NGDP and BSO when qualifying rights and freedoms 
in the Constitution. 
33 Underlying Law Rules, ord 20A, r (1)(c). 
34 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19, [2001] 1 SA 46 
(CC), [2000] 11 BCLR 1169, 4 October 2000. 
35 Constitution of South Africa, art 26, which after recognising the right to housing (art 26(1)) requires the 
state to put in place reasonable means to progressively realise the right (art 26(2)). 
36 Underlying Law Act, s 9.  
37 Sukuramu v New Britain Palm Oil Ltd [2007] PGNC 21, N3124, 16 February 2007. 
38 At [96]–[106] per Cannings J. 
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the Underlying Law Rules. Persons going to court now have more certainty in pleading 
their claim under specific court rules. 
(c) Remedy for NGDP and BSO as a sword  
Where the NGDP and BSO are used as a sword it will determine the parties’ rights and 
interests. In a sense this is a more direct application of the NGDP and BSO. This is 
allowed for by Parliament’s specific intention in the Underlying Law Act. In the example 
above, the right to development would be considered as a new underlying law, and 
aggrieved parties can rely on that new law in future cases. 
In this type of situation, where the court will be proactive, it should be wary of its 
limitations as a judicial body. The court would look firstly at how the relevant government 
body took into account the NGDP and/or BSO in the decision-making process. 
Appropriate deference should be given to the decision-making body. The court would be 
limited to determining whether decision was reasonable in the circumstances. In that 
regard, a procedural lens best allows the court to mediate between the aggrieved and the 
decision-maker. A more substantive approach, for example, by specifically ordering 
allocation of resources to fulfil the NGDP and/or BSO, could result in the court assuming 
the role of another arm of government. 
The types of remedies applicable would be firstly a declaration of a new 
underlying law (as opposed to common law). Depending on the nature of the new 
underlying law, consequential remedies would be applied to alleviate its breach.  
For example, if the court declared there was a new right to development, that in and of 
itself would not mean the court would order the government, by way of a mandatory 
injunction, to provide this right. The court would have to bear in mind the governmental 
body’s available resources, its institutional capacity, and the process it used to determine 
priority. The court could probably ask the government body to provide information on 
the criteria it used to determine which village or group of people deserved a road over 
another. From such information the court may decide whether government efforts were 
reasonable or not in the circumstances of each case.39 
                                                     
39 See Grootboom, above n 34, also discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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(d) Conclusion 
Under the framework of the Act, and supported by a liberal reading of s 25 and s 63, it is 
quite possible that the present view of the NGDP and BSO as being entirely non-
justiciable may be reviewed to allow for greater interaction in directing the way society 
develops consistent with the vision of the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC).  
This change would see the incorporation of the NGDP and BSO in the development of 
the underlying law. 
IV Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
A Constitutional Basis for Using Existing Judicial Review Procedures to Implement 
NGDP and BSO 
1 Introduction 
The phrase “judicial review” is not understood in the same way as one moves from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the American tradition, it refers to the Supreme Court’s 
power to review the constitutionality of legislation. Judicial review in the United 
Kingdom, where the Parliament is purportedly supreme, refers to the process where the 
exercise of statutory powers by a public body can be reviewed by the court, being initiated 
by person(s) adversely affected. The scope of judicial review in Papua New Guinea is 
determined by whether a decision-maker’s power is established by statute and the 
relationship sought to be reviewed is governed by legislation and not under contract or 
tort.40 As most, if not all powers exercised by the executive are prescribed by statute, its 
decisions would as a matter of course be subject to judicial review. Papua New Guinea 
has adopted the English version of judicial review, and it is in this tradition the term 
judicial review is used here.41 
Many of the decisions that concern the NGDP and BSO are made by the 
government. After Parliament enacts law, it is subsequently removed from the picture, 
                                                     
40 Michael A Ntumy Administrative Law of Papua New Guinea, Cases Texts and Materials (2nd ed, CBS 
Publishers, New Delhi, 2003) at 221. See also Bari v Governing Council, St Paul's Teachers College, 
Vunakanau; Chairman, National Education Board Appeal Committee; Minister for Education; Ministry 
for Education and The State [1994] PGNC 158, [1995] PNGLR 364, 6 April 1994; and Ragi and State 
Services & Statutory Authorities Superannuation Fund Board v Maingu [1994] PGSC 3, SC459, 29 June 
1994. 
41 The National Court Rules which regulates the judicial review process is adopted from the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court Practice 1967 (The White Book). 
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leaving the executive (and the administration) to implement the law. As a result, 
consideration should be given to the administration of the law too for implementation of 
the NGDP and BSO. For example, in New Zealand, placing too much attention on the 
actions of Parliament on human rights issues can be misleading, since much of the 
infringement of human rights occurs within the administration of law:42  
… this vision of rights does not seem to address the needs of those living under 
regimes most likely to perpetrate the worst rights abuses, it is also an incomplete 
description of the modern western democratic legal order. More than ever, public 
power is exercised through the use of discretion and delegated legal instruments, 
organisations at arms-length from the state, and even contracts, rather than 
directly through legislation. 
Judicial review of administrative action is an opportunity for the courts to ensure 
the effective implementation of the NGDP and BSO through adequate judicial scrutiny 
of the exercise of public power. 
2 Constitutional basis for engaging the NGDP and BSO in judicial review  
The court’s jurisdiction to review the exercise of executive power against the 
requirements of the NGDP and BSO is guided by an integrated reading of a combination 
of constitutional provisions – ss 22, 25(3), 63(3) and 60.43 What these provisions provide 
is that where the Constitution confers a duty, the duty should be implemented 
notwithstanding the fact that there is a lack of implementing legal procedural mechanisms 
(s 22). The court should have regard to legal developments in other jurisdictions to help 
it formulate appropriate procedures to respond to the constitutional duty.  
In answer to this stipulation, the courts have stated that judicial review is the most 
appropriate legal avenue to enforce constitutional duties.44 Section 60 connects the NGDP 
and BSO to the executive and the judicial review process. In developing the rules of 
natural justice, the court should have regard to the NGDP and BSO. This Part asserts 
judicial review can ensure the executive is held accountable for non-implementation of 
the NGDP and BSO.  
                                                     
42 Janet Mclean “Legislative Invalidation, Human Rights Protection and s 4 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act” (2001) 4 NZ L Rev 421 at 424. 
43 These provisions were covered under chapter 7, except for s 60 of the Constitution. 
44 SC Reference No 3 of 1999; Re Calling of the Parliament [1999] PGSC 55, [1999] PNGLR 285, 25 June 
1999 [Calling of Parliament]. 
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Section 22 has been used to provide a jurisdictional basis for the court to protect 
existing rights. In State v Alan Woita (No 2), the accused (Alan Woita) was allowed to sit 
next to his counsel during trial. The court was said to have a duty, stemming from ss 22 
and 57, to see the court process does not render inoperable the exercise an accused’s 
constitutional right to effective legal representation.45 In SCR No 2 of 1978; Re Corrective 
Institutions Act 1957, the Court ruled provisions of legislation which prevented an inmate 
from appealing an offence committed in prison were invalid for offending a person’s right 
to appeal. On the basis of s 22 of the Constitution, the Court then proceeded to establish 
procedures to enable Woita to exercise his right of appeal.46 The strongest view for the 
use of judicial review procedures to enforce constitutional duties comes from SC 
Reference No 3 of 1999; Re Calling of the Parliament.47  
The Court held the remedy of mandamus can be obtained against Parliament to ensure it 
performs a particular function conferred on it. 
3 Grounds for judicial review of administrative action  
The procedures and grounds to review decisions of public bodies are primarily regulated 
by Order 16 of the National Court Rules 1983 and the National Court Judicial Review 
(Amendment) Rules 2005.48 At present, the grounds for review include decisions where 
the authority:49 
 Exceeds its power; 
 Commits an error of law; 
 Commits a breach of natural justice; 
 Reaches a decision which no reasonable tribunal could have reached; or 
 Abuses its power. 
These are based on common law principles.  Sections 25(3) and 63(3) state where 
public power can be exercised in a manner to implement the NGDP and BSO,  
it should be exercised accordingly. Four different types of public powers (legislative, 
                                                     
45 The State v Alan Woita (No 2) [1978] PNGLR 113, at 117 per Kearney J, cited in Brian Brunton and 
Duncan Colquhoun-Kerr The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea (University of Papua New 
Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1984) at 61. 
46 SCR No 2 of 1978; Re Corrective Institutions Act 1957 [1978] PGSC 9, [1978] PNGLR 404, 25 October 
1978. 
47 Calling of Parliament, above n 44. 
48 Kekedo v Burns Philip (PNG) Ltd [1988-89] PNGLR 122, 13 April 1989. 
49 National Court Judicial Review (Amendment) Rules 2005, ord 16, r 13, “Purpose.” The grounds for 
judicial review are not limited to what are stated in ord 16, r 13.  
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executive, judicial and administrative) are referred to. Executive and/or administrative 
powers are considered here. Section 60 of the Constitution lends additional weight to the 
case for the inclusion of NGDP and BSO in judicial review: 
60. Development of Principles. 
In the development of the rules of the underlying law in accordance with 
Schedule 2 (adoption, etc., of certain laws) particular attention shall be 
given to the development of a system of principles of natural justice and 
of administrative law specifically designed for Papua New Guinea, taking 
special account of the National Goals and Directive Principles and of the 
Basic Social Obligations, and also of typically Papua New Guinean 
procedures and forms of organization. 
Courts will not make the decision, but ensure the process was fair. The position 
follows closely the principles enunciated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corporation.50 Wednesbury recognises the courts’ jurisdiction to review 
decisions of public bodies on the grounds of reasonableness, but only within the ambit of 
the decision-making process or the four corners of the power. Separation of powers is 
implicit in this process; courts do not make the decision but review the process.  
Another English case which applied Wednesbury may be apposite for Papua New 
Guinea when it comes to implementing the NGDP and BSO, especially where legislation 
make direct reference  to the NGDP and BSO. This is R v Minister of Agriculture ex parte 
Padfield.51 A decision by a Minister was overturned, because the reasons for his decision 
did not promote the underlying policy of the legislation. This was considered by the court 
to be unreasonable. Ntumy discusses Padfield generally in his comprehensive text on 
Papua New Guinea’s administrative law, but did not explore the opportunity it presented 
for using s 60 of the Constitution to implement the NGDP and BSO.52  
Going by the interconnectedness approach, if an NGDP and BSO is stated to be 
the objective of the legislation, the court can determine whether a decision-maker has 
fulfilled the objective of the law in their decision. On a liberal interpretation of the 
Constitution, public bodies should explicitly take into account the NGDP and BSO in the 
exercise of their public functions anyway, even if the NGDP and BSO are not stated in 
the law.53 The question of what is reasonable is a balancing exercise and should depend 
                                                     
50 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) cited with 
approval in Dusava v Justice Doherty [1999] PGSC 43, [1999] PNGLR 419, 1 October 1999. 
51 R v Minister of Agriculture ex parte Padfield [1968] AC 997 (HL). 
52 Ntumy, above n 40, at 802–803. 
53 Constitution, ss 25(3) and 63(3), sch 1.5. 
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heavily on which outcome favours the NGDP and BSO. Following Padfield would oblige 
the courts to decide whether the public authority has promoted the NGDP and/or BSO. 
4 Remedy for Administrative Judicial Review 
The traditional types of remedy available when a claim is made to court through 
administrative judicial review include certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and declaration. 
There would be no new remedies proposed for indirect justiciability in administrative 
judicial review. However, it may mean the court orders a governmental body’s decision 
is quashed, and it should go back and make a decision that demonstrates compliance with, 
and/or implementation of the NGDP and BSO. In that sense the court would be taking a 
procedure based approach to implementing the NGDP and BSO. 
In a case such as that discussed below (Medaing), where a governmental body is 
required to consider the NGDP and/or BSO, the court can order it to take them into 
account. Then by using the remedy of mandamus, the court could order the governmental 
body take such a course of action. But as discussed in the section on the Development of 
the Underlying Law, the court would take great care, and show appropriate deference to 
the authority before taking such an approach. 
5 Case study on incorporating the NGDP and BSO in the judicial review process – 
Medaing v Ramu Nico  
(a) Introduction  
It is appropriate to consider how instantiating the NGDP and BSO in the context of 
judicial review would operate in practice. This thesis reviews Medaing v Ramu Nico 
(Medaing) and comments on how the NGDP and BSP may have been given prominence 
through judicial review instead of the civil process initiated by the parties.54  
(b) The facts of Medaing and the subsequent appeal 
The plaintiffs in Medaing were persons who had customary interests in the Astrolabe Bay 
of Madang Province. The plaintiffs, numbering 1,083 individuals were led by Louis 
Medaing. They were concerned about the potential environmental damage to the marine 
life by the planned waste disposal system from Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd, a 
mining company. Ramu Nico’s mining operations were being constructed further inland. 
                                                     
54 Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGNC 95 N4340, 26 July 2011 [Medaing].  
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In Ramu Nico’s view, the commercially viable option to dispose of the mining waste 
would be to discharge it into the coastal waters rather than to retain it in a tailings dam. 
Medaing instituted a claim seeking a permanent injunction against direct discharge into 
Astrolabe Bay. The defendants were Ramu Nico, the Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea, and Dr Wari Iamo in his capacity as the Director of the Environment. The basis 
of the plaintiffs’ case was threefold: (a) the common law tort of nuisance, (b) breach of 
the Environment Act 2000, and (c) breach of National Goal 4 of the Constitution. Based 
on scientific evidence the court was able to find the common law tort of nuisance was 
made out and there was a breach of National Goal four of the Constitution. But there was 
no breach of the Environment Act. While the court found that the defendants were 
tortfeasors, it did not grant the remedy the plaintiffs sought. 
The plaintiffs appealed the National Court decision refusing the injunction and 
the defendants also cross-appealed in Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd 
(Medaing on appeal).55 The Supreme Court, on a two-to-one majority, held public and 
private nuisance could only be made out if there was actual damage suffered by the 
plaintiffs. In this case the project had not commenced and as a result there could not be 
nuisance. The Court may have been correct on this point following English authorities, 
according to which, the damage has to be substantial and not trivial.56 As to the Court of 
first instance finding the discharge was contrary to Goal 4 on natural resources, the 
appellate Court said the court below lacked jurisdiction to make declarations on the 
NGDP and BSO as they were non-justiciable. It would seem the best means of ensuring 
compliance with the NGDP and BSO would have been the administrative law judicial 
review process. 
(c) Judicial review: a better option  
Under the Environment Act 2000, a development project that would have significant 
impact on the environment is required to obtain an environmental permit from the 
Director of Environment. Before the Director of Environment is satisfied that a permit 
should be granted, the project proposal is advertised and the public is called to make 
submissions on the likely impact of the project on the environment.57 This was an 
opportunity the plaintiffs should have availed themselves of to make known their views 
                                                     
55 Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd [2011] PGSC 40, SC1144, 22 December 2011 [Medaing 
on appeal]. 
56 Medaing on appeal at [158] per Sawong and Hartshorn JJ. 
57 Environment Act 2000, s 55. 
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to the Director of Environment. In Medaing the plaintiffs had amassed a credible group 
of expert witnesses to give evidence to support their case the project would cause 
irreparable harm to the environment and as such contrary to National Goal 4 on 
sustainable use of the environment. The Court concluded from the scientific evidence that 
it was likely the tailings would harm the area it was deposited into and not behave as the 
defendants’ scientific experts predicted.58 This avenue was open to the plaintiffs to make 
their views known to the Director of Environment at the initial stage of the project. 
The Director of Environment is required by law to advertise a proposed mining 
project and request public submissions before it decides to issue the developer an 
environmental permit.59 As the Environment Act 2000 recognises Goal 4 of the 
Constitution in its long title, the Director would have to make its decision in a manner 
consistent with the NGDP. The scientists’ views accompanying the plaintiff’s 
submissions to the Director of Environment would have to be verified by the Director of 
Environment’s technical experts to verify the plaintiff’s submissions. The Director would 
consider the submissions and make his or her decision and the reasons for it. There would 
be no law impeding the Director of Environment from recording whether the decision to 
grant the environmental permit promoted Goal 4 or not. 
If notwithstanding the plaintiff’s submission, the Director of Environment 
awarded the permit to Ramu Nico, the plaintiffs could seek judicial review of the decision 
in the National Court. The plaintiff would argue as one of its grounds, the Director did 
not give sufficient consideration to Goal 4 of the NGDP and adduce as its evidence the 
scientific report. The court could apply Padfield to support the proposition that the 
Director’s actions did not promote the objectives of the legislation and were therefore 
unreasonable. The plaintiff would then be required to seek an appropriate remedy from 
the court, which may include a condition on the environmental permit, not to discharge 
waste into the Bay but instead to construct a tailings dam. Another option could have been 
a declaration that the permit granted was unreasonable and should be nullified and the 
Director of Environment reconsider an alternative avenue to discharge the waste that 
meaningfully takes into account Goal 4.  
Use of judicial review would have provided a better approach to securing the 
NGDP. Promoting the NGDP would not happen in isolation from the legislation in issue, 
                                                     
58 Medaing, above n 54, at [47]–[61], especially [61]. 
59 Environment Act 2000, s 55. 
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but in tandem with it, and in this case, the Environment Act 2000. Such a position respects 
each arm of government’s sphere of operations. There was nothing problematic with the 
decision in the Court of first instance as it was recommendatory in nature, but it did not 
have the desired effect of preventing a potentially environmentally disastrous project.60  
V Weak-form Judicial Review 
A Constitutional Basis of Weak-form Judicial Review  
1 Introduction  
Weak-form judicial review is proposed for the courts as it meets the dual constitutional 
demands of ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution of implementation and non-justiciability.61 
It is a useful way for the courts to be engaged in the political discourse of implementation 
of the NGDP and BSO without being directly implicated by making a legally enforceable 
decision. Weak judicial review is usually associated with the enforcement of rights and 
freedoms.62 The courts point out that a particular law or provision of the law inconsistent 
with a right or freedom, but do not invalidate the law, leaving it to the legislature to correct 
the error. Gardbaum has described weak-form judicial review as the new model of 
Commonwealth constitutionalism after studying the constitutional developments of 
Australia (state of Victoria for instance), Canada, New Zealand and United Kingdom.63 
Gardaum distinguishes this new model of Commonwealth constitutionalism from the 
model of constitutionalism as it operates in the United States, as in the latter the judiciary 
has the ultimate power to invalidate legislation on grounds of unconstitutionality. 
Weak-form judicial review has been in operation in Canada since the Bill of 
Rights 1960; in New Zealand since the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA); 
and in the United Kingdom since 1998. A typical feature of this approach noted in New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom is that the court may declare the incompatibility of a 
                                                     
60 This position was advanced in chapter 7. 
61 See Mark Tushnet “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights – and Democracy-Based 
Worries” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L Rev 813; and Stephen Gardbaum “The New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism” (2001) 49 Am Comp L 707 at 710. 
62 Judicial review as used here in the context of courts power to invalidate legislation as opposed to 
administrative judicial review of government decisions. 
63 Gardbaum, above n 61. 
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law with the Bill of Rights but has no power to invalidate the law.64 Weak-form judicial 
review is therefore a middle ground in constitutionalism between parliamentary 
supremacy and ultimate judicial power on constitutional issues. 
Comparative constitutional scholars such as Tushnet propose this method to deal 
with the counter majoritarian argument when promoting non-justiciable social rights.65  
In weak-form judicial review, the judiciary points out the offending provision of law and 
allows the legislature to remedy the situation.66 Weak-form judicial review is 
recommended as an alternative to the other proposals presented in this chapter. 
Obviously, the first line of choice is to use the NGDP and BSO as indirectly justiciable 
under ss 25(3) and 63(3). The strength of weak-form judicial review is to sensitise public 
discourse to issues directly affecting the NGDP and BSO so as to influence the political 
process. It is not a directly justiciable approach as was seen in one of the first cases in 
Papua New Guinea to sanction it.67 The application of weak-form judicial review in 
Medaing is taken up below. Weak-form judicial review would help the court use the 
NGDP and BSO more proactively. 
B Applying Weak-form Judicial Review to Papua New Guinea’s Context  
Although this thesis uses the terminology of weak-form judicial review, there are a 
number of fundamental differences with regard to the use of that term in Canada and New 
Zealand. Civil rights and freedoms are not being considered, but instead the NGDP and 
BSO. NGDP and BSO are in a sense considered as part of social, economic and cultural 
rights.68 In Papua New Guinea, civil and political rights and freedoms are directly 
justiciable, following the model of American constitutionalism.69 Applying weak-form 
judicial review to the protection and promotion of the NGDP and BSO follows legal 
developments in Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in human rights 
legislation. 
The object of the court’s observation on the compatibility of a law with rights and 
freedoms in weak-form judicial review is usually the legislature, but for Papua New 
                                                     
64 See s 4 of New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 [NZBORA] and s 4 the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
For a New Zealand case that considered s 4 of NZBORA see Moonen v Film and Literature Board of 
Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 [Moonen]. 
65 Tushnet, above n 61.   
66 New Zealand legislates this means of judicial review into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
67 Medaing, above n 54. 
68 Kwa, above n 32, at 69. 
69 Constitution, ss 57 and 58. 
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Guinea it could also include the executive or any other governmental body. Essentially, 
the NGDP and BSO applies to all governmental bodies under the Constitution, which 
covers the traditional three arms of government. What is important is the court’s 
constitutional ability to make declarations on the compatibility of a law, decision or policy 
with the NGDP and BSO.   
C The Constitutional Basis  
What would be the constitutional basis for the courts in Papua New Guinea to make 
declarations of inconsistency with the NGDP and BSO? In New Zealand, Moonen v Film 
& Literature Board of Review suggested the courts have the power to make a declaration 
of inconsistency.70 This power was not exercised until July 2015 when a provision of a 
law which disenfranchised sentenced prisoners was declared to be inconsistent with s 12 
of NZBORA (the right to vote).71 The effectiveness of court declarations depends on the 
legislature acceding to the court as the courts have no power to invalidate offending law 
under s 4 of NZBORA.72 In the United Kingdom, the law is more specific: s 4 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 enables the court to declare legislation incompatible with the 
European Human Rights Convention if it is not possible to construe it consistently with 
the Convention. It is then up to the legislature to correct the inconsistency. 
For Papua New Guinea, this thesis proposes that s 25(2) (and s 63(2) in similar 
terms), which states “Nevertheless, it is the duty of all governmental bodies to apply and 
give effect to them as far as lies within their respective powers”, provides the 
constitutional basis for weak-form judicial review. The court is included in the definition 
of governmental bodies and should, therefore, apply its specific functions to give effect 
to the NGDP and BSO. The issuing of declaratory orders falls within court functions. 
Since the constitutional duties of governmental bodies under ss 25(2) and 63(2) are non-
justiciable, it would be in the discretion of the legislature to decide whether to accept the 
court’s decision or not.  
The focus of court decisions on ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution in Papua New 
Guinea have centred on non-justiciability and ss 25(3) and 63(3).73 The courts have not 
explored the possibility of ss 25(2) and 63(2) in relation to weak-form judicial review. 
                                                     
70 Moonen, above n 64. 
71 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706. 
72 Andrew Butler “Judicial Indications of Inconsistency – A New Weapon in the Bill of Rights Armoury?” 
(2000) NZ L Rev43 at 59–60. 
73 This discussion took place in chapter 4. 
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While the principle of non-justiciability is consistent with weak-form judicial review, 
governmental bodies (such as the courts) are not prevented from insisting on compliance 
with the NGDP and BSO. If the court asserts a statement without making it legally 
binding, it would meet the demands of the Constitution under ss 25(2) and 63(2). 
D Case study on Medaing  
The view was taken above that the better approach to achieve justiciable outcomes 
consistent with the NGDP and BSO would be to use judicial review of administrative 
action. Be that as it may, there was no error in the final outcome of Medaing. What the 
Court did, it is submitted, was to fail to cite the correct constitutional basis for its decision 
on the application of the NGDP.  
In Medaing, the National Court, after considering the evidence on the potential 
harm to the marine ecology, made the following observation on Goal 2 on Natural 
Resources and the Environment based on s 25(3) of the Constitution: 
It amounts to a breach of our duty of trust for future generations for this to 
happen. It is a course of action that shows deafness to the call of the People 
through Directive Principle 4(2) to conserve and replenish our sacred and scenic 
marine environment in Astrolabe Bay. It puts other coastal waters of Madang 
Province at risk. Inadequate protection has been given to our valued fish and 
other marine organisms. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority ruled the National Court’s declaration on 
the actions of the state was inconsistent with the NGDP:74 
The extent provided in Constitution s 25(3) for the National Goals and Directive 
Principles to be heard or determined is in relation to whether a law can be 
reasonably enforced to give effect to or not derogate from the National Goals and 
Directive Principles. It is not provided in s 25(3) that the National Court can give 
an opinion or make a declaration as to whether a law or power conferred by a law 
is contrary to a National Goal. 
The Supreme Court had relied on a previous decision of the same Court upholding 
the non-justiciability of the NGDP and BSO.75 In that decision the Court had only 
considered s 25(1) (and s 63(1)) to arrive at its conclusion. The Court had not adequately 
dealt with s 25(2) (and s 63(2)). Justice Davani (minority Supreme Court decision) agreed 
                                                     
74 Medaing on appeal, above n 55, at [166] per Hartshorn and Sawong JJ. 
75 Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 40, SC1088, 17 
December 2010. 
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with Cannings J ruling in the Court below and commented directly on s 25(3) (and s 
63(3)):76 
Section 25(3) of the Constitution cannot be any clearer. If given its fair and liberal 
interpretation, states in no uncertain terms that a Judicial power, which includes 
the power to issue any declaration by a Court and which is also a judicial power 
to issue administrative relief being a Declaration, is issued to give effect to the 
National Goals and Directive Principles because it must be enforced in that way. 
(s.25(3) of the Constitution). 
Davani J went on to say:77 
I agree with the Trial Judge's findings that he is not contradicting or contravening 
the non-justiciability of the NGDP. The power to issue a Declaration is 
discretionary, subject to s.25(2). He proceeded under s.25(3) of the Constitution, 
which provision in my view is an exception to the general rule on the non-
justiciability of s.25 of the Constitution. 
Even Davani J focused on s 25(3) and did not consider s 25(2). 
In Medaing the principal relief the plaintiff sought was a permanent injunction to 
prevent the discharge of waste into the Astrolobe Bay of Madang Province.  
The plaintiffs further sought to compel the defendant through the court proceedings to 
construct a tailings dam to contain the waste. The National Court, despite finding that the 
waste discharge method was contrary to Goal 2 of the NGDP, did not grant the remedy 
sought. In the view of the National Court the tremendous national economic significance 
of the project dictated against the grant of the remedy. What the National Court did was 
to prioritise the goals of the state, although it focused on the Goal dealing with the 
environment. It could instead have justified its position by considering other NGDP Goals 
such as the Goal 3 on “National Sovereignty and Self-Reliance”, and decide which Goal 
was to be given priority in such a situation. This would have granted greater legitimacy 
to the goals in legal and social development, but at the same time address the counter-
majoritarian apprehension of courts enforcing social rights. This thesis concludes ss 25(2) 
and 63(2) authorises the court to make non-justiciable observations.  
                                                     
76 Medaing on appeal, above n 55, at [123] per Davani J. 
77 At [127]. 
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E Conclusion 
Weak-form judicial review provides a constitutional opportunity for the court to express 
an opinion on whether another governmental body has exercised its powers in a manner 
consistent with the NGDP and BSO. The constitutional basis for this can be found in  
ss 25(2) and 63(2) of the Constitution. Although the party’s rights are not to be determined 
by the court, they are nevertheless sensitised by the decision to the NGDP and BSO, 
which in most cases includes the government. Further, it creates a situation for a 
conversation on the NGDP and BSO by different governmental bodies. 
VI Human Rights and Freedoms and the NGDP and BSO  
A Introduction  
Securing civil and political rights should be done in a manner consistent with the NGDP 
and BSO. Basic rights in the preamble of the Constitution highlight the importance of 
considering rights and freedoms together with the NGDP and BSO. In areas of 
inconsistency, human rights and freedoms (given their directly enforceable status) would 
prevail. 
It is appropriate to provide a general overview of how the Constitution protects 
human rights and freedoms. There are three main procedures.78 The first relates to 
inconsistency of laws with human rights and freedoms provisions in the Constitution.  
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to declare laws and even executive decisions invalid 
for offending the Constitution.79 Human rights and freedoms are expressly recognised as 
constitutional laws (and justiciable), which other laws must conform to. 
The second relates to the question of limiting or qualifying human rights and 
freedoms provisions. This is permissible under ss 38 and 39 of the Constitution.  
The general test is whether the law is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society having 
proper regard for the rights and dignity of mankind. Certain rights and freedoms in the 
Constitution can be qualified. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to invalidate a law for 
not meeting the stipulations of ss 38 and 39. 
                                                     
78 HA Amankwah “Chapter 11: Human Rights in the Superior Courts” in Rudy James and Ian Fraser (eds) 
Legal Issues in a Developing Society (Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby, 
1992) 170 at 171. 
79 Constitution, ss 10–11. 
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The third is enforcement through ss 57 and 58 of the Constitution. Under this 
procedure, persons whose rights have been infringed can claim damages against human 
rights abusers and also seek preventative orders against potential abuse to avoid future 
breaches. The police feature prominently in many of these abuse cases. 
B NGDP and BSO on Questions of Inconsistency with Human Rights Provisions 
Much legislation and many Bills have been declared invalid by the Supreme Court for 
having violated human rights and freedoms in the Constitution.80 The question of 
inconsistency is one of constitutional interpretation. This would require consideration of 
the NGDP and BSO. Surprisingly, many of the leading cases dealing with inconsistency 
of laws do not consider the NGDP and BSO.  
Karingu, Enforcement of Rights Pursuant Constitution S57 provides a useful 
opportunity to discuss how the NGDP and BSO could have been involved more 
prominently but were not.81 Karingu (a lawyer) challenged the constitutionality of the 
Lawyers Act 1986. That legislation created a body called the Law Society, and made it 
mandatory for lawyers to join this organisation and obtain professional indemnity 
insurance before he or she can practise law. Karingu claimed the compulsory membership 
of the Law Society and requirement for professional insurance breached his right to 
freedom of employment protected by s 48 of the Constitution. The court concluded s 48 
guaranteed the right to choose, and not entitlement to employment.  
The dual requirements for a practising certificate under s 35 of the Lawyers Act and for 
evidence of professional indemnity insurance under s 43 of the same Act were 
“qualifications (if any) lawfully required” within s 48(1).  
The court could have elaborated on why it thought the Lawyers Act met the 
standards of s 48(1) in light of the NGDP and BSO. For example, it could have been 
argued that a professional organisation set up by law would help develop better skilled 
lawyers pursuant to Goal 3 on national sovereignty and self-reliance. This would be a 
sufficient basis for a rationale consistent with the constitutional scheme. It is equally true 
that a different conclusion may be possible, also relying on the NGDP and BSO.  
                                                     
80 One of the earlier cases on this aspect of protecting human rights was SCR No 2 of 1978; Re Corrective 
Institutions Act 1957 [1978] PGSC 9, [1978] PNGLR 404, 25 October 1978 where the court held s 30 of 
the Corrective Institutions Act 1957, which prevented prisoners right of appeal against convictions for 
corrective institution-related offences was inconsistent with s 37(15) (right to review of conviction or 
sentence by a higher court) of the Constitution, and therefore invalid. 
81 Karingu, Enforcement of Rights Pursuant Constitution S57 [1988–89] PNGLR 277, 4 August 1989. 
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However, what is important is the courts should actively promote the NGDP and 
BSO through discussion and prioritisation. This will provide an opportunity for a more 
open and engaging environment for their application.  
C NGDP and BSO on Limiting Qualified Rights  
1 Introduction 
Qualified rights and freedoms secured in many liberal democracies are also adopted in 
the Papua New Guinea Constitution.82 There are a number of requirements ss 38 and 39 
impose on parliament when it enacts laws that restrict these rights and freedoms.  
One of the substantive requirement before a human right and/or freedom can be restricted 
in a law is that the restriction must be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society having 
proper regard for the rights and dignity of humanity.83 A factor enabling the restriction of 
the law is to advance the NGDP and BSO.84 What is, therefore, of relevance to this thesis 
is the question of whether any restriction (or proposed restriction) to the legislation 
enacted by Parliament is in effect for the purpose of fulfilling the NGDP and/or BSO and 
consequently reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.85 The Constitution provides 
some guidance to the courts and parliament on questions of this nature.86 This is an area 
where the courts (judges) are embarking on a very subjective observation on government 
laws and policies with in light of their own personal views and values. It is, therefore, 
paramount there should be standards assisting the evaluation process. The NGDP and 
BSO provide this yardstick. It is imperative they are considered to maintain political 
legitimacy within constitutional limits.  
2 Relevance of comparative experience 
What is in operation in most cases is the balancing of civil and political rights and 
freedoms with social, economic and cultural rights, without any express indication this is 
being done. Section 39 enables a comparative approach to meaningfully consider the 
question of whether the restriction is reasonably justifiable. On this note it is useful to 
bear in mind the trend on social rights discourse. Justice Albie Sachs from the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa was recorded as stating 21st-century jurisprudence 
                                                     
82 See chapter 2; and Constitution, ss 41–56. 
83 Constitution, s 38(1). 
84 Section 39(3)(a). 
85 Constitution, ss 38(1) and 39(3). 
86 For a case where legislation was invalidated for not meeting the formal requirements of s 38 of the 
Constitution see Special Reference by the Morobe Provincial Executive [2005] PNGLR 1, 13 May 2005. 
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will see an increasing focus on socio-economic rights.87 It is important for Papua New 
Guinea to take into account international experiences and provide for more just social 
conditions for its population. 
Section 39 of the Constitution allows stakeholders in the constitutional system to 
have regard to international comparative legal systems.88 Courts are given the power to 
consider relevant international and domestic experience to determine the appropriateness 
of restricting rights and freedoms. Greater involvement of the NGDP and BSO on 
questions on limitations of rights were foreshadowed by commentators such as Donald 
Chalmers.89 After comparing the constitutional positions in Nigeria and India to Papua 
New Guinea, he came to the view that the Papua New Guinea Constitution, on the 
question of what is “reasonably justified,” offered a greater protection than that of 
Nigeria. But India presented an insightful experience. Chalmers thought the decision of 
Patanjali Sastri CJ in State of Madras v Row offered useful lessons for Papua New 
Guinea.90  
The test of reasonableness is not a fixed or abstract application, but the result of 
weighing the nature of the right infringed, the purpose of the restriction, the extent of the 
evil to be remedied, and the prevailing political conditions at the time of the judgment.91 
Chalmers went on to describe how the NGDP can be used to balance the interests of the 
individual against society. This balancing exercise should be kept in mind in the following 
discussions. 
3 Commentary on case laws 
Two cases which considered the question of whether the restrictions were reasonably 
justifiable will be commented on now. They focus on the role of the Supreme Court.  
What is interesting about these cases is that the formal requirements of s 38 of the 
Constitution were met. However, the Court went on to make a subjective judgment about 
whether these laws were justified and found otherwise. As a result, the laws challenged 
were declared unconstitutional. Courts can consider whether these laws necessarily 
                                                     
87 Albie Sachs, “Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable?” (Southern Methodist 
University School of Law, 1999) at 18, quoted in Langford, above n 31, at v.  
88 Constitution, s 39(3). 
89 Donald Chalmers “Human Rights and What is Reasonably Justifiable in a Democratic Society” (1975) 3 
Melanesian LJ 92. 
90 State of Madras v Row (1952) SCR 597, 1952 AIR 196. 
91 Chalmers, above n 89, at 96–97. 
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promote the NGDP and/or BSO and on that basis declare a law unconstitutional. No case 
has taken this approach; but this thesis argues it is constitutionally valid. 
(a) Case one: SCR No 1 of 1986; Re Vagrancy Act (Ch 268) 
The first case related to vagrancy. The government was concerned about the number of 
people who were migrating to the urban centres. There was escalating crime in the cities 
and many of the people coming in squatted on unoccupied land. Parliament responded by 
enacting the Vagrancy Act (Ch268). This Act made it a criminal offence to live in the city 
with no formal employment. This law was challenged in the Supreme Court in SCR No 1 
of 1986; Re Vagrancy Act (Ch 268) (SCR on Vagrancy Act) on the basis it was contrary 
to s 42, liberty of the person and s 52, freedom of movement.92 The Court found the Act 
complied with the formal requirements of s 38 of the Constitution, including the voting 
requirement of absolute majority, but did not meet the substantive requirements of s 38 
of the Constitution:93 
The exclusion orders in s 3 of the Vagrancy Act (Ch No 268) restricted the right 
to freedom of movement protected by s 52 of the Constitution, and the State had 
failed to discharge the onus under s 38(3) of the Constitution of proving that such 
exclusion orders were necessary for public order or public welfare or reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society within the meaning of s 38(1). 
The Court did not look at the NGDP and BSO, but in the view of this thesis, the 
question of public interest in the language of s 38 arises here. For example, National Goal 
2 on equality and participation should have been applied when deciding what is 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. No doubt this would require the courts to 
engage in a debate about how the government is to manage its problems, a role usually 
played by the executive and the legislature and not the judiciary. But these debates are 
important for the reason that social, economic and cultural rights in the international 
context are questioning the ideological commitment to the separation of powers.  
The prevailing practice of countries following the United States constitutional model is 
to protect negative rights (or civil and political rights and freedoms) in the Constitution.94 
Positive rights (social, economic and cultural rights) are non-justiciable, and left to the 
political process to secure.  
                                                     
92 SCR No 1 of 1986; Re Vagrancy Act (Ch 268) [1988] PGSC 29, [1988-89] PNGLR 1, 13 April 1987. 
93 At 1. 
94 Gardbaum, above n 61. 
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The two main objections to constitutionalising positive rights are first that it may 
require government to provide rights to a part of the population outside of the policy 
platform it was elected on; and second, positive rights are expensive, such as providing 
housing and quality health care.95 Different jurisdictions have provided different 
responses to the two objections. Some Commonwealth countries such as Canada,  
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, have left it to the executive to provide such rights, 
and empowering the courts to enforce negative rights.96 India and Ireland have created 
non-justiciable directive principles in their Constitutions.97 India has been particularly 
creative in applying the directive principles despite their non-justiciable nature. 
Constitutions adopted from the 1990s onwards such as in South Africa have made social 
rights directly justiciable.98 This trend has led one commentator to conclude social rights 
are no longer an outlier when compared to civil and political rights in rights 
enforcement.99 
At the time SCR on Vagrancy Act was decided in 1989, debates on enforcement 
of social rights may have been tilted in favour of enforcement of civil and political rights. 
The Court did not have the benefit of a comparative experience such as in South Africa. 
But had it engaged in that debate, it would have seen a situation where the Papua New 
Guinea legal framework could be heralded as “prophetic”. The Court would have 
considered the social condition in the rural areas, the employment opportunities available 
to the people and decide whether the policies (or their lack) of the government were 
reasonable in the circumstances. If they were not then the law was unreasonable.  
The Court could find that such legislation would contribute to a class structure between 
the rural and urban population of the country, with greater opportunities found only in the 
cities. Civil and political rights and freedoms ought to be applied consistently with the 
NGDP and BSO. It is both an express and implied intention of the Constitution that rights 
and freedoms should be applied harmoniously with the NGDP and BSO. 
Grootboom provides a useful comparison. The case concerned the provision of 
housing to a group of people who were squatting on government land. The affected people 
                                                     
95 Langford, above n 31, at 6. 
96 Gardbaum, above n 61. 
97 Constitution of Ireland, art 45, “Directive Principles of Social Policy”; Constitution of India, Part IV, 
Directive Principles of State Policy, arts 36–51. 
98 The Constitution of South Africa provides a number of social rights, including: art 26, labour rights; art 
24, right to a healthy environment; art 26, right to housing; art 27, right to food, health care and social 
assistance; art 29, right to education; art 30, right to language; and art 31, right to culture.  
99 David Landau “The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement” (2012) 53(1) Harv Int’l LJ 190. 
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were going to be evicted and sought first, an injunction to prevent their eviction; and 
second, provision of housing because of their dire circumstances. The Court made two 
main types of orders: the first was for temporary relief; and the second was to order the 
government to take reasonable steps to provide the right to housing for the applicants. As 
the South African Constitution made housing a right, the government was required to 
apply all reasonable efforts to ensure the provision of this right. Although no timeframe 
was provided to implement this order, the approach it took is instructive. The Court 
examined government laws, policies and allocation of funds to realise this right for the 
particular people and found them inadequate and, therefore, unreasonable in the 
circumstances. Grootboom is a positive development for courts of other countries to draw 
lessons from when protecting rights traditionally considered to be non-justiciable; without 
the criticism that the court is encroaching into other areas of government function. 
(b) Case two: Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; 
Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates 
The second and more recent case, which had a lasting impact on the political development 
of Papua New Guinea, was Special Reference By Fly River Provincial Executive Council; 
Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (Fly River).100 Fly River 
could have taken greater account of the NGDP and BSO to support its conclusions.  
The Papua New Guinea Parliament is notorious for instability. Constant votes of 
no confidence against prime ministers result in governments not serving the full five-year 
term. Parliament responded by enacting a constitutional law – Organic Law on the 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC). The main terms of OLIPPAC 
were to restrict the voting rights of the Members of Parliament in three key areas: electing 
a Prime Minister, constitutional amendments, and Appropriation Bills. Political parties 
would meet prior to Parliament sessions, and pass a party resolution on how it would vote 
on any of these three matters. It created an offence (misconduct) under the Leadership 
Code if a Member of Parliament voted against the party resolution. This law enabled 
Michael Somare to remain Prime Minister for a total of 10 years, a record for Papua New 
Guinea. In 2010, the constitutionality of the law was challenged. 
                                                     
100 Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates [2010] PGSC 3, SC1057, 7 July 2010. 
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OLIPPAC complied with the formal requirements of s 38 and was not in issue.  
It will be recalled s 38 requires laws that restrict rights and freedoms meet a number of 
conditions. Further, the law can only restrict the right but not abolish it. The Supreme 
Court was concerned OLIPPAC had the effect of abolishing certain rights and not merely 
restricting them. Rights and freedoms such as freedom of association (s 47) and the right 
to vote and stand for public office (s 50) were under consideration as to whether they 
were restricted or abolished. The Supreme Court found rather than Parliament restricting 
those qualified rights and freedoms, it had actually abolished them and as a result gone 
beyond its constitutional scope. To arrive at this finding, the Court considered the 
Westminster Parliament as the model Papua New Guinea should aspire to.  
The Court did not make specific reference to the NGDP and BSO when assessing 
the restrictions of OLIPPAC. Its discussions on whether political rights and freedoms 
were abolished or restricted were guided by common law jurisprudence and cases such 
as Edwards v AG Canada.101 The Court could have gone further to consider the 
implications of OLIPPAC on the NGDP and BSO. For example, Goal 2 states:  
“We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to have an equal opportunity to 
participate in, and benefit from, the development of our country”. Did the provisions of 
OLIPPAC in contention affect people’s participation through their representatives in the 
political process? There was again latitude for such a question to be raised to enable a 
greater role for the NGDP and BSO in assessing the constitutional validity of a law. 
The Court could have used this opportunity to discuss whether the challenged law 
adequately fulfilled the NGDP and BSO. Since it is an express requirement under  
ss 38 and 39 of the Constitution, the Court could do it proprio motu. The Court briefly 
referred to Goal 1 on integral human development.  Politically favourable conduct was to 
be achieved through integral human development, and not by way of legislating into 
practice a particular politically desirable behaviour. The Court made this comment in 
passing. Obviously it had significant consequences as the Court and the legislature 
differed on the solution to resolve the problem of political instability. The Court should 
have explored in detail what it meant by reference to integral human development as the 
process to achieve political development.   
                                                     
101 Edwards v AG Canada [1930] AC 124 (PC). 
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D Enforcement of Human Rights  
Persons whose rights and freedoms have been infringed can approach the courts for 
remedies or preventive orders. These remedies are provided for under ss 57 and 58 of the 
Constitution. Under these provisions, both the National Court and Supreme Court have 
jurisdiction. These rights have been listed elsewhere in the thesis.102 
The interaction of the NGDP and BSO with these rights are connected by the 
provision of s 32, “Right to Freedom” of the Constitution. This provision at the relevant 
part states: 
(1) Freedom based on law consists in the least amount of restriction on the 
activities of individuals that is consistent with the maintenance and 
development of Papua New Guinea and of society in accordance with this 
Constitution and, in particular, with the National Goals and Directive 
Principles and the Basic Social Obligations. 
Goldring has recognised this provision as having a higher status than other human rights 
provisions.103 This thesis takes the position that this provision is an interpretive 
provision.104 It will provide a guide to how other specific provisions on rights and 
freedoms may be interpreted. For example, s 46 is on freedom of expression:  
46. Freedom of Expression. 
(1) Every person has the right to freedom of expression and publication, 
except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted 
by a law— 
(a) that imposes reasonable restrictions on public office-holders; or 
(b) that imposes restrictions on non-citizens; or 
(c) that complies with Section 38 (general qualifications on 
qualified rights). 
  
                                                     
102 See chapter 2. 
103 John Goldring The Constitution of Papua New Guinea (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1978) at 215. 
104 Application by Ireeuw, Wawar, Ap, and Wakum [1985] PGNC 7, [1985] PNGLR 430, 13 December 
1985. 
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If a person was to make a claim to the court that their freedom of expression was 
breached through enforcement proceedings under s 57 of the Constitution, the question 
of the definition of the right to freedom of expression and publication would necessarily 
explore meanings consistent with the NGDP and BSO. In this way, the Constitution 
adopts rights and freedoms with due regard to the Papua New Guinean context.  
VII Conclusion  
Adopting the proposals recommended here would enhance the court’s functions to enable 
effective implementation of the NGDP and BSO. These proposals relate to the 
jurisdiction of both the National Court and the Supreme Court. In terms of the former, the 
proposals cover judicial review of administrative action and development of the 
underlying law. For the latter, the Supreme Court’s power to interpret the Constitution is 
considered. Three areas cut across both Courts’ jurisdiction. First, the interpretive 
function of the court using the contextual means of statutory interpretation; and second, 
the relationship between the justiciable human rights and freedoms and the NGDP and 
BSO. The third area open to both Courts is the possibility to explore comparative judicial 
developments of what has been described as weak-form judicial review. 
 191 
Chapter Ten – Ombudsman Commission 
I Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to make proposals for the Ombudsman Commission to 
effectively and efficiently implement the NGDP and BSO. The Ombudsman 
Commission’s relationship with the other branches of government was discussed in 
chapter 6. This chapter focuses on how the functions of the Ombudsman Commission can 
be used to implement the NGDP and BSO, and is organised in three main parts.  
Part I provides an introduction. Part II provides a brief note on the usefulness of 
comparative experiences to support proposals for implementation by the Ombudsman 
Commission. Part III proposes how the Ombudsman Commission can implement the 
NGDP and BSO under its various functions. Part IV concludes by summarising the main 
points of the chapter.  
II Overview of Ombudsman Commission Roles 
Papua New Guinea adopted an Ombudsman Commission in 1975, being inspired by the 
institution which began in Sweden in 1806.1 Originally, the primary purpose of the 
ombudsman in Sweden was controlling the application of laws by the administration.2  
In the second half of the 19th century the ombudsman evolved into an institution by which 
the Swedish Parliament could exert control over the executive.3 The extension of the 
functions of the ombudsman to an institution for the citizen to have redress against the 
arbitrariness of the bureaucracy came about in the twentieth century.4 From Sweden, other 
Nordic countries adopted similar institutions, beginning with Finland in 1919, Denmark, 
1955, and Norway in 1963.5 Commonwealth countries followed suit in the 1960s, for 
example, New Zealand in 1962, Australia in 1977, and the majority of Western 
democracies in the 1970s and 1980s.6 
                                                     
1 Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, Part One 
(Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) at 11/1 [4] [CPC Report].  
2 Mark Bevir (ed) “Ombudsman” Encyclopedia of Governance (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
2007) vol 2 at 633–634. 
3 At 633. 
4 At 633. 
5 At 633. 
6 At 633. 
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The following features have been identified as belonging to the classical 
ombudsman role, emanating from the Swedish model:7 
… (1) legally established, (2) functionally autonomous, (3) external to the 
administration, (4) operationally independent of the legislature and the executive, 
(5) specialist, (6) expert, (7) nonpartisan, (8) normatively universalistic, (9) client 
centered but not anti-administration, (10) both popularly accessible and visible.   
These attributes have been incorporated into the Papua New Guinea Ombudsman system 
under the Constitution and the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission (OLOC).8 
In presenting proposals for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO through the 
Ombudsman Commission’s functions, comparative experiences from other jurisdictions 
will be highlighted where relevant. In saying that, institutions that bear the name 
“Ombudsman” in Commonwealth countries that operate a Westminster system of 
government like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, are involved 
in investigating administrative complaints but do not possess the array of functions of the 
Papua New Guinea Ombudsman Commission. The Papua New Guinea Ombudsman 
Commission is established directly by the Constitution together with its multi-faceted 
functions.9 
In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Ombudsman are 
restricted to the classical role of the Swedish model: that is, the investigation of 
complaints against government officials for unfair or unreasonable treatment.10 Australia 
and Canada do not establish their Ombudsman directly in their written constitutions, but 
under ordinary legislation.11 New Zealand and United Kingdom with no written 
constitutions also have their Ombudsman founded by legislation.  
                                                     
7 Larry B Hill “Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy” (1974) 68(3) Am Pol Sci Rev 1075 
at 1077. 
8 For a summary of the Ombudsman Commission’s functions see David Cannings “The Ombudsman 
Commission: Jurisdiction, Functions and Performance” in Anthony Regan, Owen Jessep and Eric Kwa 
(eds) Twenty Years of the Papua New Guinea Constitution (Law Book Co, Pyrmont, 2001) 196 at 196–
197. 
9 Cannings, at 196–197. 
10 For Australia there is a Commonwealth Ombudsman established by the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth): see 
Commonwealth Ombudsman “Our History” <http://www.ombudsman.gov.au>, and a number of state 
ombudsman, for example, in Western Australia, Victoria and New South Wales. Canada has a plethora of 
Ombudsmen, each province has its own, perhaps the most active is the Ontario Ombudsman established 
under the Ombudsman Act 1975 (Ontario). New Zealand’s Ombudsman is set up by the Ombudsman Act 
1975 (there is other associated legislation such as the Official Information Act 1982 which confer additional 
powers); United Kingdom has a number of Ombudsman, such as the Parliamentary Ombudsman (or 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration) established under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 
1967. 
11 Australia has a Commonwealth Ombudsman and several state ombudsmen, while Canada has a number 
of provincial ombudsmen, see above n 10. 
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The Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and United Kingdom ombudsmen also do not 
have Leadership Code function as it obtains in Papua New Guinea.12 For countries like 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the most effective means of ensuring quality 
leadership is through the political process. In the Pacific, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
have attempted to follow the Papua New Guinea model.13 But in Solomon Islands, the 
Leadership Code Commission is separate from the Ombudsman Commission.  
Another interesting addition to the multifaceted role of the Papua New Guinea 
Ombudsman Commission is its ability to seek the Supreme Court’s binding opinion on 
the constitutionality of a law or proposed law. This function seems to be conferred on 
only one other Ombudsman-like institution, in Slovenia.14 Of particular note for Papua 
New Guinea is the ability granted to the Ombudsman Commission to have a specific role 
to implement the NGDP and BSO. This is not a feature of Ombudsman in India and 
Ireland, which have directive principles enshrined in their Constitutions.15  
In circumstances like this, comparative experience on Ombudsman-like institutions will 
be of limited use for Papua New Guinea, especially as regards the implementation of the 
NGDP and BSO. 
III Implementing the NGDP and BSO in the Ombudsman Functions  
A Introduction  
The proposals for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO by the Ombudsman 
Commission would be under the administrative complaints function, the Leadership Code 
function, and what is called “a watching brief” on the Constitution by dint of the 
Commission’s recognition as an authority capable of initiating constitutional references.16 
Because the Leadership Code enforcement involves not only the Ombudsman 
Commission, but also the Public Prosecutor and an appropriate tribunal, the proposal for 
                                                     
12 The Australian comparable institution to the leadership code role is perhaps its anti-corruption agency, 
for example, the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, a single function body. 
13 Having obtained independence after Papua New Guinea: Solomon Islands in 1978 and Vanuatu in 1981. 
14 Human Rights Ombudsman, established under art 159 of the Slovenian Constitution. 
15 In both India and Ireland, specific ombudsmen are created to oversee the role of the financial sector and 
the police respectively. No function is conferred on an ombudsman-like institution to implement the state 
policy enshrined in their constitutions. 
16 Cannings, above n 8, at 197–198. 
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implementation will unavoidably involve discussion of the whole process; the focus here 
will, however, be the Ombudsman Commission.17 
B Administrative Complaints Functions 
1 Introduction  
This part presents implementation proposals for the Ombudsman Commission’s 
administrative complaints function. Entities considered to be a state service or a 
governmental body are subject to the Ombudsman Commission’s jurisdiction.18  
The Ombudsman Commission will investigate and establish whether there has been:19 
 Wrongful conduct; and/or 
 Defects in law or administrative practice; and/or 
 Discriminatory practice. 
The finding(s) against a state service or governmental body is made in a report, 
which the Ombudsman Commission has the discretion to either make public by 
presenting it to the parliament or keeping it confidential. Where a report is confidential, 
only the persons implicated and the head of the organisation are privy to the 
Commission’s findings. The policies the Ombudsman Commission uses to decide 
whether to keep findings confidential should be publicised so the public is informed of 
how the Commission exercises its discretion. Reference to the NGDP and BSO in a public 
report draws their importance to the attention of state services and governmental bodies.  
Investigating allegations of wrong conduct, defects in law or administrative 
practice, can only relate to matters of administration.20 For example, criminal behaviour 
is outside of the scope of the Ombudsman Commission. What has become apparent is 
                                                     
17 Whether the Public Prosecutor and the Leadership Tribunal are involved depends on the category of 
leader being referred. In Re Public Prosecutor's Power to Request the Chief Justice to Appoint a Leadership 
Tribunal [2008] PGSC 48, SC1011, 29 August 2008 [Public Prosecutor's Power] the Court explained the 
referral process. For example, Members of Parliament are prosecuted by the Public Prosecutor in a 
leadership tribunal consisting of a judge and two magistrates. For a constitutional office holder (such as an 
Ombudsman), the tribunal is called a Constitutional office holders rights tribunal and consists of three 
judges. This thesis focuses on the Public Prosecutor and the Leadership Tribunal, being the most common 
entities involved as a majority of the leaders prosecuted are Members of Parliament. 
18 Constitution, s 219(1), and Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission (OLOC), s 13. The definition 
of governmental body under the Constitution includes the three arms of government and any entity 
established by law or administrative act for a public purpose (Constitution, sch 1.2.2). The New Zealand 
Ombudsman is immune from possible jurisdictional challenges because the entities it has power to 
investigate are specifically listed in legislation: see New Zealand Ombudsman Act 1975, sch 1. 
19 Constitution, s 219(1), and Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission, s 13. 
20 Constitution, s 219(8). 
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that the Ombudsman Commission has focused on the terms of the legislation to appraise 
the conduct of state services and governmental bodies. When a complaint is lodged, the 
first line of inquiry is usually whether provision(s) of the relevant legislation have been 
breached. It is quite possible the Ombudsman Commission can consider other avenues to 
ensure state services and governmental bodies implement the NGDP and BSO within the 
context of the provisions of the legislation alleged to have been breached. Such an 
approach will enable the Ombudsman Commission to ensure state services and 
governmental bodies fulfil their duties under ss 25 and 63 of the Constitution. 
The NGDP and BSO are expressly referred to in ss 219(1)(a) and 219(3) of the 
Constitution, which set out the Ombudsman Commission’s administrative complaints 
function. The first provision relates only to wrong conduct investigations; the second 
applies to all three types of investigation subjects. A review of Ombudsman Commission 
reports of since 1999 reveal a lack of use of s 219 of the Constitution to implement the 
NGDP and BSO.21 
Part II, section C, presents a legal position on how Ombudsman Commission 
recommendations can be implemented under the administrative complaints function.  
The legal position stems from ss 22 and 23 of the Constitution, and the judicial review 
remedy of mandamus. It provides an avenue for direct enforcement of the NGDP and 
BSO through the recommendations. Although the Ombudsman Commission has 
acknowledged it has such power, it has never exercised it.22 The Ombudsman 
Commission relies more on power of persuasion to support implementation of its 
recommendations.  
2 Ombudsman Commission reports  
The format of Ombudsman Commission reports has been standardised in the last 10 
years.23 They follow a standard outline: 
 Executive Summary; 
 Jurisdiction and purpose of the investigation; 
 Determination of the facts of the case; 
                                                     
21 Chapter 5 discussed an evaluation of the Ombudsman Commission’s implementation score card. There 
has been one report after the report in 2011; it was not available at the time of writing.  
22 Cannings, above n 18, at 211. 
23 This observation is based on the Ombudsman Commission reports examined. 
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 Findings; 
 Recommendations; and 
 Applicable laws. 
Under the section on jurisdiction and purpose of the investigation, the 
Ombudsman Commission outlines the legal basis of its investigations. It says why it has 
power to investigate and outlines the scope of its inquiry. Provisions of the Constitution 
and the OLOC granting power to the Ombudsman Commission over the person(s) and/or 
entities investigated are stated. It defines for example what constitutes wrong conduct in 
these laws. 
In the section on determination of the facts of the case, the Ombudsman 
Commission states the facts it has established from its investigation. Any person that is 
implicated is given an opportunity to respond. Where they respond, their reply will be 
considered and analysed as to whether it satisfactorily refutes the allegations made against 
them. 
In the part on findings, the Ombudsman Commission states its conclusion.  
That is, whether the facts that have been determined constitute wrong conduct, defective 
administrative practice or law, or is discriminatory. A short statement is made explaining 
the findings with a list of reasons supporting the findings. The reasons can include just 
facts or an analysis of the law breached. 
The other major part of the report is the recommendations. This is where the 
Ombudsman Commission recommends to the head of the state service or governmental 
body what should be done to address the problem identified in the report. 
Recommendations can take many different forms depending on the nature of the findings. 
They could include for example, that the head of the state service or governmental body 
take disciplinary action against a particular official found to be at fault. In other instances, 
the Ombudsman Commission recommends the development of more efficient policies 
and processes or training of officials in a particular area. 
The part on applicable laws reproduce the relevant provisions of the legislation 
forming the basis of the Ombudsman Commission’s investigations. The laws alleged to 
have been breached are stated here. Its utility is to ensure ease of reference in reading the 
report.  
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The implementation of the NGDP and BSO could be incorporated in the 
jurisdiction and purpose of the investigation, findings, recommendations and applicable 
laws section of the report. Proposals for their implementation are made below in some 
actual reports of the Ombudsman Commission where its findings and recommendations 
are analysed in light of the NGDP and BSO. This provides a practical means of ensuring 
implementation within the parameters of the present law. 
3 Wrongful conduct  
For the Ombudsman Commission to determine whether a state service or governmental 
body’s actions and/or omissions is wrongful, it has to consider a number of factors 
including whether the conduct is contrary to law or is unreasonable.24 In performing this 
assessment, the Ombudsman Commission can take into account the NGDP and BSO.25 
Accordingly, this thesis proposes the NGDP and BSO should guide the implementation 
of law by the state services or governmental bodies. This is a similar approach to that 
recommended respectively for the executive and the judiciary presented in chapters 8 and 
9, that is, for preference to be given to propositions that advance the NGDP and BSO over 
others that do not. Where there is an interpretation of the law which promotes the NGDP 
and/or BSO, it should be preferred by the Ombudsman Commission when it determines 
whether conduct is wrong or not. The state service or governmental body would be guided 
by Parliament as to which NGDP and/or BSO has priority and relevance to matters 
covered under the subject matter of the legislation if Parliament can state clearly as such 
in the legislation.  
Chapter 7 recommended that Parliament’s intention on which NGDP and/or BSO 
it prefers can be expressed in the preamble and/or object section of the legislation.  
This ensures the Ombudsman Commission addressing a grievance about the application 
of the law is sufficiently guided by the express terms of the legislation. A number of 
examples demonstrate this point.  
In 2009, the Ombudsman Commission released a report entitled “Investigation 
Report into the Alleged Unlawful and Abuse of Human Rights by Police, Three Mile 
Guest House, Port Moresby, National Capital District” (Police Report).26 This was a 
                                                     
24 The grounds of wrong conduct are set out in Part III of this chapter. 
25 Constitution, s 219(1)(B). 
26 The Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea Investigation Report into the Alleged Unlawful and 
Abuse of Human Rights by Police, Three Mile Guest House, Port Moresby, National Capital District, Final 
Report 2009 (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 2009) [Police Report]. 
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report arising from allegations of police unlawful entry (without a search warrant) into a 
private residence in Port Moresby, use of excessive force to secure a suspect’s arrest, and 
then subjecting them to humiliating treatment. The report found the police involved had 
acted wrongly (ie, a finding of wrong conduct was made). Certain recommendations were 
made as a result, including the need for adoption of human rights courses in the Police 
Force Course Manual.27 
The Police Report was a welcome initiative against the background of widespread 
concern about police abusing human rights. But there was scope for inclusion of the 
NGDP and/or BSO. First, in the standard outline of the Police Report, a section on the 
definition of wrongful conduct stated:28 
Section 219(2) of the Constitution specifies that conduct is wrong if it is— 
(a) contrary to law; or 
(b) unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory, whether or 
not it is in accordance with law or practice; or 
(c) based wholly or partly on improper motives, irrelevant grounds or 
irrelevant considerations; or 
(d) based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or of fact; or 
(e) conduct for which reasons should be given but were not, 
whether or not the act was supposed to be done in the exercise of deliberate 
judgement within the meaning of Section 62 (decisions in “deliberate 
judgement”). 
The statement did not cover the full definition of wrong conduct. It did not include 
the preceding provision, s 219(1), which states “… where the conduct is or may be wrong, 
taking into account, amongst other things, the National Goals and Directive Principles, 
the Basic Rights and the Basic Social Obligations …”. This may seem a trivial matter, 
but it would have expressed a commitment to the factors which the Ombudsman 
Commission should take into account when examining the conduct of a state service or 
governmental body.  
                                                     
27 At 22. 
28 At 4.  
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Published reports by the Ombudsman Commission from 1999 up until the most 
recent one in 2011 show that this was the approach taken in all the reports.29  
If the Ombudsman Commission is to make a better effort at implementing the NGDP 
and/or BSO, it should adopt a statement encompassing the NGDP and/or BSO. A clear 
indication should be given as to whether the Ombudsman Commission considered the 
NGDP and/or BSO in the report. Only two reports referred to the NGDP, but it was not 
at the commencement stages. The Commission did not determine wrongful conduct on 
the basis of the NGDP as it is required to do under the Constitution.30 No reference has 
been made to the BSO.  
Reverting to the Police Report, one of the recommendations the Ombudsman 
Commission made related to human rights:31 
Recommendation No. 5 
The Commission recommends to the Commissioner of Police to update and 
include Human Rights Courses in the Police Force Course Modules and that all 
members of the Force undertake refresher courses on Operational duties once in 
every (2) years. 
This recommendation has relevance to the BSO, which was not referred to in the report 
by the Ombudsman Commission. Paragraph (f) of the BSO states: “to respect the rights 
and freedoms of others, and to co-operate fully with others in the interests of 
interdependence and solidarity; …”. By making express reference to the BSO, evidence 
would be provided of the Ombudsman Commission fulfilling the aspirations of the 
people, and promotion of the NGDP and BSO as it is required to do under ss 25 and 63 
of the Constitution.32 This clearly was a case where the police did not respect the rights 
and freedoms of others contrary to its constitutional obligation to do so. 
                                                     
29 When a report is published, it means it is tabled in Parliament and as a result is made public: see Organic 
Law on the Ombudsman Commission, s 23. 
30 The Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea National Forest Board Report Investigation into 
the Decision of the National Forest Board to Award Kamula Doso FMA to Wawoi Guavi Timber Company 
(A Subsidiary of Rimbunan Hijau) as an Extension to the Wawoi Guavi Timber Resource Permit Final 
Report July 2002 (Government Printer, Port Moresby 2002) [National Forest Board Report, 2002], and 
The Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea Investigation into the Appointment and Conduct of 
Hamish Sharp in the National Maritime Safety Authority Board, Final Report 2009 (Government Printer, 
Port Moresby 2002 [NMSA Report]. 
31 Police Report, above n 26, at 22. 
32 Constitution, s 218 states as one of the purposes of the Ombudsman Commission is to fulfil the aspirations 
of the people of Papua New Guinea. 
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In another report of the Ombudsman Commission, entitled “Investigation Report 
into the Julian Ronald Moti Affair, Final Report 2009” (Moti Report), the Ombudsman 
Commission investigated the breach of the Extradition Act 2005 and the Civil Aviation 
Act 2000. The case concerned Julian Moti, an Australian citizen wanted by the Australian 
Federal Police for alleged sexual offences committed in Vanuatu. Mr Moti was 
subsequently appointed by the Solomon Islands government as Attorney-General. Papua 
New Guinea Police, acting on an extradition request from Australia, detained Moti as he 
was transiting through Port Moresby to Honiara. While he was in police custody, a 
political directive was issued for Moti’s release. A military plane subsequently ferried 
him to Solomon Islands (also upon political prompting). The Ombudsman Commission 
determined there were breaches of both the Extradition Act and the Civil Aviation Act by 
state services and governmental bodies involved in the saga. One of its findings stated: 
Finding No 10 
In the opinion of the Ombudsman Commission the PNGDF (Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force) officials’ actions to facilitate the transportation of Mr Moti to 
Solomon Islands were in breach of the Civil Aviation Act 2000. 
The PNGDF had acted at the behest of political directives to carry out the 
operation.33 Again, there was scope for the use of the NGDP and/or BSO. Principle 1 of 
Goal 3 directs: 
(1) our leaders to be committed to these National Goals and Directive 
Principles, to ensure that their freedom to make decisions is not restricted 
by obligations to or relationship with others, and to make all of their 
decisions in the national interest; and 
In this instance, a relationship with a foreign national (Julian Moti) resulted in the 
breach of national laws. This particular NGDP should have been brought to prominence 
in the Ombudsman Commission report. The Moti Report had only focused on whether 
the government officials had complied with the Extradition Act and the Civil Aviation 
Act. But there was there was also scope for the Ombudsman Commission to incorporate 
the NGDP and BSO in its report. By referring to the NGDP and BSO, the Moti Report 
would have contributed to their implementation. The Ombudsman Commission would 
have emphasised the NGDP and BSO should guide all governmental activity.  
                                                     
33The Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea Investigation Report into the Julian Ronald Moti 
Affair, Final Report 2009 (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 2009) at 47. 
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In 2010, the Ombudsman Commission released a report entitled “Investigation 
into the Department of Lands and Physical Planning Rezoning, Leasing and Registering 
of the Land Title for Section 31 Allotment 03 Kimbe Issued to Quinquing Trading 
Limited” (Lands Department Report). In that Report the Ombudsman Commission 
investigated the allocation of a land designated for public use to private commercial 
purposes. One of the matters the Ombudsman Commission was concerned with was the 
manner in which public land was allocated to private commercial use. The Lands 
Department is required by the Land Act 1996 to publicly advertise any government land 
which it wishes to allocate for development purposes.34 The land was exempted from 
advertisement and only one applicant tendered for it – Quinquing Trading Limited.  
The primary focus of the Report was the legality of the procedures relating to allocation 
of state land under the Land Act. The Ombudsman Commission found the Lands 
Department officials acted wrongly when they exempted Section 31 Allotment 03 Kimbe 
from public tender and allocated it to Quinquing Trading Limited. 
Here also there was opportunity for the Ombudsman Commission to incorporate 
the NGDP and BSO in the Lands Department report. Directive Principle 1 of Goal 2 
states: 
(1) an equal opportunity for every citizen to take part in the political, 
economic, social, religious and cultural life of the country … . 
This idea of participation in the development of the country is also emphasised in the 
BSO: 
(b) to recognize that they can fully develop their capabilities and advance their 
true interests only by active participation in the development of the 
national community as a whole … . 
Allocating state land without public advertisement does not give the opportunity 
to every citizen to take part in the economic life of the country. The Lands Department 
Report was an important one, and should have taken the opportunity to refer to the NGDP 
especially Directive Principle 1 of Goal 2 and paragraph (b) of the BSO. Public reports 
present an important opportunity to draw the attention of state services and governmental 
bodies to the NGDP and BSO.  
                                                     
34 Land Act 1996, ss 68 and 69. 
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A report which has, however, demonstrated a strong commitment to implementing 
the NGDP and BSO was the “Investigation into the Decision of the National Forest Board 
to Award Kamula Doss Forest Management Area to Wawoi Guavi Timber Company (A 
Subsidiary of Rimbunan Hijau) As an Extension of the Wawoi Guavi Timber Resource 
Permit, Final Report, July 2002” (National Forest Board Report 2002).35 It is 
recommended the Ombudsman Commission consistently adopt this approach. 
The circumstances of the case relate to the awarding of a licence to log in an area 
of land described as Kamula Doss Forest Management Area, some 791,400 hectares in 
size.36 The applicant, Wawoi Guavi Timber Company, did not meet the stringent 
requirements of the Forest Act 1991 yet a timber permit was granted to it. Part of the 
requirements included compliance with environmental standards and obtaining consent 
from the indigenous landowners. The Ombudsman Commission found the conduct of 
several government officials was wrongful because they did not meet the legal and policy 
requirements. Consequently, the Commission made several recommendations to prevent 
such conduct in future. In terms of the NGDP, the National Forest Board Report 2002 
covered s 25 of the Constitution and goal 4 on natural resources and the environment:37 
Five National Goals and Directive Principles are proclaimed in the preamble to 
the Constitution. The preamble directs all persons and bodies, corporate and 
incorporated, to be guided by these declared Directives in pursuing and achieving 
our aims. 
Directive 4 relates to natural resources and the environment. A fiduciary duty is 
imposed on those who are responsible for decision-making on our natural 
resources and environment.  
This is an example the Ombudsman Commission ought to use consistently in its report to 
remind state services and governmental bodies of their duty to implement the NGDP 
and/or BSO.  
If the Ombudsman Commission incorporated the NGDP and BSO directly in a 
public report two obvious advantages would ensue. First, it would draw the attention of 
state services and governmental bodies to the duty they have under ss 25 and 63 of the 
Constitution to implement the NGDP and BSO. The failure of Governmental bodies and 
                                                     
35 National Forest Board Report¸ 2002, above n 30. 
36 A forest management area is a piece of land, which the government has identified for the issuance of 
timber permit over the area, to any company that wishes to log there; but only after a public tender process 
and the incumbent satisfying relevant laws and policies, especially under the Forestry Act 1991. 
37 National Forest Board Report, 2002, above n 30, at 71. 
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state services to implement the NGDP and BSO can result in adverse findings against 
them. As such it is a duty that cannot be ignored.  
Second, if the recommendations of the Ombudsman Commission are carried out, 
an opportunity for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO emerges. Later in the 
chapter, it will be argued there is potential for implementation of Ombudsman 
Commission recommendations through the administrative judicial review remedy of 
mandamus. This is an area of the law that is not very clear but an increasing number of 
cases may help clarify it. 
4 Defects in law or administrative conduct  
Determining what is “defective law” or “defective administrative conduct” is a broad 
inquiry. One approach taken by the Ombudsman Commission in 2009 is particularly 
useful for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO. This thesis proposes the adoption 
of this method to ensure implementation. The Ombudsman Commission published a 
report entitled “Investigation Report into the Appointment and Conduct of Hamish Sharp 
in the National Maritime Safety Authority Board” (NMSA Report). The report inquired 
into whether the Minister for Transport complied with the National Maritime Safety 
Authority Act 2009 when he appointed members to the National Maritime Safety 
Authority (NMSA) Board. Section 7 of the NMSA Act required adequate board 
representation from the four regions of the country. The Ombudsman Commission found 
the NMSA Board did not have any policy in place to implement s 7(1)(d) of the Act and, 
therefore, the appointment practice (or process) was defective.  
The Commission’s relevant finding was:38 
Finding No 3 
In the opinion of the Ombudsman Commission, the National Maritime Safety 
Authority’s administrative practice is defective in that it does not have a policy 
in place to guide appointments under section 7(1)(d) of the NMSA Act.  
There is a stronger case for investigating a state service or governmental body for 
defective administrative practice for failure to put in place policies for the implementation 
of the NGDP and/or BSO. A proposal for what such an investigation would involve is 
                                                     
38 NMSA Report, above n 30, at 24. 
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presented below. This would be a possible legal avenue for the Ombudsman Commission 
to explore means of implementing the NGDP and BSO on a broad scale. 
5 Discriminatory practice  
The function of the Ombudsman Commission as an anti-discrimination body would also 
by inference incorporate National Goal two on equality and participation and the BSO, 
paragraph (f) to observe human rights. Section 55 of the Constitution is the main anti-
discrimination provision.39 National Goal 2 on equality and participation is reinforced by 
s 55 and often referred to when human rights claims in court are made for breaching s 
55.40 This thesis proposes Ombudsman Commission reports dealing with discrimination 
should refer to the NGDP and BSO as a matter of course. 
In cases where the Ombudsman Commission investigates discrimination, active 
reference must be made to the NGDP and BSO, so that an impression is made on the 
government of the basic purpose of its existence which is to fulfil the NGDP and BSO 
aspirations. Furthermore, the BSO calls for the respect of human rights and freedoms. 
In the 2009 Police Report discussed above, the residence the police raided was 
alleged to have been a brothel.41 Persons apprehended were accused of being involved in 
prostitution. The Ombudsman Commission found the suspects’ treatment was 
humiliating: 
Finding No 4 
In the opinion of the Ombudsman Commission the Police actions were 
humiliating to the victims. 
The evidence the Ombudsman Commission relied on to substantiate its findings 
was:42 
                                                     
39 There are two Acts which also prevent discrimination, which the Ombudsman Commission administers: 
Discriminatory Practices Act 1963 and the HIV/AIDS Management and Prevention Act 2003. 
40 See for example Re Application under Section 57 of the Constitution; Application by Individual and 
Community Rights Advocacy Forum Inc (ICRAF); Re Miriam Willingal [1997] PGNC 7 N1506, 10 
February 1997 where the Court held the custom of “head pay”, which allows the giving of an unmarried 
woman as part of compensation, was declared unconstitutional for being inconsistent with human rights 
provisions of the Constitution, including s 55. Reference was also made to the NGDP in the Court’s 
decision. 
41 Prostitution is illegal in Papua New Guinea, see Summary Offences Act 1977, ss 55– 57. 
42 Police Report, above no 26, at 17. 
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 The victims were required to blow, chew condoms and hold them above 
their heads as they marched to Boroko Police Station; 
 The victims were subjected to bystanders’ comments like: “Oh look at them 
what do they look for and they are the ones mostly affected by the AIDS 
virus”; 
 The bystanders shouted and made humiliating remarks such as: “You are 
the carriers of HIV and all these are spreading to other people and you 
shouldn’t do that.”; and 
 The parading of the victims through the streets was humiliating and 
unnecessary and cannot be excused as necessary policing activity. 
The suspects were discriminated against because of the nature of the offence they 
were alleged to have committed. The following NGDP and BSO were applicable to the 
facts established by the Ombudsman Commission: 
 Everyone [is] to be involved in our endeavours to achieve integral human 
development of the whole person for every person and to seek fulfilment 
through his or her contribution to the common good (Directive Principle 1 
of Goal 1); and 
 To respect the rights and freedoms of others, and to co-operate fully with 
others in the interests of interdependence and solidarity (paragraph (f) of 
BSO). 
The suspects were treated contrary to the Goal on integral human development and the 
obligation to respect their rights and freedoms were not observed. 
It is proposed that where the Ombudsman Commission investigates acts of 
discriminatory practice, it should make reference to relevant NGDP and/or BSO 
applicable to the circumstances of the case. 
6 A proposal for investigation into government policy-making under defective laws 
and/or administrative practice jurisdiction of the Ombudsman Commission 
Investigating defects in law or administrative practice can provide an opportunity to 
implement the NGDP and BSO meaningfully. It enables the Ombudsman Commission to 
comment on broader policy and legal issues from the angle of the NGDP and BSO.  
There may be policies or legislation that do not adequately provide for the NGDP and 
BSO or that are even inconsistent with them. Another provision in addition to s 219(1) of 
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the Constitution that amplifies the Ombudsman Commission’s administrative complaints 
function in relation to the NGDP and BSO is s 219(3): 
(3) The Commission shall not inquire into the justifiability of a policy of the 
National Government or a Minister or a provincial government or a 
member of a provincial executive, except insofar as the policy may be 
contrary to law or to the National Goals and Directive Principles, the Basic 
Rights or the Basic Social Obligations, or of any act of the Parliament. 
The only likely limitation would be that it should relate to a matter of 
administration, consistent with s 219(8) of the Constitution. Consequently, a liberal 
definition of what constitutes “administrative conduct” should replace the present 
interpretation to strengthen the role of the Ombudsman Commission to address general 
societal concerns. The current authority on the point is SCR No 1 of 1978; Re Ombudsman 
Commission Investigations of the Public Solicitor where the Court observed:43  
The powers of the Ombudsman Commission, save and except with regard to 
discriminatory practices and under Div. III.2 (leadership code), are limited to the 
investigation of administrative conduct. “Conduct” in s. 219 of the Constitution 
means any action (or alleged action) or inaction (or alleged inaction) relating to 
a matter of administration. It is government officials or public servants or 
members of the State Services who perform most of the administrative functions 
at which ombudsman legislation of this type is primarily directed. If one looks at 
the mischief aimed at by the ombudsman legislation in Papua New Guinea, the 
object was to protect the public from maladministration by government officials 
and hardly to protect the public (which already has recourse to other remedies) 
from professional misconduct or the mal-performance of legal aid services. 
This interpretation is helpful but may be restrictive as s 219(3) specifically refers 
to government policy. A useful definition of what constitutes administrative conduct 
broad enough to incorporate the NGDP and BSO was made in the Canadian case of Re 
British Columbia Development Corporation v Friedmann, where Dickson J held:44 
There is nothing in the words administration or administrative which excludes 
the propriety of business decisions of governmental organisations. On the 
contrary, the words are fully broad enough to encompass all conduct engaged in 
by a governmental authority in furtherance of government policy-business or 
otherwise. 
                                                     
43 SCR No 1 of 1978; Re Ombudsman Commission Investigations of the Public Solicitor [1978] PGSC 7, 
[1978] PNGLR 345, 6 October 1978. 
44 Re British Columbia Development Corporation v Friedmann (1984) 14 DLR (4th) 129 (SCC) at 139–
140. 
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In my view, the phrase “a matter of administration” encompasses everything 
done by governmental authorities in the implementation of government policy. I 
would exclude only the activities of the legislature and the courts from the 
Ombudsman’s scrutiny. 
It is submitted that where a governmental body does not have an adequate policy 
to demonstrate how it can implement the NGDP and/or BSO, this amounts to defective 
administrative practice (or conduct).45 Defective administrative practice occurs because 
a governmental body has not implemented its constitutional duty under ss 25 and 63.  
Such an approach is based on the current practice of the Ombudsman Commission 
discussed above in the NMSA Report. The Ombudsman Commission found as defective 
administrative practice a lack of policy to implement s 7 of the NMSA Act. By analogy, 
it is recommended the Ombudsman Commission adopt a similar approach to see whether 
state services and governmental bodies have policies in place to implement the NGDP 
and BSO. The Ombudsman Commission is ideally placed to investigate state services and 
governmental bodies’ policies and decision-making processes to understand at least from 
an administrative point of view why the NGDP and BSO are not being implemented. 
Based on this inquiry the Ombudsman Commission can recommend measures to 
overcome the deficiency. 
There are many state services and governmental bodies.46 The Ombudsman 
Commission could identify two or three of these entities and use them as a pilot study to 
conduct investigations. The main outcomes of these findings can be used by other 
governmental bodies to develop their policies to implement the NGDP and BSO.  
An investigation of this nature would cover the aspects presented below. What is 
significant about s 219(3) in the implementation framework is that it presents an 
opportunity the courts would not have, because often, they only intervene when there is 
an actual dispute. Under this function, general societal concerns about the direction of the 
country can be reviewed and commented on by the Ombudsman Commission in light of 
the failure to implement the NGDP and BSO. 
(a) Enabling legislation 
The first part of the Ombudsman Commission’s investigation would define the objectives 
and functions of the state service or governmental body. The Commission would be able 
                                                     
45 “Administrative practice” and “administrative conduct” are used interchangeably. 
46 This observation is based on definition of governmental bodies and state services in the Constitution: see 
sch 1.2(1) and s 188, respectively. 
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to define the functions from a close study of the legislation and the provisions in the law 
that establish the state service and governmental body. Defining the specific function of 
a state service or governmental body helps formulate the findings of the report and point 
to the Ombudsman Commission which NGDP and/or BSO is most appropriate for the 
state service or governmental body to implement; or whether a more generic policy is 
more suitable to allow discretion to the state service or governmental body. Obviously 
enabling legislation that has made express reference to the NGDP and/or BSO in line with 
the recommendations in chapter 7 would enable a clearer direction for the Commission’s 
inquiry. 
(b) Relevant NGDP and/or BSO  
After the Ombudsman Commission has considered the functions of the state service or 
governmental body from the latter’s operating legislation, the relevant NGDP and/or BSO 
applicable will usually become clear. For example, the National Housing Corporation 
(NHC) under its operating legislation has as its first function the improvement of housing 
conditions.47 The relevant goals and principles relevant to the National Housing 
Corporation would be Goal 1 on integral human development: 
… every person to be dynamically involved in the process of freeing himself or 
herself from every form of domination or oppression so that each man or woman 
will have the opportunity to develop as a whole person in relationship with others. 
Living in oppressive housing conditions is not a fulfilment of this Goal. In fact 
having good accommodation is interrelated with achieving many other developmental 
aspirations, for instance good health. This would mean that the NHC in its policies and 
decision-making process should make reference to these goals and principles. 
(c) Current Practice/Policy 
After identifying which NGDP and/or BSO is relevant to the state service or 
governmental body, the Ombudsman Commission would look at the existing policies and 
practices to see how a particular state service or governmental body have incorporated 
the NGDP and/or BSO in them. The Ombudsman Commission would determine whether 
there are adequate provisions in the policy to implement the NGDP and/or BSO. 
                                                     
47 National Housing Corporation Act 1990, s 28(1)(a). 
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(d) Recommendations 
The final part of the report would contain recommendations. After studying the enabling 
legislation and existing policy practices, the Ombudsman Commission would recommend 
which NGDP and/or BSO is particularly relevant for the state service or governmental 
body and avenues in which they can be implemented. Alternatively, the Ombudsman 
Commission may recommend a more general policy to engage the NGDP and/or BSO as 
and when the state service or governmental body sees fit. This may result in the state 
service or governmental body having to amend its current policies.  
After the recommendations are made, it falls on the state service or governmental 
body to implement them. Failure to implement the recommendations without good 
reason(s) can result in the Ombudsman Commission taking up enforcement proceedings. 
The nature of such enforcement proceedings is discussed in the next part of the chapter.  
C Legal Consideration of Ombudsman Commission Reports/Recommendations 
The position on the status of the Ombudsman Commission reports is unclear.  
In s 219(6), the Constitution states: 
Except as provided by or under Division III.2 (leadership code), the 
Commission’s powers of enforcement are limited to publicity for its proceedings, 
reports and recommendations, to the making of reports and recommendations to 
the Parliament and other appropriate authorities as provided by an Organic Law, 
and to the giving of advice. 
The Constitution limits the enforcement of recommendation to publicity, but goes 
further to provide for the enactment of an Organic Law to give effect to this.  
The Organic Law that gives effect to this provision is the Organic Law on the 
Ombudsman Commission. Section 22(3) states: 
If the Commission so requests, the responsible Minister, Permanent Head or 
statutory head as the case may be, shall, within such period as specified by the 
Commission, notify the Commission as to the steps (if any) that he proposes to 
take to give effect to its recommendations. 
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This is how the Ombudsman Commission has interpreted the legal effect of  
s 22(3) in its reports:48 
Accordingly, there is a duty placed on each recipient of a recommendation to 
notify the Commission; and if it is proposed not to implement any 
recommendation, there is a further duty to give cogent and convincing reasons 
why recommendations cannot or should not be implemented. These duties arise 
due to a combined effect of the Constitution and the Organic Law on the 
Ombudsman Commission. 
A failure to comply with these duties may result in the Ombudsman Commission 
commencing enforcement proceedings in the National Court, pursuant to s 23 of 
the Constitution. 
A decision of the National Court may provide an avenue to support the legal duty 
to provide reasons for not complying with the Ombudsman Commission’s 
recommendations.49 In Niggints v Tokam, a terminated government employee had his 
dismissal reviewed by the Public Service Commission.50 The Public Service Commission 
recommended Niggints’ reinstatement to his previous position. The recommendation was 
not attended to and he sought judicial review of his former employer’s decision. The 
Court held the Commission’s recommendation should not be ignored:51 
The departmental head is, in my view, required by common-sense and the need 
for public administrative accountability to give serious consideration to the 
Commission’s recommendation and the reason for it. Having considered the 
recommendation, if it is decided not to accept it, then the reason for not so 
accepting the recommendation should be provided to the aggrieved officer, 
because the officer has a right to seek judicial review as the applicant has done 
in this case … . 
The recommendation of the Ombudsman Commission in the report is made under 
law after according natural justice to those adversely commented on. In fact, the 
recommendations are authorised by a constitutional law. Interpreting these two provisions 
(Constitution s 219(6) and OLOC s 22(3)) in a way they apply concurrently, the 
Ombudsman Commission would not be able to directly implement its recommendations, 
but could compel the head of the state service or governmental body to whom the 
recommendations are addressed, to demonstrate what steps he or she intends to take to 
                                                     
48The Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea Investigation into the Purchase of The 
Conservatory, Cairns by the Public Officers Superannuation Fund Board and associated transactions and 
arrangements, Final Report November 1999 (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1999) at 354. 
49 Cannings, above no 8, at 208. 
50 Niggints v Tokam [1993] PNGLR 66.  
51 Per Amet J. 
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implement them. “Cogent and convincing” reasons should be provided in the event of 
non-implementation of the recommendations.  
Section 22 of the Constitution empowers courts to create procedures to enforce 
constitutional duties, where there are no mechanisms to enforce them.52 The duty in this 
instance is created by an Organic Law and sanctioned by the Constitution. Further, s 23 
of the Constitution provides various alternative remedies for breach of constitutional 
duties.53 In any case, it is a duty stemming from statute. What would be the appropriate 
process to enforce duties arising from Ombudsman Commission recommendation(s)? 
United Kingdom decisions have recognised administrative judicial review procedures 
with the remedy of mandamus to enforce statutory duties.54 Ombudsman Commission’s 
recommendations confer a public duty, directed to public authorities. That is to say, the 
basis of the Ombudsman Commission’s recommendations are designed rectify conduct 
of public entities falling short of constitutional expectations, which should be considered 
a public duty. Kapi Dep CJ remarks in Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 
10; Calling of the Parliament; Reference by the Ombudsman Commission (Calling of 
Parliament) allows scope for the enforcement of constitutional duties.55 Kapi Dep CJ held 
the remedy of mandamus in an administrative judicial review, can be used to implement 
constitutional (and public) duties.56 The reasoning was based on an analogy from the 
United Kingdom where statutory duties can be implemented by mandamus.57 
The Ombudsman Commission would institute proceedings against the head of the 
state service or governmental body as the case may be. The court would be asked to 
compel the head of the state service or governmental body to provide an explanation for 
non-implementation of the recommendation(s). If an order is successfully obtained 
against the head of the entity, he or she must provide adequate reasons for not 
implementing the recommendations.  
                                                     
52 Chapter 7 also discusses ss 22 and 23 of the Constitution. 
53 Organic Laws are considered as part of constitutional laws, see Constitution, sch 1.2.2. The Organic Law 
on the Ombudsman Commission would therefore be regarded as constitutional law. 
54 See R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn (No 1) [1968] 2 QB 118 (CA), 
[1968] 1 All ER 763; R v Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No 3) [1973] QB 241 (CA); R v 
Greater London Council, ex parte Blackburn [1976] 3 All ER 184 (CA). 
55 Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 10; Calling of the Parliament; Reference by the 
Ombudsman Commission [1999] PGSC 21, SC628, 25 June 1999 [Calling of Parliament]. This case was 
referred to in chapter 7. 
56 Constitution, s 218. 
57 See Calling of Parliament, above n 55, where English cases were discussed to draw useful analogy. 
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D Leadership Code Function  
1 Introduction  
Not all government leaders are subject to the Leadership Code; only those that have been 
expressly identified in s 26 of the Constitution are. They are Members of Parliament, 
Ministers and judges amongst others. The duties and responsibilities of leadership are 
only expected of leaders covered under s 26; failure to meet the standards of the 
Leadership Code is considered misconduct. 
This chapter will focus on the Ombudsman Commission, but there are also other 
bodies involved in the implementation of the NGDP and BSO in the Leadership Code 
process.58 They are the Public Prosecutor and the Tribunal.59 Each one of them makes its 
decision independently of the other. The following is a brief description of what each 
body does.  
The Ombudsman Commission investigates the allegations for misconduct in 
office based on s 27 of the Constitution and the OLDRL. If there is a case against the 
leader, the Ombudsman Commission asks the leader to respond by way of what is called 
a “right to be heard”.60 If the Ombudsman Commission is not satisfied with the leader’s 
explanation, believing there is a prima facie case against the leader, it refers the 
allegations to the Public Prosecutor to independently review the case, accompanied by a 
statement of reasons.61 The statement of reasons sets out the nature of the allegations.  
If the Public Prosecutor is also satisfied there is a case against the leader (based on the 
statement of reasons), the Public Prosecutor requests the Chief Justice to empanel a 
tribunal to inquire into the allegations. The Public Prosecutor then prosecutes the leader 
before the Tribunal. It can be seen the Ombudsman Commission has the initial role to set 
                                                     
58 See Public Prosecutor's Power, above no 17, for a discussion of the extent of the involvement of each of 
these bodies, such as the Public Prosecutor and the appropriate tribunal. 
59 The name of the tribunal and its constitution depends on the category of leader referred: see Public 
Prosecutor's Power, above n 16. 
60 A right to be heard is a natural justice requirement where allegations against a leader is put to the leader, 
for a response within a specific time period. Depending on the response, the Ombudsman Commission then 
decides to refer the leader for prosecution for misconduct in office. 
61 The statement of reasons is referred to in s 27(1) of the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities 
of Leadership. A statement of reasons was described by Kapi J in Re The Leadership Tribunal; Bonga v 
Sheehan [1997] PGNC 20 N1512, 4 March 1997 as two-fold. For the Public Prosecutor, it provides the 
basis to consider whether he or she should proceed with prosecution. Second, when it is placed before the 
tribunal by the Public Prosecutor (required by law) it is not evidence, but simply indicates the nature and 
direction the inquiry may take.  
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the scene (or terms of reference) for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO under the 
Leadership Code function despite there being other independent entities involved, too.62 
2 Methodology 
If the Ombudsman Commission’s investigation against a leader reveals a prima face case 
of misconduct in office, the allegations are prepared against the leader. The leader is then 
formally (and confidentially) informed of his or her alleged infringement of the 
Leadership Code. The allegations are eventually inquired into by the Tribunal.  
It is, therefore, important to understand the way the allegations are formulated to 
determine the scope of implementation of the NGDP and BSO. Essentially, the facts of 
the case are considered against the standards of the general duties expected of leaders 
under s 27 of the Constitution. These duties are stated in broad terms: 
 Not to have a conflict of interest; 
 Not to demean the office; 
 Not to allow their official or personal integrity to be called into question; 
and 
 Not to endanger or diminish respect for confidence in the integrity of 
government in Papua New Guinea. 
In Application of John Mua Nilkare, a decision of the Supreme Court, Kapi Dep 
CJ made an important observation about the ambit of s 27 of the Constitution on what 
kind of behaviour constitutes misconduct in office:63 
The other three types of conduct (s 27(1)(b) to (d)) are expressed in very wide 
and general terms. It is incapable of precise definition. In fact any kind of 
definition is likely to fall short of what this provision was intended to cover. 
These provisions cast a very wide net to catch all kinds of conduct by leaders. 
One thing is clear; it is the public perception of the leader, which is the dominant 
theme. Section 27(2) speaks about "doubt in the public mind". When a leader 
demeans his office or his integrity is called into question this will diminish the 
respect for and confidence of government. 
As s 27 has wide scope of application, it is submitted that a leader can commit 
misconduct for breaching the NGDP and BSO. The NGDP and BSO were expected by 
                                                     
62 But the Ombudsman Commission has a reserve power to initiate prosecution, if the Public Prosecutor 
has not commenced prosecution within a reasonable time of the referral: see Constitution, s 29(2). The 
Supreme Court held in Public Prosecutor's Power a reasonable time was considered to be one to four 
months, except where the special circumstances of a case require longer period, above n 16, at [23]. 
63 Application of John Mua Nilkare, SC 536 at [27] per Kapi DCJ. 
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the CPC to be the basis upon which the performance of a leader is judged.64 The public 
perception of a leader is determined by the leader’s efforts to realise the NGDP and BSO. 
If there are any doubts to including the NGDP and BSO in determining misconduct, ss 
25(4) and 63(4) of the Constitution conclusively settle the issue by making them 
justiciable. In SCR No 2 of 1992; Re The Leadership Code the court said:65 
Subsection 25(4) enables the Tribunal, for the purposes of the Leadership Code, 
to take the National Goals and Directive Principles fully into account in all cases 
as appropriate.  
In In the Matter of a Reference by the Public Prosecutor and the Hon Melchior 
Pep, Member of Parliament (Melchior Pep), the tribunal stated that a leader was bound 
by the NGDP by virtue of s 25 of the Constitution.66 This observation would equally apply 
to the BSO because s 63 of the Constitution is similar to s 25. The justiciability of the 
NGDP and BSO under the Leadership Code should as a result support the incorporation 
of the NGDP and BSO in the misconduct assessment performed by the Ombudsman 
Commission. 
Essentially, a leader’s conduct is assessed against the general duties under s 27 of 
the Constitution and then against the specific duties in the OLDRL. In addition to the 
specific offences under the OLDRL, misconduct also occurs where breach of specific 
rules and guidelines (for example financial procedures), are breached. 
The CPC was of the view that if Papua New Guinea was to have a good 
opportunity to implement its NGDP and BSO, the ultimate responsibility firmly rested 
with the country’s leaders.67 It is, therefore, not surprising that the Constitution expressly 
made the NGDP and BSO justiciable under the Leadership Code function.68 This is a 
clear indication to the Ombudsman Commission by the Constitution of the importance of 
the NGDP and BSO to its functions under the Leadership Code.  
                                                     
64 CPC Report, above n 1, at 2/1 [6]. 
65 SCR No 2 of 1992; Re The Leadership Code [1992] PGSC 16, [1992] PNGLR 336, 31 July 1992 per 
Kidu CJ, Amet, Los and Andrew JJ. 
66 Re Reference by the Public Prosecutor and the Hon Melchior Pep, Member of Parliament, Unreported 
decision of the Leadership Tribunal, 14 October 1992, [Melchior Pep] at 1. 
67 CPC Report, above n 1, at 3/2 [13]. 
68 Constitution, ss 25(4) and 63(4). 
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3 Formulation of the misconduct allegations  
A review undertaken by the thesis of the allegations inquired into by the Tribunal revealed 
that the Ombudsman Commission do not commonly charge (for want of a better word) 
leaders for breaching the NGDP and BSO under their leadership duties and 
responsibilities.69 That is, the practice by the Ombudsman Commission to use the NGDP 
and BSO as directly justiciable in framing misconduct allegations. If the Ombudsman 
Commission framed allegations to cover breaches of the NGDP and BSO more 
commonly, then there would be a greater opportunity to measure the conduct of leaders 
against them when it comes to the tribunal stage because the terms of reference would 
have been set earlier in the process. 
Re reference by the Public Prosecutor and the Hon Edward Ramu Diro (Diro) 
was an important case in which the Ombudsman Commission could have formulated its 
charges to take greater account of the NGDP and BSO.70 It concerned a former Member 
of Parliament and Minister, Edward Diro. There were 76 misconduct counts levelled 
against the leader and considered by the Tribunal in 1991; he was found guilty of all 
except five counts. Two counts which could have directly incorporated the NGDP were 
counts 44 and 45. The allegation covered Diro’s receipt of $US139,400 from a foreign 
military general, which he did not declare to the Ombudsman Commission. This was a 
matter that directly relates to Goal 3, national sovereignty and self-reliance. The leader’s 
actions compromised the sovereignty of the country. Whilst the Tribunal found the 
allegation to be true, the non-reference to the NGDP suggests a lack of awareness by the 
Ombudsman Commission of the importance the CPC placed on leaders to implement the 
NGDP and BSO. The allegations could have been couched in terms including the NGDP 
and BSO. Alternatively, the Tribunal could have also have alluded to the NGDP and BSO 
on its own initiative in deciding the moral culpability of the leader. The Tribunal did not 
do so. 
An example of a case investigated by the Ombudsman Commission and 
prosecuted in the Leadership Tribunal that did take the duty under ss 25(4) and 63(4) into 
account was Re Peter Yama, Member of Parliament.71 The relevant misconduct charge 
                                                     
69 Many of the Tribunal decisions are not publicly available, and were obtained from the records of the 
Ombudsman Commission office in Port Moresby. 
70 Re reference by the Public Prosecutor and the Hon Edward Ramu Diro, unreported decision of the 
Leadership Tribunal, Recommendations on Penalty, 27 September 1991.  
71 Re Peter Yama, Member of Parliament [2004] PGLT 2; N2746, 1 December 2004 [Peter Yama]. 
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against the leader, incorporating the NGDP, is quoted in full from the Tribunal’s reported 
decision:72 
ALLEGATION 16: THAT in 1995, the Leader failed to carry out the obligations 
imposed by Section 27 (1) of the Constitution; 
By conducting himself in his public life and in his associations with other persons 
in such a way that he: 
(a) placed himself in a position in which he had a conflict of interests; and 
(b) demeaned his office as the member for Sumkar Open and Minister for 
Transport and Works; and 
(c) allowed his official integrity and his personal integrity to be called into 
question; and 
(d) endangered and diminished respect for and confidence in the integrity of 
government in Papua New Guinea 
AND FURTHERMORE the Leader failed to carry out the obligations imposed 
by Section 27(2) of the Constitution; 
BY using his office for personal gain and entering into transactions that might be 
expected to give rise to doubt in the public mind as to whether he was carrying 
out the duty imposed by Section 27(1) of the Constitution; 
IN THAT having been politically responsible for K21.8 million of public money 
intended for allocation among the 109 members of the  National  Parliament 
under Vote No 259-3601-5-202 for those members to in turn apply to specific 
transport projects in each of their electorates approved for funding under the 
Rural Transport Development Program, he— 
(i) distributed that public money contrary to the  principles of fair and 
equitable distribution required by the  National Goals and Directive 
Principles; and [emphasis added] 
(ii) failed to allocate any funds under the Rural Transport Program to a 
considerable number of electorates; and 
(iii) allocated the grossly disproportionate amount of K1,557,640.00 of that 
public money to projects in his own electorate; and 
(iv) having allocated a grossly disproportionate amount of funds to projects in 
his electorate, failed to apply those funds to his nominated projects and 
applied those funds to other unauthorised purposes; and 
(v) converted a substantial part of the funds intended for his electorate, being 
public money, to his personal use and the use of his associates; and 
                                                     
72 Peter Yama. 
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(vi) failed to provide to the administering authority, the Department of 
Transport, a full and prompt acquittal of how the funds were disbursed, 
despite being the Minister with political responsibility for the Rural 
Transport Development Program. 
THEREBY being guilty of misconduct in office under s. 27 (5)(b) of the 
Constitution. 
This allegation of a breach of the general duty under s 27 of the Constitution is 
followed by a detailed explanation of the circumstances constituting the breach.  
The provisions of s 27 can be interpreted in light of the NGDP and BSO and furthermore, 
the specific NGDP and/or BSO offended are spelt out after highlighting the general duty 
breached.  
Peter Yama was accused of breaching the NGDP in one of the series of 
allegations. The Tribunal decision was subjected to a number of judicial reviews and 
appeals, but at no point was the question of the justiciability of the NGDP challenged.73 
The reason is because this is allowed for under ss 25(4) and 63(3) of the Constitution.  
As was highlighted previously in this chapter, this method of using the NGDP and/or 
BSO is not common in the Ombudsman Commission. This thesis recommends that the 
Commission should use this approach more consistently when a leader’s conduct 
breaches the NGDP and BSO. What is important is that the reference to the NGDP and/or 
BSO operates in tandem with s 27 of the Constitution and the OLDRL. 
Yama was eventually found guilty of misconduct in office by the Leadership 
Tribunal. The Tribunal then proceeded to determine the penalty. As a result of allegation 
16, the Tribunal observed:74 
I am reminded that you have failed to distribute fairly and equitably K21.8 
million in public funds. The fact that you got for yourself K1,557,640 which was 
six times more than your approved share is indeed a cause for concern to all 
                                                     
73See for example Ombudsman Commission v Yama [2004] PGSC 30; SC747, 2 June 2004. 
74 Per Manuhu, senior magistrate at page 44 of the unedited decision on recommendation on penalty handed 
down on 1 December 2004. The edited version in the reported decision of the tribunal by the same member 
of the tribunal was to the following effect: 
The K21.8 million under the Rural Transport Development Program Fund of 1995, as the title implies were 
intended to improve the road infrastructure network of rural areas of the country where each of the 109 
Members of Parliament may have identified in their respective electorates. 
By the conduct of the leader, six electorates were deprived of the use of those public funds which were 
rightfully theirs in every sense of it.  
In my view his actions are not only unconstitutional but undemocratic. The political ministry he held 
belongs to the people of Papua New Guinea and as such all Papua New Guineans, regardless of their cultural 
background, language, tribe, or region, have equal constitutional rights to be treated equally and fairly, more 
so in this case, to receive their share of the national wealth. 
Furthermore, the actions of the leader do not promote the constitutional spirit of a united Papua New 
Guinea. 
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Papua New Guineans. As a leader you are bound by the National Goals and 
Directive Principles by virtue of s 25 of the Constitution. 
If the Ombudsman Commission adopts the approach in Peter Yama consistently 
in the formulation of allegations, it would become a standard consideration by the 
tribunal. It will form the basis upon which the tribunal focuses its determinations on the 
misconduct charges. This will ensure the leaders of the country are made increasingly 
sensitive to the NGDP and BSO and in turn influence the organisations they lead. In this 
way the NGDP and BSO can guide the government. 
In a later case of Re Reference by the Public Prosecutor under s 27(2) of the 
Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership and in the Matter of the 
Honourable Charlie Benjamin, Member of Parliament and Member for Manus Open, 
(Charlie Benjamin), with similar facts to the Peter Yama decision, the leader also 
misappropriated public funds, but no reference was made to breach of NGDP in the 
allegations referred to the tribunal.75 The comparable allegation to Peter Yama’s matter 
was stated this way: 
Allegation 9: 
That from October 1998 to March 2002 the Leader intentionally applied money 
forming part of a fund under the control of Papua New Guinea to purposes to 
which it could not lawfully be applied; 
In that having received K1,070,000 (NZ$500,000) in the form of fifteen (15) 
cheques from the National Government, under the Rural Action Program, being 
funds intended for the development of the Manus Open electorate in respect of 
the years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002, he-Applied a significant part of that 
public money to his personal use; and 
(a) Made approximately 198 unverifiable and/or improper debit transactions 
totalling about K667,507.48 (NZ$330,000) by writing out cheques to pay 
cash; and 
(b) Failed to properly acquit that money; 
Contrary to— 
(i) The requirements of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and 
Local-Level Governments; and 
(ii) The requirements of the Public Finances (Management) Act; and 
                                                     
75 Re Reference by the Public Prosecutor under s 27(2) of the Organic Law on the Duties and 
Responsibilities of Leadership and in the Matter of the Honourable Charlie Benjamin, Member of 
Parliament and Member for Manus Open, unreported decision of the Leadership Tribunal, 18 July 2006. 
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(iii) The implied conditions subject to which he was given control of that public 
money; 
Thereby being guilty of misconduct in office under Section 13 (a) of the Organic 
Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership  
What the leader did was contrary to National Goal 2 on equitable distribution of 
state resources. The allegations focused on breach of the Organic Law on Provincial 
Governments and Local-Level Governments, the Public Finance (Management) Act and 
the conditions of the grant of the funds. The Commission could have included the NGDP 
in the list of laws breached, so the tribunal would have deliberated on the allegation. 
A tribunal decision which took into account the NGDP despite the lack of 
reference in the allegations to the NGDP and/or BSO by the Ombudsman Commission 
was Melchior Pep.76 The Tribunal considered a number of allegations, one of which 
included the leader writing to the Prime Minister demanding financial support in 
exchange for supporting him in Parliament against potential votes of no confidence.  
After finding the leader guilty, the Tribunal proceeded to determine the penalty. In its 
decision on penalty the Tribunal stated the following with regards to the NGDP:77 
The Leadership Code under our Constitution places an onerous duty on our 
leaders. The public expects leaders to be committed to the National Goals and 
Directive Principles enshrined in our Constitution. Our leaders must ensure that 
their decisions are not restricted by obligations to or relationship with others and 
most importantly to make all of their decisions in the interests of the people and 
the country as a whole.  
Again the Tribunal has not been consistent in making such references to the 
NGDP and/or BSO. It should be. Although the Tribunal can refer to the NGDP and/or 
BSO on its own initiative, if allegations are framed on the basis of the NGDP and BSO, 
it would be required to make a finding on the allegation. 
In a case similar to Diro, concerning the serving military commander of the Papua 
New Guinea military, Jerry Singirok received money from a private international firm in 
the hope of the firm securing a military contract with the national government.  
Such conduct compromised the sovereignty of the country, which leaders are expressly 
                                                     
76 Melchior Pep, above n 66. 
77 At 1. 
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required to observe under Goal 3 of the NGDP.78 The breach of this Goal should have 
been raised in the allegation against the leader for the Tribunal to consider.   
4 Section 27(4) constitutional direction  
The constitutional mechanisms available to the Ombudsman Commission in its 
Leadership Code function also include the power to prevent the commission of 
misconduct by the leader. This is provided for in s 27(4) of the Constitution: 
(4) The Ombudsman Commission or other authority prescribed for the purpose 
under Section 28 (further provisions) may, subject to this Division and to any 
Organic Law made for the purposes of this Division, give directions, either 
generally or in a particular case, to ensure the attainment of the objects of this 
section. 
The extent of this power is similar to a court injunction.79 Any person to which 
the direction is addressed is bound by its terms. Persons that can be covered under the 
direction do not only include the leader and public institutions but can extend to private 
entities. For example, commercial banks can be directed to freeze accounts where leaders 
have deposited funds which are the subject of investigations. What is important is the 
subject of the direction relates to investigation of a leader. For example, in Peter Yama, 
on allegation 16, if the Ombudsman Commission had evidence before it that the leader 
had the intention of unfairly distributing money , it would have issued a direction under 
s 27(4) to prevent inequitable distribution. The Ombudsman Commission does not only 
have the power to investigate an event after it occurs, but can also ensure leaders perform 
their duties and responsibilities. 
The power under s 27(4) has been a matter of great debate in Papua New Guinea. 
It resulted in Parliament successfully passing constitutional amendments to curtail it in 
2010, amongst a number of other amendments to the Ombudsman Commission powers 
and functions. The Ombudsman Commission subsequently challenged these amendments 
in court under s 19 of the Constitution as a constitutional reference.80 The Supreme Court 
declared all the amendments unconstitutional. Of note was the Supreme Court’s ruling on 
                                                     
78 In the Matter of a Reference by the Public Prosecutor Pursuant to the Organic Law on the Duties and 
Responsibilities of Leadership and in the Matter of Major General Jerry Singirok, unreported decision of 
the Leadership Tribunal on Penalty, 21 March 2000. 
79 See for example Ombudsman Commission v Yer [2009] PGSC 45, SC1041, 3 August 2009, where the 
direction issued by the Ombudsman Commission was overturned by the court through a judicial review. 
80 SC Ref No. 1 of 2010, Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution, Section 19(2), In the Matter of: 
Constitutional (Amendment) Law 2008, Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea, 
SC 1302, 19 December 2013. 
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s 27(4). The amendments to s 27(4) were interpreted by the Court to give the government 
wide power to lift a direction if it interfered with government policy. The Court held the 
amendment to s 27(4) was unconstitutional. The basis of the finding of unconstitutionality 
of amendments to s 27(4) was breach of s 217(6) of the Constitution. Section 217(6) 
protects the Ombudsman Commission from direction or control by any person in the 
discharge of its functions. Section 27(4), therefore, continues to operate in its original 
form. It is a significant tool of the Ombudsman Commission in its supervision and 
enforcement of the Leadership Code. 
E Ability to Raise Constitutionality of Laws, Bills, etc 
1 Introduction 
Another important avenue the Ombudsman Commission has to ensure the 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO is the power to institute constitutional reviews 
under s 19 of the Constitution.81 The Ombudsman Commission is ideally placed to 
assume the role of initiating cases for the court to review the constitutionality of laws or 
Bills on the basis of whether adequate provision(s) have been made in the legislation or 
Bill to implement the NGDP and/or BSO. This is supported by the Ombudsman 
Commission’s general purpose under the Constitution to realise the aspirations of the 
people and its constitutional independence. The legal case for review of legislation or 
Bills for failure to implement the NGDP and BSO under s 19 was made in chapter 7. 
Other authorities are also conferred standing to invoke this constitutional review 
jurisdiction. But it is constitutionally desirable for the Ombudsman Commission to take 
up this role vis-à-vis the NGDP and BSO.82  
A general overview constitutional review follows. The section then outlines some 
arguments to support this role for the Ombudsman Commission. This thesis then further 
recommends that constitutional review takes place as early as possible perhaps through 
preventative injunctive relief to avoid inconvenience to legal relations arising as a result 
of the new law taking effect. 
                                                     
81 Section 19 of the Constitution was discussed in chapter 7. 
82 These authorities identified under s 19(3) of the Constitution. 
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2 Constitutional review/advisory opinion generally 
This section provides an overview of the nature of constitutional review and the legal 
nature of the Papua New Guinea model.83 Constitutional review in Papua New Guinea 
can take place absent an actual dispute. 
(a) Different procedures of constitutional review  
Constitutional review in Papua New Guinea can be invoked in a number of ways.84  
Three common avenues are ss 18(1), 18(2), and 19(1) of the Constitution. Under s 18(1) 
any person can raise a constitutional issue by filing proceedings directly in the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court will hear the matter as the court of first instance and there is 
no further appeal. For example, if the government makes a decision inconsistent with the 
Constitution, a person who is directly affected can ask the Supreme Court to review the 
decision and make declarations as to its constitutional validity.85  
The second example, s 18(2), is where a court other than the Supreme Court (such 
as the National Court) or tribunal hears a matter and a constitutional issue(s) arises during 
the proceedings. The proceedings will be suspended and the matter sent to the Supreme 
Court to resolve the referred issue(s). After the issue is resolved in the Supreme Court it 
is remitted to the court or tribunal to complete the hearing.86 The third option is reserved 
for specific authorities which can raise constitutional issues before the Supreme Court 
under s 19(1). Whereas it is important in the first two examples for the litigant to 
demonstrate an interest in the issue and to have standing, in this third example, an entity’s 
appearance before the court is by reference to the law and no interest in the issue has to 
be demonstrated.87 This thesis focuses on constitutional reviews under this third option: 
s 19(1). 
                                                     
83 The term constitutional review is used as opposed to judicial review because the latter is used to describe 
administrative judicial reviews. 
84 See Peter Bayne Constitutional Review Jurisdiction in Papua New Guinea (Law Reform Commission of 
Papua New Guinea, Waigani, 1981) which discusses the various options. 
85 See for example Ombudsman Commission v National Parliament [2003] PGSC 19, SC721, 21 November 
2003. 
86 For example see Re Powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Commissioner of Police [2014] 
PGSC 19, SC1388, 2 October 2014. 
87 See Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of 
Political Parties and Candidates [2010] PGSC 3, SC1057, 7 July 2010 at [13]. 
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(b) Advisory opinions under s 19(1) 
The procedure created under s 19(1) combines both the judicial (constitutional) review 
function of courts and the advisory opinion role as in other jurisdictions. Like the United 
States’ model, this jurisdiction confers power on the court to invalidate legislation; but 
unlike the United States which has a diffuse constitutional review system where any court 
can hear constitutional disputes, in Papua New Guinea, the Supreme Court alone has 
power to hear constitutional disputes unless the Constitution expressly confers 
jurisdiction on another court such as the National Court.88 Further, there does not have to 
be an actual controversy.89  
The Papua New Guinea Supreme Court can issue its opinion on specific 
constitutional questions referred to it.90 Following the example of countries like Canada 
and also the International Court of Justice, the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court can 
issue its opinion on any question referred to it by any of the specified authorities on 
questions of constitutional interpretation and application.91 But the opinion is binding like 
a court declaration, meaning it must be complied with.92 Such an express binding legal 
status is not conferred on the Canadian Supreme Court or the International Court of 
Justice under its advisory jurisdiction.  
(c) Primacy of the Constitution  
The constitutional review of legislation or Bills to ensure consistency with the 
Constitution, is an example of the operation of the principle of the primacy of the 
Constitution, as opposed to Parliamentary supremacy.93 In the common law tradition, the 
leading jurisdiction operating under the former is the United States and of the latter is the 
United Kingdom. Marbury v Madison is the often cited authority to support the primacy 
                                                     
88 Constitution, ss 18(1) and 57. 
89 The “case and controversy” characterises the United States position under art III, s 2, cl 1 of its 
Constitution; see also Muskrat v United States 219 US 346 (1911) and Alabama State Federation of Labor 
v McAdory 325 US 450 (1945). 
90 Constitution, s 19. 
91 For Canada, a reference to the Supreme Court is not directly established under its Constitution but by 
legislation (Supreme Court Act) after the decision in Attorney General (Ont) v Attorney General (Can) 
[1912] AC 571 (PC). For the United Nations see ch IV of the Statute of International Court of Justice, arts 
65–68. For a useful article comparing the Canadian and American position see James L Huffman and 
Mardilyn Saathoff “Advisory Opinions and Canadian Constitutional Development: The Supreme Court's 
Reference Jurisdiction” (1989–1990) 74 Minn L Rev 1251. 
92 Constitution, s 19(2), which states “An opinion given under Subsection (1) has the same binding effect 
as any other decision of the Supreme Court.” See also Re Re-Election of the Governor General [2010] 
PGSC 32, SC1085, 10 December 2010. 
93 Primacy of the Constitution. 
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of the Constitution in the United States.94 Papua New Guinea has recognised the 
implications of Marbury v Madison in constitutional review.95 In the United Kingdom, 
parliamentary supremacy reigns and is defended by noted legal and constitutional 
commentators such as Dicey.96 Papua New Guinea, having adopted a written 
Constitution, has specifically entrenched procedures for constitutional review.97  
It is interesting to note that Australia, with which Papua New Guinea had a close 
relationship before independence, despite recognising the supremacy of the Constitution, 
does not expressly provide for constitutional review in its Constitution.98  
(d) Distribution of power 
Another important role that constitutional review plays is to act as a check and balance 
on the exercise of power. The Papua New Guinea Constitution has opted to distribute 
powers amongst various institutions to make sure government operates effectively and 
also to prevent abuse of power.99 Different institutions play a role to ensure constitutional 
compliance. In terms of s 19(1), various authorities (in addition to the Ombudsman 
Commission) are conferred standing to seek the Supreme Court’s binding opinion on a 
constitutional question as well as on the validity of a law or proposed law.100 The Supreme 
Court has the power to invalidate legislation or Bills as unconstitutional at the behest of 
one of the authorities listed under s 19(3). The legislation or Bill ceases to exist on 
declaration by the Supreme Court. 
(e) Mixed model judicial review 
Specific courts can be granted exclusive constitutional review jurisdiction. This is known 
as the centralised model of judicial review. An example is South Africa, with its 
Constitutional Court. Decentralised models operate in the United States where any court 
                                                     
94 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803), 1 Cr 137. 
95 Calling of Parliament, above n 55, per Los J: 
It is an agonizing thought that the Judiciary would even think of sanctioning the Legislature. But greater and 
older countries like the USA had agonized over such thoughts before us. I refer in particular to the historical 
case of Marbury v Madison [1 Cranch 2 L Ed 60 (1803)]. The question asked in that historical case was 
whether it was the Judiciary’s task to interpret the law or should it be Legislature or the Executive. The 
decision of course went in favour of the Judiciary, the least dangerous branch of the governmental structure 
where the Executive held the sword of the community while the Legislature commanded the purse and held 
power to prescribe rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen were regulated. 
96 AV Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885). 
97 Many commentators use the term judicial review, but this thesis adopts the judicial review terminology 
for judicial review of administrative actions. 
98 Mathew Stubbs “A Brief History of the Judicial Review of Legislation under the Australian Constitution” 
(2012) 40 FL Rev 227.  
99 Independent constitutional institutions were discussed in chapter 2. 
100 Constitution, s 19(1). 
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can hear constitutional disputes. There is no specific constitutional court in Papua New 
Guinea. The Supreme Court has been given this special role, and is often described as the 
guardian of the Constitution.101 However, Papua New Guinea appears to have a mixed 
model of judicial review. Although the Supreme Court deals with most constitutional 
disputes, the National Court also hears a number of constitutional issues such as human 
rights matters.102 It has elements of both a centralised model and decentralised version.  
(f) Judicial review ex-ante and judicial review ex-post 
Commentators have categorised the legal ability to review Bills and legislation for 
constitutional compatibility as either “judicial review ex-ante”103 or “judicial review ex-
post”.104 The former is abstract in nature, while the latter looks at the constitutionality of 
measures after they have been taken. Section 19 allows for the filing of hypothetical 
questions,105 without there being any actual “case and controversy”.106 Bills can be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court as the Constitution refers to “a law or proposed law”.107 
This presents the basis for an early review of legislation or Bills against the requirements 
of ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution before the legislation takes effect or in the case 
of a Bill, becomes law. If a Bill is found unconstitutional it would not become law. 
In the United States and Australia, there are no specific procedures to ask the court 
to decide the constitutionality of a law per se, whether in an actual controversy or in 
hypothetical circumstances. For example, a party cannot institute proceedings 
challenging the constitutionality of a law without the involvement of a person whose 
interests have been affected by the law. In such a scenario, it is even less possible to 
challenge a Bill, as it has not taken effect. The seminal case of Marbury v Madison, which 
declared the Judiciary Act 1789 unconstitutional, arose out of a dispute between two 
persons. A claim was made under ordinary legislation, and although the Supreme Court 
recognised the merit of the claim under the Act, refused the claim on the basis the Act 
                                                     
101 Haiveta, Leader of the Opposition v Wingti, Prime Minister, Attorney-General, and National Parliament 
[1994] PGSC 6, [1994] PNGLR 197, 25 August 1994 per Amet CJ. 
102 Juliane Kokott and Martin Kaspar, “Ensuring Constitutional Efficacy” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds) (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 792 at 806. 
103 At 806. 
104 At 807. 
105 SCR No 5 of 1982; Hugo Berghuser and ors v Joseph Aoae [1982] PNGLR 379 at 383. 
106 Muskrat v United States, above n 90. 
107 Constitution s 19(1). See also Reference by the Ombudsman Commission; Re Section 19 of the 
Constitution [2010] PGSC 43, SC1027, 17 May 2010 at [36]. 
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was inconsistent with the Constitution. It therefore could not grant the relief sought by 
the plaintiff.  
Many of the important constitutional cases in the United States follow Marbury.108 
African-Americans affected by the segregation laws sought invalidation of the laws on 
the grounds of inconsistency with the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs on the 
basis the principle of separate but equal, upheld in Plessy v Ferguson, was no longer 
constitutional.109 The segregation laws could not be challenged unless a person (or 
persons) claimed their rights were affected.   
Many laws in Papua New Guinea have been found to be unconstitutional on the 
basis of a special reference to the Supreme Court by the recognised authorities.  
The Ombudsman Commission has been a frequent referrer using the procedure under  
s 19 of the Constitution. This thesis submits the Ombudsman Commission should take up 
this role for reviewing of legislation or Bills on the basis of the NGDP and BSO. 
3 Special references by the Ombudsman Commission to the Supreme Court for 
compliance with the NGDP and/or BSO 
A number of reasons suggest the Ombudsman Commission would be the ideal candidate, 
of the authorities listed under s 19(3), to assume the role of filing special references to the 
Supreme Court under s 19(1) for the constitutional review of legislation or Bills on the 
issue of whether Parliament has discharged its duty under ss 25(3) and 63(3) of the 
Constitution. The reasons are listed now. 
(a) CPC position 
The view a body that has a close connection to implementing the NGDP and BSO should 
have authority to file special references to the Supreme Court is made clearly in the CPC 
Report on its recommendations on s 19.110 The CPC recommended the establishment of 
a body that would review laws and recommend how they should be reformed to be 
consistent with the NGDP and/or BSO. Further, such a body would have authority to seek 
advisory opinion of the Supreme Court. The Constitution did not establish such a body. 
Since the Ombudsman Commission has a great deal of scope to implement the NGDP 
                                                     
108 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 347 US 483 (1954). 
109 Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896). 
110 CPC Report, above n 1, at 8/16 [154]. 
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and BSO in both its administrative complaints and Leadership Code functions, it would 
be the ideal alternative to take up this role. This complements the other proposals for the 
administrative complaints function and the leadership code function for the 
implementation of the NGDP and BSO. 
(b) Consistency with objectives and functions of the Ombudsman 
Commission 
Section 218 of the Constitution sets out the purposes of the Ombudsman Commission. 
One of these purposes is to ensure governmental bodies fulfil the aspirations of the people, 
which the NGDP and BSO express. Parliament is a governmental body.  
This means the Ombudsman Commission is required to ensure it fulfils the aspirations of 
the people. Legislation or Bills that do not implement the NGDP and/or BSO arguably do 
not fulfil the aspirations of the people. It is submitted that challenging such legislation or 
Bills is an activity mandated by the Constitution for the Ombudsman Commission.  
(c) Independence of the Ombudsman Commission  
The independence of the Ombudsman Commission distinguishes it from the other 
authorities listed under s 19(3) of the Constitution.111 There may be controversial 
legislation that Parliament has passed without adequate legislative scrutiny due to 
executive dominance. Other authorities, not as independent as the Ombudsman 
Commission, may be discouraged from taking up the case. The Ombudsman Commission 
can take up such a case without fear or favour. 
An example of where the Ombudsman Commission has filed a constitutional 
reference under s 19(1) of the Constitution on a matter which was politically sensitive as 
it had implications on the stability of government was Calling of Parliament.112  
In this reference the Ombudsman Commission was concerned about the long 
adjournments of Parliament. The Government, using its numerical strength over the 
opposition, adjourned Parliament for long periods of time. This was perhaps to avoid 
potential votes of no confidence being brought. The constitutionality of Parliament’s long 
adjournment was challenged by the Ombudsman Commission under s 19(1).  
The Court ruled long adjournments were unconstitutional and Parliament could be legally 
                                                     
111 Constitution, s 217(6) states the Ombudsman Commission is not subject to direction or control by any 
person in the performance of its constitutional functions. 
112 Calling of Parliament, above n 55. 
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compelled to sit more regularly in accordance with the Constitution.  
Other authorities listed under s 19(3) may not have the independence to take up cases of 
this nature. 
(d) Past record  
The Ombudsman Commission has frequently sought the Supreme Court’s binding 
opinion under s 19. This thesis suggests this is due to the high constitutional ideals 
conferred on the Ombudsman Commission to realise,113 and its independence.114 A study 
of a number of constitutional references decided by the Supreme Court reveals that of the 
authorities granted standing under s 19 of the Constitution, the Ombudsman Commission 
has been a frequent referrer to the Supreme Court.115  
One of the first cases filed by the Ombudsman Commission was in 1982 where it 
challenged the constitutionality of the amendments to the Electoral Commission Act for 
breach of s 50 of the Constitution.116 In 1993 the Ombudsman Commission challenged 
the validity of the Internal Security Act 1993 for offending the right to presumption of 
innocence under s 37 of the Constitution.117 Another piece of legislation it challenged was 
the amendments to the Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Governments 1995 
in 2010.118 Also in 2010 the Ombudsman Commission sought constitutional review of 
amendments to the Forestry Act 1991. These cases are examples which show the strong 
position the Ombudsman Commission is in to take up the role of review of legislation or 
Bills in relation to the NGDP and BSO.  
(e) Comparative experience 
There is no useful comparative experience to draw on to support the Ombudsman 
Commission for the type of constitutional review proposed here. Other Ombudsman 
Commissions, or Ombudsman-like institutions considered, reveal that the ability to 
                                                     
113 Constitution, s 218. 
114 Constitution, s 217(5). 
115 From the cases surveyed this role proposed for the Ombudsman Commission is not unique as it has 
previously on two occasions initiated a constitutional reference on the basis of the NGDP and/or BSO. 
These were the cases of Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 
10, SC1058, 4 June 2010, and Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] 
PGSC 40, SC1088, 17 December 2010. 
116 SCR No 2 of 1982 (No 1); Re the Organic Law on National Elections (Amendment) Act 1981 [1982] 
PGSC 19, [1982] PNGLR 214, 5 April 1982. 
117 Internal Security Act; Reference by the Ombudsman Commission, Re [1994] PGSC 9, [1994] PNGLR 
341, 4 May 1994. 
118 Reference by the Ombudsman Commission; Re Section 19 of the Constitution [2010] PGSC 43, SC1027, 
17 May 2010. 
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question the constitutionality of Acts and Bills generally has not been conferred on an 
Ombudsman. Australia, with a written Constitution, established its Ombudsman by 
ordinary legislation. Outside the Pacific, Constitutions modelled after the Westminster 
system, such as in Canada and India also do not possess this function. New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom, with unwritten Constitutions, cannot provide a useful experience 
for Papua New Guinea, at least on this specific question on the Ombudsman Commission 
assuming standing to file constitutional references. The only other country that confers 
such standing to an Ombudsman is Slovenia, but its Constitution was adopted in 1991, 
much later than Papua New Guinea and may not have built up a body of case law to 
enable sufficient comparison.119 This would mean that Papua New Guinea Ombudsman 
Commission stands in a unique position to advance constitutional compliance. 
IV Conclusion  
The Ombudsman Commission was established as an important institution to ensure 
control of the exercise of government power in Papua New Guinea. Its purposes are 
clearly established in the Constitution, one of which is to fulfil the aspirations of the 
people. The NGDP and BSO are a constitutional recognition of these aspirations.  
As a result, the Ombudsman Commission has an important role to implement the NGDP 
and BSO. Mechanisms to put this into place are two-fold: the administrative complaints 
function, and the Leadership Code function. To enable it to do its functions properly, the 
Commission has been conferred a great deal of independence. There is ample opportunity 
provided within the legal structures of these functions to implement the NGDP and BSO. 
It falls on the Ombudsman Commission to take these opportunities seriously to implement 
the NGDP and BSO. The third role presented in this chapter to fulfil the NGDP and BSO 
is for the Ombudsman Commission to use its authority to institute constitutional 
references to initiate cases on the basis Parliament may not have adequately taken the 
NGDP and BSO into account.  
                                                     
119 Slovenian Constitution, art 159. 
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Chapter Eleven – Conclusion  
I Introduction 
This Chapter concludes this thesis by providing a summary of the implementation 
proposals for the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and the ombudsman. There are 
three parts: Part I is this short introduction; Part II presents a summary of the 
implementation proposals; and Part III is the conclusion.  
II Implementation Proposals  
A Overview 
There are four areas of government within which the implementation proposals are made: 
the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and the ombudsman. A constant feature of 
this exercise is to suggest implementation within the existing constitutional framework 
and implementation by one branch has an implication for the other, which in chapter 6 is 
described as the interconnectedness approach. This thesis submits implementation must 
be explored within the existing framework before looking at legislative reforms. Sections 
25(3) and 63(3) of the Constitution are interpreted as creating an indirectly justiciable 
duty on each of the entities addressed. 
1  Legislature  
The proposals for the implementation of the NGDP and BSO by the legislature fall under 
two broad categories: direct and indirect means of implementing the NGDP and BSO. 
Firstly, for direct implementation, this thesis proposes a constitutional norm exists 
where Parliament is required to demonstrate it has considered the implementation of the 
NGDP and/or BSO in any legislation that goes before it. A failure to comply would result 
in the Bill or legislation being invalidated by the Supreme Court for being 
unconstitutional. The importance of this proposal ties in with what is being presented for 
the other arms of government.  
The second proposal presents an indirect mechanism of implementing the NGDP 
and BSO. Indirect implementation relates to the political process. It is called indirect 
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because failure to implement does not result in any legal process to enforce 
implementation. Several proposals are offered: 
(a) The use of preambles and object provisions in legislation to refer to the NGDP 
and BSO. When Parliament points out the particular NGDP and/or BSO in the 
legislation, it assists those interpreting and applying the law, to be guided by 
Parliament’s intentions as to which NGDP and/or BSO is being implemented.  
It provides clarity and demonstrates which NGDP and BSO has priority with 
respect to the matter at hand. 
(b) This thesis proposes before the passing of the annual budgets the National 
Executive Council consults the Budget and Estimates Committee on ways the 
NGDP and BSO can be adequately resourced. Such report is then made available 
to the government, which has the task of preparing the budget for the year. 
(c) When Parliament scrutinises decisions of the executive, it should do so on the 
basis of the NGDP and BSO. This provides a point of reference to assess the 
decisions of the executive. 
2 Executive 
A single proposal is made for the executive. The NEC should adopt a Cabinet (or NEC) 
Manual to guide its operations. The Manual would make clear reference to the NGDP and 
BSO. Decisions would have to be made that implements the NGDP and/or BSO by virtue 
of the Manual. In time, a legal expectation will be created for NEC decisions to be 
referenced to the NGDP and BSO.  
3 Judiciary 
There are a number of ways the judicial function can be used to implement the NGDP 
and BSO. This thesis reached the following conclusions. 
First, the role of preambles in constitutional interpretation. Two main roles are 
identified: the “in case of doubt” approach, and contextual role. It was found the latter 
presented a better chance of implementing the NGDP and BSO. As the NGDP and BSO 
are contained in the preamble to the Constitution, it should be considered in all cases to 
provide the context of the Constitution when matters go before the court. The “in case of 
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doubt” approach would only see reference to the NGDP and BSO when there is an 
ambiguity in the provisions of the Constitution. 
Second, judicial review of administrative actions. This thesis contends the judicial 
review process should engage the NGDP and BSO more often. This is encouraged by the 
Constitution under ss 22, 23 and 59. For example, remedies such as mandamus can be 
used to enable an outcome that would be consistent with the NGDP and BSO. 
Third, the use of the NGDP and BSO in the development of the underlying law. 
This process is assisted now with the Underlying Law Act 2000. The NGDP and BSO 
can contribute directly to developing new principles of law, directing a movement away 
from relying solely on the common law. 
Fourth, the use of weak-form judicial review. By this method, the court will point 
out the inconsistency of a law or government decision with the NGDP and/or BSO for 
either parliament or the executive arm of government to correct it. It is weak in the sense 
the court’s view does not invalidate the law or government decision. 
Fifth, the interaction of the NGDP and BSO with human rights and freedoms. 
Rights and freedoms are to be protected by the Constitution in a way that harmonises with 
the NGDP and BSO. This is provided for by ss 38 and 39 of the Constitution.  
4 Ombudsman  
The Ombudsman Commission has two main functions: administrative complaints, and 
supervision and enforcement of the Leadership Code. The third function relates to its 
ability to raise questions on the constitutionality of decisions of Parliament, such as Bills 
and legislation. 
Under the first two functions, there is an express requirement for the Ombudsman 
Commission to take into account the NGDP and BSO. A review of the reports of the 
Ombudsman Commission and the Leadership Tribunal decisions suggests the 
Ombudsman Commission has not actively engaged its express constitutional mandate to 
implement the NGDP and BSO. Because of the extensive reach of its jurisdiction to 
almost all activities of the government machinery, it would provide an effective means of 
implementing the NGDP and BSO. This is especially true for this thesis, which only 
focuses on four areas. The Ombudsman Commission would be able to extend the 
implementation further than the judiciary, the executive and the legislature.   
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The third function proposes the Ombudsman Commission is an ideal institution 
to challenge Bills and legislation in court that do not comply with the constitutional norm 
of Parliament consulting the NGDP and/or BSO for all legislation that goes before 
Parliament. One of its objectives is to fulfil the aspirations of the people, and it can do 
this through the ability to enforce the constitutional norm of consultation with the NGDP 
and/or BSO. 
III The Thesis 
This thesis proposes practical and efficient means to implement the NGDP and BSO 
within the present constitutional arrangement, where each implementing entity influences 
the other in the context of their constitutional function. Implementation of the NGDP 
and/or BSO would make a positive contribution to Papua New Guinea’s political, social, 
cultural and economic advancement. 
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Appendix One – National Goals and Directive Principles 
National Goals and Directive Principles. 
WE HEREBY PROCLAIM the following aims as our National Goals, and direct all 
persons and bodies, corporate and unincorporate, to be guided by these our declared 
Directives in pursuing and achieving our aims:— 
1. Integral human development. 
We declare our first goal to be for every person to be dynamically involved in the 
process of freeing himself or herself from every form of domination or oppression 
so that each man or woman will have the opportunity to develop as a whole person 
in relationship with others. 
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR— 
(1) everyone to be involved in our endeavours to achieve integral human 
development of the whole person for every person and to seek fulfilment 
through his or her contribution to the common good; and 
(2) education to be based on mutual respect and dialogue, and to promote 
awareness of our human potential and motivation to achieve our National 
Goals through self-reliant effort; and 
(3) all forms of beneficial creativity, including sciences and cultures, to be 
actively encouraged; and 
(4) improvement in the level of nutrition and the standard of public health to 
enable our people to attain self fulfilment; and 
(5) the family unit to be recognized as the fundamental basis of our society, and 
for every step to be taken to promote the moral, cultural, economic and social 
standing of the Melanesian family; and 
(6) development to take place primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean 
forms of social and political organization. 
2. Equality and participation. 
We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to have an equal opportunity to 
participate in, and benefit from, the development of our country. 
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR— 
(1) an equal opportunity for every citizen to take part in the political, economic, 
social, religious and cultural life of the country; and 
(2) the creation of political structures that will enable effective, meaningful 
participation by our people in that life, and in view of the rich cultural and 
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ethnic diversity of our people for those structures to provide for substantial 
decentralization of all forms of government activity; and 
(3) every effort to be made to achieve an equitable distribution of incomes and 
other benefits of development among individuals and throughout the various 
parts of the country; and 
(4) equalization of services in all parts of the country, and for every citizen to 
have equal access to legal processes and all services, governmental and 
otherwise, that are required for the fulfilment of his or her real needs and 
aspirations; and 
(5) equal participation by women citizens in all political, economic, social and 
religious activities; and 
(6) the maximization of the number of citizens participating in every aspect of 
development; and 
(7) active steps to be taken to facilitate the organization and legal recognition of 
all groups engaging in development activities; and 
(8) means to be provided to ensure that any citizen can exercise his personal 
creativity and enterprise in pursuit of fulfilment that is consistent with the 
common good, and for no citizen to be deprived of this opportunity because 
of the predominant position of another; and 
(9) every citizen to be able to participate, either directly or through a 
representative, in the consideration of any matter affecting his interests or the 
interests of his community; and 
(10) all persons and governmental bodies of Papua New Guinea to ensure that, as 
far as possible, political and official bodies are so composed as to be broadly 
representative of citizens from the various areas of the country; and 
(11) all persons and governmental bodies to endeavour to achieve universal 
literacy in Pisin, Hiri Motu or English, and in "tok ples" or "ita eda tano gado"; 
and 
(12) recognition of the principles that a complete relationship in marriage rests on 
equality of rights and duties of the partners, and that responsible parenthood 
is based on that equality. 
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3. National sovereignty and self-reliance. 
We declare our third goal to be for Papua New Guinea to be politically and 
economically independent, and our economy basically self-reliant. 
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR— 
(1) our leaders to be committed to these National Goals and Directive Principles, 
to ensure that their freedom to make decisions is not restricted by obligations 
to or relationship with others, and to make all of their decisions in the national 
interest; and 
(2) all governmental bodies to base their planning for political, economic and 
social development on these Goals and Principles; and 
(3) internal interdependence and solidarity among citizens, and between 
provinces, to be actively promoted; and 
(4) citizens and governmental bodies to have control of the bulk of economic 
enterprise and production; and 
(5) strict control of foreign investment capital and wise assessment of foreign 
ideas and values so that these will be subordinate to the goal of national 
sovereignty and self-reliance, and in particular for the entry of foreign capital 
to be geared to internal social and economic policies and to the integrity of 
the Nation and the People; and 
(6) the State to take effective measures to control and actively participate in the 
national economy, and in particular to control major enterprises engaged in 
the exploitation of natural resources; and 
(7) economic development to take place primarily by the use of skills and 
resources available in the country either from citizens or the State and not in 
dependence on imported skills and resources; and 
(8) the constant recognition of our sovereignty, which must not be undermined 
by dependence on foreign assistance of any sort, and in particular for no 
investment, military or foreign-aid agreement or understanding to be entered 
into that imperils our self-reliance and self-respect, or our commitment to 
these National Goals and Directive Principles, or that may lead to substantial 
dependence upon or influence by any country, investor, lender or donor. 
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4. Natural resources and environment. 
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea's natural resources and 
environment to be conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all, and be 
replenished for the benefit of future generations. 
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR— 
(1) wise use to be made of our natural resources and the environment in and on 
the land or seabed, in the sea, under the land, and in the air, in the interests of 
our development and in trust for future generations; and 
(2) the conservation and replenishment, for the benefit of ourselves and posterity, 
of the environment and its sacred, scenic, and historical qualities; and 
(3) all necessary steps to be taken to give adequate protection to our valued birds, 
animals, fish, insects, plants and trees. 
5. Papua New Guinean ways. 
We declare our fifth goal to be to achieve development primarily through the use 
of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic organization. 
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR— 
(1) a fundamental re-orientation of our attitudes and the institutions of 
government, commerce, education and religion towards Papua New Guinean 
forms of participation, consultation, and consensus, and a continuous renewal 
of the responsiveness of these institutions to the needs and attitudes of the 
People; and 
(2) particular emphasis in our economic development to be placed on small-scale 
artisan, service and business activity; and 
(3) recognition that the cultural, commercial and ethnic diversity of our people is 
a positive strength, and for the fostering of a respect for, and appreciation of, 
traditional ways of life and culture, including language, in all their richness 
and variety, as well as for a willingness to apply these ways dynamically and 
creatively for the tasks of development; and 
(4) traditional villages and communities to remain as viable units of Papua New 
Guinean society, and for active steps to be taken to improve their cultural, 
social, economic and ethical quality. 
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Appendix Two – Basic Social Obligations 
Basic Social Obligations. 
WE HEREBY DECLARE that all persons in our country have the following basic 
obligations to themselves and their descendants, to each other, and to the Nation:— 
(a) to respect, and to act in the spirit of, this Constitution; and 
(b) to recognize that they can fully develop their capabilities and advance their true 
interests only by active participation in the development of the national community 
as a whole; and 
(c) to exercise the rights guaranteed or conferred by this Constitution, and to use the 
opportunities made available to them under it to participate fully in the government 
of the Nation; and 
(d) to protect Papua New Guinea and to safeguard the national wealth, resources and 
environment in the interests not only of the present generation but also of future 
generations; and 
(e) to work according to their talents in socially useful employment, and if necessary 
to create for themselves legitimate opportunities for such employment; and 
(f) to respect the rights and freedoms of others, and to co-operate fully with others in 
the interests of interdependence and solidarity; and 
(g) to contribute, as required by law, according to their means to the revenues required 
for the advancement of the Nation and the purposes of Papua New Guinea; and 
(h) in the case of parents, to support, assist and educate their children (whether born in 
or out of wedlock), and in particular to give them a true understanding of their basic 
rights and obligations and of the National Goals and Directive Principles; and 
(i) in the case of the children, to respect their parents. 
IN ADDITION, WE HEREBY DECLARE that all citizens have an obligation to 
themselves and their descendants, to each other and to the Nation to use profits from 
economic activities in the advancement of our country and our people, and that the law 
may impose a similar obligation on non-citizens carrying on economic activities in or 
from our country. 
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Appendix Three – Legislation Referring to the NGDP and BSO 
Legislation  Provision incorporating 
the NGDP and/or BSO 
Particular reference to 
NGDP and/or BSO 
Bougainville 
Constitution  
NGDP and BSO referred to 
in s 180, “Qualifications on 
the Qualified Rights.” 
NGDP and BSO generally 
referred to, with no particular 
mention of any specific NGDP 
or BSO. 
Classification of 
Publication (Censorship) 
Act 1989  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
NGDP and BSO generally 
referred to. 
Community Services 
Trust Act 2002  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Section refers to Goal 1, 
integral human development, 
Goal 3 equality and 
participation, Goal 3 national 
sovereignty and self-reliance, 
Goal 5, Papua New Guinea 
Ways and BSO generally. 
Compensation 
(Prohibition of Foreign 
Legal Proceedings) Act 
1995 
NGDP only referred to in the 
preamble of the Act and 
NGDP and BSO both 
referred to in s 1 on 
compliance with 
constitutional requirements   
Goal 3 on national sovereignty 
and self-reliance referred to in 
the preamble and makes 
reference to National Goal 3 
on national sovereignty and 
self-reliance and National Goal 
5 on Papua New Guinea Ways 
in s 1. Also refers to BSO on 
maximising wealth of Papua 
New Guineans in s 1. 
Compulsory Third Party 
Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Industry Act 2002  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Makes reference to National 
Goal 3 on national sovereignty 
and self-reliance and National 
Goal 5 on Papua New Guinea 
Ways. Also refers to BSO on 
maximising wealth of Papua 
New Guineans. 
Conservation Areas Act 
1978  
NGDP referred to in the long 
title of the legislation and in s 
1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements. 
Reference to BSO only in s 1. 
National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment 
referred to. BSO referred to 
generally. 
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Legislation  Provision incorporating 
the NGDP and/or BSO 
Particular reference to 
NGDP and/or BSO 
Electricity Commission 
Privatisation Act 2002  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
National Goal 3 on national 
sovereignty and self-reliance 
and National Goal 5 on Papua 
New Guinea Ways referred to 
and BSO on protecting Papua 
New Guineans and the interest 
of future generations (BSO 
para (d)). 
Employment of Non-
citizens Act 2007   
Section 3 (not s 1 as in most 
legislation) on compliance 
with constitutional 
requirements refers to both 
NGDP and BSO. 
NGDP and BSO referred to 
generally. 
Environment Act 2000 NGDP referred to in the long 
title of the legislation only. 
No reference to the BSO.  
National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment 
referred to. 
Environmental 
Contaminants Act 1978  
NGDP referred to in the long 
title of the legislation and in s 
1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements. 
No reference to BSO. 
National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment 
referred to. Act also refers to s 
25 of the Constitution in the 
long title. 
Environmental Planning 
Act 1978  
NGDP referred to in the long 
title of the legislation and in s 
1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements. 
No reference to BSO. 
National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment 
referred to. Act also refers to s 
25 of the Constitution in the 
long title.  
Essential Services Act 
2002  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
National Goal 3 on national 
sovereignty and self-reliance 
and National Goal 5 on Papua 
New Guinea Ways referred to 
and BSO on protecting Papua 
New Guineans and the interest 
of future generations (BSO 
para (d)). 
Fisheries Management 
Act 1998  
NGDP only referred to in the 
long title of the Act. 
National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment 
referred to by implication and 
not expressly. 
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Legislation  Provision incorporating 
the NGDP and/or BSO 
Particular reference to 
NGDP and/or BSO 
Forestry Act 1991  NGDP referred to in the long 
title of the legislation. No 
reference to the BSO. 
National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment 
referred to by implication and 
not expressly. 
Gaming Control Act 
2007  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Refers to NGDP and BSO 
generally and also makes 
specific reference to National 
Goal 3 on national sovereignty 
and self-reliance and National 
Goal 4 on natural resources 
and environment. 
Harbours Board Act 
1963  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
National Goal 3 on national 
sovereignty and self-reliance 
and National Goal 5 on Papua 
New Guinea Ways referred to 
and BSO on protecting Papua 
New Guineans and the interest 
of future generations (BSO 
para (d)). 
Higher Education Act 
1983  
NGDP referred to in the 
objectives of the legislation 
under s 4. No reference to 
BSO. 
National Goal on integral 
human development referred 
to. 
Independent Consumer 
and Competition 
Commission Act 2002  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
National Goal 3 on national 
sovereignty and self-reliance 
and National Goal 5 on Papua 
New Guinea Ways referred to 
and BSO on protecting Papua 
New Guineans and the interest 
of future generations (BSO 
para (d)). 
Informal Sector 
Development and 
Control Act 2004  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
NGDP and BSO generally 
referred to, with no particular 
mention of any specific NGDP 
or BSO. 
Mineral Resource Act 
2005  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP. No 
reference to BSO. 
Refers to National Goal 3 on 
national sovereignty and self-
reliance and National Goal 5 
on Papua New Guinea Ways. 
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Legislation  Provision incorporating 
the NGDP and/or BSO 
Particular reference to 
NGDP and/or BSO 
Mining (Ok Tedi Mine 
Continuation (Ninth 
Supplement) Agreement 
Act 2001 
NGDP and BSO referred to 
in the preamble and in s 1 on 
compliance with 
constitutional requirements. 
The Preamble refers to 
National Goal 3 on national 
sovereignty and self-reliance 
and National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment. 
Under the Preamble the BSO 
on wealth maximisation also 
referred to. Same goals and 
BSO referred to in s 1 of the 
Act.  
Mining (Ok Tedi 
Restated Eighth 
Supplement) Agreement 
Act 2001 
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Refers to National Goal 3 on 
national sovereignty and self-
reliance and National Goal 4 
on natural resources and 
environment. BSO on wealth 
maximisation also referred to. 
Mining (Safety) 
Regulation Act 1977  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Refers to National Goal 3 on 
national sovereignty and self-
reliance and BSO referred to 
generally.  
Motor Vehicles 
Insurance (PNG) Trust 
(Administrative 
Arrangements) Act 1996  
NGDP and BSO referred to 
in the preamble of the Act. 
Preamble refers to National 
Goal 3 on national sovereignty 
and self-reliance and the BSO 
on wealth maximisation. 
Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act 
2005  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
NGDP and BSO generally 
referred to. 
National Agricultural 
Research Institute Act 
1996  
NGDP generally mentioned 
in the long title of the Act. 
No reference to the BSO. 
NGDP generally referred to. 
National Capital District 
Commission Act 2001 
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
As s 1(3) of the Act elaborately 
uses NGDP and BSO it is 
quoted here: 
(3) The Parliament, in enacting this 
law, considers it is reasonably 
justifiable, taking into 
account— 
(a) the National Goals and 
Directive Principles 
(including, in particular, the 
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Legislation  Provision incorporating 
the NGDP and/or BSO 
Particular reference to 
NGDP and/or BSO 
goals that citizens of Papua 
New Guinea should, among 
other things, have equal 
opportunity to participate in, 
and benefit from the 
political life of the country, 
and in the creation of 
political structures that will 
enable effective, meaningful 
participation by the people 
of Papua New Guinea in 
political, social and 
economic life, and for every 
citizen to be able to 
participate, either directly or 
through a representative, in 
the consideration of any 
matter affecting his interests 
or the interests of his 
community and to ensure 
that, as far as possible, 
political and official bodies 
are so composed as to be 
broadly representative of 
citizens); and 
(b) the Basic Rights and Basic 
Social Obligations 
(including, in particular, the 
right of all persons whatever 
their race, tribe, place of 
origin, political opinion, 
colour, creed or sex, to take 
part in political activities), 
for providing for 
composition of the National 
Capital District Commission 
for the purpose recited in 
this section, in a democratic 
society that has a proper 
regard for the rights and 
dignity of mankind. 
National Parks Act 1982  NGDP referred to in the long 
title of the legislation. No 
reference to BSO.  
National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment 
referred to. 
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Legislation  Provision incorporating 
the NGDP and/or BSO 
Particular reference to 
NGDP and/or BSO 
National Development 
Bank Act 2007 
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Refers to NGDP and BSO 
generally and also makes 
specific reference to National 
Goal 3 on national sovereignty 
and self-reliance and National 
Goal 4 on natural resources 
and environment. 
Oil and Gas Act 1998  Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Refers to NGDP and BSO 
generally and also makes 
specific reference to National 
Goal 3 on national sovereignty 
and self-reliance and national 
goal 4 on natural resources and 
environment. 
Organic Law on the 
Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
No particular NGDP and BSO 
referred to. 
Proceeds of Crime Act 
2005  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
No particular NGDP and BSO 
referred to. 
Provincial Health 
Authorities Act 2007  
NGDP referred to in the long 
title of the legislation and in s 
1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements. 
No reference to BSO. 
General reference to integral 
human development without 
reference to NGDP specifically 
in the long title. But National 
Goal 1 on integral human 
development specifically 
referred to in s 1 on 
constitutional compliance.  
Regulatory Statutory 
Authorities 
(Appointment to Certain 
Offices) Act 2004. 
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Section 1 of the Act refers to 
National Goal 3 on national 
sovereignty and self-reliance 
and natural resources and 
environment and to the BSO 
generally.  
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Legislation  Provision incorporating 
the NGDP and/or BSO 
Particular reference to 
NGDP and/or BSO 
Salaries and 
Remuneration 
Commission Act 1983  
Referred to in s 14 of the Act, 
“Guidelines in Fixing 
Salaries etc.” There is no 
reference to the BSO. 
NGDP referred to generally in 
s 14(1) that in fixing the 
salaries, allowances, pensions 
and other benefits, Parliament 
shall give consideration to the 
NGDP generally, amongst 
other considerations. 
Telecommunications Act 
1988 
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Refers to National Goal 3 on 
national sovereignty and self-
reliance, National Goal 5 on 
Papua New Guinea Ways and 
BSO on protecting the wealth 
of Papua New Guineans. 
Telecommunications 
Industry Act 2002  
Section 1 on compliance with 
constitutional requirements 
refers to both NGDP and 
BSO. 
Refers to National Goal 3 on 
national sovereignty and self-
reliance, National Goal 5 on 
Papua New Guinea Ways and 
BSO on protecting the wealth 
of Papua New Guineans. 
Underlying Law Act 
2000 
Section 4 of the Act, 
“Application of Sources of 
Underlying Law  
Refers to the NGDP and BSO 
generally as sources of the 
underlying law and as tests to 
guide the development of the 
underlying law.  
Water Resources Act 
1982  
The long titles refers to the 
NGDP only and not the BSO. 
National Goal 4 on natural 
resources and environment 
referred to. 
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Re Reference to Constitution section 19(1) by East Sepik Provincial Executive [2011] 
PGSC 41, SC1154, 12 December 2011. 
Re Reference Pursuant to Constitution section 19(1) by Allan Marat [2012] PGSC 1, 
SC1149, 23 January 2012. 
Reference by the Executive Council of the Enga Provincial Government [1990] PGSC 10, 
[1990] PNGLR 532, 28 December 1990. 
Reference by the Ombudsman Commission; Re Section 19 of the Constitution [2010] 
PGSC 43, SC1027, 17 May 2010. 
Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 10, 
SC1058, 4 June 2010. 
Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 40, 
SC1088, 17 December 2010. 
SCR No 1 of 1977; Re Rights of Person Arrested or Detained [1977] PGSC 15, [1977] 
PNGLR 362, 26 October 1977. 
SCR No 1 of 1978; Re Ombudsman Commission Investigations of the Public Solicitor 
[1978] PGSC 7, [1978] PNGLR 345, 6 October 1978. 
SCR No 1 of 1978; Re Tribunal established under the Organic Law on the Duties and 
Responsibilities of Leadership S 27 and Leo Robert Morgan [1978] PNGLR 460. 
SCR No 1A of 1981; Re Motor Traffic Act [1982] PNGLR 122. 
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SC Ref No 1 of 2010; Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution, Section 19(2), Re 
Constitutional (Amendment) Law 2008, Reference by the Ombudsman Commission of 
Papua New Guinea, SC 1302, 19 December 2013. 
SCR No 1 of 1984; Re Minimum Penalties Legislation [1984] PGSC 13, [1984] PNGLR 
314, 2 November 1984. 
SCR No 1 of 1986; Re Vagrancy Act (Ch 268) [1988] PGSC 29, [1988-89] PNGLR 1, 13 
April 1987. 
SCR No 1 of 1997; Reference by the Principal Legal Advisor under Section 19 of the 
Constitution [1997] PGSC 8, SC526, 14 July 1997. 
SCR No 2 of 1976; Re Motion of No Confidence [1976] PGSC 17, [1976] PNGLR 228,  
2 June 1976. 
SCR No 2 of 1978; Re Corrective Institutions Act 1957 [1978] PGSC 9, [1978] PNGLR 
404, 25 October 1978. 
SCR No 2 of 1981; Re Electoral Boundaries [1981] PGSC 22, [1981] PNGLR 518, 
10 December 1981. 
SCR No 2 of 1982 (No 1); Re the Organic Law on National Elections (Amendment) Act 
1981 [1982] PGSC 19, [1982] PNGLR 214, 5 April 1982. 
SCR No 2 of 1984; Re New Ireland Provincial Constitution [1984] PGSC 14, [1984] 
PNGLR 81, 27 April 1984. 
SCR No 2 of 1987; Reference by Robert Henry Seeto Member for West Coast Namatanai 
in the New Ireland Provincial Assembly and Former Premier [1987] PGSC 16, [1987] 
PNGLR 31, 1 April 1987. 
SCR No 2 of 1989; Re Village Courts Act (Ch 44) [1988] PGSC 30, [1988-89] PNGLR 
491, 28 November 1989. 
SCR No 2 of 1992; Re The Leadership Code [1992] PGSC 16, [1992] PNGLR 336, 31 
July 1992. 
SCR No 3 of 1976; Re Calling of a General Election [1976] PGSC 18, [1976] PNGLR 
242, 21 June 1976. 
SCR No 3 of 1986; Ref by Simbu Provincial Executive [1987] PGSC 17, [1987] PNGLR 
151, 10 April 1987. 
SC Reference No 3 of 1999; Re Calling of the Parliament [1999] PGSC 55, [1999] 
PNGLR 285, 25 June 1999. 
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SCR No 4 of 1990; Reference by the Acting Principal Legal Adviser [1994] PGSC 17, 
[1994] PNGLR 141, 11 January 1991. 
SCR No 4 of 1980; Re Petition by MT Somare [1981] PNGLR 265. 
SCR No 5 of 1982; Hugo Berghuser v Joseph Aoae [1982] PNGLR 379. 
SCR No 5 of 1992; Re Organic Law on National Elections (Amendment No 1) Law 1991 
[1992] PGSC 17, [1992] PNGLR 114, 5 June 1992. 
Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates [2010] PGSC 3, SC1057, 7 July 2010. 
Special Reference by Morobe Provincial Executive; re Election of Governor General 
(2010) SC 1085, 10 December 2010. 
Special Reference by Simbu Provincial Executive [1988] PGSC 31, [1988-89] PNGLR 
213, 30 November 1988. 
Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 10; Calling of the Parliament; 
Reference by the Ombudsman Commission [1999] PGSC 21, SC628, 25 June 1999. 
Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 19; Reference by Frances Damem, 
Attorney General [2002] PGSC 7, SC689, 26 July 2002. 
Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 19; Re Sitting Days of Parliament 
and Regulatory Powers of Parliament [2002] PGSC 2, SC722, 31 December 2002. 
Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 19; Section 365 of the Income Tax 
Act [1995] PGSC 3, SC482, 29 June 1995. 
Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 19; Special Reference by Morobe 
Provincial Government [2002] PGSC 9, SC693, 27 September 2002. 
Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 19; Special Reference by the Morobe 
Provincial Executive [2005] PGSC 32, SC785, 13 May 2005. 
Supreme Court Reference by the Western Highlands Provincial Executive [1995] PGSC 
6, SC486, 20 September 1995. 
The State v Alan Woita (No 2) [1978] PNGLR 113. 
The State v Independent Leadership Tribunal; Ex Parte Sasakila [1976] PNGLR 491, 5 
November 1976. 
The State v NTN Pty Ltd and NBN Ltd [1992] PGSC 11, [1992] PNGLR 1, 7 April 1987. 
The State v Wonom [1975] PGSC 43; [1975] PNGLR 311, 6 October 1975. 
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Supreme Court Reference by the Western Highlands Provincial Executive [1995] PGSC 
6, SC486, 20 September 1995. 
Sukuramu v New Britain Palm Oil Ltd [2007] PGNC 21, N3124, 16 February 2007. 
Yer, Secretary, Department of Finance v Yama [2009] PGSC 28, SC996, 30 October 
2009. 
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(b) Leadership Tribunal Decisions* 
No  Case Date 
1. In the matter of Michael Pondros, Member of Parliament 
[1983] PGLT 1, N425. 
21 June 1983. 
2. Chan, In the matter of [1988] PGLT 1, [1988-89] PNGLR 
260, 1 July 1988. 
1 July 1988. 
3. Uru, Re [1988] PGLT 3, [1988-89] PNGLR 226. 20 July 1989. 
4. Sigulogo, Re [1988] PGLT 2, [1988-89] PNGLR 384. 2 October 1989. 
5. Edward Ramu Diro, Member of Parliament (MP) and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and later Minister for Forestry.  
27 September 1991. 
6. Melchior Pep, MP. 14 October 1992. 
7. Peter Garong, MP. 29 October 1992. 
8. Philip Laki, MP. 18 March 1994.  
9. Andrew Posai, MP and Minister for Home Affairs.  6 July 1995.  
10. Timothy Bonga, Chairman of Lae City Authority (allegations 
relate to matters arising during term as an MP). 
30 April 1996. 
11. John Mua Nilkare, MP. 2 July 1996. 
12. Jeffrey Balakau, MP  13 December 1996.  
13. Gabriel Dusava, MP (Allegations relate to another leadership 
position held, not as MP). 
10 October 1997. 
14. Jerry Singirok, Commander of PNG military.  21 March 2000. 
15. Jim Kas, MP.  27 September 2000. 
16. Anderson Agiru, MP. 18 January 2002. 
17. Mao Zeming, MP.  27 May 2003. 
18. In the matter of Michael Nali, Member of Parliament (No 1) 
[2003] PGLT 2, N2398. 
29 April 2003. 
19. In the matter of Andrew Kumbakor [2003] PGLT 5, N2363. 8 May 2003. 
20. In the matter of Michael Nali, Member of Parliament (No 2) 
[2003] PGLT 3, N2388. 
6 June 2003. 
21. In the matter of Michael Nali, Member of Parliament (No 3) 
[2003] PGLT 4, N2399. 
10 July 2003. 
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No  Case Date 
22. In the matter of Bernard Hagoria, Member of Parliament 
[2003] PGLT 1, N2525. 
27 August 2003. 
23. Bernard Hargoria, MP.  3 September 2003. 
24. Mark Wani, Auditor General. 14 January 2004. 
25. Michael Nali, MP. 29 April 2004. 
26. In the matter of Peter Yama, Member of Parliament [2004] 
PGLT 2.  
1 December 2004. 
27. In the matter of Raho Hitolo, Member of the Ombudsman 
Commission [2004] PGLT 1, N2745. 
3 December 2004. 
28. In the matter of Peter Ipatas, Member of Parliament [2006] 
PGLT 1, N3078. 
4 August 2006. 
29. In the Matter of Puka Temu, Member of Parliament [2006] 
PGLT 2, N3099. 
24 August 2006. 
30. In re Gallus Yumbui [2006] PGLT 3, N3993. 31 October 2006. 
31. Gabriel Kapris, MP. 13 November 2006. 
32. Andrew Baing, MP. 20 December 2006. 
33. Charlie Benjamin  15 January 2007. 
34. In re Gallus Yumbui [2007] PGLT 2, N4052. 2 March 2007. 
35. In the matter of Melchior Pep, Member for Dei Open 
Electorate Western Highlands Province [2007] PGLT 1, 
N3134. 
8 May 2007.  
36. In the Matter of Hon Sir Moi Avei MP [2007] PGLT 3, 
N4632 (LT). 
4 April 2007. 
37. Moi Avei, MP. 19 April 2007. 
38. In the Matter of Hon Sir Moi Avei [2007] PGLT 4, N4633 
(LT). 
11 May 2007. 
39. Michael Somare, MP and Prime Minister.  24 March 2011.  
 
* The tribunal decisions are not consistently reported. Decisions that are reported 
are indicated. The Ombudsman Commission keeps records of most Tribunal 
decisions. 
 255 
2 Australia 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA; (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
Bowtell v Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd (1906) 3 CLR 444. 
Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73 
[Dignan’s Case]. 
Wacando v Commonwealth [1981] HCA 60; (1981) 148 CLR 1. 
Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387. 
3 Canada 
Attorney General (Ont) v Attorney General (Can) [1912] AC 571 (PC). 
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Department of Education) (2001) 203 DLR (4th) 128. 
Edwards v Attorney General of Canada [1930] AC 124 (PC). 
Re British Columbia Development Corporation v Friedmann (1984) 14 DLR (4th) 129 
(SCC). 
Re Provincial Judges Reference [1997] SCR 3. 
Reference re a Resolution to amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753. 
4 France  
French Constitutional Council, decision no 71-44DC, 16 July 1971, JO 7114, 18 July 
1971, Recueil 29. 
5 India 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v India [1981] 2 SCR 516. 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161, [1984] AIR 802. 
Kesavananda v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 255, (1973) AIR 146. 
Minerva Mills v Union of India [1980] AIR 1789 (SC). 
State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan [1951] AIR 226 (SC). 
State of Madras v Row (1952) SCR 597, 1952 AIR 196. 
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6 New Zealand  
Attorney-General v Whangarei City Council [1987] 2 NZLR 150 (CA), BCL [1587]. 
Awatere Huata v Prebble [2005] 1 NZLR 289 (SC). 
Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30; [2007] 3 NZLR 91. 
Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 439 (CA). 
Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704 (HC). 
Lawson v Housing New Zealand [1997] 2 NZLR 474 (HC). 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [1999] NZCA 329, [2000] 2 NZLR 9. 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board Review [2002] 2 NZLR 754 (CA). 
Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) [Baigent’s case]. 
Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706. 
Te Waka Hi Ika O Te Arawa v Graham CA556/96, 27 November 1996. 
7 Solomon Islands   
Folotalu v Attorney-General [2001] SBHC 149, HC-CC 234 of 2001, 19 October 2001.  
Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly v Speaker of National Parliament [1997] SBHC 5, 
HC-CC 309 of 1996, 26 February 1997.  
Minister for Provincial Government v Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly [1997] SBCA 
1, CA-CAC 003 of 1997, 11 July 1997.  
8 South Africa  
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19, 
[2001] 1 SA 46 (CC), [2000] 11 BCLR 1169, 4 October 2000.  
Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 
(CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15, [2002] 5 SA 721 (CC), [2002] 10 BCLR 103, 5 July 2002. 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (CCT32/97) [1997] ZACC 17, 
[1998] 1 SA (CC) 765 (CC), 1997 (12) BCLR 1696, 27 November 1997.  
9 United Kingdom  
Attorney-General for Ontario v Attorney-General for Canada [1912] AC 571 (PC). 
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Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436 (HL). 
Attorney-General v Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 884 (HL). 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 
(CA). 
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 (HC). 
Davis v Johnson [1978] UKHL 1, [1979] AC 264. 
Edwards v Attorney-General Canada [1930] AC 124 (PC). 
Eton College v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1964] 1 Ch 274. 
Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61. 
In re M [1993] UKHL 5, [1994] 1 AC 377. 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 (PC). 
The Norwhale [1975] QB 589, [1975] 2 All ER 501. 
Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, [1993] AC 593. 
Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co Ltd [1897] 2 QB 242. 
R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 
[2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 AC 1312. 
R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn (No 1) [1968] 2 QB 
118 (CA), [1968] 1 All ER 763. 
R v Greater London Council, ex parte Blackburn [1976] 3 All ER 184 (CA). 
R v Minister of Agriculture ex parte Padfield [1968] AC 997 (HL).   
R v Pierce (1814) 3 M & S 62, [1814] 105 ER 534. 
R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No 3) [1973] QB 241 (CA). 
R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World 
Development Movement Ltd [1994] EWHC 1 (Admin), [1995] 1 All ER 611. 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Anderson [1984] 1 QB 778. 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL). 
10 United States of America   
 258 
Alabama State Federation of Labor v McAdory 325 US 450 (1945). 
Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 347 US 483 (1954). 
Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education [1971] USSC 121, 402 US 1 (1971). 
Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803), 1 Cr 137.  
Muskrat v United States 219 US 346 (1911). 
Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896). 
B  Legislation 
1 Papua New Guinea  
(a) Constitution 
(b) Organic Laws 
Organic Law on Certain Constitutional Office-holders. 
Organic Law on Immediate and Transitional Constitutional Provisions. 
Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections. 
Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville-Autonomous Bougainville Government 
and Bougainville Referendum 2002. 
Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries. 
Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments. 
Organic Law on Residence. 
Organic Law on the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy. 
Organic Law on the boundaries of the National Capital District. 
Organic Law on the calling of Meetings of the Parliament. 
Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership. 
Organic Law on the Guarantee of the Rights and Independence of Constitutional Office-
holders. 
Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates. 
Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates 2003. 
Organic Law on the Internment Tribunal. 
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Organic Law on the Judicial and Legal Services Commission. 
Organic Law on the Nomination of the Governor-General. 
Organic Law on the Number of Ministers. 
Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission. 
Organic Law on the Relief of Members of Disciplined Forces from the Responsibility for 
the Consequences of Carrying out a Lawful Order. 
Organic Law on the Terms and Conditions of Employment of Judges. 
Organic Law on the Terms and Conditions of Employment of the Governor-General. 
(c) Ordinary Legislation 
Business Groups Incorporation Act c144. 
Classification of Publication (Censorship) Act 1989. 
Community Services Trust Act 2002. 
Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign Legal Proceedings) Act 1995. 
Compulsory Third Party Motor Vehicle Insurance Industry Act 2002. 
Conservation Areas Act 1978. 
Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 2004. 
Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea. 
Constitutional Development Commission Act 1997. 
Constitutional Documents (Manner of Proof) Act 1976. 
Constitutional and Law Reform Commission Act 2004. 
Customs Recognition Act 1963. 
Discriminatory Practices Act 1963. 
District Court see District Court Act 1963. 
Education Act 1983. 
Electricity Commission Privatisation Act 2002. 
Employment of Non-citizens Act 2007. 
 260 
Environment Act 2000. 
Environmental Contaminants Act 1978. 
Environmental Planning Act 1978. 
Essential Services Act 2002. 
Fairness of Transaction Act 1993. 
Fisheries Management Act 1998. 
Forestry Act 1991. 
Gaming Control Act 2007. 
Harbours Board Act 1963. 
Higher Education Act 1983. 
HIV/AIDS Management and Prevention Act 2003. 
Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act 2002. 
Informal Sector Development and Control Act 2004. 
Investment Promotion Act 1992. 
Interpretation Act c2. 
Land Act 1996. 
Land Dispute Settlement Act 1975. 
Marriage Act 1963. 
Mineral Resource Act 2005. 
Mining Act 1992. 
Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth Supplement) Agreement Act 2001. 
Mining (Ok Tedi Restated Eighth Supplement) Agreement Act 2001. 
Mining (Safety) Regulation Act 1977. 
Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust (Administrative Arrangements) Act 1996. 
Motu Koita Assembly Act 2007. 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2005. 
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National Agricultural Research Institute Act 1996. 
National Capital District Commission Act 2001. 
National Development Bank Act 2007. 
National Economic and Fiscal Commission Act 2007. 
National Housing Corporation Act 1990. 
National Museum and Art Gallery Act 1992. 
National Parks Act 1982. 
Oil and Gas Act 1992. 
Prime Minister and National Executive Council Act 2002. 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2005. 
Provincial Health Authorities Act 2007. 
Regulatory Statutory Authorities (Appointment to Certain Offices) Act 2004. 
Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act 1983. 
Telecommunications Act 1988. 
Telecommunications Industry Act 2002. 
Summary Offences Act 1977. 
Underlying Law Act 2000. 
Village Courts Act 1989. 
Water Resources Act 1982. 
(d) Court Rules 
National Court Judicial Review (Amendment) Rules 2005. 
National Court Rules 1983. 
Rules of the National Court of Justice (Underlying Law Amendment) 2011. 
Supreme Court Rules 1984. 
2 Australia  
Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 1984 (Australia, Cth). 
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Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia.  
3 Canada 
Constitution Act 1867. 
Constitution Act 1982. 
Ombudsman Act 1975 (Ontario). 
4 Colombia 
Constitution of Columbia. 
5 India 
Constitution of India 
6 Ireland 
Constitution of Ireland. 
7 New Zealand  
Ombudsman Act 1975. 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Treaty of Waitangi.  
8 Samoa  
Constitution of Samoa.   
9 Slovenia 
Constitution of Slovenia  
10 Solomon Islands  
Constitution of Solomon Islands. 
11 South Africa 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
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12 Uganda 
Constitution of Uganda. 
13 United Kingdom 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
Government of Wales Act 2006. 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. 
Scotland Act 1998.  
14 Vanuatu  
Constitution of Vanuatu. 
15 United States of America  
Constitution of the United States of America.  
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. 
C Treaties 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Adopted on 13 September 2007 by the 
United Nations General Assembly). 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 
on 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976).  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened 
for signature on 19 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976). 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 1948 
by the United Nations General Assembly). 
D Books and Chapters in Books 
HA Amankwah “Chapter 11: Human Rights in the Superior Courts” in Rudy James and 
Ian Fraser (eds) Legal Issues in a Developing Society (Faculty of Law, University of 
Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1992). 
 264 
Chester James Antieau Adjudicating Constitutional Issues (Oceana Publications Inc, 
London, 1985). 
Dennis Austin (ed) Liberal Democracy in Non-Western States (Professors World Peace 
Academy, St Paul, 1995). 
Graham Austin The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999).  
JA Ballard (ed) Policy-Making in a New State: Papua New Guinea 1972–1977 
(University of Queensland Press, Brisbane,1981). 
Ahron Barak Purposive Interpretation in Law (transl S Bashi, Princeton University Press, 
2005), relevant excerpts reprinted in Tony Blackshield and George William Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory (5th ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2010). 
Mark Bevir (ed) “Ombudsman” Encyclopedia of Governance (vol 2, Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, CA, 2007). 
Tony Blackshield and George William Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (5th 
ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2010). 
Gary D Bouma, Rod Ling and Douglas Pratt Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific, National Case Studies (Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg, London and New 
York, 2010). 
Durga Dus Basu Comparative Constitutional Law (Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 
1984). 
FAR Bennion Statutory Interpretation: A Code (2nd ed, Butterworths, London, 1992) 
Peter Biskup, B Jinks and H Nelson A Short History of New Guinea (Angus and 
Robertson, Melbourne, 1968). 
Brian Brunton and Duncan Colquhoun-Kerr The Annotated Constitution of Papua New 
Guinea (University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1984). 
Takele Soboka Bulto “The Indirect Approach to Promote Justiciability of Socio-
Economic Rights of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in RH Murray 
(ed) Human Rights Litigation and the Domestication of International Human Rights 
Standards in Sub-Saharan Africa (jointly published by The Kenyan Section of the 
International Commission of Jurists, Nairobi and The Swedish Section of the 
International Commission of Jurists, Stockholm, 2009). 
David Cannings “The Ombudsman Commission: Jurisdiction, Functions and 
Performance” in Anthony Regan, Owen Jessep and Eric Kwa (eds) Twenty Years of the 
Papua New Guinea Constitution (Law Book Co, Pyrmont, 2001). 
 265 
Rachel Cleland Papua New Guinea, Pathways to Independence: Official and Family Life 
1951–1975 (Artlook Books, Perth, 1983). 
Joel Colon-Rios Weak constitutionalism: democratic legitimacy and the question of 
constituent power (Routledge, New York, 2012). 
DJ Colquhoun-Kerr “Sources of Political Legitimacy in Conflict and Naturalised 
Foreigners: Some Comments on the General Constitutional Commission’s Final Report, 
1983” in De Vere, Colquhoun-Kerr and Kaburise (eds) Essays on the Constitution of 
Papua New Guinea (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1985). 
Owen Cox Papua New Guinea’s Law and Legal System (Pacific Adventist University, 
Boroko, 2004). 
APW Deklin “The Legal Control of the Executive in Papua New Guinea” in Pacific 
Constitutions: Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VI Peter Sack (ed) (Law 
Department Research School of Social Science, ANU, 1982). 
Tony Deklin “In Search of a Home-Grown Constitution: The Constitutional Development 
in Papua New Guinea Between 1962 and 1975” in Sione Latukefu (ed) Papua New 
Guinea: A Century of Colonial Impact 1884–1984 (The National Research Institute and 
the University of Papua New Guinea in association with the PNG Centennial Committee, 
Port Moresby, 1989). 
Sean Dorney Papua New Guinea: People, Politics and History Since 1975 (rev ed, ABC 
Books, Sydney, 2000). 
AV Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885). 
Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1977). 
Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986). 
Cecile Fabre Social Rights Under the Constitution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2000). 
Peter Fitzpatrick “Popular Participation and the Constitution” in Ross de Vere, Duncan 
Colquhoun-Kerr and John Kaburise (eds) Essays on the Constitution of Papua New 
Guinea (Tenth Independence Anniversary Advisory Committee, Port Moresby, 1985). 
John Goldring The Constitution of Papua New Guinea (The Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1978). 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed) Interpreting Constitutions, A Comparative Study (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007). 
 266 
Peter Hanks Australian Constitutional Law, Materials and Commentary (Butterworths, 
Sydney, 1990). 
Andrew Heywood Politics (Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1997). 
HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994). 
Graham Hassall and Cheryl Saunders Asia-Pacific Constitutional Systems (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002). 
Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders (eds) Political Theory and the Rights of 
Indigenous People (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
Gary J Jacobsohn The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Totowa, 1986). 
Ernest A Jelf “Justiciable Disputes” Transactions of the Grotius Society Vol 7, Problems 
of Peace and War, Papers Read before the Society in the Year 1921 (1921) 59–71 
(published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law) <http.labs.jstor.org>. 
Owen Jessep and John Luluaki Principles of Family Law in Papua New Guinea (2nd ed, 
UPNG Press, Port Moresby, 1994). 
Philip A Joseph Constitutional & Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, Thomson 
Brookers, Wellington, 2007). 
Peter King, Wendy Lee and Vincent Warakai From Rhetoric to Reality, Papua New 
Guinea’s Eight Point Plan and National Goals After a Decade (University of Papua New 
Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 1985). 
Juliane Kokott and Martin Kaspar “Ensuring Constitutional Efficacy” in Michel 
Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 792. 
Eric Kwa Constitutional Law of Papua New Guinea (Law Book Co, Sydney, 2001). 
Malcolm Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence, Emerging Trends in International 
and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009). 
Ian Maddocks and Edward P Wolfers Living History and Evolving Democracy Living 
(University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby, 2010). 
Alexei M Marcoux “Social Contract” in David S Clark (ed) Encyclopaedia of Law and 
Society: American and Global Perspectives (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2007) vol 
3. 
 267 
Geoffrey Marshal Constitutional Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971). 
Ron May (ed) Micronationalist Movements in Papua New Guinea (Department of 
Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1982). 
Ron May From Promise to Crisis: A Political Economy of Papua New Guinea – State 
and Society in Papua New Guinea (ANU Press, Canberra, 2004). 
Baron de Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws (transl Thomas Nugent, Hafner Press, 1949) 
at 150; cited in Blackshield and Williams Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (5th 
ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2010).   
Bernard Narokobi The Melanesian Way, Total Cosmic Vision of Life (Institute of Papua 
New Guinea Studies, Port Moresby, 1980). 
Bernard Narokobi Life and Leadership in Melanesia (Institute of Pacific Studies, 
University of the South Pacific, Suva and University of Papua New Guinea, Port 
Moresby, 1983). 
Bernard Narokobi Law and Custom in Melanesia (Institute of Pacific Studies of the 
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